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Flooding related disasters are rising both in magnitude and intensity across the UK. 
As a consequence, significant attention is now being paid to understanding, 
managing and mitigating such events. While most of this attention has centred on 
government funded intervention and policy development, community-based 
resilience methods and approaches have assumed increased prominence in recent 
years.  Community resilience is fundamental to the ability of communities to recover 
after an adverse event, by enabling them to harness their own capacity and become 
active, rather than passive, agents in the recovery process. Evidence, however, 
suggests that improvements in resilience have been inhibited by a lack of 
frameworks developed within the community, for the community and with a view to 
capturing resilience capacity over time. 
 
Addressing this gap, this thesis focuses on enhancing awareness of resilience in 
post-disaster affected communities by developing a framework to enable capacity 
building. The study employs a mixed methods research design, combining a range 
of qualitative and quantitative methods including: secondary data analysis; social 
network analysis (including social media); and key stakeholder interviews. 
Interviews were conducted at the community, regional and national level to examine 
perceptions of resilience, drivers of and barriers to resilience, acceptable methods 
for enhancing resilience and validation of the proposed framework. The data 
analysis approach was twofold: firstly, network visualisation software was used to 
analyse social network data; and, secondly, a qualitative data analysis package was 
used to undertake a systematic and flexible ‘Framework method’ analysis of the 
interview transcripts. 
 
While there were many substantial findings, the principal conclusions from this 
analysis illustrate the ability of communities to harness their own capacity to cope, 
adapt or transform in the aftermath of a flood event. In addition, the study 
illuminates nuances between how resilience presents itself at the rural and urban 
scale. The emergent use of social media was also found to play a valuable role in 
strengthening community resilience through information dissemination and 
galvanising the connectedness of communities. The research further highlighted the 
need for an integrated approach to planning and development decisions, between 
 xx 
all interested parties across the catchment.  Finally, the research argues for the 
development of innovative resilience standards (including certificates, codes, and 
regulations), supported by the insurance industry, which adapt and respond to the 













































1.1 Background to the research  
 
This research was borne from first-hand experience practising as an architect in the 
post-earthquake city of Yushu in the Qinghai province of China. Reflecting on the 
top-down approach to post-disaster recovery and reconstruction prompted the 
author to investigate the potential of a more community-focused model. Research 
has shown that disasters, such as the Yushu earthquake, continue to escalate in 
frequency and magnitude worldwide (UN-Habitat, 2012). The international disaster 
database, Emergency Management Database (EM-DAT, 2013), shows that disaster 
occurrence for the period 2000-2009 rose sharply to 7,694 disaster events, relative 
to the period 1980-1989 (2,798 disaster events), representing an increase of 175%. 
In 2015 alone, over 20,000 people were killed in 376 disasters worldwide, costing 
an estimated $US65 billion (EM-DAT, 2016). Large-scale shocks, or the cumulative 
effects of small-scale repeat stresses, can negatively influence the development of 
a community (Global Facility For Disaster Reduction And Recovery (GFDRR), 
2013). The above statistics represent a key concern for the global community, 
highlighting that the world is becoming increasingly prone to disasters. In addition, 
climate change, and its relationship to natural disasters, is closely aligned to the 
United Nations’ (2011) prediction that the unprecedented scale and frequency of 
recent disasters is a trend that is set to continue.  
Disasters of the type outlined above have been classified as either natural or 
technological (EM-DAT, 2016). Technological disasters include industrial accidents 
and transport accidents (Moe et al, 2007). Natural disasters, however, are typically 
divided into four principal categories, which are then subdivided into individual types 
and subtypes: geophysical (earthquakes, landslides, tsunamis and volcanic 
activity); hydrological (avalanches and floods); climatological (extreme 
temperatures, drought and wildfires); and biological (disease epidemics and 
insect/animal plagues) (EM-DAT, 2016). Research by the United Nations Office for 
Disaster Risk Reduction (2015) reports that 90% of the world’s cost damages from 
natural disasters are generated from three categories of disaster, namely: floods, 
earthquakes and tropical cyclones. During the period 2005-2014, floods had the 
highest occurrence rate worldwide, accounting for 46.5% of natural disasters, 
followed by storms at 33.8% and droughts at 12% (EM-DAT, 2016). This evidence 
is consistent with reports that refer to 2013 as ‘the year of flooding’ (Munich Re, 
2013), with the number of people killed by floods reaching 9,819 in 2013, 
representing 45% of global disaster mortality that year (EM-DAT, 2013). Flooding 
 3 
across Europe accounted for 13% of total disasters in 2015, claimed 48% of all 
disaster victims and constituted 57% of natural disaster costs (EM-DAT, 2016). In 
particular, two consecutive floods in the United Kingdom during 2015/2016 
accounted for the costliest disasters across Europe. The December 2015 floods of 
Storm Desmond and Eva accumulated upwards of US$1.2 billion damage, with 
similar bills attributable to Storm Frank in January 2016 (EM-DAT, 2016).  
Geographically, Asia suffered the highest proportion of disasters in 2015, standing 
at 44%, followed by the Americas (25%), Africa (16%) and Europe (7%) (EM-DAT, 
2016). Guha-Sapir et al (2012) estimate that almost 80% of all disasters occur in 
developing countries, yet the cost of disasters is highest in the developed world, 
with hydrological disasters in Europe (2013) resulting in upwards of US$ 13 billion in 
damages, largely as a consequence of the severe flooding in South and East 
Germany (Thieken et al, 2016). The frequency of flood disasters in 2015 may have 
fallen by 13% below its decade average (2005-2014), however the impact on 
victims increased. For example, three floods across Europe (Macedonia, United 
Kingdom, Albania) in 2015 accounted for 81% of all disaster victims in Europe that 
year (EM-DAT, 2015).  
Against that background, disaster management should not be viewed in isolation, 
rather as part of the ongoing Disaster Management Process (DMP). The disaster 
life cycle is an essential component of the DMP, ensuring that loss of life and 
property damages are reduced in a disaster event (Warfield, 2004). The life cycle 
describes the preparation and response of emergency managers to a disaster 
situation, and illustrates how they facilitate people and institutions to recover from 
them, mitigate their effects, reduce the risk of loss, and prevent further disasters 
(such as fires) from occurring (Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 
2007). The on-going nature of the disaster process incorporates experiences as 
learning tools and constantly evolves depending on the situation, country and 
context. The process can be classified into four stages: mitigation; preparedness; 
response; and recovery, with reconstruction a sub-group of the recovery phase 
(Guzman, 2002). 
Post-disaster recovery (PDR) therefore represents a phase and process within the 
DMP that begins with the stabilisation of the disaster situation and ends when the 
community has returned to its pre-disaster condition. The primary goal of PDR is to 
restore affected communities to the situation they were in before the disaster struck. 
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The economic benefits of investing in PDR has not been fully addressed in the 
literature, with very limited research into the opportunities that PDR can offer 
communities (Birkmann, 2010). 
 
Research suggests that investment in PDR and mitigation amounted to only circa 
1% of the $US150 billion spent in the twenty countries that received the most post-
disaster humanitarian aid (GFDRR, 2013). This very limited level of investment calls 
for an analysis as to how the recovery and reconstruction phases can contribute to 
long-term recovery in affected communities. In particular, there is a need to explore 
the economic benefits of more efficient investment in PDR. The study, therefore, 
seeks to present the long-term benefits of investing in disaster resilience, ultimately 
creating a better understanding among donors, partner governments and 
multilateral agencies of how and what to invest in disaster resilience (GFDRR, 
2013). 
 
Beyond a loss of human life, the recent trend of natural disasters has resulted in 
significant human, property and environmental losses, as well as economic and 
social disruption. The cost of disasters was estimated by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP, 2012) at more than US$2 trillion over the last two 
decades, with proactive investment in resilience measures considered to be 
inadequate (Emergency Response Management, 2012). The number of natural 
disasters during the period 2002-2012 increased threefold, in comparison with the 
1960’s, while over the same period the amount of economic loss has risen by a 
factor of almost nine (Munich Re, 2013). 
The increased human, economic and environmental costs resulting from disasters 
demands an improved response from stakeholders. Historically, the focus has been 
on a reactive response (to mitigate downside), rather than on proactive, long-term 
sustainable solutions (Moe et al, 2006). The post-disaster response significantly 
affects fatality numbers, with timely reconstruction presenting an opportunity to 
reduce the wider economic and social damage through incremental design 
improvements and a rethinking of key infrastructures. International organisations, 
such as the UN, have responded to the increase in disasters by developing a ‘Plan 
of Action on Disaster Risk Reduction for Resilience’ (2013). This increased 
commitment from global institutions further highlights the severity and relevance of 
the disaster issue. 
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Research suggests that the recovery and reconstruction phase represents a 
window of opportunity, albeit created by a tragic situation, to help reduce future 
disaster risk by addressing existing vulnerabilities (Palliyaguru, 2010). Whilst much 
of the extant resilience research has been undertaken in developing countries 
(Global South), the effects of disasters are increasingly having a detrimental impact 
on the developed world (Global North) (EM-DAT, 2017). In any event, the principles 
of resilience recovery translate across communities, regardless of economic 
standing. Rebuilding in the aftermath of a disaster provides an opportunity for the 
physical and social conditions to be shaped for long-term recovery, thus facilitating 
a community’s ability to mitigate and prepare for future disasters (Lizarralde et al, 
2004; Paton et al, 2004).  
 
In addition, it is important to understand the distinct phases of a disaster and their 
interconnectivity within the disaster lifecycle process. The use of disaster phases 
(preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation) (Guzman, 2002) has facilitated 
disaster managers and researchers to organise activities, systemise and codify 
research (Alexander, 2010). Disaster phases enhance the efficiency of disaster 
managers’ capabilities (Baird, 2010), however, require advancement in its practical 
implementation. Research presented in this thesis seeks to build upon existing 
literature on these disaster phases in a bid to improve the theoretical and applied 
dimensions of the disaster context, and ultimately build more resilient communities. 
Of the four DMP, the recovery and reconstruction phases have received the least 
attention in academic literature, with the majority of the research concentrating on 
the earlier stages of the disaster process. The recovery phase, which encompasses 
the reconstruction phase, is the least studied in the disaster literature (Rubin, 2007; 
Tootle, 2011), with stakeholders focusing on the emergency phase (Jayaraj, 2006). 
However, despite improvements in the emergency response to natural disasters, 
UN-Habitat (2012) argues that reconstruction is often inefficiently managed, 
uncoordinated and slow to get off the ground. The success of long-term 
development within affected communities relies heavily on making the most of the 
opportunities that the other phases present. Accordingly, this research seeks to 
establish a theoretical and conceptual basis for the issues related to post-disaster 
recovery and reconstruction through a detailed analysis of the identified phases. 
This approach is consistent with arguments by authors, such as O’Riordan (2001) 
and Oudenhoven et al (2012), concerning the importance of understanding 
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resilience at the community level before scaling to a regional, national or global 
level. Indeed, Adger et al (2005) and Wilson (2010) maintain that resilience can be 
implemented ‘on the ground’ in this way. Furthermore, empirical research shows 
that in the early stages of the response, it is the local community which in fact saves 
the most lives (Gilbert, 1998; Haghebaert, 2007). In addition, research suggests that 
external sources of aid relief save less than 10% of victims after a disaster (Bankoff 
et al, 2004). From a practical perspective, the community level is also scalable and 
more adaptable to change. Zakour and Gillespie (2013) reiterate the point that it is 
by working together as communities that real change will happen. Hence, the focus 
of the study is at community level, exploring capacity possibilities and facilitating 
bottom-up initiatives to stimulate  ‘building back better’ (UNISDR, 2017). 
 
Within the post-disaster recovery and reconstruction context, there is the argument 
that urbanisation can affects a disaster just as profoundly as disaster can affect 
urbanisation (Pelling, 2003). This highlights the importance that recovery planning 
has on the quality of the urban built environment. The World Bank (2014) has, for 
example, already emphasised its commitment to resilient reconstruction by stating  
that the challenges associated with reconstruction also present “opportunities to 
promote disaster risk management through integrated resilient recovery and 
reconstruction planning that will drive longer-term resilient development”. An 
inherent component of resilience is the capacity for individuals and communities to 
recover from an external shock or stress and return to their original pre-disaster 
condition (Norris et al, 2008; UNDP, 2012). The framework proposed in this 
research is ultimately a tool to harness opportunities offered in the recovery and 
reconstruction phases, through the enhancement of capacity within post- disaster 
affected communities and the subsequent development of resiliency.   
 
The aim of this study and the supporting objectives (Section 1.2) illustrate the focus 
of the research to address deficiencies in the recovery and reconstruction phases, 
in a bid to facilitate affected communities’ ability to mitigate risk and prepare for 
future disasters. Ultimately, the thesis seeks to propose a framework that highlights 
the importance of the recovery and reconstruction phases for long-term community 
recovery. The objectives have been structured to reflect the development of 
theoretical insights into long-term development within the recovery and 
reconstruction phases. The theoretical element then paves the way for the 
subsequent empirical phase of the research. 
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1. 2  Aim and objectives 
 
The aim of this research is to develop a framework to enhance community capacity 
and build resilience during the recovery and reconstruction phases of a disaster.  
 
The aim of the research is accomplished through the following objectives: 
 
1.2.1     to establish a theoretical and conceptual basis of the issues related to    
             post-disaster recovery and reconstruction within the Disaster Management  
             Process (DMP); 
 
1.2.2     to define the properties that make a community resilient, exploring   
             methods to facilitate capacity development for post- disaster        
             reconstruction of the Built Environment; 
 
1.2.3    to examine existing post-disaster frameworks, including the extent   
            of integration between top-down planning and bottom-up demands from  
            the recovery to reconstruction phase; and 
 
1.2.4    to develop a framework to reconcile the gap between recovery planning and     




A research methodology represents a particular approach to research, and can be 
referred to as strategy of inquiry (Creswell, 2009). Many factors play a role in 
shaping an appropriate methodology, such as the research questions, research 
area and timescales of the study. The methodology also presents the rationale for 
the study, which informs the methods adopted (Crotty, 1998) to help meet the 
research objectives (Saunders et al, 2009). The research methodology chosen 
should also be informed by a combination of the researcher’s theoretical 
perspective and how the data will be analysed (Gray, 2009).  
 
In the context of recovery and reconstruction, the reality exists in the community’s 
views but should also reflect views from practitioners and experts in the relevant 
fields. As such, the research philosophy integrates views from communities, 
practitioners and experts who are the major stakeholders in PDR and 
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reconstruction. The overall philosophical assumption of this study is that of the 
‘critical realist’, accepting both objective and subjective interpretations of the 
disaster context.  
 
Based on the research questions posed and the defined objectives, a mixed-
methods approach will be applied. Adopting Creswell’s (2009) concurrent, mixed 
methods approach, the qualitative strategy of this study focuses on defining the 
observations, experiences, views and attitudes of all stakeholders within the post-
disaster recovery and reconstruction process. The study adopts a comprehensive 
(bottom up) mode of research to allow patterns to emerge within the case-studies, 
which will inform the final framework. By contrast, the quantitative approach can be 
viewed as a more detached method to populate/inform the case-studies’ findings 
 
Following a comprehensive literature review, the research strategy was designed 
with the objectives of the investigation taken into account in guiding the process. 
The first two objectives (outlined in Section 1.2 above) were aligned to the literature 
review, with the latter two objectives aligned to an analysis of extant frameworks 
and the empirical study, which ultimately informed the output framework.  
 
The unpredictable nature of the study necessitated a research method that allowed 
for the collection of contextualised data. In light of the objective and subjective 
philosophical position of the study, the case-study method incorporated a variety of 
research methods (document analysis, observation, semi-structured interviews and 
social network analysis). Creswell’s (2002) interpretation of a case-study as an in-
depth process of investigation forms an appropriate method of inquiry for this thesis, 
focused on community recovery to a ‘specific’ or ‘bounded’ disaster event (Merriam, 
1998). The multiple case-study approach (incorporating three case-study regions) 
allows for the identification of patterns and relationships across case-studies. In 
doing so, it can enable more robust findings (Stake, 2000; Yin, 2003).  
 
To summarise, the research approach (mixed methods) was chosen for its 
suitability to both empirical and theoretical knowledge on post-disaster recovery. 
The research adopts a multiple case-study approach in order to capture a wider set 
of experiences and contexts after a disaster event. Data collection for the case- 
studies comprised a two-phased approach (Phase 1 and 2), including the 
quantitative analyses of publically available official data sets, followed by more in-
depth qualitative interviews and focus groups. The analysis of this data was carried 
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out in line with the highly structured ‘Framework method’ of data analysis. The 
empirical results were subsequently used to inform the final framework output.  
 
1.4 Thesis structure 
 
Chapter 1 provides a general introduction to the research context, as well as 
outlining the overarching framework upon which the research is built. Chapter 2 
explores the theoretical knowledge and understanding of disaster management 
globally. It does so by highlighting historic and current challenges facing the DMP, 
and the operational, strategic responses used to help reduce disaster risk. Chapter 
2 closes by highlighting gaps in the DMP, which hinder the long-term, sustainable 
recovery of affected communities. 
 
In Chapter 3, the contested nature of ‘resilience’ is discussed. The literature 
surrounding the definition and operationalisation of the concept is analysed and 
reviewed. The analysis traced the multi-disciplinary history of the resilience concept, 
its development and application in practice. Despite a lack of consensus on the 
concept’s definition, it is largely accepted that the term offers its greatest influence 
in development activities. The latter half of the chapter discusses the relationship 
between community resilience and the ability to withstand and recover from 
adversity. Chapter 3 concludes by highlighting the positive role community 
resilience can play in reducing the impact of post-disaster disruption in a resource 
limited environment.  
 
Chapter 4 reviews the most relevant, existing resilience frameworks for the 
purposes of this thesis, providing a knowledge base for the development of the 
theoretical framework proposed by this thesis. In doing so, it reveals deficiencies 
and inconsistencies within extant frameworks. Further, it identifies the most 
prominent community resilience components, namely: risk; resources and 
capacities; connectedness; and learning. To help take these concepts from the 
theoretical to the practical, they are used as the constituent components of the 
thesis Framework. Basing the case-study analysis on these components, the 
Framework acts as an analytical tool capable of assessing resilience in practice. 
This chapter, together with Chapters 2 and 3, inform the theoretical underpinnings 
and provide the evidence base for the development and application of the proposed 
resilience Framework.  
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Chapter 5 outlines the methodological approach taken to apply and validate the 
Framework set out in Chapter 4. It begins by establishing the philosophical stance 
used to operationalise and test the resilience framework proposed. It follows by 
detailing the mixed methods research approach applied across the three regional 
UK case-studies. It outlines the main data collection methods and explains how 
these are applied to populate the research framework. Further, it details the 
analytical techniques used to draw information and explanation from the data. 
Chapter 5 closes by outlining the steps taken to ensure that research integrity and 
ethics were adhered to throughout the study.  
Chapter 6 details evidence from the Northern Ireland pilot case-study, assessing the 
usability and effectiveness of the proposed Framework before extending it to a full-
scale project. The chapter serves as a means to test the research instruments and 
identify logistical issues associated with the application of the research methods. 
Piloting the research instrument tests the appropriateness and practicality of the 
sampling frame and its approach to interviewee recruitment. Ultimately, the pilot 
study seeks to determine the feasibility of the case-study approach and research 
methods, in terms of their ability to deliver the richness of data required to populate 
the proposed Framework.  
Chapter 7 presents evidence in respect of the first main case-study conducted in 
this research. The Cumbria case-study is outlined generally, together with an 
overview of the eight micro case-studies. Chapter 7 sets out the context of flood-
affected communities, outlining the flood risk landscape in England and the 
stakeholders who operate within it. It follows by detailing the application of the 
Framework within the context of the 2015 winter floods. In doing so, it identifies 
resilience indicators that enhance and impede a community’s ability to recover. In 
terms of social resilience, Social Network Analysis (SNA) was also undertaken to 
explore the role social networks play in the mobilisation of resources and capacities.  
 
Consistent with the approach taken in the Cumbria case-study, Chapter 8 explores 
whether the Framework’s applicability can be transposed successfully to a different 
location. The North East Scotland case-study seeks to substantiate evidence from 
Cumbria (Chapter 7), thus validating the framework. Together with Chapters 6 and 
7, this chapter provides empirical evidence to inform the overall conclusions of the 
study in Chapter 9.  
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Chapter 9 concludes the thesis by evaluating the key findings from the research and 
presents conclusions. The key findings are presented in respect of the overall aim 
and objectives of the thesis. The thesis closes by presenting its main conclusions, 
together with areas for potential further research. Figure 1.1 shows how each of the 
chapters discussed above sits within the overall structure of the thesis.  
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Chapter 1 provided a general introduction to the research, as well as the 
overarching framework upon which the thesis is built. It did so by detailing clear 
aims and objectives for the study and outlining the rationale for the research scope 
and focus. Section 1.3 set out the research methods applied in both the theoretical 
and empirical stages, with Section 1.4 establishing the thesis structure. In doing so, 
the chapter provides a strong theoretical foundation from which the empirical stages 
of this thesis can be based. 
 
Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical knowledge and understanding of disaster 
management globally. The chapter identifies historic and current challenges facing 
the Disaster Management Process (DMP). In addition, it also critically explores 
operational and strategic responses to these phenomena. In light of that review, it is 
clear that there is a definitional issue surrounding the term ‘disaster’. In order to 
understand disaster management it is first important to reflect on the significant 
definitional challenges that manifest themselves in the current literature base. 
Addressing the contested definition of disaster, it establishes a working definition of 
‘disaster’ in Section 2.2. Further, it expands on disaster understanding in Section 
2.3, where a significant analysis of historic disaster trends and their associated 
impacts are detailed. Section 2.4 moves beyond these challenges by demonstrating 
the operational disaster management and mitigation processes adopted (nationally 
and internationally) in order to minimise and mitigate the impact on society. 
 
Efforts to reduce losses, provide prompt assistance to victims and achieve rapid, 
effective recovery are not always met through the implementation of the DMP 
(Section 2.4), meaning that communities often fail to return to a pre-disaster state. 
Section 2.5 investigates these issues and barriers to long-term recovery, which 
disaster management professionals frequently fail to address. The chapter closes 
with a conclusion in Section 2.6. Figure 2.1 illustrates the positioning of Chapter 2 
within the thesis structure. It highlights how the chapter makes a specific 
contribution towards the fulfilment of objective 1.2.1. It does so by establishing the 
theoretical basis of the issues related to post-disaster recovery and reconstruction 




Figure 2.1 Position of Chapter 2 within the thesis structure   
2.2 Defining disasters 
A large body of research exists detailing the highly complex nature of disasters and 
their associated consequences on a global scale (Quarantelli, 2001; Schaluf et al, 
2003; Furedi, 2007; UNDP, 2012; Von Meding, 2013). Nonetheless, the frequency 
and magnitude of such disasters provide significant challenges for national 
governments and their partners engaged in disaster management and mitigation 
efforts. Much of this complexity is a consequence of the relative inability to predict 
when disasters are likely to occur, although the multi-disciplinary nature of the 
management and mitigation process further contributes to the complexity. As a 
result of this multi-disciplinarity, there is significant debate as to what constitutes a 
disaster and, as such, no generally accepted definition exists. This poses particular 
challenges for government when developing both operational and strategic policies 
for disaster management and mitigation, particularly when disasters occur across 
more than one jurisdiction (Corriveau, 2000; Bullard et al, 2008). While definitional 
disparity across jurisdictions manifests itself as a fundamental issue, the complex 
nature of ‘understanding disasters’ is made even more difficult by significant 
thematic differences in definition across disaster management and mitigation 
stakeholder sectors.  
A series of research studies (Krimgold, 1974; Cuny, 1983; Kreps, 1984; Quarantelli, 
1995; Tierney et al, 2001; Perry and Quarantelli, 2005) support the notion that the 
absence of an agreed definition1 has increased the challenges facing those tasked 
with managing and mitigating disasters. Below et al (2009) note that the absence of 
an accepted definition has led to inconsistency, unreliability and poor interoperability 
                                                
1 Definitional issues surrounding the term resilience are dealt with in more detail in Chapter 3. 
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of disaster management initiatives. Quarantelli (1995) supports this notion, arguing 
that until an agreed definition is advanced, there will continue to be challenges 
facing the development, implementation and delivery of disaster management and 
mitigation strategies. Given the complex cross-disciplinary nature of disasters, it is 
not surprising that the term ‘disaster’ has different meanings in different professions 
associated with the DMP (Perry, 2005). As a consequence, there have been 
concerted (but so far unsuccessful) efforts to align disaster definitions to conceptual 
themes in the literature base, with Lindell and Perry (2011) arguing that disasters 
are as much ‘social’ as they are ‘technical’ and ‘scientific’.  The following section will 
discuss each of these three themes in turn. 
Historically, disasters have been viewed as a ‘social product’ which defies simple 
interpretation (Fritz, 1961, Britton, 1986). Generally, the sociological research base 
suggests that disasters are, in the first instance, events that can be designated in 
space and time, which ultimately result in significant impacts on societies’ ability to 
function. In this regard, disasters possess a geographical dimension, delineated by 
the intersection between the geography which society inhabits and the geography 
which disasters impact upon. Consequently, the social element reacts and alters its 
responses to cope with these impacts (Kreps, 1995; Fischer, 2003). Indeed, Fritz’s 
pioneering definition in 1961 is still widely adopted in the literature today, describing 
a disaster as an event concentrated in time and space, where society is subjected 
to “physical harm and social disruption” and preventing the “essential functions of 
society” (Fritz, 1961:p655). However, to fully understand a sociological definition, it 
is first necessary to trace its origins and development throughout history. 
The publication of Fritz’s widely read definition in 1961, paved the way for more 
detailed and diverse theorising on a sociological definition. The social thread of 
Fritz’s work was evident for decades, as many researchers adopted Fritz directly or 
referenced his work. Fritz has influenced much disaster research, including flooding 
(Perry, 1985) and bush fires (Wettenhall, 1979). The influence of Fritz’s definition is 
still evident in the work of 21st century researchers, with Fischer (2003) pointing out 
that sociologists actually study social change under disaster definitions. 
Following in the footsteps of Fritz, Fischer’s (2003) definition focused on the 
‘process of change’ which alters the normal functioning of daily life. Fischer 
discusses a shift from a priori social structure to a new temporary alternative state. 
Both Fritz’s and Fischer’s definitions recognise the impact ‘social’ (human) 
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influences have on a disaster event, thereby highlighting the need for social/human 
intervention to withstand hazard events. 
In this vein, McEntire (2007) argues that the extent of disaster impact is a product of 
the level of vulnerability within the social system. Beau (2002) holds that baseline 
conditions are not equal across case-studies and nations; however, the principles of 
resilience and capacity building are transferable across communities. Disasters are 
a worldwide issue and, as such, appropriate consideration is required to take 
account of the social, economic and cultural nuances associated with Global North 
and Global South communities. In this regard, Disaster Management is less to do 
with the hazard agent and more to do with the nature / degree of vulnerability within 
a particular community. This sociological understanding of a ‘disaster’ notes that 
concepts, issues and variables are not equal across cultures and systems 
(Peacock, 1997).  However, the literature base argues that the principles of the 
DMP remain relevant and useful regardless of economic, social and cultural 
variations (Beau, 2002).  
In summary, a sociological definition of ‘disaster’ is focused on the situation created 
and not the hazard agent (Fritz, 1961; Dynes, 1998; Kreps, 1998; Porfiriev, 1998). 
Dombrowsky (1998) notes sociological definitions do not describe natural or human-
made ‘disaster agents’ (hurricane, flood waters, tidal waves), instead they focus on 
the disruption of everyday normal life caused by a hazard agent. Thus, a 
sociological ‘disaster’ definition concerns itself with how society reacts to the 
impacts and destruction caused by a disaster agent.   
However, despite the attention paid to societal disaster definitions in the current 
literature, they often include immeasurable criteria, thus illustrating the need for a 
precise, scientific definition and system of categorisation. In this context, Sheehan 
(1969) was one of the first to assign figures to a disaster in order to bring clarity as 
to what constituted a disaster. Sheehan argues that disasters are events that 
caused at least one hundred fatalities, one hundred human injuries, or financial 
damages greater than or equal to USD $1 million. By contrast, Denis (1995) views 
‘major’ as meaning more than fifty fatalities.  
Whilst there is no consensus on an exact quantifiable and scientific definition, the 
most widely accepted and adopted definition in the literature is that from the “Centre 
for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters” (CRED), Emergency Events 
Database (EM-DAT). International organisations such as the United Nations 
 18 
(intergovernmental), the World Health Organisation (intergovernmental) (WHO), and  
the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (non-
governmental) (IFRC), acknowledge the need for a scientific definition and accept 
the application of a system of categorisation. This required EM-DAT to put figures 
on what constitutes a disaster in order to be included in their database. Although 
broadly similar to the Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at Local Level 
(APELL) database, there are variations in the figures. To constitute a disaster and 
be entered into the database, EM-DAT states at least one of the following criteria 
must be met: ten (10) or more people must be reported killed; one hundred (100) or 
more people must be reported affected; a declaration of a state of emergency must 
be made; or a call for international assistance must occur (Vos et al, 2010). 
In addition to ‘social’ and ‘scientific’ thematic definitions, a technical perspective can 
be found in the literature base. A disaster can be described technically as a sudden 
or unplanned event, which has scope to impact unfavourably on numerous people if 
not an entire community. Such a definition will take into consideration the scope of 
the event, the number of fatalities, lives impacted, destruction of property and 
economic disruption to business activities (Amartunga et al, 2011).  
Technical definitions in the literature were found to characterise a disaster by its 
sudden, overwhelming and unforeseen nature (Mc Entire, 2000; Landsman, 2001; 
IFRC, 2008). Ruthenford and Boer (1983) emphasise the ‘overwhelming’ aspect of 
a disaster through its impact on resources, describing a disaster as a destructive 
event which due to insufficient resources can result in an inability to cope, coupled 
with significant casualties over a short space of time. Sundnes and Birnbaum (2002) 
reiterate resources as a defining element, by describing a disaster relative to the 
mismatch between resources available to perform the necessary tasks, irrespective 
of whether this mismatch is being caused by natural or avoidable man-made (non 
natural) events.  
2.2.1 Further definitional issues: categorisation  
Beyond the thematic definers presented above (social, technical, scientific), 
disasters can be characterised by their disaster agents, namely: natural; man-made; 
or hybrid (Shaluf, 2007) and classified into disaster types, sub-disasters, and 
disastrous events (Tables 2.1- 2.2). Natural disasters are hazards resulting from 
natural causes, where the human dimension and external hazard act upon each 
other in an interconnected relationship (Von Meding, 2013). Natural disasters are 
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generally classified into four categories: geophysical; hydrological; meteorological 
and climatological, which are further divided into sub-categories (Table 2.1) 
(UNISDR, 2004; Guha-Sapir and Vos, 2012).  
There is a growing body of research that suggests that humans interference with 
the natural environment may be affecting the frequency, magnitude and geographic 
distribution of precipitating events (Peduzzi et al, 2009; Guha-Sapir and Vos, 2012). 
An awareness of the community level is critical with respect to this relationship 
between human interference and external physical factors acting upon each other 
(Von Meding et al, 2012).  
Table 2.1 Natural disaster classification. Adapted from Guha-Sapir and Vos, 2012. 
 
The diversity of man-made disasters makes them comparatively more difficult to 
predict than natural hazards (Smith and Petley, 2009). Man-made disasters include 
industrial accidents, transport accidents and accidents resulting from human error, 
negligence or malicious motives (as illustrated in Table 2.2). Essentially, man-made 
disasters occur as a consequence of human or organisational error, leading to 
system failure (Pidgeon, 2012). Some can be solely man-made whilst others can be 
the result of poor decision-making in already vulnerable areas.  
Such events, where a natural force meets human error, are known as hybrid 
disasters. Smith (2001) rejects the idea that disasters are truly ‘natural’ hazards, 
emphasising that all disasters arise from a combination of physical exposure and 
human vulnerability. Thus, hybrid disasters are events which result from the overlap 
of natural and man-made disasters meeting a social process.  At the root of hybrid 
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disasters is the assumption that it is not the environment or technology which is to 
blame but in fact, human failings (Stout et al, 2008). This assumption highlights the 
potential human intervention has to positively or negatively influence disaster 
impact.  
Table 2.2 Man-made disaster classification. Adapted from Guha-Sapir and Vos, 2011; 
Munich Re, 2014. 
 
Regardless of its thematic definer, a disaster definition must consider multiple 
perspectives. This approach resonates with arguments proposed by Quarantelli 
(1994) that defining a disaster by a single concept is an attempt to capture too 
much. Further, it could be argued that it is not appropriate to attempt to place 
heterogeneous phenomena under a single label of ‘disaster’. No definition is all 
encompassing, but what is important is clarity of the term within the context it is to 
be applied. Thus, the definition constructed below embodies the perspective of this 
study, incorporating characteristics identified throughout the above literature review.  
In particular, a definition appropriate for this study must refer not only to the physical 
agent and its impact on society, but also with an assessment of that physical impact 
on a vulnerable social dynamic. Synthesising the literature base, a succinct 
definition of a disaster suitable for the positioning of this study is as follows:  
a sudden or unforeseen event, derived from a hybrid of a natural hazard and 
human intervention, causing physical and social disruption which exceeds 
the capacity of the affected community to function normally (Source: Author). 
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2.3 Trends and impacts 
 
The UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) (2011) state the first step 
towards reducing disaster risk for communities involves capturing the spatial 
distribution, composition and impact of disasters. Further, UNISDR highlight 
inconsistencies in historical disaster data collection, describing it as “ad-hoc”, i.e. 
reactively collecting it at the time of the emergency. In addition, the lack of a precise 
or generally agreed scientific definition has impacted the collection of systematic 
disaster data and led to variation in facts surrounding disaster occurrence figures 
globally (UN, 2013).  
Unsurprisingly, disaster data has been criticised as being inconsistent and 
unreliable, providing limited interoperability (Below et al, 2009). However, advances 
in disaster data have been made through the introduction of databases such as 
‘EM-DAT’ collection and management by The Centre for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters; ‘Disaster Inventory System-DesInventar’ from the United 
Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR); ‘NatCatService’ by 
Munich RE, and ‘Sigma explorer’ by Swiss Re. Drawing on these databases, the 
following section outlines historic disaster trends (frequency) and their associated 
impact in terms of fatalities and monetary costs. 
 
Research demonstrates that disasters continue to escalate in frequency and 
magnitude worldwide (UN-Habitat, 2013). A recent review of natural and man-made 
disasters by Swiss Re (2015) revealed that in 2015, 353 disasters were recorded, 
down from 336 in 2014 (Figure 2.2). Of those figures, 198 were natural disasters 
(down from 189 in 2014) and 155 were man-made (up from 147 in 2014) (Swiss Re, 
2016). EM-DAT (2016) similarly notes an increasing long-term trend in disasters, 
reporting that over the period 1974 to 2015 the occurrence of reported disasters has 
increased steadily on an annual basis (from less than 100 in 1974 to 376 in 2015).  
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Figure 2.2 Trends in frequency of man-made and natural disasters. Source: Swiss Re, 2016. 
 
 
That said, the frequency of man-made disasters has in fact reduced during recent 
years, down 40% since peak levels in 2005. Despite this declining figure in very 
recent times, the overall frequency of man-made disasters has been on an upward 
trajectory, rising from 60 in 1970 to 155 in 2015 (Swiss Re, 2016) (Figure 2.2). The 
recent reduction in man-made disasters is largely attributed to improvements in 
hazard minimisation processes that control fires and explosions.  
 
Natural disasters outweighed man-made disasters by 21% in 2015 (Swiss Re, 
2016). The evidence from Figure 2.2 suggests that the world is becoming more 
vulnerable to both natural and man-made disasters. Furthermore, research 
suggests that it is developing countries that suffer the most (Eshghi and Larson, 
2008; Haigh and Amaratunga, 2011a; Guha-Sapir et al, 2012). Upwards of 80% of 
disasters occur in the developing world, with the result that the majority of research 
focuses on alleviating the impact of disasters in the developing world (FAO, 2015). 
Interestingly, Haigh (2011) argues that this focus has led to an imbalance in the 
literature on the developed world. In line with this, UNDP (2012) has called for 
further research into disaster impacts on the developed world, with particular 
emphasis on the socio-economic consequences. 
 
The reasons for the historic increase in natural disasters are complex and multi-
faceted, extending beyond the climate change argument (UNISDR, 2015). Guha-
Sapir of EM-DAT attributes the increase recorded in part to improved disaster 
media reports and advances in communication, which have artificially inflated the 
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figures. Another reason is that, at the start of the 1980s, agencies such as CRED 
and UNISDR became more active in their recording of natural disasters, thus 
inflating the figure of recorded disasters. On the other hand, many small and often 
repetitive disasters in rural locations go unreported (IFRC, 2014). These disasters 
are not reflected in global figures on losses but, when taken in aggregate, have a 
significant negative impact upon society.  
 
In addition, researchers argue that the rapid urbanisation of vulnerable 
environments is, in effect, ‘making disasters’. A World Bank report on ‘Natural 
Disaster Hotspots’ in 2005 states that increased urbanisation in vulnerable areas 
has created a situation where over 160 countries have more than 25% of their 
populations in high at-risk areas. Schneider et al (2013) notes that, by placing 
humans in a vulnerable environment, what was previously a natural event becomes 
a disaster.  
 
Urbanisation coupled with climate change and natural disasters, further compounds 
the risk. The United Nations (2011) predict that the unprecedented scale and 
frequency of disasters in recent years, as a consequence of climate change, 
represents a trend set to continue. Rising global temperatures, which are currently 
projected to rise by 6.3 °C by the end of the twenty first century (United Nations 
Environment Program, 2009), is a cause for concern worldwide. The United Nations 
predicts that, even if countries achieve their climate promises, a temperature rise 
will occur nonetheless. This is expected to result in an increase in the number of 
tropical cyclones and heavy rainfall. Furthermore, the United Nations predict that 
sea level is set to rise by a metre, increases the probability of natural disasters in 
North Western European and other world regions, such as South East Asia. 
 
Researchers suggest that, whilst climate change is not solely responsible for the 
increasing impact of disasters, it is to blame for the increase in frequency and 
magnitude of the precipitating event. Similarly, Eliscar (2010) argues that whereas 
disasters used to occur on an annual basis, climate change means that one event 
triggers another (or amplifies its magnitude) resulting in devastating effects. The 
evidence base indicates that, in addition to man’s influence, climate change is a 
significant contributory factor, which has the potential to exasperate a disaster 
situation (Phillips, 2015). 
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However, despite the overall trend in increasing frequency of disaster events, 
overall fatality rates are on the decrease, standing below the annual average levels 
in the period from 1990-2015 (Munich RE, 2016). Of these disasters, typhoons, 
earthquakes, flooding and heat waves were responsible for the majority of deaths 
from natural disasters in 2015 (Munich RE, 2016). Maritime disasters, aviation and 
stampedes caused the majority of man-made disasters, for example a sinking 
migrant boat killed 800 people off the Libyan coast in 2015 (Munich RE, 2016).  
Man-made disasters accounted for 7,000 deaths in 2015, up from 5,900 in 2014, 
but remained on trend for the decade average (Swiss Re, 2016). By contrast, the 
number of natural disaster fatalities had declined in comparison to the period from 
2005-2014, which saw an average of 76,416 deaths per annum (EM-DAT, 2016). In 
particular, the high average (2005-2014) can be attributed to the three years (2004, 
2008 and 2010) which saw almost 200,000 fatalities and 2003 and 2005 which saw 
100,000 fatalities, the majority attributed to earthquakes. The 2015 EM-DAT data 
suggest that, whilst the number of ‘disaster’ incidents is on the increase, the sum of 
those killed and affected worldwide (101.3 million) is the lowest since 2005. The 
decrease is attributed to the lower human impact of hydrological and meteorological 
disasters, whose number of victims are 75% and 60% respectively below the 2005-
2014 annual averages. Further, the decrease in fatalities is attributed to improved 
efficiencies in the response phase (UNDP, 2009), improved early warning systems 
and increased preparedness (Rogers and Tsirkunov, 2010; Kafle, 2017). 
Whilst the number of fatalities is decreasing, this headline figure hides the fact that 
those injured, displaced or left homeless by disasters is actually increasing In this 
vein, Guha-Sapir (2011) highlights that reduced mortality rates can actually present 
new challenges, for example, by placing additional pressure on already depleted 
resources. 
 
The negative economic consequences of disasters frequently impacts upon an 
affected community’s ability to recover. Both natural and man-made disasters can 
have devastating effects on short and long-term economic growth and development 
(Munich Re, 2016). The cost of disasters in 2015 (USD $ 70.3 billion) was the third 
lowest since 2005, representing a 56% decrease to the annual average costs for 
the period 2005 to 2014 (EM-DAT, 2016). Of the USD $37 billion recorded 
insurance damages, only USD $9 billion were caused by man-made disaster, 
whereas USD $27 billion attribute natural disasters stemmed largely from 
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hydrological disasters such as floods and extreme weather events in Asia, North 
America and Asia. 
 
Research shows that, within Europe, natural disaster costs are rising at a faster rate 
than disaster frequency rate, yet man-made disaster damages remain on trend 
(Munich Re, 2015). While disaster damages have fallen in 2015, it was found that 
overall damage costs have increased from USD$50 billion a year in the 1980s to 
USD$200 billion in the last decade. This trend is set to continue, with the European 
Commission (2015) predicting that European flooding costs could increase almost 
five-fold by 2050. Evidence indicates that Europe saw losses of more than USD$13 
billion attributable to natural disasters in 2015 (Swiss Re, 2016). The bulk of these 
losses can be attributed to flooding in the UK and south eastern France (Munich Re, 
2016). In December 2015, heavy rainfall from Storm Desmond and Storm Eva 
flooded more than 3500 properties across the UK, damaging several bridges and 
other critical infrastructure (Munich Re, 2016). Incurring damages of around USD $2 
billion, this figure depicts the considerable impact that a single disaster events can 
have on human society.  
2.4 Disaster management process 
 
Disaster management is the process of organising and managing resources and 
capacities to limit or avoid threats from hazards (Jaya-Kumar, 2000; FEMA, 2007). 
It is a collective term, incorporating pre-disaster planning and post-disaster 
responses to the social and physical impacts of disasters (Warfield, 2004; FEMA, 
2017). Disaster management is synonymous with the complex organisation of all 
tasks and actors.  In response, the DMP was developed in the 1970s, to meet the 
need for an organisational mechanism, to help manage disaster events and their 
associated impacts (Westgate and Wisner, 1975; Neal 1997; Kelman, 2007).  
 
The DMP is itself illustrative of the iterative nature of responses to a disaster event. 
The process initiates or ends with the mitigation phase, followed by the 
preparedness phase. Both phases serve to improve disaster preparedness, for 
example, through better warnings and reduced vulnerability in anticipation of an 
event. A significant concept during these phases is “development”, i.e. enabling a 
community to better withstand the consequences of a disaster and prepare for a 
subsequent disaster. Post-disaster activities take place in the response and 
recovery phases. The response phase is heavily influenced by humanitarian actors 
in the immediate aftermath of a disaster event, followed by more long-term recovery 
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and reconstruction efforts in the recovery phase (Warfield, 2004; FEMA, 
2017)(Figure 2.3). The goal of the recovery and reconstruction phases is to return 
the affected community to a similar or improved stabilised state of normality 
(Davidson and Johnson, 2006). Thus, the overarching purpose of the DMP is to limit 
or avoid the potential losses from disasters, assure prompt and appropriate 
assistance to victims of disaster and achieve rapid recovery (WHO,2002). 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Disaster management process. Source: FEMA, 2017. 
 
The DMP has the potential to serve as an organisational tool for those tasked with 
responding to the complexities of a disaster event. A well-defined and clear process 
aids the organisation and simplification of complex events by helping to prioritise 
critical tasks, particularly when operating in a restricted timeframe. In addition, the 
DMP differentiates between practical conditions and theoretical processes. This 
practical learning can inform and shape future disaster management plans. A 
further benefit for disaster managers is the use of the process as a tool to quantify 
disaster events (Shreve, 2014). Documenting the phases of the DMP can help 
develop a common understanding of the disaster process, facilitating improved 
integration between urgent response and long-term recovery strategies 
(Kelly,1998). The above- listed items highlight the potential for formal DMP to 
reduce disaster risk, by encouraging support and investment from outside 
organisations in the formalised process (Kelly, 1998). 
 
Given that disasters are by their very nature unexpected and involve many actors, 
Warfield (2004) argues for the need to categorise the DMP into different phases 
according to activities. However, the simplification of the DMP into arbitrary phases 
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is a contentious question within literature, fraught with inconsistencies (UNISDR, 
2014). To understand the nature, purpose and boundaries of these phases, it is 
important to trace their development throughout history.  
 
FEMA (2007) argues that the development of these phases allows actors to focus 
on each stage individually, achieving a more detailed study and better 
understanding of each distinct phase. In order to further clarify the phases, it is first 
important to identify precisely the temporal stages to which they belong. The phases 
are both logical and temporal and are defined as: pre-disaster, disaster and post-
disaster (Figure 2.4). The pre-disaster period is concerned with the time before the 
disaster event, the disaster period looks at the disaster itself and the immediate 
aftermath, then the post-disaster phase refers to the period between the end of the 
disaster and the return to normality. The temporal stages have a logical relationship 
with disasters and thus, within the literature, mitigation and preparedness is 
contained primarily within the pre-disaster stage; response occurs in the disaster 
stage and recovery occurs during the post-disaster stage (Faulkner, 2001; McEntire 
et al, 2002; Mansor et al, 2004; Hwacha, 2005; Coetzee, 2012).  
 
 
Figure 2.4 The disaster stages. Source: Author. 
 
Tracing the origins, nature and differentiation of the phases through history offers a 
better understanding of the roles and benefit these phases can offer. Since its initial 
inception in the early 1900’s the DMP has evolved, varying in the number of phases 
it contains.  The earliest attempt to describe disaster phases came from Carr 
(1932). Carr describes the initial phase as the ‘preliminary period’ during which the 
disaster agents responsible for the ultimate collapse present themselves. The 
‘dislocation and disorganisation phase’ follows, referring to fatalities and loss 
incurred by the affected community as opposed to the disaster agent itself. The third 
phase was referred to by Carr as the ‘readjustment and reorganisation phase’. This 
phase concerns itself with efforts by the community to cope and adjust to disaster 
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consequences. The phase focuses upon the leadership and morale of the affected 
community to cope with the complexity of the disaster event itself (Carr, 1932). 
Though basic, this early effort reflects an early shift in focus from the physical to the 
social consequences of a disaster. 
 
Building upon an earlier study by Powell and Rayner (1952), Powell (1954) made a 
further attempt to define the disaster phases, dividing them into eight distinct 
phases. The first stage, ‘pre-disaster conditions’ refers to the existing environment 
and a community’s attitude to a disaster. This follows with a ‘warning stage’ which in 
turn is met with the ‘threat’ stage, focusing on activities that enable communities to 
survive the impact. The ‘impact’ stage represents the understanding that 
considerable devastation may ensue. The fifth stage is the ‘inventory’ stage, which 
refers to the acknowledgement of the damage sustained. The incorporation of 
reactive efforts to assist those affected follows in the ‘rescue’ phase. The ‘remedy’ 
phase follows by listing the actors involved in emergency first response. ‘Recovery’ 
marks the final phase and represents attempts to assist the affected community 
return to a stable pre-disaster state (Powell and Rayner, 1952; Powell, 1954; Neal, 
1997).  
 
Stoddard (1968) followed with a similar six-stage process, namely: pre-emergency; 
emergency; evacuation; dislocation; relocation; post-emergency. A noteworthy 
development in this process was Stoddard’s argument that different phases of 
disaster reflect different types of individual and group behaviour. The emergence of 
phases such as pre-emergency, emergency and post-emergency phases have 
been described by modern researchers as an insight into the future of the DMP 
(Coetzee, 2009). Stoddard’s subdivision of the main disaster phases is 
representative of what can be seen in many subsequent DMPs.  
 
From the above discussion, we can conclude that the roots of the DMP are strongly 
influenced by early disaster phase research. The isolated and ‘linear’ examples of 
disaster phases by Carr (1932), Powell (1954) and Stoddard (1968) indicate that the 
concept of disaster phases has long been embedded in disaster research. 
However, a criticism of these early efforts, is that they focussed heavily on the 
immediate preparedness and response phases, with little attention paid to long-
term, post-disaster recovery. In addition, the shift from a linear to an iterative 
process requires further investigation as well (Kelman, 2007; Lewis, 2007; Wisner et 
al, 2007).  
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Developments in the historical analysis and categorisation of disasters led Barton  
(1969) to define a disaster in five stages, combining both the functional and 
temporal aspects of a disaster. The first ‘pre-disaster period’ was not described. The 
second phase followed with a description of the ‘detection and communication of 
warning’ for a specific threat. The third phase evolves around the immediate 
response efforts, focusing on the implications of the disaster impact. Barton extends 
the response phase to include a fourth social response period, lasting from a few 
days up to months or even years. The final phase considers a community’s attempt 
to readjust to a more stable state of normality. Overall Barton’s biggest contribution 
was his pioneering attempt to analyse disaster phases in terms of the organisational 
behaviour of both communities and wider disaster stakeholders.  
 
Following earlier efforts (Carr, 1931; Powell, 1954; Stoddard, 1968; Dynes, 1970; 
Barton 1969), Mileti et al (1975) subsequently produced a process involving six 
phases comprising: preparedness; warning; pre-impact; early actions; post-impact; 
short-term actions; restoration (recovery) and reconstruction. Whilst offering a new 
codification effort, the categories lacked certain theoretical foundations, with the 
main rationale for their construction based on a direct interpretation of the tasks 
each phase comprises (Drabek,1986; Neal, 1997).  
 
In 1979 the disaster management field saw a further development in codification 
efforts, through the National Governor’s Association Report, which represented an 
important step in professionalising the disaster management discipline. Prior to this, 
disaster theory was limited to practical response and recovery efforts (Lewis et al, 
1976; Twigg, 2004; UNISDR, 2004). Addressing this gap, the report proposed a 
holistic, integrated approach to disaster management with the output being a four 
phase disaster management process, which is still the most prevalent and widely 
used process to date (FEMA, 2007). Drabek followed in 1986 with an updated 
codification effort, focused on the impact and consequences of disasters. Adopting 
the four-phased process identified in the National Governor’s Association Report, 
Drabeks’s efforts included further sub-divisions of the process phases, placing a 
new focus on the social element of disasters. 
 
The pioneering National Governor’s Association report helped to clarify the purpose 
of the DMP phases. Acknowledging ambiguity surrounding disaster terminology, the 
report proposes a four-phased process, which directs attention towards the function 
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and objective of each phase (Neal, 1997). As such, the report defines a phase 
according to its ‘function’ and the activities undertaken to deliver on this function. 
The four phases are considered part of a new universally accepted disaster 
language and are outlined in further detail in the following section (Neal,1997). 
2.4.1 Mitigation 
 
Mitigation is the initial phase of the DMP, which employs actions to reduce, 
eliminate or manage the long-term human and physical risk of disasters (FEMA, 
1998). Dynes (1993) summarises the phase as human attempts to limit the 
potentiality of disaster occurrence. The focus of this phase is to employ long-term 
risk strategies in place of hitherto reactive temporary solutions, with a view to 
preventing disasters before they happen (Lindell and Perry, 1992). This proactive 
mitigation includes the reduction of vulnerability and the distribution of costs across 
the affected community.  
 
Efforts to reduce threats to a community include actions such as updating building 
codes, risk assessments, land-use management, improved health care and 
education (FEMA, 2004; Warfield, 2004). It is worth noting, however, that without 
collaboration and participation from the community these actions will not effectively 
strengthen the disaster reduction. The inter-dependency of the phases is best 
represented through a disaster management process diagram, highlighting the 
overarching relationship between mitigation and the other phases (Figure 2.5).  
 
 
Figure 2.5 Disaster Management Process. Source: FEMA,1998.  
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Despite its importance in the process, the literature indicates that mitigation 
received the least attention amongst the resources devoted to disaster 
management (Roberts, 1994; GFDRC, 2013), highlighting a reactive approach to 
DM. By contrast, mitigation involves measures taken prior to the disaster event, 
which in combination with proactive investment (as opposed to a reactive response 
to an early warning sign), can significantly reduce disaster losses. 
2.4.2 Preparedness 
 
The second phase of the process, “preparedness”, pertains to disaster response 
planning designed to protect society by using available resources and capacities in 
an efficient manner, resulting in a more effective response (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA, 2007). The preparedness phase acts almost as an 
‘insurance policy,’ limiting the extent of disaster impact (Sutton and Tierney, 2006). 
The relevant pre-disaster activities are conducted within a limited timeframe and 
seek to equip the community with a sufficient level of readiness to reduce the 
disaster consequences (WHO, 2002).  
 
The preparedness phase has been further categorised by the US FEMA into five 
sub-phases namely: plan; organise and equip; train; exercise; evaluate and improve 
(Figure 2.6). The “plan” phase centres around the integration of action plans within 
both regional and national policy, acting as a method for budget allocation (Bildan, 
2003). The “organising and equip” stage comprises early warning systems, 
provision of health facilities, risk awareness programs, capacity building exercises 
and training (Von Meding et al, 2012). Finally, the “evaluation and improvement” 
stage incorporates hazard mapping and risk assessment with a view to outlining 
vulnerable areas and reducing the frequency, intensity and impact from disaster 




Figure 2.6 Disaster management cycle within the preparedness phase. Source: FEMA, 
2017. 
 
Training is integral to the successful implementation of the preparedness phase. 
Training involves the practice and evaluation of disaster plans in a risk free 
environment. This, in turn, helps to establish roles and responsibilities for all actors 
involved in the phase. Successful implementation of this stage will highlight areas 
for refinement, capability gaps and opportunities, all of which can be fed back into 
the process as lessons learned for future improvement. Ultimately, enhanced 
preparedness as a result of these activities will help build capacity within the 
affected community (Bildan, 2003).  
2.4.3 Response 
 
The third phase of the disaster process is the response phase. It starts with the 
detection of an event and ends with a return to a stable state after the event (Lindell 
and Perry, 1992).  A definition from FEMA lists the activities undertaken during this 
stage as: the provision of food, water, shelter and health services to those affected 
and the return of critical infrastructure (FEMA, 1998). The goal of the response 
effort is to implement preparedness measures as soon as a hazard is identified. 
Further efforts during this phase include the provision of emergency assistance and 
dealing with immediate physical effects. The final stages of the response effort 
focus on enhancing long-term recovery potential through damage assessments and 
the application of donations.  
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Focused on the direct aftermath, this phase is strongly characterised by a sense of 
urgency, less prevalent in other stages of the process (Neal, 1997). Lindell and 
Perry (1992) reemphasise the importance of a timely response, noting that in the 
immediate aftermath of a disaster, minutes can cost lives. As the sense of crisis 
dissipates the process enters into the recovery phase. Neal (1997) suggests an 
indicator of the transition from the response phase into the recovery phase is 
apparent when disaster managers begin wearing business suits again. This 




The fourth phase in the DMP is “recovery”. The goal of this stage is to return all 
systems (formal and informal) to as normal a state as possible (FEMA, 1995). The 
phase focuses on the rebuilding of communities, enabling them to function without 
assistance. The phase should allow those affected to return to a pre-disaster state 
or even an improved situation (FEMA, 1994). Largely speaking, recovery efforts 
begin after the response phase, but are dependent upon the recovery measures in 
place. This means recovery efforts can run concurrently with response phase 
efforts. Of particular relevance to this thesis is the lack of recognition of the recovery 
phase in early codification efforts (Barton 1969). Ambiguity over the complex 
recovery process is represented in the numerous labels attached to the phase: 
restoration; recovery; rehabilitation; redevelopment; reconstruction. Certain 
descriptions within the literature divide the phase into short and long-term recovery 
(Baird, 2010). In this regard, Chapman (1962) describes recovery as the social and 
physical ‘rehabilitation’ of the affected community, focusing on the long-term aspect 
of recovery. Furthering Chapman’s division of the phase into short-and long-term 
recovery, Stoddard (1968) also followed with a divided recovery phase. Overall, the 
descriptions applied to this phase are more abstract relative to the other phases. 
For example, less emphasis is paid to the activities which define it, with the focus on 
the goals and desired outcomes of the phase. It could be argued that the ambiguity 







Although not recognised by theoretical literature as a phase in itself, reconstruction 
is a fundamental subdivision of the recovery phase and as such is pertinent to this 
study. Sitting within the recovery phase, it serves to bridge the gap back to disaster 
mitigation through activities which build-back affected communities, reduce risk and 
foster resilience 2 . The reconstruction element encompasses the rebuilding of 
affected areas in order to return to a stable state. It comprises activities including 
the restoration and rebuilding of critical infrastructure and a re-evaluation of building 
codes and land use regulations (Drabek and Hoetmer, 1991). 
 
The media focus on reconstruction has traditionally been around the provision of 
shelter (Davidson et al, 2007). Given the chaotic context of a post disaster situation, 
reconstruction efforts are often characterised by urgency and poor quality of 
workmanship. Disaster managers acknowledge however that a disaster in fact 
presents a window of opportunity for long-term development. Such development will 
require reflective discussion and consensus building, in order to effectively act upon 
lessons learned. The UN recognises this ‘window of opportunity’ and encourages 
national government decentralisation so as to allow community-driven, context-
specific responses to emerge (Birkmann et al, 2009).  
2.4.6 An alternative view 
 
There is consensus within literature that the phased approach to DMP is a useful 
means to manage disasters (Kelly, 1998; Alexander, 2002). However, 
implementation of the DMP is not without its difficulties and issues (Neal, 1997; 
Kelly, 1998; Cebulla, 2004; Von Meding et al, 2012). The complex nature of the 
discipline prompted some researchers to apply a generalised, phased approach to 
disaster management, placing the focus on individual events, with the aim of 
clarifying principles that can be applied to all types of hazards and subsequent 
disaster events (Checkland, 1999; Skyttner, 2005; Becker, 2009).  
 
However, the literature also presents a contrasting school of thought, which argues 
that the unique nature of disasters cannot be dealt with in such a generalised 
homogenous manner (FEMA, 1995; Neal, 1997). Managing disaster is a long-term, 
iterative process over a prolonged period of time. The lifecycle of this process 
                                                
2 Definitions of resilience will be reviewed in detail in Chapter 3.  
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requires adaptable phases that meet the array of demands a disaster presents, 
including: appropriate strategies to plan and mitigate against hazards, respond to 
threats and recover from the physical and social impacts (FEMA, 1993; WHO, 
2007). Neal (1997) raises further challenges with the concept of “phases” in an 
article titled ‘Reconsidering the Phases of Disaster’, where he highlights the 
ambiguous interpretation of phasing amongst researchers and practitioners. With 
Neal’s article acting as a backdrop, the following section investigates the challenges 
and problematic themes evident in the existing unclear processes which populate 
the literature. 
 
The varied interpretation of a phase as being defined by ‘time’ or ‘functional activity’ 
is a contentious issue in the literature. Waugh and Tierney (1997) refers only to 
‘activities’ and ‘functions’ in their description of disaster management, disregarding 
the need to discuss the temporal nature of phases in the description. Constredt 
(2002) cautions that defining phases by function alone makes the elements of each 
phase appear ‘action’ based with less emphasis being assigned to social 
dimensions. This can lead to a misrepresentation of the process ‘action’ oriented, 
with an emphasis on the hazard rather than its social consequences (Constredt, 
2002). 
 
Adopting the ‘function’ interpretation of phases, Waugh recognises that whilst 
phases exist in the process, there is a growing acceptance that activities can 
overlap and inhabit multiple phases at any one time. Alexander (2002) takes this 
point further, stating that disaster responders are required to take measures to 
facilitate recovery whilst simultaneously adopting preparedness strategies to 
mitigate against the next disaster. Similarly, Dynes (1981) discusses the 
simultaneous existence of activities and their overlapping nature within phases, 
when responding to different sets of disaster demands. 
 
The use of ‘functions’ as a phase definer is also used by Haddow (2008) in his 
chapter on ‘recovery’. By referring to phases as functions, Haddow raises a 
theoretical debate over the ‘timing’ of these phases. In particular, Haddow questions 
the point of transition from the completion of the response ‘function’ to the 
commencement of the recovery ‘function’. Despite a lack of consistency in 
terminology, the above sources agree on the circumstances or ‘functions’ having 
precedence over a ‘temporal’ definer.  
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Ambiguous terminology in respect of timing of the phases compounds the 
confusion. The notion of “continuum” is used throughout the literature, describing 
the successive disaster phases as linear, cyclical, iterative or a phased process 
(Kirkby et al, 1997; Neal,1997; WHO, 2002; Warfield, 2004). A pioneer in relation to 
the temporal definition of phases was Dynes (1981), who argued that an 
understanding of the mechanics of disaster developments and their associated 
activities was essential before temporal phase thresholds could be defined. Dynes 
uses the process to illustrate the pragmatic implementation of humanitarian efforts 
in a sequential manner from response through to preparedness. Debate has arisen 
over the sequential nature of the process, with Bolin (1982) describing the process 
as iterative not linear. Integral to the iterative approach is the fact that an individual 
can experience a ‘phase’ at a different time to another individual or community. As 
such, differences in the time taken for affected communities and individuals to 
transition from ‘phase’ to ‘phase’ can be dependent upon factors such as social 
class or ethnicity (Quarantelli, 1982).  
 
In a similar vein to Waugh and Tierney (1997), Dynes acknowledges the 
overlapping nature of the phases, describing the boundaries between phases as 
“arbitrary”. Dynes states that the phases are often misrepresented and wrongly 
described as acting in isolation. As mentioned previously, the disaster management 
process is characterised by a very wide range of actions, equipment, agencies, 
individuals, and events (FEMA, 1995). In this regard, the overlapping phases 
require resources and input from actors at multiple stages across the DMP.  
 
As such, a strictly linear interpretation of the phased process is frequently 
challenged within literature. Whilst adopted in many policy documents, the 
construction of arbitrary barriers between the phases implies a clear delineation 
between the phases. However, in practice the temporal nature of the phases is not 
equal, with the recovery and reconstruction phases often requiring a much greater 
length of time (USAID, 2013). It can however be seen that the phases do not work 
in isolation, nor are they static. Rather, they are interrelated within the process, 
operating concurrently in response to disaster demands.  
The above discussions make clear that many variations of the disaster 
management process exist. The four-stage disaster process adopted is not ‘better’ 
than any other ‘process’, however it is the most accepted interpretation in the 
literature. The notion of phases is widely contested within literature, however once 
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practitioners remember that phases are not mutually exclusive but in fact 
interrelated, the pragmatic four-stage process can arguably act as a useful tool to 
guide disaster management (Neal, 1997). Further, phases are not characterised by 
time alone and thus should not be regarded as strictly temporal. Instead they are 
more significantly determined by circumstances of disaster demands, that require 
certain activities to fulfil phase goals (Warfield, 2004; Haigh, n.d). It is the fulfilment 
of these goals, which ultimately draws a line between one phase and the next.  
Figure 2.7 acts as a summary of the DMP, highlighting the three main stages of a 
disaster event and further illustrating the main phases comprised in the DMP (Baird 
et al, 1975; Khan et al, 2008). All phases are shown to operate concurrently, with 
overlaps reflecting the inadvertent relationship between those phases. The process 
also includes the reconstruction phase, given its significance to this study and this is 
represented as running concurrently with the recovery phase (Khan et al, 2008). 
Figure 2.7 Original DMP and its reinterpretation. Source: Baird et al,1975; adapted from 
Khan et al, 2008). 
2.5 Issues and challenges with the DMP 
 
The disaster management discipline is a changing landscape (Rosenthal, 1998; 
Kouzmin and Haynes, 1999; Comfort, 2001; Smet et al, 2011), shifting from a focus 
on relief response towards an approach based on holistic long-term development. 
The view that disasters are ‘one offs’ and rare is now outdated, meaning that 
mitigation efforts can no longer work in isolation. Instead they are part of an iterative 
process of preparation ahead of the next disaster. As such, the challenge for 
practitioners is to move preparedness efforts from ‘reactive relief’ efforts towards 
more proactive activities during the recovery and reconstruction phases, building 
the foundations for long-term development and improvement. However, the 
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complex nature of the DMP is currently characterised with inefficiencies and 
challenges, impeding long-term recovery. This section analyses key issues common 
to all phases and details specific challenges to positive resilience action during the 
recovery and reconstruction phase.  
2.5.1 Communication and information exchange 
 
The effectiveness of the DMP is heavily dependent on the information surrounding 
potential disaster risks and availability of resources to mitigate, then recover from 
such risks. In this regard, knowledge sharing has been described by researchers as 
an “underutilised” communication tools (Zhang et al, 2002; Marincioni, 2007; 
Patnaik et al, 2007:p200). Further, Hidayat and Egbu (2010) attribute the lack of 
information and knowledge sharing between actors as one of the major causes of 
poor disaster preparedness. Further compounding the issue, the literature highlights 
a failure to adopt new communication technologies to assist knowledge sharing 
within the community (Palen et al, 2007). Consequently, information flows are 
heavily underutilised as a result of resistance to move away from conventional 
information management approaches (Mersham, 2010). In addition, Haigh et al 
(2006) attribute the absence of a detailed communication strategy as a contributor 
to the ambiguity in the roles of actors in response efforts, impeding long-term 
sustainable recovery.  
2.5.2 Co-ordination of actors 
 
The complex network of actors involved in disaster response has made their 
coordination problematic (UNOCHA, 2012). In a multidisciplinary context, 
coordination requires a flexible and agile strategy (Kaynak, 2014). In any disaster 
situation, actors can include international and local NGOs, national and multilateral 
donors, disaster practitioners and the affected community. Evidence of competition 
and rivalry for resources is illustrative of the lack of collaboration amongst actors. 
The UN (2011) has identified this issue and called upon governments to support 
local level agency by decentralising recovery and reconstruction efforts. Such 
efforts will enable greater community participation, foster capacity building and 
promote long-term resilient development.  
 
Further, the literature reports that strict adherence to the disaster phases promotes 
a silo mentality, thereby widening the gap between preparedness and long-term 
recovery actions. Breaking down the traditional siloed approach to disaster phases 
would promote a more collaborative relationship between preparedness and 
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response activities (OECD, 2013). Working in parallel, the two phases can help 
bridge the gap between preparedness and long-term recovery.  
Research also indicates that the silo mentality is hampering information 
dissemination, for example through poor awareness and application of lessons 
learned (Fenwick, 2009). In contrast, collaboration between phases and 
organisations, can lead to a positive shift away from segmented, siloed perspectives 
towards a more holistic view of long-term development. A survey in 2008 
commissioned by the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR), revealed 
that humanitarian and development departments are operating within the same 
United Nations (UN) agency, yet operate in isolation. This disjointed approach 
prohibits fulfilment of holistic, long-term development strategies, and calls for a 
movement away from siloed boundaries and improved inter-agency cooperation.  
2.5.3 Community participation  
 
The misinterpretation and limited extent to which community participation is 
integrated into disaster management presents a further challenge. Traditionally, 
community participation within preparedness activities focused on capacity building 
in the sense of developing skills. However, this skills-based approach neglects the 
development of social and adaptive capacities (Carpenter, 2013; UNISDR, 2014). 
Participatory practices are now gaining recognition within preparedness activities, 
viewing a community preparedness and empowerment as central to future 
development (Carter, 2008). The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation (UNESCO) notes that communities possess local knowledge which is 
‘invaluable’ to a preparedness programme, driving development forward (Hiwasaki 
et al, 2014). This marks a movement away from a view of ‘community capacity’ as 
function-based towards a broader view of capacity, underpinned by resilience and 
adaptability (Hemond and Robert, 2012). Carter (2008) summarises the situation by 
stating it is the capacity of the communities themselves that creates resilience, 
acting as a bridge between the preparedness and response phase. 
Further, to meet the demand for urgent post-disaster reconstruction, the labour 
shortfall is often left to international agencies and private investors to deal with. 
Alexander (2002) argues that this approach impinges on local capacity. In a 
competitive market, international actors are reported to poach local level 
government thus weakening the response effort and reducing a community’s ability 
to cope independently. The involvement of private enterprises is a similarly 
contentious issue, with reports of ‘disaster profiteering’ closing the window of 
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opportunity for the local community to participate and benefit from reconstruction 
(Mutter, 2015).  
Another contested issue is the degree of community participation, most specifically 
in the reconstruction phase (Davidson et al, 2007). Many disasters are repeat 
events (UNDP, 2012), therefore the use of local knowledge based on previous 
disasters can represent an effective mitigation strategy. Alexander (2008) highlights 
this point, stating that the first problem in disaster management is a failure to 
implement existing knowledge based on lessons learned. The failure to implement 
knowledge sharing represents a key challenge to the reconstruction phase (Koira, 
2009). In this regard, the UN recognises that all disasters, regardless of scale, 
happen first in communities.  
2.5.4 Poor planning  
 
It is well recognised within the literature that a lack of timeliness and urgency in 
response efforts surrounding a disaster can exacerbate the challenges (UNISDR, 
2011). Humanitarian agencies are invariably called upon to respond in an efficient, 
timely manner, however a lack of planning during the preparedness phase and 
inexperienced leadership have been cited as two major challenges inhibiting the 
ability to meet the immediate needs of the affected community (Lindell, 2003; Allen, 
2006). Further, UNISDR (2012) highlights the importance of acknowledging and 
learning from past mistakes (for example, building in flood plains), to inform robustly 
designed planning measures. In other words, the failure to act upon past mistakes 
can jeopardise a community’s long-term sustainable development (Alexander, 2005; 
Evans and Elphick, 2005).   
2.5.5 Issues pertaining to the recovery and reconstruction phase  
 
The post-disaster phases seek to bridge the gap between resilience planning 
(mitigation) and long-term development. However, Lyons and Schilderman (2010) 
criticises its practical application, claiming the phases often fails to deliver its key 
objectives. Despite the emphasis on pre-disaster planning outlined in the mitigation 
and preparedness phase, post-disaster action remains invariably reactive (UNDP, 
2011; UNISDR, 2014). The post-disaster phases reveal the inadequacies of historic 
development policies, offer new knowledge for improved reconstruction and are 
characterised by an increased awareness of potential risk (Thurairajah et al, 2008; 
UNDP, 2011). However, instead of proactively mitigating against future disasters, 
researchers describe the phases’ associated actions as ad-hoc and lacking 
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strategic coordination (Drabek and Hoetmer, 1991; Shaw et al, 2003). 
Consequently, this leads to slow, expensive and inefficient reconstruction efforts 
(Shaw and Sinha, 2003). 
When construction begins, balancing urgency and quality reconstruction is a 
significant challenge impeding long-term reconstruction (Haigh and Sutton, 2012). 
For example, reconstruction in a chaotic environment is beset with challenges, 
particularly when disaster stakeholders are already stretched and under-resourced. 
This situation often ends in a failure to implement critical long-term development 
plans. During the strained reconstruction period, construction work is often 
outsourced to meet unprecedented demands. However in doing so local knowledge 
is often overlooked in favour of timely reconstruction (Bilau et al, 2017).  
Challenges typically associated with reconstruction work are cost overruns, 
insufficient labour and the supply and quality of resources (Bilau et al, 2017). In a 
difficult disaster situation, these issues are magnified. A lack of resources requires 
NGOs to work beyond their expertise which has been noted in substandard works 
(Koira, 2009). Hayles (2010) reiterates the point of NGOs working outside their 
expertise, stating that their funded projects are often inappropriate due to their lack 
of local knowledge on environment and materials, which is further exacerbated by 
their lack of expertise (Moe et al, 2006; Koira, 2009; Von Meding, 2013). 
 
The literature highlights how a lack of project benchmarking has the potential to limit 
its reconstruction performance. The assessment of a project’s success is varied and 
as such ‘success’ is subjective. Ahmed (2011) contributes this inconsistency to the 
lack of globally accepted project standards or guidelines in this field. Emphasising 
the diversity of perceived project success, Chang et al (2010) propose resource and 
labour availability as a key success factor. By contrast, other researchers focus on 
front-loaded planning (Tatum and Terrell, 2012), community-centred approaches 
(Ophiyandri et al, 2010), coordination and communication amongst stakeholders 
(Ika et al, 2012), and effective time management (Ismail, 2014). As such, the 
literature suggests that the lack of reconstruction performance criteria or project 
benchmarking can impede a disaster manager’s ability to assess project success.  




This chapter presented an understanding of the theoretical knowledge surrounding 
disaster management globally. It did so by highlighting definitional issues around 
the term ‘disaster’, and how it has been defined thematically as a ‘social’, ‘technical’ 
and ‘scientific’ issue. In particular, the discussion focused on how disasters can be 
defined by the situation created rather than the ‘hazard’ or precipitating agent. As 
such, disasters can be described as ‘social events’, with the focus being the 
disruption to the functioning of everyday life. As a first step towards identifying 
solutions for resilient communities, the chapter moved towards assessing current 
trends, impacts and spatial distribution of disasters globally. The evidence was clear 
that disasters are increasing in frequency and magnitude worldwide, in particular, 
hydrological disasters.  
At the European scale, it was found that hydrological disasters, such as floods, 
were both the most frequently occurring disaster as well as the costliest in terms of 
economic damage. In response to this increased risk from disasters, recent disaster 
management paradigms have shifted from a disaster relief orientation towards a 
holistic development, focused on disaster preparedness and mitigation. However, 
the DMP was found to be held back by poor co-ordination, communication and a 
lack of planning. In particular, the recovery and reconstruction phases were limited 
by a lack of clear project performance standards, resources and the struggle to 
balance urgency and long-term sustainable development. The chapter concludes 
that greater collaboration at the local and regional level and across disaster phases 
could bridge the current gap between disaster preparedness and long-term 
recovery. Having established the theoretical knowledge and understanding of 
disaster management in this Chapter 2, the following Chapter 3 examines the 



























Chapter 2 set out the theoretical background and understanding of disaster 
management globally, identifying a number of historic and current challenges facing 
the disaster management process. Further, it critically explored the operational and 
strategic responses to hazardous events. The chapter concluded by highlighting a 
series of matters, which the disaster management process fails to address, thereby 
impeding long-term recovery.  
A key component of the 2015 UN World Conference on Disaster Reduction 
(UNWCDR) was to highlight the need for increased momentum through resilience 
action as a response to the increased frequency of disasters. As such, resilience is 
heavily integrated in The Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 (HFA) (UNISDR, 
2011). In line with this, the last decade (2005-2015) has seen increased focus on 
what affected communities can do for themselves in terms of preparation and 
responsiveness to disasters (IFRC, 2014). Objective 2.1 of this thesis aligns itself 
with this thinking through its search for the properties which make a community 
resilient.  
As noted already, the lack of clarity around the resilience concept risks 
compromising its realisation through community level initiatives and policy.  The 
ambiguity attaching to the concept of resilience is often attributed to the multiple 
disciplines the concept spans. Section 3.2 of this chapter addresses the ambiguity 
surrounding the term, focusing on the evolution and definition of the concept. The 
definition of resilience will be described under three main themes. The first of these 
focuses on the outcome of the resilience process (Mallak, 1998; Coleman and 
Hagell, 2007; Ramutsindela, 2007); the second focuses on the processes which 
assist in the building of resilience (Doron 2005; Woods, 2006; Wreathall, 2006); and 
the third focuses on the transformation or evolutionary potential of resilience 
(Bahadur et al, 2014)(Section 3.3.1-3.3.3). Ultimately, advancing clarity around the 
definition and aspects of resilience can positively assist in its operationalisation.  
Despite advances in resilience thinking, there remains inconsistency as to how the 
concept of resilience is applied in theory, policy and practice. As a result, there is a 
need to critically examine the conceptualisation of resilience and its application 
within a post-disaster context. Section 3.4 critically analyses resilience thinking 
within a disaster context, analysing a shift in the resilience paradigm from a reactive 
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‘bounce back’ approach to a more proactive, transformational ‘bounce forward’ 
analysis.  
The latter half of the chapter builds upon these interpretations of resilience, focusing 
on the capacity of human agency to foster proactive, innovative interventions. The 
development of this agency has the potential to sustain and/or build resilience in a 
post-disaster context. Section 3.6 highlights the role and importance of community- 
level efforts in a post-disaster situation and the benefits which can be derived from 
community participation. It is anticipated that a clearer understanding of the 
‘community’ construct and its associated definers (presented in Section 3.7- 3.7.2), 
will assist in highlighting the value of social connections within resilient communities 
(Section 3.8). Section 3.9 concludes the chapter by presenting a summary of the 
important role social connections play in leveraging community resilience. 
Figure 3.1 Position of Chapter 3 within the thesis structure.   
3.2 The evolution of resilience 
Building resilience through the human response to disasters has gained increased 
currency within the field of disaster management in the last decade (2005-2015, 
UNISDR, 2009). The emerging resilience discourse has focused on the shift 
towards what affected communities can do to strengthen their capacity to overcome 
disaster events (IFRC, 2014). This focus is echoed by the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) through humanitarian development programmes 
such as ‘Building Resilience’ in Ethiopia, Kenya and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC). Further, DFID has expressed its commitment to this resilience 
approach by declaring its intention to build the concept into all its programmes by 
2015 (DFID, 2011). Evidence of this commitment is demonstrated through the 
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Growth and Resilience Department (GRD’s) operational plan 2011-2015 and 
ongoing research into the topic, for example, “Defining Disaster Resilience: A DFID 
Approach” (DFID 2011).  
Despite growing acknowledgement of the potential for this resilience approach, the 
current issue facing disaster managers remains the ambiguity surrounding the 
resilience concept. This ambiguity is attributed to the varied academic definitions of 
the concept and its application across multiple disciplines, resulting in confusion 
around its exact characteristics (Paton, 2005; Sapountzaki, 2007). This ambiguity 
has led researchers to question whether the concept is merely an ‘ideal state’, 
which calls for further refinement before it can be operationalised (Manyena, 2006; 
Cote and Nightingale, 2012). 
According to Klein et al (2003), the resilience concept stems from the Latin word 
“resilio” meaning “to bounce back”. Research surrounding the early use of the term 
found the concept had its roots in the sciences, including both physics and 
mathematics (Holling, 1973; Brand and Jax, 2007). In this context, Pimm (1991) 
argues that the term describes the capacity of the system or material to return to a 
stable state or “equilibrium” after disruption. The physics approach to resilience 
holds that, no matter the extent of the initial disruption or displacement, resilience is 
more concerned with the speed with which a stable equilibrium can be achieved. 
This concept of resilience equilibrium influenced Holling’s (1973) pioneering 
ecological definition. 
Holling (1973) first applied the term resilience within an ecological context in his 
seminal publication “Resilience and stability of ecological systems”. Holling 
proposed that a resilient socio-ecological system exists in an area that is 
ecologically, economically and socially sustainable. The Resilience Alliance (2006) 
expanded on Holling’s initial thinking by characterising ‘resilience’ by reference to 
three main determiners. Firstly, the extent of change the system can withstand 
disruption whilst still maintaining a stable state. Secondly, the self-organising 
capacity of the system and thirdly, the ability of the system to build and enhance its 
capacity by learning and adapting to change (Waller, 2001). 
A psychological interpretation of resilience emerged from studies to determine the 
development of psychopathology. In particular, these studies focused on the ability 
of at-risk children to cope with family conflicts and poverty (Masten, 1999; Rolf, 
1999). Studies in that field focused on risk and impacts sustained by children as a 
 47 
consequence of life disturbances such as divorce and abuse (Waller, 2001; 
Johnson and Wielchelt, 2004).  
3.3 Defining resilience  
Despite the various different definitions across the disciplines, certain similarities 
are evident within the resilience discourse and these can be grouped in three main 
branches: outcome-orientated; process-orientated; and transformation-oriented. 
Holling (1973) was the first to introduce the distinction between resilience and 
stability within ecological systems, arguing that a system can remain resilient whilst 
also being in a state of non-equilibrium. Pickett et al (2004) differentiate between 
the conceptual models of “outcome” (social equilibrium) and “process” (social non-
equilibrium) resilience. Outcome resilience is demonstrated by the ability to return to 
the original state after a disaster event, whilst process resilience manifests itself 
through change and adaptation in response to a disruption. By extension, 
transformational resilience comprises multiple-equilibrium, 3  acknowledging the 
ability of a resilient system to ‘transform’ or flip into a new stable state (Walker, 
2004; Davoudi, 2012). Research suggests the boundaries of these ambiguous 
definers (outcome, process, transformation) need to be clearly outlined (Gunderson 
and Holling, 2002; Davoudi, 2012), or resilience stakeholders may fail to reach 
minimum consensus on what exactly ‘disaster resilience’ comprises in practice 
(Quarantelli, 1995).  
3.3.1 Resilience as an outcome  
Resilience definitions which adopt the ‘outcome’ approach are framed in the 
following terms: ‘cope’ (Pelling, 2003), ‘bounce back’ (Wildavsky, 1991), ‘withstand’ 
(Miletti, 1999; Resilience Alliance, 2006), ‘absorb negative impacts’ (Cardona, 2003) 
and to return to ‘normality’ (Cardona, 2003; UNISDR, 2005) as quickly as possible. 
Such a reactive view of resilience is more in line with a physics definition of 
resilience, where a material can bend, stretch and compress itself before returning 
to its initial state (Shaikh and Kauppi, 2010).  
A return to a stabilised ‘normal’ state, is perceived in the literature as an ‘outcome’ 
in its own right (Coleman and Hagell, 2007). This vague definition however lacks 
practical clarity as it fails to differentiate between an active demonstration of 
resilience and the potential to be resilient. Certain resilience outcomes are often 
                                                
3 Transformational resilience rejects the idea of a single resilient state, rather it assumes the existence of multiple 
stable states (Davoudi, 2012). 
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viewed as intangible (for example, empowerment and self-efficacy), meaning the 
resilience level of a community is difficult to quantify.  
Mallak (1998), in his study on the measurement of resilience in the healthcare 
system, highlighted six outcomes of resilient communities which can serve to 
represent intangible “potential resilience”. Mallak considers that such resilient 
communities are goal driven and actively seek adaptive solutions. They are further 
characterised by critical thinking, allowing them to use information effectively. The 
ability to interchange roles and access resources within a chaotic environment was 
also noted. Such communities also tend to be sceptical of new situations which 
could be potentially disruptive. Furthermore, beyond scepticism they also 
demonstrate a preference to use multiple sources when assessing the reliability of 
data. Mallak’s study is particularly relevant to this thesis as it shows that indicators 
of potential resilience can be displayed through a wide range of factors. Whilst this 
is useful in itself, Mallak’s study lacked an opinion on whether these characteristics 
are useful on an individual basis or whether they need to be considered collectively 
to provide a resilient outcome. 
The downside of viewing resilience as an outcome is that this reinforces the 
traditional reactive stance (McEntire et al, 2002). In this regard, resilience 
approaches can be viewed as “paternalistic”, derived from supply not demand 
(Chandler, 2014). Furthermore, outcome orientated disaster resilience programmes 
tend to adopt a rigid “command and control” approach (Alexander, 2002). This rigid 
approach focuses on risk to life and return to a state of normality as soon as 
possible (Manyena, 2013). However the UNDP (2014) argue the objective of 
resilience should be to enhance community capacity not reinstate the status quo. 
An approach designed to simply reinstate the status quo stifles long-term 
community development, and fails to meet the long-term aspirations/needs of the 
community (UNDP, 2014; Saunders and Becker, 2015).  
3.3.2 Resilience as a process 
The outcome orientated approaches included above focused on an equilibrium 
model which is characterised by a return to the original state after a disruptive event 
(bounce back). In contrast, the non-equilibrium model does not simply seek to 
return to the previous state, rather it focuses on demonstrating resilience through an 
adaptive process of change in response to disruptive events (bounce forward). 
Doron (2005) infers that adaptive capacity is critical to the creation and 
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strengthening of resilience on multiple levels; personal; family; social; and 
organisational. In this context, Doron argues that adaptive capacity fosters a sense 
of belonging, control and positive perspective after a disaster event. The willingness 
to change in the face of a disruptive event is seen to promote a culture of 
‘betterment’ through learning new skills, greater self-efficacy and more developed 
support systems (Patel et al, 2017).  
UNISDR (2011) highlight that a resilience building process is required to adapt to 
disturbances exceeding a community’s “normal adaptive capacity” (Woods et al, 
2006). Woods maintains that, by identifying a baseline level of competency, 
attention can be directed toward building upon and beyond that baseline. Exceeding 
the status quo (resilience baseline) marks a shift in resilience thinking from 
evaluating hazards (reactive) to viewing disaster events with a resilience capacity 
‘lens’ (proactive) (Egan, 2014). In this manner, attention turns towards harnessing 
existing and potential resources/capacities to absorb and adapt in response to 
disruptive impacts.  
The use of ‘adaptation’ as a resilience descriptor is indicative of the process of 
change that is inherent within a resilient process (Folke et al, 2010). An adaptive 
process acknowledges the inter-relationship between human and natural systems 
and is underpinned by lessons learned from past experience (Berkes, 2007). 
Adaptation must no longer be thought of as an add-on to existing development 
programmes (Walker et al, 2004), rather, adaptation must be ingrained in our daily 
decision-making and treated as an integral component of development (O’Keefe et 
al, 2008).  
Ultimately, enhancing process-orientated resilience requires a system with the 
capacity to adapt in order to cope (Folke et al, 2010), whilst maintaining core 
attributes or assets (Berkes, 2007). Individuals, communities and institutions 
possess an inherent degree of resilience, however of critical importance is who 
benefits from this resilience (Pelling et al, 2005). For example, a top-down approach 
to forced settlement after the Yushu earthquake (2010) on the Tibetan border in 
China (Tibetan Heritage Fund, 2010), successfully restored functionality for the 
community but eroded the core values of Tibetan culture and built heritage, 
traditional values and also their livelihood. Analysis of humanitarian action can lead 
to lesson learned, however this is unlikely to yield significant benefit unless the 
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essential values and capacities of human agency are reflected in resilience 
development. 
3.3.3 Resilience viewed as transformative  
Moving beyond the stable states of outcome (single equilibrium) and process 
orientated resilience (multiple equilibrium), the literature notes the emergence of 
socio-ecological or transformative resilience. Scheffer (2009) initially questioned the 
nature of the stability resilience domain. Through her socio-ecological thinking, 
Scheffer proposes that people and nature are distinct (albeit interdependent) 
systems. Rather than accepting a simple ‘bounce back’ or ‘return to normality’, this 
viewpoint acknowledges the potential for socio-ecological systems to cope, adapt or 
transform when confronted by hazards (Pendell et al, 2010). This perspective of 
resilience bears similarities to Holling’s presentation of the ‘adaptive cycle’ in 1986.  
For ‘transformative’ resilience to be successful, it is imperative that a community 
learns to live with change, uncertainty and risk, with a view to absorbing disturbance 
(Folke et al, 2011). Moench and Dixit (2004) argue that the experience gained from 
living through risk will enhance a community’s ability to manage risk. As such, 
transformative resilience is characterised by a long-term (proactive) approach to 
constant adaptation. This multi-equilibria approach allows greater scope for future 
adaptive change (Gunderson and Folke, 2011). The concept of different stable 
states (multi-equilibria) accepts different outcomes and promotes transformational 
change towards an improved, ultimately more sustainable state (Walker, 2014). 
However, despite acknowledgement of the benefits to multiple stable states (UNDP, 
2012), a risk averse preference for a stable state (return to status quo) restricts the 
promotion of constant adaptation to unforeseen hazards. 
Transformational resilience is also referred to in the literature as ‘socio-ecological’ 
resilience, due to its merging of both human and ecological elements (Folke et al, 
2010). Transformational resilience holds a broader, long-term perspective on 
adaptive change, relevant to situations characterised by complexity and increasing 
uncertainty (Béné, 2012). The long-term resiliency approach, however, is not only 
focused on promoting constant adaptation to disturbances. It also seeks to foster a 
‘betterment’ through innovation and the implementation of lessons learned  
(Birkmann et al, 2013). As such, these aspects (betterment, innovation and lessons 
learned) are critical to the successful functioning of transformative resilience. This 
advancement and sense of change is facilitated through experimentation, learning, 
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and innovation and is often referred to as ‘adaptive change’ or ‘pro-active resilience’ 
within the literature (Sousa et al, 2006; Birkmann et al, 2013). Existing research 
proposes multiple definitions of adaptive change, however, the most applicable to 
this thesis is that of Smit and Pilifosova’s (2001), which refers to human capacity 
rather than a focus on natural systems (hazards). Smit and Pilifosova’s description 
focuses on the capacity to adapt (transform) as opposed to the ability to cope by 
returning to a pre-disaster stable state.  
The terms ‘cope’ and ‘adapt’ are frequently used interchangeably within the 
literature (Levina and Tirpak, 2006), however while closely linked they are two 
distinct processes with separate objectives (Eriksen et al, 2005; Agrawal, 2010). For 
example, Dover and Handmer’s work (1992) differentiates between the two 
processes, describing the former as short-term, reactive resilience (coping capacity) 
and the latter as proactive, long-term resilience (adaptive capacity). Reactive 
resilience focuses on a reinstatement of the status quo, buffering against potential 
threats and resisting system change (Klein et al, 2003). This form of resilience is 
closely aligned with the ‘outcome’ orientated form of resilience. On the flip side, a 
proactive resilience stance is more concerned with the inevitability of change and 
attempts to create a system that has the potential to adapt to new circumstances. 
This is a significant broadening of the traditional interpretation of resilience, moving 
beyond robustness of the system towards a more transformative interpretation. In 
order for adaptive capacity to be successfully implemented, emphasis needs to be 
placed upon learning through experimentation and innovation. The ‘learning’ 
element highlights the importance of an integrated system including feedback 
around the implementation of lessons learned (Folke, 2006). 
The relevance of further proactive resilience properties (i.e. ‘adaptive capacity’ and 
‘self-organisation’) is highly debated within literature (Folke et al, 2010).  Self-
organisation in this context refers to the collaborative process of co-ordinating, 
adapting and learning in order to fulfil a common goal or objective (Mehrota, 2013). 
However, including adaptive capacity and self-organisation within resilience 
strategies may cause ambiguity opposite to the distinction between resilience and 
structural stability (changes in the stability landscape-vulnerability). Gallopin (2006) 
argues that the idea of ‘adaptive capacity’ disconnects resilience from the notion of 
multi-stability (state shifts between domains of attraction) or indeed from stability 
itself.  Despite this view, there is a body of literature which holds adaptive capacity 
as a core tenet of resilience (Walker et al, 2004; Carpenter and Brock, 2008; 
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Manyena, 2013). Folke et al (2010), however, takes a different stance, drawing the 
resilience argument away from its persistence or robustness to disturbances. By 
contrast, he directs attention towards the opportunities which can emerge from a 
disaster event, in terms of heightened engagement by stakeholders, renewal of the 
system and the potential to transform into more sustainable trajectories. In this 
respect, disasters create opportunities to learn, improving society’s ability to 
respond to future disasters. Consequently, communities are left in a better position 
ahead of the next disaster. In this, disaster events provide the impetus for 
communities to utilise their capacity and transform unsustainable ecological, 
economic or social structures into resilient structures (Walker et al, 2004).  
The move towards socio-ecological resilience, which this thesis adheres to, requires 
further explanation of the transition into a new more sustainable trajectory in 
response to unpredictable change. In this regard, Holling (2002) introduced the 
metaphor ‘the adaptive cycle’, which seeks to explain the different types of change 
and variables in resilience. The cycle handles a range of paradoxes associated with 
complex resilient systems. Gunderson (2000) describes the first of these four 
paradoxes as the risk averse preference for “persistence versus change”. The 
second paradox focuses on the need for “flexibility versus efficiency”. The third 
presents “connected versus adaptable” and finally the fourth addresses “resilient 
versus transformational”. The four phases of the cycle (as represented in Figure 
3.2) can be explained as beginning with a period of rapid growth in exploitation (r) 
which in turn leads to the accumulation and conservation/consolidation of structure, 
during which time the system tends toward rigidity and declining resilience (k). The 
system then suffers a rapid breakdown and release of accumulated potential 
through restructuring (Ω) and is followed by renewal and the opportunity to 
reorganise (α) (Quinlan, 2003).  
The speed of change between the phases is represented by arrows. In Figure 3.2, 
the short arrows represent a fast pace of change whereas the longer arrows are 
represent a slower, incremental change. The adaptive cycle comprises two axis. 
The x-axis indicates the level of connectedness influencing the variables, while the 
y-axis indicates the accumulated resources inherent within the system. When 
potential is not harnessed, the possibility to exit is indicated by the exit arrow, 









Figure 3.2 Adaptive cycle. Source: Gunderson and Holling, 2002. 
The four phases occur in hierarchical cycles, with the phases ‘nested’ one inside 
each other across “space and time scales” (Holling, 2001:p396). Similar to the 
Disaster Management Process discussed in chapter two, it functions in a non-linear 
manner (non-sequential) which can skip a phase and (for example) move directly 
from (r) to (Ω).  Furthermore, it is important to note that a cycle does not occur in 
isolation, rather it interacts at multiple scales across the “nested” adaptive cycles 
(Peterson et al, 1998). The scales are determined by size and speed. As such, in 
complex adaptive systems, there are continuous interactions between cycle size 
(small and large) and speed (slow and fast). Growth and accumulation of resources 
is represented by the “slower and longer” processes operating at a larger scale. 
Whereas the “shorter and faster” cycles, representing re-growth and renewal, occur 
at smaller scales. An integral part of the success of the adaptive cycle is the ability 
of the system to self-organise (fast) and maintain resilience (slow). However, 
caution must be applied to the risk of getting ‘locked in’ to the conservation stage 
(k), demonstrating a reluctance to move through the cycle and thus becoming 
vulnerable to future disruptions (Lew et al, 2017). 
The need to exploit the potential for ‘change’ is integral to the concept of 
transformational resilience. The transformational interpretation of resilience rejects 
the acceptance of simply maintaining equilibrium after a disaster, and instead 
concentrates on the dynamic interplay between “persistence and adaptability” 
(Folke et al, 2010:p20) in order to transform into a more sustainable trajectory 
(Adger, 2000; Folke et al, 2010; Walker, 2014). The following section seeks to 
unpack the components of positive change, leading to transformational resilience, 
and serves as the bridging concept between the social and ecological worlds. 
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3.4 Resilience and disaster management 
For decades, social scientists have emphasised the importance of adaptability in 
responding to and recovering from disasters. Folke (2006), for example, maintains 
that addressing resilience is not solely concerned with preserving systems and 
retaining their existing function. Rather, transformational thinking seeks to create 
opportunities for renewal and transformation into an improved state, particularly 
when the old ecological and social structures were unsustainable. The argument 
around the need to exploit the potential of ‘change’ is a critical component of this 
thesis. In this way, resilience is imbued with an element of potential and optimism 
(Comfort, 1999) brought about through a system’s ability to anticipate change and 
the inevitable need to respond. In doing so, an opportunity for innovation presents 
itself. Similarly, Dynes (2002:p14) has advocated for a flexible “problem-solving” 
approach that he contrasts with the more rigid “command and control” approach 
that has historically characterised the disaster management field. 
Despite the established view among social scientists that adaptability is an integral 
component of disaster resilience, this approach is not typically shared by 
government (Handmer and Dovers, 1996). For example, national-level structural 
and policy changes following the earthquake in Hiati in 2010 resulted in a more 
bureaucratic system of emergency management. The historical trend towards 
reactive, ‘outcome’- orientated concepts of resilience necessitates a re-evaluation of 
whether disaster strategies should be focused on adaptability or 
robustness/persistence.   
The latter approach, with its emphasis on resistance and buffering against threats, 
leaves little room for reflection and the potential for ‘betterment’ through innovation 
and experimentation. Such an approach, with its emphasis on efficient 
reinstatement of the status quo (Cutter et al, 2009), has been heavily criticised in 
the disaster literature (Davoudi, 2012; Walker and Salt, 2012) as it conceptualises 
disaster resilience as static (Holling, 1996). The failure to recognise the evolving 
nature of disasters inhibits the possibility of dynamic interaction leading to 
transformation (Holling, 1996).  
Furthermore, ‘risk’ perception influences a disaster manager’s decision to buffer risk 
through resistance (reactive) or to reduce risk through adaptation (proactive). A 
purely reactive response to a disaster focuses on a quick return to normality, but 
fails to exploit the opportunities which disasters present. A resilient community, 
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seeking to transform into a more sustainable enhanced state, possesses an 
acceptance of risk and reacts to unexpected change in a flexible and adaptive 
manner. The following section investigates how a community’s perception of risk 
directly influences its ability to successfully operationalise transformational 
resilience. 
3.4.1 Risk and disaster management 
Within a disaster management context, risk is defined as “the probability of harmful 
consequences, or expected loss resulting from interactions between natural or 
human induced hazards and vulnerable/capable conditions” (Asian Disaster 
Research Centre (ADRC), 2015:p41). A more simple understanding of risk is the 
potential for undesirable negative impacts as a consequence of a hazardous event 
(Von Meding, 2013). Calculating risk is in turn predicated on the estimation (Clarke 
et al, 2000) and quantification (Cutter et al, 2003) of future potential disruptions. 
Calculating risk in the scientific sense can be explained through the equation “Risk 
= Hazard x Vulnerability/capability” (UNISDR 2002:p41). Cutter et al (2003) reiterate 
the relevance of viewing risk from a scientific viewpoint, arguing that the 
manifestation of risk is a consequence of hazards or vulnerability, as the level of 
impact is inextricably linked to the force of the hazard and societies level of 
vulnerability. However, according to Haque and Etkin (2007), quantifying risk 
(objective) has proved ineffective since it neglects a wide range of disaster impacts 
(subjective), such as social disruption which is known to increase vulnerability. Such 
a calculation must therefore take account of risk probability, its potential impacts 
and the level of exposure or vulnerability (Human and environmental) at the time of 
exposure (McEntire, 2005).  
Extending the above argument, an interdisciplinary approach to risk (Cutter et al, 
2006; World Bank, 2012) takes the focus further away from the physical and 
scientific, and instead argues for the incorporation of a human centric approach to 
risk decision-making. This human perspective is referred to as perceived risk. 
Perceived risk equates to how people make sense of the uncertain world (Slovic, 
1987). People’s perception of risk is influenced by how they think, feel and make 
judgments about what they consider an acceptable level of risk. Eiser et al (2012) 
proffer that peoples’ perception of risk is influenced by their past experiences, 
personal values and cultural beliefs. Anderson-Berry and King (2005) reason that 
the empowerment of communities is a useful strategy in risk management. This 
 56 
empowerment is achieved by understanding the diverse nature of risk and sharing 
local knowledge with other stakeholders.  
The concept of risk perception embodies elements of subjectivity, however it can 
also provide insight into the complexities of public perception more generally 
towards risk (Vasvari, 2015). In this respect, risk perception is actively used to 
identify issues related to disaster events, which vulnerable and affected people 
endure. For example, a study on flood hazards in Scotland conducted by Werritty et 
al (2007) at the household level affords in-depth insights into the vulnerabilities of 
affected communities based on their perception of flood risks. The findings revealed 
that greater understanding of community attitudes (for example views on flood 
defences) and behaviour (flood ownership) at the local level, can inform ‘what 
works’ for each individual community. A further study by Terpstra (2011) in the 
Netherlands found that emotions related to recurrent flooding disasters influenced 
the community’s perception of risk, causing them to enhance their adaptive capacity 
in anticipation of future disasters.  
The above discussion suggests that, in order to reduce vulnerability, an 
understanding of several risk factors is required. Firstly, the magnitude and 
dimensions of the risks facing the community needs to be considered. Secondly, 
decision-making is strongly influenced by the understanding and perception of risk 
held by the community. Lastly, reducing vulnerability requires an understanding of 
what actions the community decides on or the behaviour it wishes to adopt to 
minimise their exposure to risk. 
Ultimately, the impact of a hazardous event is not only dependent on its severity or 
force, but also on the vulnerability of people and their living conditions (Marskrey, 
1989). Referring back to Blackie’s scientific equation of risk, the emphasis is taken 
away from the hazard itself, with the focus now being on the state of vulnerability in 
the community, the economy and the spatial built environment (Kasperson et al, 
2001). The shift of focus from the hazard towards community vulnerability and 
capacity to withstand a disaster speaks to the flexible and adaptive responses 
inherent in transformational resilience. Von Meding (2013) argues that risk is a 
constant factor which, when coupled with inadequate systematic efforts (capacity), 
lessens the resilience of a community. In this regard, the need to review attitudes 
towards perceived risk and accept risk as part of the adaptation process is 
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imperative (IPCC, 2012). By fostering capacity building as a response to accepted 
hazards, resilience can ultimately lead a transformational path.  
3.4.2 Vulnerability and disaster management 
Risk perception greatly influences the decision to respond to a disaster in a reactive 
or proactive manner (Pelling, 2011). It has been argued that an unwillingness to 
accept risk leads to a reactive approach to resilience. Willingness to accept risk is in 
turn influenced by the ambiguous relationship between resilience and vulnerability 
(Paton, 2006). The term vulnerability first became part of disaster management 
vocabulary in the 1970s with O’Keefe (1976:p566) proposing that there was a need 
to take the “naturalness out of disasters”, stating disasters were not determined by 
natural agents but rather a consequence of socio-economic vulnerability. O’Keefe 
emphasises the vulnerability element of the community, describing it as ‘the real 
cause of disaster’. As outlined in Section 3.2, the resilience thinking approach 
accepts risk and disturbances as elements of the adaptation process, and does not 
believe they contribute to vulnerability (Anderson, 1989; Blaikie, 1994). Resilience 
thinking needs to accept that risk is inevitable, and resilience should focus on the 
ability to adapt to (rather than control) the inevitable (Slootweg and Jones, 2011).  
Resilience and vulnerability are interrelated concepts within the disaster 
management field, however interchangeable use of the respective terms can lead to 
confusion (Klein et al, 1998; Adger, 2006; Berkes, 2007). Davis et al (2004) view 
resilience as a function of vulnerability, in that a lack of capacities or assets 
increases vulnerability, which in turn reduces resilience. In this light, the two 
concepts co-exist, with resilience only emerging when required during times of 
adversity (Naom, 1996; Winderl, 2014). Additional clarity on the relationship 
between the two terms, (both theory and practice) will act to assist in the defining of 
the meaning, implications and application of resilience to other related concepts 
such as long-term development (Miller et al, 2010). 
Through his seminal work, “Vulnerability, Resilience and the Collapse of Society’, 
Timmerman (1981) highlighted the close relationship between the concepts of 
resilience and vulnerability. Ambiguity surrounding the definers of vulnerability was 
found to limit consensus on the particulars of vulnerability theory (Watts and Bohle, 
1993). Timmermann (1981) describes vulnerability as the capacity of a system to 
absorb and recover from disturbances. Similarly, Comfort’s (1999) analysis of 
resilience refers to a lack of capacity as a factor of vulnerability by reducing a 
 58 
system’s ability to respond. These definitions and others indicate an apparent 
relationship between vulnerability and the level of existing capacity within the 
community (Blackie et al, 1994). Accepting this viewpoint leads to the assumption 
that resilience stands as a positive attribute of community development and 
recovery, with vulnerability at the negative end of the reference framework 
(Abolghasemi,  2013). An advocate of this stance is the Resilience Alliance (2006), 
which views low vulnerability as a consequence of high resilience within the system. 
In this regard, vulnerability is a contributory factor of resilience, with increased 
vulnerability attributable to reduced resilience.  
Viewed differently, vulnerability can also be characterised in terms of its ‘threat’ 
(Green et al, 1994) or “exposure”, making “people or places vulnerable to hazard 
(Cutter, 1996; Adger, 2006:p270). In this respect, the terms vulnerability and 
resilience can be categorised as separate constructs with no relationship to each 
other. Definitions by Downing (1991); Blackie et al, (1994); and Comfort (1999) view 
vulnerability in terms of the degree of potential loss as a consequence of a 
disruptive event. Watts and Bohle (1993) further describe the form of potential loss 
as social, economic, political or technical. The broad nature of ‘vulnerability’ 
definitions introduces ambiguity and, more significantly, creates a barrier to its 
application within a practical resilience framework.  
Paton (2005), notes that societies can possess characteristics that leave them 
vulnerable, whilst simultaneously holding characteristics that display a capacity to 
adapt. As such, Paton posits that resilience and vulnerability should be viewed as 
discrete constructs. Similarly, Mallak (2005) argues that a lack of vulnerability does 
not necessarily equate to a more resilient society. Indeed, the consensus within 
literature is that resilience is not the opposite of vulnerability (O’Keefe, 2004). While 
resilience and vulnerability are two separate concepts, they both influence how we 
understand a system’s recovery from a disruption. As such, resilience and 
vulnerability are both central concepts within this thesis, framing analysis of societal 
change to a disruptive event in a complementary but distinct manner. Resilience 
thinking accepts risk and disturbances as part of the adaptation process but does 
not attribute it to increasing vulnerability (Bahadur et al, 2010:p15). 
Disturbances are an inevitable force impacting upon resilient systems. The system’s 
capacity to respond is as important as its capacity to control.  A focus on resisting 
vulnerabilities leads to a reactive, short-term view often favoured by politicians. This 
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is evidenced by Donahue et al (2006) through her report commissioned by 
homeland security, “Lessons we don’t learn: A Study of the Lessons of Disasters, 
Why We Repeat Them, and How We Can Learn Them”. Donahue et al illustrates 
this argument by describing unsuccessful government responses to disaster events 
such as Hurricane Katriona in 2005 and Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Indeed, they 
advocate for a push beyond reinstating the status quo and shifting the focus 
towards adaptive capacity in response to accepted hazards. Donahue et al argues 
this approach allows resilience to pave a transformational path. However, they 
acknowledge this path is not easy for politicians with an eye on short-term stability. 
Similarly, Handmer and Dovers (1996) warn that while resisting threats may be 
more politically acceptable, it also leads to potential system collapse.  
3.4.3 Typologies of resilience in disaster management  
In addition to risk perception, adopting ‘specified’ or ‘general’ resilience also 
influences the decision to take a reactive or proactive response to a disaster. A rigid 
or ‘reactive’ approach is frequently referred to in the disaster literature as ‘specified’ 
resilience, whilst a more flexible approach is referred to as ‘general’ resilience 
(Constanza et al, 2011). In socio-ecological resilient systems, ‘specified’ resilience 
refers to resilience against a specified threat, at a particular point or ‘snapshot’ in 
time. In this vein, Carpenter et al (2001) refers to specified resilience as “Resilience 
of what, to what?”. For example, resilience of a community to earthquakes. 
Evidence suggests however, that there is a danger of becoming too focused on 
resilience to certain disturbances (e.g. a flood), at the cost of reducing overall 
resilience to other parts of the system (e.g. resilience to all extreme weather events) 
(Cifdaloz et al, 2010). Carson and Doyle’s (2000) presentation of the HOT (highly 
optimised tolerance) theory illustrates the ability of systems to resist a known, 
frequently occurring disturbance (specified resilience), as distinct from infrequent 
disturbances (general resilience). Summarising the above argument, Walker (2014) 
concludes that increasing resilience to specific hazards at one scale can in fact 
reduce ‘general’ resilience at other scales. 
‘General’ resilience represents a less rigid approach which does not define either 
(1) the part of the system that may cross a threshold or (2) the kind of disruptions 
the system has to endure (Carpenter, 2012). General resilience focuses on 
adapting to expected and unexpected disruptions. Unlike the ‘specified’ resilience, 
‘general’ resilience seeks to broaden options for dealing with unexpected 
disturbances and limiting the likelihood of new forms of instability. General 
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resilience relies on disruptive events to drive change. For example, socio-ecological 
resilience thinking proposes that disruptive events create the opportunity to re-
assess the status quo, prompt social engagement where necessary, and promote 
learning and innovation ahead of future events. In this regard, general resilience is 
appropriate for the development of adaptation and has the potential to lead to 
transformation, which is critical for long-term disaster recovery. 
In a post-disaster environment, however, governments and institutions frequently 
rely on the rigid approach to ‘specific’ resilience in a bid to ‘manage’ uncertainty, 
making this the predominant approach in the past (Handmer and Dovers,1996). As 
mentioned previously (Section 3.3.1) transformation is sometimes viewed as 
undesirable and a system failure from a risk management perspective (Walker, 
2014). However, the transformational resilience perspective, views ‘system failure’ 
or an unsustainable trajectory as an opportunity to transform into a new improved 
state (Pelling, 2011). In this regard, transition and change is viewed as a positive 
influence on resilience. In this light, socio-ecological resilience regards adaptation 
as a necessary form of continuous process, involving the realisation of 
transformative potential. A transformative system encourages change, creativity and 
learning in response to inherent uncertainties and risk (Davoudi et al, 2012). 
The idea of ‘potentiality’ and ‘positive change’ arising out of adaptation, underpins 
the under-utilised transformational (socio-ecological) dimension of resilience 
(Holling, 2001; Seville, 2009; Davoudi et al, 2012). In this light, resilience is viewed 
here as a fixed asset (robust) whilst also including an adaptive, transformative 
element (Davoudi et al, 2012). The notion of opportunity emerging from a disaster 
event is not a new one, with various academics suggesting that a post-disaster 
context presents the opportunity for positive change (Adger, 2000; Folke, 2006; 
Davoudi et al, 2012; Walker and Salt, 2012; Mannakkara and Wilinson, 2014; 
Mochizucki and Chang, 2017). In addition, Holling’s (2001) definition of resilience 
incorporates the positive elements associated with change and development 
through the ‘adaptive cycle’.  
The concept of the adaptive cycle as proposed by Holling is critical to 
transformational resilience theory. The cycle captures the different phases systems 
evolve through in order to transform into a more sustainable trajectory. However, 
too much connectedness and order in the system can reduce the adaptability in the 
system. This reveals an apparent paradox whereby the more connected a system is 
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internally, the more rigid and inflexible the system becomes. The ecological model 
of ‘adaptive cycles’ seeks to reconcile this contradiction through the idea of 
‘panarchy’ (Figure 3.2; 3.3). The panarchy model illustrates how no system can be 
understood or managed by focusing on a single scale. All systems, and, in 
particular complex adaptive systems (such as a disaster event), function at varied 
scales across “space, time and social organisation” (Robbins and Judge, 
2007:p1496).  
Gunderson and Holling (2002) categorise the change element into three distinct 
types, all of which can lead to innovative processes, namely; “incremental”, 
“spasmodic” and “transformational”. The adaptive cycle acknowledges 
transformation through its inclusion of opportunities for learning and innovation at 
different stages. However, Gunderson (2010) argues that this change is 
fundamentally reorganisation within the same system. Referencing the 
conceptualised panarchy diagram (Figure 3.3), the front loop represents the 
potential for incremental learning growth (r) until a level of conservation (k) is 
achieved. Similar to single loop learning, the system has the potential to learn from 
past experiences and improve routines (Gupta et al, 2010). This front loop can 
comprise incremental learning, as the system constantly seeks to innovatively 
enhance existing ideas. By contrast the reorganisation phase of the backloop is 
characterised by spasmodic learning. This form of learning is associated with 
radical innovation whereby new ideas enable the system to function in an entirely 
different manner (Biggs et al, 2012). Estimating the probability of success can be 
difficult however as there can be resistance to new ideas or processes that 
challenge the broader institutional framework (McKeown, 2008). Triple loop learning 







Figure 3.3 Panarchy: Nested Adaptive Cycles. Source: Gunderson and Holling, 2002. 
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Within the disaster management discourse, resilience definitions frequently 
comprise a ‘learning’ element. However, there remains ambiguity as to what 
precisely qualifies as ‘learning’ for these purposes. Recurrent disasters are seen as 
situations to learn from in preparation for the next disaster. However, it is unclear 
from the literature how much communities in fact learn from disasters (Birkland, 
2006). The literature  links the learning element to the transformative version of 
resilience, tying innovative and experimental adaptation  results to a ‘bounce 
forward’ outcome (Shaw and Maythorn, 2012). 
Despite the benefits of the panarchy (ecological) model, the system lacks the 
foresight and intentionality, typically associated with socio-ecological systems 
(Walker, 2014). The existence of human capacity within socio-ecological systems 
would enable the model to anticipate and plan ahead for future disruptive events 
(Walker, 2014). While knowledge and awareness will not of itself prevent a disaster 
event, human agency embedded within the panarchy cycle of adaptive change, has 
the potential to do so (Folke et al, 2011).  
3.5 Issues and challenges of operationalising resilience for disaster management  
Innovation, adaptation and learning should be fostered as integral sources of 
resilience (Swartling et al, 2011). However, in an increasingly bureaucratic system 
of disaster management, there is a strong pressure to revert to the rigid, command 
and control response to disasters (Handmer and Dovers, 2006). A key criticism 
emanating from the ‘Prevent, Prepare, Respond, Recover’ framework (Greater 
London Authority (GLA), 2007) is the lack of attention paid to lessons learnt from 
past disaster experiences. This criticism may be attributed to the fact that research 
surrounding the consequences and impacts of disaster is more difficult to compare 
than the statistical probability of future disaster events (Dao et al, 2012). Further, 
Manyena (2016) argues the lack of innovation is a consequence of communities 
being viewed as passive participants, rather than as active agents in disaster 
adaptation. As such, the valuable resource of community narrative and memory that 
drives social learning is restricted.  
Social resilience can be defined as the capacity of people in a group (formal and 
informal) to face up to post-disaster challenges (Keck, 2013). It incorporates both 
collective and individual resources accumulated across the community from social 
interaction (Pelling et al, 2015). Social learning involves the understanding of the 
availability of capacities and resources already existing in a community, which can 
 63 
be harnessed in the event of a disaster. Further, ‘participation capacity’ can play a 
vital role in assisting communities to self-organise and adapt in the face of adversity 
(Voss, 2010). ‘Participation capacity’ has the ability to build softer capacity skills, 
such as, trust and shared understanding, which would not be typically developed 
through more traditional/rigid scientific processes (Folke, 2011). Engagement from 
all stakeholders is a core component of transformative resilience building. However, 
translating concepts such as social learning and community participation into 
practical resilience strategies remains a significant challenge within current disaster 
response efforts (Berke et al, 2015). Consequently, these issues will be further 
investigated under the umbrella of human agency and social capital in Section 3.8. 
Disaster resilience is a discipline where the gap between research theory and 
practice frequently reveals itself. On the one hand, disaster researchers have 
identified adaptability as a source of resilience. On the other hand, the practice of 
disaster management has moved in a more inflexible direction, with an emphasis on 
standardisation and procedures (Folke et al, 2012). In order to bridge the divide 
between research and practice, there is the need for an approach that 
simultaneously fulfils (1) the need for structure and (2) the demand for innovation in 
the post-disaster environment (Underwood, 2010). For example, Harrald 
(2006:p256), has called for an approach that provides both “agility and discipline”. 
Similarly, Webb and Chevreau (2006:p66) suggest the need for “planning to 
improvise” and McEntire et al (2013) have developed the concept of “spontaneous 
planning” to capture the dual needs of stability and flexibility in responding to 
disasters. If this drive for preparedness as a core component of resilience is acted 
upon, potential opportunities as well as threats will be identified, addressing the 
strategic shortcoming of missed opportunities.  
Shifting the emphasis from a ‘bounce back’ to a ‘bounce forward’ approach, has the 
potential to radically transform the disaster response/management process into a 
more desirable trajectory. In order for this transformation to be achieved, a 
community’s capacity needs to be focused as much upon finding opportunities as 
identifying potential threats (Alexander, 2012). The latter half of this chapter moves 
the discussion from resilience towards the human agency component of resilience. 
This perspective views people as active participants in disaster adaptation, as 
opposed to mere passive recipients of protective measures. Starting with an 
examination of the community construct, the following sections seek to evaluate the 
positive influence of social connections in a resilient community. It is anticipated that 
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a review of the literature will identify the potentiality of leveraging community 
connections to build capacity and assist in the creation of more adaptable and 
resilient communities.  
3.6 Community resilience and disaster management 
 
Disasters not only cause losses of life, economic cost and environmental damage 
but also (in many cases) derail community development (Tsuda, 2001; UNISDR, 
2013). This can leave the affected community most vulnerable to the impacts of 
disasters (Sen, 1999; UNDP, 2014). In a disaster context, safety of the community 
should be the primary issue (IFRC, 2011). Accordingly, these issues should be 
discussed and determined by the community (World Bank, 2012). As such, disaster 
recovery concerns itself with the physical reconstruction of the built environment as 
well as the reconstruction of the whole community (Shaw, 2014). Although little can 
be done to minimise the magnitude of the event itself (World Bank, 2014), its impact 
can be substantially reduced by acknowledging the vulnerabilities within the 
community and building community capacity to withstand the effect (UNDP, 2014).  
 
Against that background, communities are increasingly being recognised as the 
critical component required to reduce the impact to their social infrastructure (Adger, 
2000; Amartunga and Haigh, 2009; Genapati 2009). Shaw and Goda (2004) 
highlight the importance of community level disaster strategies, stating that 
government resources are often over-extended in times of disaster and require the 
support of the community to fill any capacity gaps. Accordingly, the valuable role the 
community can play in disaster management has gained currency within literature 
and policy in recent years (2010-2015). In this vein, the United Nations International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR, 2013) has put forward a vision to “enable all 
communities to become resilient to the effects of disasters.” The push for 
community level inclusion within the disaster process is further evidenced in the 
National Research Council report by the Committee on Private-Public Sector 
Collaboration to Enhance Community Disaster Resilience (2011). This highlights the 
need for the ‘full fabric’ of the community to be included in disaster decision-making. 
In its simplest form, effective recovery and reconstruction after a disaster are 
significantly influenced by community involvement (UNDP, 2014).  
Despite growing acknowledgment of the community resource, the reality is that the 
community is often an untapped resource within a post-disaster context (Alexander, 
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2012; UNDP, 2014). Evidence of the potential of the local level community resource 
is widespread in the literature (Gillard and Texier, 2010; Jha et al, 2010), with 
increasing emphasis now being placed on the underexploited role and value of the 
community in post-disaster situations (Alexander, 2012). Community networks, local 
knowledge, resources and participation are now regarded as the pivotal drivers of 
community resilience (UNDP, 2015; Audefroy, 2017). It is argued that, by effectively 
harnessing local capacities and resources within existing localised social support 
systems, we can better inform effective post-disaster resilience strategies (Linnell, 
2013). In doing so, the most valuable assets of affected populations (human; social; 
and natural), are more likely to be protected (World Bank, 2014). 
Active inclusion of and participation from the community can also assist in 
combatting the feeling of isolation and abandonment that occurs after a disaster 
event (Goyet, 2006). FEMA (2011) emphasise this point by stating that community 
participation in disaster recovery and reconstruction goes beyond the provision of 
essential coping needs. Participation ensures that the community’s voice is heard, 
that community needs are at the centre of reconstruction efforts and carried out in a 
way that reinvests in the community’s future (Alexander, 2012). Further to the cost 
advantages of using an existing resource (Goyet, 2006; UNDP, 2011; Shreve, 
2014), this participatory approach facilitates an authentic dialogue with the 
community and empowers the community to identify the needs and the existing 
resources that can be harnessed to address its vulnerabilities (Cutter et al, 2009). 
As noted above, the benefits of incorporating and promoting community level 
initiatives are many: utilisation of local knowledge, resources and capacity; cost 
effective, project ownership and empowerment, (UNDP, 2013). Despite these 
identified benefits, the practical realisation of resilience thinking is fraught with 
issues and complexities (Seneviratne et al, 2012; UNDP, 2013; Victoria, 2015). The 
main challenge arises when complex resilience theory is applied within a rigid, 
inflexible policy environment, where uncertainty and adaptation are not valued 
(Schwab, 1998; Berke and Campanella, 2006; Alexander, 2012). A safer command 
and control approach is frequently preferred by government which can in fact result 
in making vulnerable conditions worse (Barstein et al, 2010; Pasteur, 2011). 
Garschagen (2013) echoes this point, commenting that theoretical models of 
resilience cited in the literature do not fit within rigid policy, and consequently stand 
to impede community level inclusion in resilience strategies.  
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Buckle et al (2001) argue that by failing to take into account the needs and 
demands of the local community, ‘one size fits all’ government-led models (Davis, 
2016) often prove wasteful and inappropriate (Vale and Campanella, 2005), falling 
short on objectives and under-utilising the community resource (local knowledge, 
skills and resources) (La Trobe, 2008; Alexander, 2011). Reporting on 
reconstruction efforts in Banda Aceh, Indonesia, Lyons and Schilderman (2010) 
evidence the need to put the community at the centre of reconstruction efforts. They 
describe past government led efforts as ‘notoriously inappropriate’, failing to 
acknowledge the bespoke needs of individual communities. The key challenge 
associated with government driven reconstruction can be likened to John Turner’s 
(1972) description of the differentiation between what a house ‘is’ and what a house 
‘does’. In this context, Turner was differentiating between the core function of a 
‘house’ (to provide shelter) and the intangible benefit of a ‘home’ (to improve 
standards of living through “social, political, physical, human resource” benefits). 
Similar issues were also evidenced in a study on reconstruction efforts in post-
earthquake Haiti. Skarbek (2010) found that government strategies, which failed to 
consult with the affected community, led to an inadequate response, neglecting the 
needs and desires of the community in Haiti and even led to abandonment in some 
new developments (Cox et al, 2011; Lie et al, 2011). 
Arbon (2014) propose an alternative community-centred approach, wherein the 
government assists the local community to participate in disaster strategies. This 
reduces many of the mismatched needs/resources, which often characterise 
conventional top-down programmes (Cox et al, 2011). By harnessing local 
knowledge and capacity, the use of local resources is maximised, facilitating 
community-led initiatives to achieve a lot more with a lot less (UNDP, 2012) in a 
manner befitting the needs of the community, thus improving overall resilience (Da 
Silva, 2010).  
3.7 Understanding the community concept  
As identified in Section 3.1, resilience is a fundamental concept in this research, 
however its manifestation at the community level is where this research has its 
particular focus. Communities are the people most affected by disaster impacts 
(UNDP, 2012) and, as such, there is a need to unpack the multiple interpretations of 
the ‘community’ concept before successfully applying it to the resilience concept.  
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In the early part of the 20th century, the ‘modern traditional’ community emerged as 
a key concept in community theorising (Buckle et al, 2001; Amit, 2002; Day, 2006). 
Tönnies’ (1957) publication of “Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft” (Community and 
society) is frequently cited as the most influential text surrounding the community 
debate of its time. Tönnies’ discussion of the relationship between community 
(Gemeinschaft) and the broader associations of society (Gesellschaft) revealed an 
interpretation of community founded on tight-knit, family-centred connections. 
Tönnies’ description of a “traditional” community is one where there is “perfect unity 
and balance of wills” between individuals within the community (Tönnies, 1957:p37). 
The workings within a traditional community were shown to have a focus on shared 
entertainment, common goals and relationships (Tönnies, 1957). Similarly, Jane 
Jacobs (1961) in her classic study ‘The Death and Life of Great American Cities’ 
highlights the value of tight-knit social connections to society, which are fostered 
through everyday interactions within traditional urban forms.  
As the twentieth century developed, so too did interpretations of community, with 
particular emphasis on the diffuse nature of ‘traditional community’ boundaries 
(Frankenber, 1969; Anderson, 1983; Crow and Allen, 1994). This discourse led 
Anderson (1983) to develop the concept of ‘imagined’ community, which differed 
from a traditional community as it was not founded on daily human communication 
and interaction. Anderson puts forward the concept that a nation is a socially 
constructed community, “imagined” by those who have an affinity or perception of 
belonging to that particular community. For example, Anderson explains how 
affiliation to a particular nation during the Olympics is a mental image of the 
‘imagined community’ you associate yourself with.  
Clark et al (2003) claims that ‘traditional’ communities, bounded by geography, are 
characterised by strong locally specific (close-proximity) social networks. In the 
event of a disaster, these face-to-face connections add value by enabling 
communities to harness their adaptive capacity. However, such traditional 
communities have been eroded in the last decade (Putnam, 2000) as communities 
shift away from traditional inner city neighbourhoods towards ‘modern’, globalised 
and mobile technological communities located on the periphery of the city (Stein, 
1960; Jacobs, 1961; Albrow, 1997; Putnam, 2000). On the other hand, dispersed 
rural communities take advantage of similar technological communication methods, 
in order to increase connectivity (Stern et al, 2011). In this vein, Crow and Allen 
(1994) question the ‘traditional’ concept of a community arguing against community 
 68 
being bounded by geography. Instead they propose that today’s modern community 
is ‘abstract’ and cannot be delineated by an arbitrary boundary. Substantiating this 
view, technological advances such as the internet has enabled ‘modern’ 
communities to engage in long distance communication, allowing community 
members to “belong” to a community unrestricted by geography (Eade, 1997:p24).  
Further refinements to the ‘community’ concept started to emerge towards the end 
of the twentieth century, signifying an attempt to renew the traditional concept 
(Delanty, 2003; Day, 2006). More recent viewpoints discard positive notions of 
community “justice and fairness” and instead define “modern” communities by the 
level engagement in social processes (Delanty, 2003; Davoudi, 2012:p306). In 
contrast to the harmonious  “unity and balance” described by Tönnies in 1957, 
modern communities accept diversity and individualism amongst members 
(Bauman, 2001; Amit, 2002), acknowledging that communities are not 
homogenous.  
This section has established an understanding of the evolution of the complex 
community concept over time. The following section seeks to critically evaluate the 
definers of a ‘community’ within a resilience context, thus informing a working 
definition appropriate to the context of this thesis. 
3.7.1 Framing a ‘community’ 
The variety of definitions and thematic definers of ‘community’ which are evident in 
the literature over the last sixty years (1955- 2015) only serves to exacerbate the 
lack of clarity surrounding what a ‘community’ comprises. The following section 
traces recent developments in the framing and conceptualisation of the ‘community’ 
concept. It goes beyond presenting the different ‘types’ of community, namely: 
geography, circumstance and practice. In addition, it investigates inconsistencies in 
the concept’s application. Finally, the section concludes by framing a community 
within a disaster context.  
Adding to the complexity, it is clear from the development of the ‘community’ 
concept (Section 3.7) that the term is constantly evolving both in theory and in 
practice (Crow and Mah, 2011). In particular, the most contested aspect is that of 
community boundaries. In an age of globalisation and growing reliance on 
technology to communicate, Papacharissi (2010) argues that ‘internet communities’ 
have no boundaries. In this regard, geographical boundaries are rendered “defunct” 
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in the eyes of some researchers (Boellstorff, 2008). As such, defining communities 
by geographical boundaries or administrative area (such as county, town or village) 
does not hold the same relevance today as it did back in 1957 when Tönnies’ first 
proposed it.  
In practice, however, disaster responses are frequently organised by reference to 
administrative boundaries, such as a local government area. Unfortunately, “broad-
brush” disaster management with a focus on administrative boundaries runs the risk 
of overlooking local differences (Buckle,1998:p6). Further, disaster events often 
occur cross borders and do not obey artificial geographic boundaries (Stoltman et 
al, 2007). As such, a lack of cross-border communication can lead to significant 
challenges opposite the coordination, planning and operationalisation of cross-
jurisdiction resilience activities. 
Geographic proximity is a less influential factor in modern communities, which are 
now becoming less geographically defined due to the availability of technological or 
‘virtual’ connections (Larsen and Axhaussen, 2005). Interestingly, research into the 
commonalities between ‘virtual’ and ‘physical’ communities revealed less 
differentiation between their defining characteristics than the researchers expected 
(Rheingold, 2000; Boellstorff, 2008). Their similarity reaffirms Buckle’s premise that 
community should be defined by their needs rather than arbitrary geographical 
boundaries.  
Irrespective of whether a community is viewed as geographically bounded, 
communities are built on networked individuals (Clark, 2007). In a disaster context, 
a community can be categorised into those either responding to a disaster or those 
affected by the disaster (Brennan, 2006). The responding community may well form 
part of the ‘modern’ community connected by mobile or ‘virtual’ means even where 
they are not bound by the geography of the disaster event. Nevertheless, the 
affected community is characterised by the disaster event as it directly impacts the 
geography of their community.  
While ‘communities of geography’ may hold less relevance in today’s virtual society 
(Delanty, 2003), ‘place’ still remains a key unifier of ‘communities of circumstance’. 
Such communities are brought together by sharing an experience, such as a flood. 
However the literature cautions that amalgamation by circumstance does not 
necessarily constitute a community, rather an artificial geographical construct 
(Buckle et al, 2001; emBRACE, 2012a). 
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A further shift in thinking is the view that community characteristics, such as 
“cohesive” and “tight-knit”, do not always positively influence community behaviour 
(Mooney and Neal, 2008). In contrast to the community ideals, such as “balance 
and unity” proposed by Tönnies (1957), ‘community’ can also be associated with 
social problems, exclusion and “problem populations” (Mooney and Neal, 2008; 
Crow, 2012). Unlike Tönnies’ earlier interpretation (1957), later research reveals an 
acknowledgement of the social and cultural diversity embedded within communities 
(Goodson et al, 2016). Modern communities are characterised by their diversity and 
adaptability, with individuals often belonging to multiple communities (Buckle, 1998). 
Whilst diversity widens access to resources and capacities, the literature cautions 
that this can lead to social exclusion and inequality (Crow and Mah, 2012). Further, 
the distribution of capacity within a contested ‘community’ concept can lead to 
exclusion or unequal distribution of resources (Davoudi, 2012).  
A further community theme, known as ‘communities of practice’, is drawn from a 
common interest or goal (Wenger, 1998). In a disaster context, an example of a 
‘community of practice’ could include ‘resilience groups’. These groups are formed 
with the aim of sharing knowledge and experience related to disaster preparedness 
and recovery (Cabinet Office, 2016). Resilience groups act as a conduit for 
members to learn from each other, galvanise and build upon existing capacities 
through collaborative participation (Wenger, 1991). Empirical evidence shows the 
benefit these groups offer in terms of capacity building (Chandra, 2011). However, 
the literature cautions that ‘Community’ should not be considered a panacea for all 
complex development activities (Chitambo, 2002). In this regard, Wallace (2010) 
argues that in practice and policy often the “rhetoric” and the “reality” of “community” 
is not interconnected.   
To summarise the above discourse on community, it is apparent that strong 
connections created by people through social interaction are the cornerstones of 
community development. In this regard, ‘community’ can be viewed as an emergent 
body of group behaviour created through social connections, face-to-face or virtual. 
With the advent of improved technologies and globalisation, the evolving community 
concept has rendered the ‘traditional’ community of place less relevant in today’s 
society.  
In a disaster context, community is characterised both by geography (place) and 
interest. Disaster communities share common interests and goals, in particular to 
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reduce risk against potential threats. Community involves the coming together of 
both the affected community (geographical) and responding community 
(geographical and virtual) for the common good of risk reduction. A disaster 
community is not homogenous, accepting individualism and diversity among 
members, and is characterised by an ability to adapt to uncertain environments. The 
review above acknowledges that the concept of ‘community’ is a contested subject. 
It recognises that the concept is constantly evolving and that consensus on a 
universally accepted ‘framing’ of the concept is not possible. However, what is clear 
is that any definition of the concept should reflect its intended application. In doing 
so, the “rhetoric” and the “reality” will remain connected. Like resilience, there is ‘no 
one size fits all’ community. 
3.8 Social connections and social capital 
Social connections consist of networks of individuals or groups related to one 
another through connections such as family ties, friendships, similar interests and 
other types of common interest (Carpenter, 2013). Social connections are 
considered the foundation of social capital and described in the literature as 
investments in relationships with expected returns (Lin et al, 2001). The literature 
argues that strong social connections and ties assist in building trust and ultimately 
lead to the creation of social capital (Putnam, 2000). Social capital is closely aligned 
to the social and participatory nature of cohesive communities (Sundet and 
Mermelstein, 1996; Norris, 2008). It refers to interaction between community 
members in pursuit of a shared goal, demonstrating the synergistic capacity of 
collaborative communities (Bourdieu,1986). 
Historically, the concept of social capital within the literature focused on a 
community and its connections (Simmel and Wolf, 1950; Tonnies, 1957). Social 
capital and its related connections capture the dynamic capabilities of a community 
to self-organise and respond, adapt and recover from a disaster event (Meyer, 
2013). Despite its positive potential for community resilience, social capital is often 
overlooked and excluded from policy (UNDP, 2011; Aldrich, 2012). Aldrich attributes 
the intangible, non-physical nature of social capital as the reason for its 
underutilisation in a disaster context. Aldrich claims the immeasurability of 
connections and human capital makes it difficult to define (Aldrich, 2012; GSDRC, 
2013).  
 72 
A theoretical understanding of the attributes and benefits of social capital may 
however assist in a better understanding of its definition and its influence on 
community resilience. The discussion below begins with an investigation into social 
capital theories presented in the literature.  In particular, it focuses on the 
contributions to social capital theory by two key authors, Bourdieu (1986) and 
Putnam (1993).  
3.8.1 Investigating the theory of social capital  
There is no real consensus on a ‘social capital’ definition throughout the literature 
base, which includes interpretations from fields such as economics, sociology and 
politics (Schuller et al, 2000; Woolcock, 2001; Field, 2008), each with their own 
contrasting viewpoints. The concept’s application in diverse fields has led to 
definitional problems, linking it to responsible citizenship, reciprocity, social 
networks, human capital, trust, norms, values and economics (Bridger and Luloff, 
2001; Tuan, 2002; Stocker, 2004; Bhandari et al, 2009). An examination of 
Bourdieu’s and Putnam’s work highlights how involvement and participation in 
groups can have a positive effect on the community (Portes, 1998). Bourdieu 
focuses on an academic interpretation of the social network based approach, whilst 
Putnam’s focus is on the norms, trust and a more civic-based approach.  
Bourdieu’s theoretical underpinning of social capital is located within Marxist 
thinking, suggesting that social capital arises through the construction of social 
resources (labourers) with a durable network of institutionalised (capitalist) 
relationships (Lin, 1999; Coradini, 2010). Bordieu’s stance was concerned with the 
unequal distribution of resources and maintenance of power (Field, 2008). 
Accordingly, Bordieu identified four types of capital: cultural, social, symbolic and 
economic (Bordieu, 1986). Bordieu presents social capital as a dynamic and 
participatory concept embedded within social connections. This dynamic and 
participatory interaction can generate other forms of capital, leading to (for example) 
greater economic opportunities (Granovetter, 1983).  
In line with Bourdieu’s interpretation of social capital, Lin (1999) posits that social 
capital is essentially comprised two interacting elements: a durable social network 
and the accessibility of resources passing through the connection ties. A key 
concern for disaster managers adopting this interpretation of social capital is the 
effect social ties have on resources and the level of assistance these connections 
can offer (Nakagawa and Shaw, 2004; Murphy, 2007). 
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In contrast to Bordieu’s social network approach, Putnam (2000) describes social 
capital in relation to connections between individuals and social networks. In 
particular, Bordieu focuses on relationship attributes, such as reciprocity and 
trustworthiness, arising from these connections. Putnam’s theory features aspects 
of social organisation applied to groups and communities rather than to individuals 
(Woolcock, 2001; Bhandari and Yasunobu, 2009). Putnam posits that cohesive 
communities, who interact well during normal circumstances, have a greater 
potential to interact effectively during a disaster. FEMA (2011) validate this thinking 
by stating that the many features of a cohesive community are also features that 
may foster disaster resilience.  
3.8.2 Social connections and disaster resilience  
 
Following a community disruption people come together to assist each other, and it 
is this demonstration of social capital, which is referred to as the “core engine of 
recovery” (Aldrich, 2012). Strong social networks help survivors access information, 
support and recover faster (Von Meding, 2013). Similarly, the Committee on 
Disaster Research in the Social Sciences of the National Research Council (2009) 
highlights the integral role social capital plays in bolstering a community’s resilience. 
It details the ability of social capital to galvanise existing relationships of trust, assist 
community problem solving and limit conflict (National Research Council, 2009). 
Norris et al, (2008) further emphasises the importance of psychological social 
capital to resilience. Norris highlights that social bonds have the ability to foster a 
“sense of community”, “place attachment”, and “citizen participation”. 
 
Having highlighted the benefits of social capital to disaster recovery, Carpenter 
(2013) argues for the need to strengthen social connections. Galvanising social 
connections should be a key objective of disaster interventions, rather than a mere 
by-product (Carpenter, 2013). Alexander (2012) believes social networks provide an 
informal safety net during difficult times, assisting communities to mobilise essential 
resources promptly after a disaster. However, the challenge remains on how best to 
alter the mindset of stakeholders towards prioritising and strengthening social 
capital as a key objective of all interventions (Gannon, 2013).  
Social capital has also been described in terms of its positive influence on resilience 
change (Aldrich, 2012). Field (2008) argues social capital based on trust is the 
‘social glue’ holding post-disaster communities together. This ‘social glue’ is 
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founded on feelings of responsibility, participation and concern for others (Woolcock 
and Narayan, 2000; Roberts and Lacey, 2008) and is instrumental in helping people 
cope with and recover from disaster (Cutter et al, 2003). Patterson et al (2011) 
demonstrate that strong social connections facilitate the creation of bottom-up 
responses and the organisation of community resources. Social networks are 
consistently highlighted as an important factor in community resilience, and 
attempts to operationalise the link between social connections and resilient 
communities have not waned (Cutter et al, 2003; Paton, 2003; Patterson et al, 
2011). 
3.9 Conclusion 
The literature review has highlighted a growing concern surrounding the issue of the 
increasing frequency and magnitude of disasters worldwide. The ability to enable 
communities to become more resilient is a key thread evident in the literature. This 
realisation has created the impetus to include the entire fabric of the community 
within the disaster process. Whilst the literature has historically focused on the 
disaster response phase, the recovery and reconstruction phases offer unique 
opportunities for the community to go beyond rebuilding the status quo.  By 
contrast, these post-disaster phases seek to transform the community into a new 
trajectory, by building back better. Harnessing local capacity in this manner can 
significantly improve resilience in the face of a future disaster.  
The literature review supports the notion that socially engaged communities display 
higher resilience than those who are not connected. By fostering social capital, 
communities can harness their own capacity more easily, enabling them to not only 
recover but also ‘build back better’. The recovery and reconstruction process is not 
just about physical recovery but equally about the social recovery of the community. 
The literature review has highlighted that social and physical reconstruction efforts 
are inextricably linked. The physical structure of the built environment has the 
potential to serve a facilitating role in the creation of greater social connections. It 
acts as backdrop for social interaction, facilitating the mobilisation of resources and 
capacity to expedite disaster recovery. The desire to ‘build back better’, instead of 
reinstating the status quo, is imprinted in resilient communities.  
Chapter two and Chapter three have examined the theoretical and contextual 
components of this research and provide the basis for a hypothesis to be developed 
and tested during the empirical phase of the investigation. Chapter four follows with 
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an evaluation of existing resilience frameworks, in order to inform the development 
























































Resilience is a diverse term, adopted across many disciplines (Alexander, 2013). 
Chapter 3 highlighted how its many interpretations have led to a lack of consensus 
surrounding the term. It is however largely accepted that the concept offers its 
greatest benefit within development work (Schoon, 2005). Increasingly, it is 
recognised that resilience plays an integral role in expediting post-disaster recovery 
(UNDP, 2012). In particular, Chapter 3 highlighted the value of community resilience 
activities within a resource limited environment (Alexander, 2012). Despite the 
recognised value of community resilience, operationalising the concept remains a 
challenge (Bahadur, 2015). 
 
The literature review (Chapter 3) identified factors likely to contribute to community 
resilience. However, discussion on the precise components has been rather broad 
and lacking the specificity required for implementation (Bene, 2013). Meeting 
Objective 3 of the thesis, this chapter seeks to enhance the limited understanding of 
the core drivers of resilience, which can act as “levers” for building resilience. 
However, the resilience concept is fraught with complexities associated with 
‘systems thinking’ which adds to the complexity of the task (emBRACE, 2012a). For 
example, challenges such as cross-scalar interaction and non-equilibrium dynamics 
have been found to complicate the transition from theoretical to practically 
implemented frameworks (Bahadur et al, 2013; Quinlan, 2014). Further, many of the 
frameworks appear to be new, rather than built on earlier research. As a result, 
many of the frameworks do not benefit from the lessons learned in previous 
iterations.  
 
To help address this gap, the chapter undertakes a review of the extant resilience 
frameworks (n=77) is undertaken in the following Section 4.2. ‘Frameworks’, in the 
context of this research, refers to a roadmap designed to systemise the concepts 
and components of resilience into an operational process. The review highlights 
tensions, commonalities and differences between existing frameworks (Section 4.3), 
In doing so, the analysis informs the creation of a ‘resilience lens’ to be applied 
across a list of 33 frameworks in Section 4.4. The list of 33 frameworks is limited to 
the context of this thesis and, as such, comprises only those frameworks which are: 
(1) located within a disaster context; and (2) practical in nature.  
 
The ‘resilience lens’ identifies five criteria for evaluation across the distilled list of 
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frameworks. These were: (1) holistic systems approach; (2) dynamic capacity; (3) 
multiple scales; (4) empirical grounding; and (5) mixed methods methodology. 
Informed by the framework analysis (Section 4.5), Section 4.6 starts the framework 
development process by identifying the integral components/assets of resilience 
common across existing frameworks. This section differentiates between ‘dynamic’ 
and ‘inherent’ resilience and outlines the four ‘community assets’ comprising Phase 
1 of the Framework. Section 4.7 follows by outlining the four key components 
emerging from this analysis of ‘dynamic’ resilience (Phase 2). This section 
examines these four components, (namely: risk; dynamic resources and capacities; 
connectedness and learning), by reference to their operation within existing 
frameworks. Further, it describes the process of analysis used (within qualitative 
analysis software NVivo) to identify appropriate sub-components within the four 
core components. Section 4.8 closes the chapter by presenting an overview of the 
proposed thesis Framework. Figure 4.1 below illustrates the location of this chapter 
within the overall context of the thesis. 
Figure 4.1 Position of Chapter 4 within the thesis structure.   
4.2 Overview of existing frameworks 
 
The intention of this section is to analyse a broad variety of resilience interpretations 
and assessments currently employed in order to contextualise resilience in practice. 
The analysis used key search terms to scan extant frameworks within international, 
academic, electronic databases (Scopus; Taylor and Francis Online; Wiley Online 
Library; Science Direct; and Google Scholar). The search was based on the title, 
keywords and abstract. Multiple search words were used, including (community) 
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AND (resilience) AND (disaster) AND (crisis) AND (emergency) AND (framework) 
AND (analysis) AND (evaluation) NOT (plant OR forest OR fish). As the focus of 
resilience is on socio-ecological systems, the “NOT” category was included to avoid 
solely ecological systems. Grey literature was included as it comprises a significant 
portion of operationalised resilience frameworks. A process of discriminative 
snowball sampling followed, whereby further relevant literature was highlighted from 
within the initial data sources (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). The qualitative analysis 
software NVivo was employed to filter and organise the sources into a resilience 
matrix table. This outlined the year, author organisation, geography, resilience focus 
and applied level of the framework. In total 77 frameworks were identified for 
evaluation.  
In line with these categorisations, the following section reviews the frameworks in 
respect of their: (1) resilience focus; (2) frequency trends; (3) geographical location 
and (4) level of analysis.  In the first instance, it was necessary to define the focus 
of the analysis, which Yin (2014) refers to as the ‘parameters of the system’. 
Adopting inductive parameters of analysis, ‘open coding’ (Strauss and Corbin, 
1990) was conducted through an iterative process of analyses, categorisation and 
comparison of data into themes within ‘nodes’ in NVivo. Subsequent ‘axial coding’4 
created sub-themes within nodes through the identification of relationships among 
the open codes (Strauss and Corbin 1990). Finally, selective coding identified core 
variables by merging and synthesising overlapping themes (Lawrence and Tar, 
2013). For example, health and well-being resilience were included under the theme 
of ‘vulnerability’. Figure 4.2 below illustrates the dominant and overlapping 
resilience themes emerging from the framework data set within this research. In 
order of frequency of occurrence, they comprised: disaster, community, resilience 





                                                
4 Axial coding  is a process involving inductive and deductive analysis,  where coding themes and categories are 









Figure 4.2 Resilience focus of 77 framework dataset.  
A review of the framework data set indicated that ‘resilience thinking’ has gained 
traction across geographies, as illustrated in Figure 4.2. An analysis of frequency 
trends revealed a growth in framework output from 2007 onwards (Figure 4.3). A 
peak in 2010 was attributed to increased output from larger international 
organisations, such as the American and Canadian Red Cross, United Nations and 
Arup (Arup Group Limited). This growth in ‘resilience thinking’ may be attributed to 
the resilience agenda embedded within the Hyogo Frameworks for Action (HFA), 
published in 2005. The knock-on influence of the HFA could be seen through the 
emergence of seminal works on resilience frameworks, including: Twigg (2007; 
2009); Cutter (2008; 2010); and Norris et al (2008). These pioneering works created 
a foundation for many subsequent frameworks. It was important to note that, whilst 
an author may develop a framework in one country, its intended application may be 
for an entirely different geography (Figure 4.4). For example, it was found that some 
frameworks developed in the United States were actually designed to be applied 
within an African context (DFID,2000). Consequently, it was important to analyse 
frameworks not only by their affiliated author but also by the region of study or the 


















Figure 4.3 Frequency of framework output.  
 
 
Figure 4.4 Geographical representation of intended implementation of frameworks according 
to year and frequency produced.  
 
With respect to the geographic origin of the frameworks, the analysis revealed  
developed countries contributed the bulk of the knowledge concerning resilience. In 
total, 61% of authors were either independent authors or affiliated with research 
centres in the developed world. The remaining frameworks from the developing 
world dealt with Africa (9.5%); South East Asia (8%); and South America (3%). 
 
As regards to the applied frameworks, the highest percentage of implemented 
research is located in Asia (15.5%) and Africa (13%). North America produced the 
greatest output of resilience frameworks, however not all frameworks were 
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designed for implementation within North America. Research focused on the 
International perspective accounted for 15.5% of all papers. It was found that 42% 
of all papers were theoretical in nature and presented no empirical analysis.  
 
Interestingly, it was noted that the majority of research in respect of the developing 
world was actually conducted in developed countries. The majority of academic 
literature originated in developed countries, which raises questions as to how 
accessible this research is to the developing world. By contrast, practically-
orientated grey literature originated mostly in the developing world. This may be 
attributed to the greater demand for practical frameworks in the developing world. 
These findings suggest that improved promotion and dissemination of research in 
the developing world, (in particular South America, Africa and South East Asia) is 
required, in order to advance/promote academic research in the developing world. 
This evidence is in line with findings from the GSDRC Governance, Social 
Development, Humanitarian Knowledge Services (2013), who report on the limited 
geographic scope of extant frameworks. Table 4.1 outlines an overview of the 77 
frameworks reviewed. The community focus of the analysis is highlighted by the fact 
that 83% of these frameworks are located at the community level.  




The above section has outlined the extant framework data-set (n=77). In order to 
analyse the frameworks in more detail, it was first necessary to develop a ‘resilience 
lens’ to guide the analysis. The following section explains the process used to 
develop this ‘lens’.   
4.3 Development of a framework for analysis 
The varied interpretation of resilience has led to the development of numerous 
frameworks and methodologies to assess and analyse the concept. When taken 
together, the various conceptualisations of resilience within the frameworks (n=77), 
suggest that resilience is a comprehensive and robust concept.  However, the 
diverse range of interpretations also points to the challenges that arise when the 
concept is operationalised. In particular, a ‘one size fits all’ framework approach, 
accommodating all facets of the varied disciplinary divides, appears to be idealistic 
and unfeasible (Bahadur, 2011; National Research Council, 2015). As such, an 
explicit outline of the rationale to/for a resilience assessment is a critical prerequisite 
to an appropriate assessment in practice.  
When devising a lens for analysis, it was important to determine the key tensions 
and core characteristics of a resilient system. To this end, NVivo’s ‘query’ function 
was used to identify frequently occurring words, phrases or concepts within the 
framework data set (Figure 4.5). In total, five core themes emerged as influencing 
resilience systems, namely: holistic systems thinking; static and dynamic resilience; 
multi-scalar; mixed methods; and empirical assessment. These five themes formed 
‘cases’ in NVivo, where coded text could be stored for analysis. The following 
section provides detail of these five ‘themes’ and outlines the key criteria/ tensions 
within existing frameworks. The section concludes with a set of five criteria to 


























Figure 4.5 NVivo text query results. 
4.3.1 Holistic resilience approach  
The above-mentioned themes form the lens through which the framework dataset 
will be reviewed in this section. Taking each theme in turn, this section begins with 
the first theme ‘holistic systems thinking’. Despite various interpretations of the 
resilience concept, it is apparent that the definitions within the frameworks adhere to 
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a ‘systems approach’ to change (Folke, 2006; Wisner et al, 2007). However, despite 
this commonality, the absence of a clearly defined, systematic approach towards 
conceptualising a resilient system, is impeding operationalisation (Pasteur, 2011; 
Practical Action, 2014).  
Of the frameworks reviewed, 45% partially adopted a resilient systems approach, 
while 55% fully accounted for the inter-connectedness between resilience systems. 
The primary objective of a systems approach is not to focus on ‘specified’ resilience 
to a particular threat, rather, it looks to build the adaptive capacity necessary to deal 
with a range of disturbances across the system. ‘Systems thinking’ seeks to 
combine a portfolio of strategies, resources and actors to address potential 
uncertainty in the system (UNDP, 2007). The Livelihoods Framework, as proposed 
by TANGO (2007), argues that the overarching objective of a ‘holistic’ resilience 
approach is to inform stakeholders (local, regional, national level) of the myriad of 
factors and processes that can impact upon a system’s resilience level. 
 
4.3.2 Static or dynamic interpretation of resilience 
 
Addressing uncertainty requires a multi-dimensional and dynamic capacity within 
resilient systems (Bene, 2012). The dynamic response to increasing uncertainty 
makes it difficult to capture the transformative characteristics of resilience at any 
one point (Armitage et al, 2012). Indeed, the review of 77 frameworks revealed that 
only 33% of the frameworks addressed the interaction between different dimensions 
of resilience (Table 4.4), and it is this process of interaction that is integral to an 
understanding of transformational resilience (Walker et al, 2004).  
 
The review also indicated that the inter-connected relationship between vulnerability 
and resilience strongly influences the choice to adopt a ‘static’ or ‘dynamic’ 
interpretation of resilience (Constas and Frankenberger, 2013). As discussed in 
Chapter 3, ‘resilience’ and ‘vulnerability’ are concepts in their own right, however 
there is substantial debate as to whether and how the two concepts are distinct 
(Constas and Frankenberger, 2013; Gall, 2013; Cutter et al, 2014). Disaster 
literature has however witnessed a shift in thinking, where communities are now 
viewed in respect of their ability to transform in the face of adversity, as opposed to 
the traditional interpretation of a community as vulnerable to disaster events 
(Constas and Frankenberger, 2013). From this perspective, disaster recovery 
assessments no longer focus on static stressors such as exposure and sensitivity, 
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formerly associated with vulnerability (IPCC, 2008). Instead, focus has shifted 
towards the community’s dynamic capacity (resilience).  
 
Beyond the vulnerability/resilience debate, this section also differentiates between 
frameworks which view resilience as a process of adaptive change rather than 
simply a static outcome. The premise of socio-ecological systems is that the system 
embraces change in order to absorb shocks and undergo a process of development 
when required (Holling, 1973; Mayena, 2006). The level of behavioral change 
required has been framed in terms of its dynamic positioning on the continuum of 
resilience (absorb-adapt-transform) (Speranza, 2013). First steps in resilience 
change may be interpreted as a system’s ability to resist or buffer threats. For 
instance, Walker and Salt (2006:p164) refer to resilience as the ability of 
communities to ‘absorb’ or ‘withstand’ shocks and disturbances, such that the 
“system remains within the same regime, essentially maintaining its structure 
function and feedbacks”. Further along the continuum, resilience can be framed in 
terms of its ability to embrace change and adapt in the face of adversity (Norris et 
al, 2008). Finally, Folke (2006) frames the concept not only by reference to a 
system’s ability to incrementally adapt over time (multiple equilibria) but also, past a 
certain point, the system’s capacity to transform into a more sustainable trajectory 
(Gunderson, 2010). As such, instability within the status quo may demand that the 
system transform into a new more sustainable trajectory.  
 
A recent example of a dynamic approach to resilience assessment is offered by 
Christian Aid (2016). Adopting a “holistic, adaptive and integrated approach”, the 
framework focuses on building resilience as a process rather than an outcome 
(Christian Aid, 2016:p2). The framework describes itself as a “community-led 
process”, which seeks to “empower communities to manage risk”, thus leaving the 
community in an improved position relative to its pre-disaster state (Christian Aid, 
2016:p2). By building capacity within communities, the framework seeks to enable 
communities to mobilise their resources and capacities to anticipate threats, self-
organise and absorb or adapt to uncertainty (change) when required. Overall, the 
framework describes resilience as an iterative, capacity-building process to enable 
to communities to adapt and change in response to uncertainty. 
 
Understanding how a system changes internally, in terms of its ability to withstand 
disturbances and its capacity to absorb, adapt or transform, is integral to resilience 
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building (BRACED, 2017). In particular, understanding how the different phases of 
change progress along the continuum of resilience (adsorb, adapt, transform), 
ultimately informs the timing and nature of management interventions (Alexandra, 
2012). Investigating interactions between different dimensions is a necessary 
prerequisite to analysing how the different components and resources shape 
community resilience (Burton, 2012).  
4.3.3 Defining multiple levels and scales 
 
The second theme recognises ‘scale of analysis’ as a critical aspect of how a 
system is defined (Renschler et al, 2010). It does so by analysing the importance of 
‘multi-scalar relationships’ within frameworks. As discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 
3.3), scales are interdependent and rely on the dynamic relationship between one 
another (panarchy) in order to cope, adapt or transform (Renaud et al, 2010; 
Quinlan et al, 2016). Garchagen et al (2011) reaffirms this thinking, noting that 
component shifts at one scale can affect what happens at other scales. For 
example, individuals operate within a household unit, which operates within a 
community, which in turn operates within a wider system of governance (Barrett and 
Constas, 2012).  
 
Managing a resilient system, therefore, requires an appreciation of what is 
happening at multiple scales (Burton, 2012). This underlines the importance of 
capturing multi-scalar dynamics in order to attain a true assessment of resilience. In 
particular, Bene (2012) points out how the promotion of multi-scalar general 
resilience can enhance long-term resilience through support at the local, regional 
and national scale.  
4.3.4 Metrics and indicators 
The ability to assess or measure resilience empirically is a fundamental step in 
seeking to operationalise the concept (UNDP, 2012). The analysis revealed that 
less than half of the 77 frameworks reviewed were grounded in empirical evidence. 
Furthermore, many of the resilience frameworks reviewed have not yet been 
empirically tested. This is particularly true at the urban level, where data and 
sources of information remain very limited (Bosetti et al, 2016). Indeed, Thomas 
Windel of UNDP (2014:p19) stated that “no general measurement framework for 
disaster resilience has been empirically verified yet”.  
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Many framework examples such as Mayunga’s (2007) heavily cited “Capital based 
approach” are not founded on empirical data, drawing only on an analysis of 
existing concepts. Nevertheless, Mayunga’s work has acted as a foundation for 
more recent frameworks. One such example is the ‘Resilience score’ by Zurich et al 
(2016), which uses Mayungas’ 5 capitals’ approach as a foundational platform, but 
includes an additional empirical element. A further attempt to address the lack of 
empirically tested frameworks was devised by Silva and Morena (2014) through 
their “City Resilience Framework” (Rockefeller Foundation/Arup). This framework 
compiles empirical data and was informed by a combination of interviews, focus 
group discussions and workshops across 6 cities worldwide. It stands as a 
pioneering step towards bridging the empirical gap within existing resilience 
frameworks.  
The above review of frameworks highlights issues in respect of resilience 
assessments which neglect the dynamic nature of resilience (Burton, 2012; UNDP, 
2012; UNDP, 2014; Bahadur, 2015). The review found that measuring resilience in 
a traditional manner, through quantifiable indicator data, presents a significant 
challenge (Pelling, 2011). It was found that quantitative indicators only present a 
static snapshot of resilience and fail to capture the dynamics of the concept in 
practice. Despite the difficulties attached to standardising a dynamic concept and 
process, attempts have been made to develop an indicator-based approach to 
assess and measure resilience (ODI, 2011). To this end, extant frameworks 
highlight the ability of indicator proxies to provide a flexible approach to collect and 
assess data across multiple scales (Cutter, 2008; Arup, 2014; Bahadur, 2014).  
4.4 Analytical approach 
 
This section outlines the application of the resilience lens developed in the previous 
section. To enable a more in-depth analysis, the data-set of frameworks was refined 
to a manageable number of frameworks. The focus of this research is on 
operationalising the resilience concept. As such, the following analysis was 
restricted to those frameworks which were of a practical nature and situated within a 
disaster hazards context. Consequently, further refinement of the initial data set in 






Table 4.2 Review of 33 operational frameworks to evaluate components.  
 
 
Distilling the current state of knowledge on frameworks in this way will inform the 
framework design of this thesis. Applying the lens outlined in Section 4.3, the 
following section describes the current state of knowledge and application of 
frameworks in relation to the five analysis criteria. It is anticipated that analysis of 
practical frameworks (n=33) will highlight gaps within extant frameworks and inform 
the design of the proposed thesis Framework. The ‘resilience lens’ analysis criteria 
are listed in Table 4.3, then applied and discussed further in the following section. 
 
Table 4.3 Proposed analytical lens for framework analysis.  
 







Resilience thinking is systems thinking 
 
Dynamic Capacity Frameworks ability to capture the absorptive, adaptive and 
transformative capacities of the system 
Resilience or vulnerability 
Outcome or output 
Asset or process  
Multiple scales Defining multiple levels, states and scales 
Empirical  Empirical grounding 
Mixed Methods Qualitative or quantitative (combined methods) 
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4.4.1 Holistic resilience approach 
 
Chapter 3 identified a shift in thinking within research, such that disasters are no 
longer viewed simply as ‘Acts of God’ (hazard), rather they are a function of human 
influence. As such, resilient systems now recognise both the ‘social’ (human) and 
‘ecological’ (hazard), aligned with the socio-ecological interpretation of resilience. In 
this vein, the importance of “systemic thinking” emerged strongly across the majority 
of reviewed frameworks, particularly those encompassing a socio-ecological 
approach (Turner et al, 2003; Arup, 2010; USAID, 2013; IFRC, 2014; Keating et al, 
2015; NIST, 2015; Emergency Management Victoria, 2016). An example of this 
paradigm shift towards holistic system frameworks is reflected in Arup’s City 
Resilience Framework (Rockefeller Foundation, 2014), which underlines the 
importance of adopting systems thinking. In particular, Arup argue that resilience is 
applicable to cities “…because they are complex systems that are constantly 
adapting to changing circumstances”. Acknowledging the interaction between the 
social (human) and the environmental (city), the framework embodies this strand of 
resilience thinking in a more tangible way by including seven qualities and twelve 
indicators of resilience that fall into four separate categories. It is argued that these 
elements are nested within each other and come together in different configurations 
to determine the resilience of particular urban contexts. Arup’s framework 
emphasises the inevitable interconnection between different elements of a resilient 
system. As such, this framework acknowledges the need for concurrent change 
across human and ecological systems, which characterise holistic resilience 
thinking (Ramalingam, 2008). 
4.4.2 Static or dynamic interpretation of resilience 
 
The analysis found a number of frameworks which do not explicitly align with the 
key assumptions of ‘systems thinking’. Instead, they provide a static list of issues or 
vulnerabilities that have the potential to reduce resilience without discussing how 
the interplay between these vulnerabilities influences resilience levels (Mayunga, 
2007; IOTWS, 2007).  
Despite the increasing relevance of ‘resilience thinking’ (discussed in Section 4.4), 
many frameworks were still found to hold a vulnerability focus (DFID, 1999; Turner 
et al, 2003; Wisner et al, 2004; Cutter, 2010; Pasteur, 2011). One of the more 
recognised frameworks is the Pressure and Release (PAR) framework (Figure 4.7), 
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which focuses on a social interpretation of resilience (Wisner et al, 2004). Wisner’s 
framework is based on the idea that the extent of disaster impact has more to do 
with the vulnerability (low capacity) of the affected community than the hazard 
agent. It argues that inherent vulnerability within a community affects its ability to 
respond and recover from an adverse event. As such, if a hazard occurs in an area 
but there is no vulnerable community, then there is no disaster. Figure 4.6 illustrates 
how a disaster situation is worsened by three levels of processes, namely: root 
cause of vulnerability; limited resources; and an uncertain environment. The figure 
indicates that if these three processes (left of figure) meet a hazard agent (right of 
figure), then disruption and disaster will occur.  
 
Figure 4.6 Pressure and release (PAR) model. Source: Wisner et al, 2004. 
 
Turner et al (2003) seek to re-address the ‘static’ interpretation of resilience. Taking 
on a pioneering, holistic approach, their framework examines resilience through a 
‘systems thinking’ lens. In doing so, it evaluates resilience from both a human and 
an ecological perspective. The overarching aim of the framework is to limit the long-
term vulnerability of the system to future uncertainty (Figure 4.7). As such, the 
framework focuses on the dynamic interplay between the five core community 
assets (social, physical, environment, economic and political) and system 
vulnerability (Birkmann, 2006). Unlike the Pressure and Release model, this 
conceptual framework takes into account the concept of adaptation. Turner views 
change as an integral element of systems thinking, which positively impacts 
resilience levels. This marks a step towards accounting for the dynamic attributes of 
 93 
resilience, and marks a shift away from the focus on vulnerability and hazards, 
towards a more holistic approach to resilience.  
 
Accepting that resilience requires dynamic adaptation, Bahadur (2015) highlights 
the need for ‘systems thinking’ within ‘resilience thinking’.  A ‘systems thinking’ 
approach moves away from a ‘static’ focus on vulnerabilities towards understanding 
and developing capacity to adapt to uncertainties. Systems thinking was found to 
incorporate strategies that enable a community to advance along the continuum of 
resilience, by either absorbing, adapting or transforming in response to disturbances 
(Bene, 2012). In relation to the frameworks reviewed, a significant proportion 
concentrate on the ‘absorb’ element of resilience (IOTWS, 2007; Twigg, 2009; 
DFID, 2011; Tulane University, 2012). Twigg’s (2009:p8) “Characteristics of a 
Disaster Resilient Community” is one such framework, which seeks to capture the 
absorptive aspect of resilience by describing resilient communities’ capacity to 
“absorb potential stresses or destructive forces…. and maintain certain basic 
functions… or ‘bounce back’ after an event”.  
 
 
Figure 4.7 Turner’s Global Framework. Source: Calgaro and Lloyd, 2008. 
 
On the other hand, the ‘Baseline Resilience Indicators for Communities’ (BRIC) 
Model for understanding community resilience, developed by Cutter et al (2010), 
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moves one step further on the continuum of resilience towards ‘adaptive’ capacity. 
Despite concentrating on system recovery after a shock, it also incorporates 
medium-term learning and social adaptation in response to changing patterns of 
risk. Other frameworks within the reviewed data-set (n=33) highlight the importance 
of adaptive capacity towards building resilience including: IOTWS, 2007; Renschler 
et al, 2010; Bahadur, 2010; Cutter, 2010; Rockefeller Foundation, 2014; UNDP, 
2014; Emergency Management Victoria 2016 (Table 4.2). 
 
An attempt to move further along the continuum of resilience (towards 
transformation) was devised by Tierney and Bruneau (2007) through their 4Rs 
framework. Their framework sets out what they view as the four core components of 
an adaptive and resilient system, namely: robustness; rapidity; redundancy; and 
resourcefulness. Bruneau refers to ‘robustness’ or persistence as the ability of a 
system of a system to be able to buffer or “withstand” a disruption whilst still 
maintaining the essential function of the system. ‘Redundancy’ refers to excess 
capacity, which enables a system to maintain essential functions despite a 
disruptive event. ‘Resourcefulness’ (referred to as ‘adaptation’ in other frameworks) 
refers to a system’s ability to adapt and respond when faced with adversity. This 
flexibility enables the system to exploit the opportunities that disasters present by 
positively adapting into a more sustainable trajectory (Tierney and Bruneau, 2007; 
Alexander, 2012). Finally, ‘rapidity’ refers to the time dimension of the system and 
the capacity to achieve goals on time.  The 4Rs framework makes a valuable 
contribution to the development of long-term resilience by presenting an 
understanding of the key system components and dimensions required to develop 
transformational resilience. 
 
The above examples have largely dealt with the levels of change/adaptation on the 
continuum of resilience (absorb, adapt and transform), as isolated and excluding 
capacities (Bene, 2012). Conceptualising resilience in this manner excludes the 
potential for synergy between the three states of change. For example, absorption 
or maintenance of the status quo alone is not a desirable end state; whereas, 
absorptive and adaptive capacity combined can ultimately lead to transformational 
resilience (Kahler, 2013). Frankenberger (2012:p4) sums up the importance of inter-
connectedness between ‘states’ (absorb, adapt, transform) by referring to the 
capacities and components of resilient systems as “mutually reinforcing”, and 
existing at “multiple levels”.  
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4.4.3 Scale of analysis and multiple states 
 
Despite advances in holistic adaptive capacity, the omission of ‘scale’, as a 
fundamental aspect of any resilience assessment, has been criticised in the 
literature (Frankenberger, 2012; emBRACE, 2012a). Overall, the review found that 
more than half of the subject frameworks partially addressed the issue of scale and 
only a quarter accounted fully for the issue. The concept of multiple-scales and 
levels is important within system-based frameworks, as the parameters that affect 
communities may change from community to community (Renschler et al, 2010; 
Community Regional Resilience, 2013). Frameworks were found to operate at 
multiple scales and on a cross-scalar basis (Community Regional Resilience, 2013; 
Schipper, 2015). Similarly, Garchagen et al (2011) highlight the importance of 
component shifts in systems, recognising that what happens in a system at one 
scale can have a knock-on effect at higher or lower scales.  
 
Results from a study on resilient living in Africa by Tufts University Feinstein 
International Centre revealed that previous attempts to assess resilience focused on 
an isolated, stable state of “equilibrium”. Further studies, such as the example of 
FAO’s sustainable livelihoods research in Uganda in 2016,  
 
The review revealed that previous attempts to assess resilience primarily focused 
on an isolated, stable state of “equilibrium” (coping). By contrast a limited number of 
the frameworks focused on the “dynamics” of resilience analysis (DFID, 1999; 
ADPC, 2006; Miles and Chang, 2011; Community Regional Resilience, 2013; 
Keating et al, 2016). These frameworks focused on identifying how livelihoods 
adapt and change over time (rather than one particular state) in response to 
uncertainty.  
A frequently cited example of a framework operating across multiple-scales is the 
‘Sustainable Livelihoods Framework’ shown in Figure 4.8 (DFID, 1999). The 
framework reflects the interdependency of its components at the human and 
environmental level. The framework recognises both the need for humans to be 
dynamic as well as the approach to learning and adaptation (Kollmair et al, 2002). 
Presenting the SLA approach, the asset pentagon illustrates that communities 
possess inherent resilience actions that can be drawn upon to allow communities to 
achieve their own objectives.  The assets listed in the framework comprise: human, 
natural, financial, social and physical. The framework recognises the influence that 
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social (human), institutional and governmental (policies) environments have upon 
the mobilsation of these assets. The framework was designed on the basis that the 
relationship between these three players (social, institutional, political) influences 
the manner in which communities mobilise their assets to build resilience. 
Figure 4.8 Sustainable livelihoods framework (SLA). Source: DFID, 1999. 
 
The preceding section outlined how a meaningful resilience assessment needs to 
account for cross-scalar (multiple stable states/equilibrium) dynamics between both 
humans and assets (Barrett and Constas, 2013; Bene, 2013). The section 
highlighted how resilience is inherently a multi-scalar phenomenon (absorb, adapt, 
transform) and any effective assessment needs to capture data at each scale 
concurrently Bene (2013).  
 
4.4.4 Metrics and indicators 
 
Identifying the most appropriate approach and method to capture cross-scalar and 
dynamic attributes is a common source of tension within framework literature (Bene, 
2012; UNDP, 2014; Bahadur, 2015). The choice between qualitative or quantitative 
indicators was found to be an important consideration when designing an 
appropriate resilience framework (Bene, 2012). Of the frameworks reviewed, 19/33 
adopted some form of mixed-methods approach (Twigg, 2009; Miles and Chang, 
2011; NOAA, 2013; Community Regional Resilience, 2013; OXFAM, 2013; 
Rockefeller Foundation, 2014). The remaining 14/33 were either theoretical (non-
empirical) in nature of favoured a wholly qualitative or quantitative approach (Table 
4.2). Qualitative indicators in the framework literature are found to be helpful in 
highlighting characteristics of a resilient community. The flexible nature of qualitative 
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data collection allowed indicators to be grounded within a case-study approach 
(Twigg, 2009; emBRACE, 2014; emBRACE, 2015b). In this regard, qualitative 
approaches are suitable in situations where a particular community has been 
identified, together with a clear conceptualisation and interpretation of resilience 
(Bene, 2012). Of note, however, is that the specificity attached to this approach 
reduces its potential transferability (Gall, 2013).  
 
As mentioned previously, Twigg’s (2009) “Characteristics of a Disaster Resilient 
Community” is a pioneering framework that outlines (in broad terms) the core 
characteristics, components and the enabling environment that shape resilience. 
Although not fully developed, Twigg’s framework provided a foundation for 
researchers to build upon and refine. The indicators proposed in the framework are 
both outcome and process orientated, and sit under broad thematic headings, 
including: risk; funding; preparedness; social and economic capital; information and 
communication and infrastructure. Overall, Twigg’s framework highlights the 
importance of creating an enabling environment to help build resilience.  
 
Qualitative approaches, such as Twigg’s, offer an effective means of assessing the 
multi-scalar characteristics of resilience. The flexibility of the qualitative approach 
allows assessment of the human and, often intangible, disaster recovery process. 
As such, the dynamic approach permits analysis of factors beyond tangible 
resources and assets, to include intangible resilience characteristics embedded 
within communities. In doing so, the assessment of a resilient community reflects 
not only the physical resilient conditions, but also the social factors that help to 
develop social capital and to mobilise resources and capacities (Ostadtaghizadeh et 
al, 2015).  
 
In contrast to the above, the quantitative approach to resilience indicators sees 
resilience as a “set of networked adaptive capacities” (Norris et al, 2008). The 
framework quantitatively assesses the interplay between the networked capacities. 
The framework proposes that the effective interplay between these five 
components/networked capacities (social, economic, community, institutional, 
environmental) will produce a strategy for long-term disaster readiness. However, 
Norris’s more rigid (quantitative) approach to disaster readiness has been criticised 
within the literature, as it does not fully account for the dynamic and intangible 
aspects of community resilience. The literature argues that over-emphasis on the 
five stand-alone networked capacities, overlooks the intangible subtleties of 
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resilience (emBRACE, 2012b; Sharifi and Yamagata, 2016). In this regard, the 
multi-faceted character of resilience is limited to a ‘static snapshot of resilience’, 
focused on resilience outcomes, paying scant attention to the overall resilience 
process (Kim-Cohen and Turkewitz, 2012; Cutter et al, 2014). In a similar vein, 
Tyler (2014) argues that a quantitative ‘snapshot’ cannot fairly represent the 
complexity of resilience. Restricting assessment to a certain point in time fails to 
recognise that resilience is an outcome of a complex process, which only presents 
itself through interaction and development over time (Kim-Cohen and Turkewitz, 
2012). 
 
Another frequently-cited quantitative approach is Cutter’s DROP model (2008) 
(Figure 4.9). As discussed previously (Section 4.4.1), this framework adopts a 
holistic, systems thinking approach. Cutter views the community as a holistic 
system, within which vulnerability and resilience are inherent. Uniquely, the 
framework assesses both inherent resilience (ability to operate during non-disaster 
times) and adaptive resilience (ability to function during and after a disaster event). 
Addressing the first form of resilience (inherent) required the collection and analysis 
of 29 variables using predominantly open-source data. Whilst Cutter’s quantitative 
methodology is known for its holistic and comprehensive nature, it remains reliant 
on national data sources. In this regard, Cutter’s selection of quantitative data-
sources is criticised in the literature as being ‘out-dated’ (lagging effect), and 
insensitive to the nuances of the community scale (Ostadtaghizadeh et al, 2015).  
 
 




Table 4.4 below further reflects the difficulty assessing resilience, highlighting that a 
minority of frameworks reviewed did not attempt to assess the resilience concept 
empirically. Ultimately, both qualitative and quantitative indicator methods have their 
merits depending on the context and objective of the resilience framework.  
4.5 Key insights going forward 
The review of existing frameworks provided insights into the assessment, evaluation 
and framing of resilience, which in turn underpins the proposed framework. Systems 
thinking and the multi-dimensional aspect of resilience were threads carried through 
most of the frameworks. ‘Systems thinking’ was embraced holistically and 
meaningfully by some frameworks, whereas others highlighted the core tenets of 
resilience but only discussed its application briefly in practice.  
The analysis reveals that holistic ‘systems thinking’ is embedded within the majority 
of frameworks, either partially (35 of 77) or fully (42 of 77). However, despite this 
progress in resilience thinking, hesitancy to engage with the operationalisation of 
the concept is apparent in both the lack of empirical data and empirically tested 
frameworks (UNDP,2014; Bahadur, 2015). Overall, a minority of frameworks were 
found to have no empirical grounding, which raises questions about the practical 
validity of some extant frameworks. The analysis recognises advances in systems 
thinking within frameworks and further acknowledges the need to integrate the core 
tenet of systems thinking more rigorously in new frameworks. Furthermore, 
capturing and measuring the dynamic characteristics of resilient systems remains a 
key challenge for the operationalisation of the concept going forward.  
Along the continuum of resilience (cope, adapt, transform), it was noted that the 
frameworks engaged least with the concept of transformational resilience. It was 
found that frameworks tended to focus on adaptation or absorption, rather than 
transformation. Furthermore, many focused on these capacities in isolation (short-
term), rather than on the process of system adaptation along the continuum of 
resilience (long-term). Frameworks reflecting transformational resilience, regarded it 
as the ability to transform into a more sustainable trajectory when the existing 
situation became unstable (Action Aid, 2014). The absence of attempts to 
operationalise transformational resilience is arguably a reflection of its emergent 
nature and ambiguity (Bahadur, 2014). However, there is a clear argument within 
the literature, defending its potential and which calls for a more robust integration of 
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the relationship between resilience and transformation (Pelling, 2011; Dodman, 
2012; Bahadur et al, 2014).  
The frameworks under review highlighted the prominence of community or local 
level resilience frameworks over those at a regional or national level. On the one 
hand, this is indicative of the practical ease of adopting frameworks and strategies 
at the more manageable community/local scale (Bahadur, 2013), but equally it 
reflects the proactive role undertaken by communities and organisations at the local 
level. While the frameworks acknowledge the importance of harnessing capacity at 
the community level, the review further recognised the need to complement these 
actions with cross-scalar governmental actions (Bourton, 2012; UNDP,2012). The 
urgency to promote cross-scalar actions is catalysed by the need to measure 
targets and indicators under new inter-governmental frameworks, such as the 
Sendai Framework for Action on Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDP, 2015). Despite 
the growing acknowledgement of the importance of cross-scalar dynamics at 
community and higher levels, 18% of frameworks did not address this issue at all 
and only 24% addressed the issue gap effectively (Bene, 2012).  
Resilience metrics are fraught with difficulties and this has led to a common debate 
on qualitative versus quantitative assessments (Dodman et al, 2013).  An emerging 
trend within more recent frameworks seeks to bridge this divide by employing both 
qualitative and quantitative assessments. The review found that 57% of frameworks 
adopted this mixed-methods approach. There is no prescribed path to balance the 
qualitative and quantitative objectives in frameworks, however a common theme is 
apparent, whereby resilience is understood as a sum of assets as well as the 
process of capacity building. Quantitative methods were predominantly used to 
assess the former and qualitative approaches to understand the latter. Acceptance 
and understanding of the merits of both approaches represents a viable precedent 
for measuring resilience in the future (DFID, 2013). An overview of the analysis 






Table 4.4 Overview of resilient system analysis 
 
 
4.6 Framework development  
 
Key insights from the previous section identified the need to capture both the assets 
(inherent) and dynamic processes (learned) of resilience through a mixed-methods 
approach. Critically, the literature is sceptical of frameworks which claim to assess 
resilience based on a set of characteristics which have not been empirically 
grounded (Gall, 2013; Levine, 2014). In light of this observation, this research seeks 
to further the current assessment of resilience by embedding the framework within 
an empirical context. In doing so, it is anticipated that emerging contextual and 
empirical data will enhance the credibility and robustness of its practical resilience 
assessments (emBRACE, 2015b). To advance this process, a theoretical 
framework first needs to be devised, that can act as a tool to guide the process of 
identifying ‘dynamic’ and ‘inherent’ resilience.  
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4.6.1 Identifying Framework Assets and Components  
 
This section outlines the process of identifying the core components and 
assets/resources to be included within the proposed thesis framework. This process 
required further in-depth analysis and coding of the extant framework dataset in 
NVivo. The first step involved filtering the frameworks down to a more manageable 
number. As such, the fifteen frameworks which best met or fulfilled the five criteria 
listed in Table 4.4 only were selected for more detailed analysis. This distilled list of 
15 frameworks then underwent multi-stage coding in NVivo.  
 
First, an inductive approach to manual coding (axial-coding) was undertaken to 
create ‘nodes’ for the key themes/components which emerged. The process of 
manually coding in NVivo enabled codes to be assigned to the text and new nodes 
were created to act as ‘storage containers’ for the codes (Bazaley, 2007). Nodes 
were structured in a hierarchy, where a ‘parent’ node could hold several ‘child’ 
nodes within it. To enhance the robustness of the analysis, NVivo’s ‘query’ function 
was used to conduct word frequency searches within particular nodes. As the 
analysis progressed, more components/characteristics emerged from the data. 
Cross-cutting (relevant to more than one node) and overlapping ‘child’ nodes were 
subsequently amalgamated to synthesise the number of nodes. The process of 
refinement distilled the 52 components of resilience into a final set of 28 main 
components as listed in Table 4.5.  
 
The spread of resilience assets/components evident across the 15 frameworks 
highlighted a marked difference between frameworks that focused on the 
accumulation of existing community assets (human, economic, environment, social, 
physical), as opposed to those which sought to capture dynamic resilient capacities. 
For example, Table 4.8 below illustrates the core components of resilience identified 
within existing frameworks. The table highlights the differencing between 
frameworks based on community assets, such as the ‘whole community’ framework 
“Community and Regional Resilience Institute” (CARRI) (2013) or the 
“Measurement of Community Disaster Resilience” (MCDR), (2016). By contrast, 
frameworks accounting for wider resilience dynamics evidenced a greater diversity 
of components. Indeed, examples such as City Resilience Framework (CRF) by 
Arup (2014) and  “A Framework for Community Safety and Resilience: In the Face 
of Disaster Risk” IFRC (2008) are notable examples, which tried to capture 
elements of ‘inherent’ and ‘dynamic’ resilience. 
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4.6.2 Two phased approach to resilience assessment  
 
The research acknowledges the value of assessing ‘inherent’ baseline resilience 
through a pre-disaster capital-based assessment. In addition, the research is 
cognisant that this research lies within the post-disaster recovery phase. As such, 
there is a focus on the ‘dynamic’ capacity of a community to transform and recover 
via a more sustainable trajectory. This called for the framework to be divided into 
two phases in order to properly capture the complexity of the resilience concept. To 
account for the distinction between ‘inherent’ resilience assets and ‘dynamic’ 
resilience capacities, a mixed-methods approach was required. The following 
sections will discuss the process of capturing both ‘inherent’ (Phase 1) and 
‘dynamic’ resilience (Phase 2) resilience separately. 
 
Phase 1 captures the ‘inherent’ or baseline resilience conditions existing within a 
community. Table 4.5 illustrates the coding framework generated within NVivo, 
highlighting the core community assets, namely: physical, environment, economic 
and human. These four assets are representative of existing conditions within the 
community and, as such, should be treated as background context to be assessed 
quantitatively. The approach taken draws upon capital-based frameworks, including 
those by Cutter (2008) and Mayunga (2007). However, the ‘social’ component, 
which is viewed as a dynamic attribute, is assessed (qualitatively) together with the 
other three dynamic components in Phase 2. 
 
Phase 2 seeks to assess the ‘dynamic’ components of resilience, which a top-down 
quantitative assessment of resilience may overlook. This phase acknowledges that 
certain resilience characteristics only present themselves when a community is 
faced with an adverse event. As such, by focusing on the post-disaster phases, 
Phase 2 permits an assessment of ‘dynamic’ resilience capacity. The research 
considers the addition of a qualitative approach (Phase 2) to be more 
comprehensive, allowing the qualitative (Phase 2) and quantitative (Phase 1) 
research to be mutually reinforcing. Table 4.7 below illustrates the NVivo coding 
structure used to arrive at the four core ‘dynamic’ components, namely: risk; 
dynamic resources and capacities; connectedness; and learning. These four 
‘parent’ nodes are presented together with their respective sub-components or 
‘child’ nodes below (Table 4.7). The following sections will discuss the composition 
of these two phases in more detail.  
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Table 4.7 Systematic multi-stage analysis in NVivo, arriving at four main component 
‘themes’ (risk; dynamic resources and capacities; connectedness and learning) and four 
community assets (environment, economic, human, physical). 
 
4.6.3 Assessing ‘inherent’ resilience (phase 1)   
The literature indicates broad consensus on the core community resources/assets, 
however how to accurately assess or measure these assets remains a contentious 
subject. The Phase 1 baseline assessment draws on capital-based frameworks 
such as those by Cutter et al (2008) and Mayunga, 2007. In doing so, Phase 1 is 
centred on the four ‘inherent’ resilient resources shown to emerge most prominently 
by the NVivo framework analysis. Figure 4.10 illustrates the coding weighting 
(hierarchy of codes identified) of extant frameworks, which found the core assets to 
be: environment; economics; human; and physical (Table 4.7). The coding 
weighting was found to be evenly distributed, with the exception of ‘environment’, 
which had a slightly higher weighting (Figure 4.10). Overall, there is consensus in 
the literature that a greater reserve of these assets will lead to improved resilience 
or, conversely, a deficit can reduce resilience (Mayunga, 2007; IFRC, 2012; Silva 
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and Moreno, 2014). The process of identifying suitable variables to act as proxies 
for the four assets/resources is outlined in detail below. 
 
Figure 4.10 NVivo hierarchical coding matrix highlighting framework components and 
inherent resilience assets/resources, namely: (1) Environment; (2) Economic; (3) Human 
and (4) Physical.  
As discussed in Section 4.4, the DROP model proposed by Cutter, focuses on the 
inherent resilience of place. This multifaceted interpretation of resilience considers 
five capitals or assets, namely: economic; infrastructure (Physical); social; 
community (Human); and institutional.  The approach taken by Cutter is largely 
consistent with the four assets proposed in this Phase 1 assessment, using 
composite indicators. Composite indicators derived from open-source datasets are 
believed to be an effective means to capture ‘inherent’ resilience (pre-disaster) 
(Cutter et al, 2008). The omission of the ‘social’ and ‘institutional’ components for 
present purposes was deliberate, on the basis that the dynamics and 
connectedness of these two groups were more appropriately assessed qualitatively 
in the collective ‘connectedness’ component in Phase 2.  
The Phase 1 assessment makes no claim to enhance resilience in itself, however 
combined with Phase 2 it makes an indirect contribution by identifying areas of low 
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resilience to target intervention. Sole reliance on this form of top-down assessment 
is criticised within the literature (Bene et al, 2012; Bahadur, 2015), as national data 
sets can lack the granular detail required for community level studies.  However, 
used in addition to qualitative methods, the quantitative capital-based approach can 
inform an assessment of baseline resilience. Acknowledging the limitations of a 
quantitatively biased approach, the proposed Phase 1 approach complements 
Phase 2, ensuring a more comprehensive assessment of the complex resilience 
concept.  
4.6.4 Deductive variable selection (Phase 1) 
The next step in framework development involved the identification of variables that 
are “relevant, robust, and representative” of the four community assets and 
components (Cutter et al, 2010:p51). A review of existing databases (Appendix 1) 
indicated that, there is no consensus within the literature on an accepted set of 
standardised disaster resilience indicators. Accordingly, in respect of the four 
‘inherent’ resilience assets (Phase 1), a deductive method was adopted to identify 
variables. The process of variable selection relies predominantly on existing 
variables from extant frameworks. Cutter et al (2010) warn that limiting resilience to 
an absolute state would neglect the complexity of the resilience concept. As such, 
the framework identifies a number of variables which act as proxies for each of the 
four assets (Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich, 2006; Cutter et al, 2008). In line with the 
approach taken by Cutter et al’s (2008) process of variable selection, variables were 
selected in respect of two main considerations. First, they were underpinned by 
existing framework literature; and second, variable data could be sourced from 
publically available official datasets, thereby enhancing access and transferability. 
Context variances, together with policy differences and the availability of data sets, 
meant that a broader approach to variables was undertaken while still maintaining 
the philosophy of the assets/capital approach. Emphasis was placed on finding and 
evaluating existing national census or statistical surveys at the administrative 
community level, which could be used to conduct an inherent resilience assessment 
at the community level with a focus on flooding impacts.  
The research is cognisant of the fact that, for the most part, disaster data are not 
held centrally and considerable effort was placed in collating publically available 
data for each variable. The readily available public data permitted a certain amount 
of flexibility and the research sought, where possible, to use the same variables for 
each case- study, however slight variations were inevitable. These differences in 
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case-study variables are highlighted in bold in Appendix 2. The majority of selected 
variables were derived from the UK Census data, however others were obtained 
from County Council databases, flood maps, deprivation indexes and land cover 
maps (Appendix 2). Taking England as an example, a synthesised list of 21 
variables and their literature underpinnings are listed in Table 4.8. 
4.6.5 Phase 1 variables 
‘Physical’ resilience refers to the influence of the built environment and critical 
infrastructure on a community’s ability to recover. For example, proximity to services 
including: hospitals, fire station, police stations were found to provide an additional 
layer of resilience (Cutter et al, 2008). Finally, limiting exposure of housing, 
businesses and critical infrastructure in a disaster area can increase resilience (by 
reducing vulnerability) (Mileti, 1999; Ronan and Johnston, 2005; Lindley et al, 
2011).  




Variable Description Variable assessment Data source Literature 
1.Physical resource 
Exposure Increased exposure 
from river, surface 
water and tidal 
flooding reduces the 
resilience of the 
community 







Lindley et al, 
2011 




zones (DfI) *1 
IOTWS, 2007; 
Twigg, 2009; 
Lindley et al, 
2011 
Tidal flood risk AEP. Rivers Agency 
historical flood 
zones (DfI) *1 
IOTWS, 2007; 
Twigg, 2009; 




Greater access to 
services/resources 
increases the ability 
of community to 
recover quickly. 







Cutter et al, 
2008; Cutter, 
2010; Arup and 
Rockefeller, 
2014 
 % of people working 






Lindley et al, 
2011. 
The thesis aligns itself with the socio-ecological approach to transformational 
resilience discussed in Chapter 3. Accordingly, the impact of disaster events on the 
environment can have a negative effect on resilience due to the instability caused 
and its knock-on effects on wider society. For example, development in flood plains 
and the amount of green open-space (absorbs flood water) can contribute to 
increased flood vulnerability and reduced community resilience (Lindley and O’Neill, 
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2013). Acknowledging the “all hazards” approach to this thesis, it was decided that 
this environmental component merited inclusion. 




Variable description Variable 
assessment 
Data source Literature 















No. of public 
























Lindley et al, 2011 
The ‘economic’ resource is illustrative of the economic stability of a community. 
Extant frameworks have shown that communities with high home ownership, low 
unemployment and economic diversity, are in a better position to recover quickly 
from a disaster event (Adger, 2000; Tierney et al, 2001; Cutter et al, 2008; Norris et 
al, 2008; Lindley et al, 2011). 








Data source Literature 









% of working age 
that is employed 




Sherrieb et al, 
2010; Burton, 
2015 




Sherrieb et al, 
2010; Burton, 
2015 
Income Income and 
employment levels 














2010; Sherrieb et 














2010; Sherrieb et 
al, 2010; Burton, 
2015 
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Tenure Higher rates of 
homeownership is 
indicative of 
financial resilience.   
% households 
owner occupier 
Census, 2011  
 
Norris et al, 2008; 
Burton, 2015 
The ‘human’ asset refers to the social demographic existing within the community. 
For example, extant frameworks suggest that communities with high educational 
attainment, low crime and good health are likely to demonstrate a greater capacity 
to adapt and cope during a disruption.  




Variable description Variable 
assessment 
Data source Literature 
4. Human Resource 
Community 
capacity 
Young, active and 
healthy communities 
are characteristics 
associated with resilient 
communities. Access to 




% of population over 











% of population 







Education Knowledge and skills 
enable a community to 
adapt to uncertainty. 
% of college degree 
or higher % of college 
degree or higher 
(level 4 or above) 
UK Census 
2011 





% of population with 






















Social capital is 
evidenced to produce 
synergistic resilience 
action. This is referred 
to in the literature as 
the ‘social 
infrastructure’ needed 
to effectively mobilise 
essential resources and 
capacities in a timely 
manner. 








 High voting rate is 
indicative of a tight-knit 





participation in last 
election   
Electoral Office 
for Northern 
Ireland (2013) *6 







Local knowledge is 
higher in established 
communities. 








4.7 Identifying ‘dynamic’ resilience (Phase 2) 
 
In relation to the ‘dynamic’ capacity of resilience, analysis of the 28 components 
revealed the emergence of four core themes/components from the extant 
frameworks (Table 4.8 above). These four components comprise the ‘dynamic’ 
capacity of resilience, namely: risk; dynamic resources and capacities; 
connectedness and learning. Further sub-themes or ‘child’ nodes were 
subsequently grouped under these four core components (parents). Figure 4.11 
below illustrates the weighting of the sub-components (child nodes) under the core 
components (parent nodes). The lower level coding in the ‘learning’ component 
reveals a gap in extant frameworks, which fail to capture the full transformational 
(betterment through learning) capacity of communities.  
 
 
Figure 4.11 Weighted overview of the four resilience components: risk; dynamic resources 
and capacities; connectedness and learning. 
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Informed by the framework review (x  of 33), the following section outlines a review 
of the four constituent components, which together were found to represent 
‘dynamic’ resilience within extant frameworks, namely: risk; dynamic resources and 
capacities; connectedness and learning. Given the lack of useable data within 
existing European and UK disaster databases (Appendix 1), further analysis was 
undertaken on the four ‘dynamic’ nodes in NVivo, to identify sub-components and 
proxy indicators for these components. By way of example, Table 4.9 outlines the 
NVivo coding structure for the ‘risk’ component. It highlights how the risk  ‘parent’ 
node comprises two potential sub-components, namely: risk awareness and risk 
acceptance. Further, the coding details how certain indicators were shown to have a 
positive influence on ‘risk awareness’, namely: education, risk knowledge; and risk 
understanding. 
 
Table 4.9 NVivo coding structure for ‘risk’ component. 
 
4.7.1 Component 1: Risk 
 
The reviews of extant frameworks served to reaffirm the importance of the four core 
components of ‘dynamic’ resilience. Risk emerged as a theme across all 
frameworks, however the UN/ISDR “Disaster Resilience Scorecard for cities” (2014) 
present it from a community-centred perspective, analysing how a community 
understands, monitors and assesses risk. The framework highlights the importance 
of risk awareness and understanding as a critical first step in resilience 
development. Similarly, the International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC) (2008) 
developed a framework to assess and build community level resilience. Centred on 
four key resilience areas, the framework advocates the need to enhance 
‘knowledge’ of risk (and health), arguing that misinterpretation of risk can impede a 
community’s ability to mitigate against it. Once risk understanding and acceptance 
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is established, attention then turns to actions designed to maintain the status quo in 
times of disaster. Further, risk acceptance is shown to lead to improved risk 
reduction strategies, such as the development of early warning systems and risk 
management plans (Paton et al, 2001; Mayunga, 2007). It was found that as risk 
understanding improved, risk responsibility developed in parallel (Paton et al, 2001). 
A key takeaway from this framework is that a community’s perception of hazards 
and its associated relationship to risk is a fundamental foundation of community 
resilience (Alexander, 2012). While top-down assessments typically include risk 
assessments, few frameworks were found to address hazard risk from a 
community’s perspective. As such, the thesis framework endeavors to address and 
develop risk awareness and understanding as an integral foundation to improving 
resilience.  
4.7.2 Component 2: Dynamic resources and capacities  
 
Building upon Norris’s (2008) principles of adaptive capacity, Tierney and Bruneau 
(2007) developed the 4R’s framework of resilience. The framework articulates four 
properties of resilient systems by incrementally building upon existing adaptive 
capacity. The framework proposes four components to strengthen adaptive 
capacity, namely: robustness; rapidity; redundancy; and resourcefulness. 
Robustness  (absorb) refers to the inherent strength or ability of the system to resist 
uncertainty. In doing so, communities are able to cope and maintain essential 
functions through self-organisation (O’Rourke, 2008; Twigg, 2009). Redundancy 
(adapt) enables the system to adapt by using alternative resources when faced with 
uncertainty (Ostrom, 2009; Arup, 2010; Pasteur, 2011). Resourcefulness enhances 
the level of adaptation, enabling communities to mobilise resources and capacities 
when needed. These capacities can include flexibility, problem-solving, self-efficacy 
and innovation (Bahadur, 2010; 2011; Cutter, 2010 Pasteur, 2011). This has been 
referred to in the literature as the ability to transform. Other frameworks employ the 
principles of adaptive systems through their incorporation of ‘absorb, adapt and 
transform’ along the continuum of resilience (Frankenberger et al, 2013; Constas 
and Barret, 2013). However, the 4R’s is pioneering in its inclusion of the time 
element of ‘rapidity’, referring to the speed at which normality can be regained by 
achieving recovery goals in a timely manner. The two framework examples 
discussed in this section highlight the importance of promoting dynamic adaptive 
capacity within resilient systems. Failure to embrace this change will limit a 
community’s potential to adapt and transform into a more sustainable trajectory. 
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4.7.3 Component 3: Connectedness 
 
The connectedness of a community is integral to the successful mobilisation of 
resources and capacities. This component seeks to exploit the social capital within 
a community through the development of bonding, bridging and linking network ties 
(Mayunga, 2007; Cutter, 2010). The “community resilience toolkit” (2015) from the 
Torrens Resilience Institute demonstrates the importance of a robust ‘social 
infrastructure’. The framework develops an understanding of the role of dense 
social networks, enabling communities to mobilise resources and capacities more 
readily. The literature indicates that evidence of self-organisation and leadership is 
an indicator of community empowerment (Twigg, 2009; Bahadur et al, 2010). In 
addition, cohesive communities, which engage and collaborate during adversity, 
tend to exhibit higher levels of trust and sense of belonging (IOTWS, 2007; Paton, 
2008; Bahadur, 2010; Pelling, 2011).  As such, the framework acknowledges that 
unconnected communities are less likely to have access to the resources and 
capacities needed to recover in a timely manner.  
4.7.4 Component 4: Learning  
 
Frameworks which adopt a ‘transformational’ interpretation of resilience view 
resilience as an iterative ‘process’ of development, building resilience through 
experimentation and the implementation of lessons learned (Bene, 2012). In 
particular, ODI’s “Characterisation of adaptive capacity” framework focused on the 
importance of ‘learning’ by sharing information and knowledge. Located at the 
community level, the framework has the ability to understand adaptive capacity at 
the local level, which can then be supported more widely at a regional/national level. 
The framework views resilience as a process, seeking to advance resilience actions 
incrementally. In particular, the framework develops an enabling environment to 
foster transformational resilience through its encouragement of resourceful and 
flexible adaptation. Critically, lessons learned are acted upon to inform long-term 
resilience actions. Central to this ‘learning’ aspect is knowledge and information 
dissemination in support of adaptation activities.  
 
A more recent framework, acknowledging the importance of lessons learned, is the 
“City Resilience Framework” (2014) by the Rockefeller Foundation. The framework 
aims to articulate city resilience founded on past learning through an extensive 
literature review, case-studies and fieldwork. The systems approach includes both 
the physical and social attributes of a resilient city through its consideration of 
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socially driven processes as ‘inherent’ components of the system. The approach 
adopts a learning element, which seeks to develop new skills and further highlights 
how ‘disaster learning’ can enhance a community’s ability to cope with new 
challenges (Rockefeller Foundation, 2014). Literature argues that the development 
of new practices, policy change and constant innovation are the cornerstones of 
transformational resilience (Bahadur, 2010; Pasteur, 2011; Zaida and Pelling, 
2011). 
 
The component analysis above outlined the selection of the four most pertinent 
components for capturing dynamic resilience. Further, it identified proxy indicators 
that are “relevant and representative” of the four ‘dynamic’ components (Cutter et al, 
2010:p51). However, these identified indicators in NVivo are not set in stone, rather 
they will act as a form of hypothesis to be tested in the empirical work. Further, the 
research accepts that there is no ‘one size fits all approach’ to resilience and 
appropriate indicators will depend upon the context in which the framework is 
grounded. The intention of Table 4.10 is to act as a scaffold to assist empirical 
analysis, following data collection. Indeed, the research expects that application of 
the framework will reveal further indicators that can be added to those outlined in  
Table 4.10 below.  
 
Table 4.10a Outline of ‘risk’ component indicators and their corresponding link to literature.  
Component  Description Sub-components and 





Awareness of potential risk 
and actions to mitigate 











Acknowledgement of risk 
and willingness to employ 
strategies against it 
-Disaster experience 
-Risk reduction strategies  
-Responsibility 
-Early warning system 
-Risk management plans 
Paton et al, (2001); 
Mayunga (2007)  
 
 
Table 4.10b Outline of ‘resources and capacities’ component indicators and their 
corresponding link to literature.  
Dynamic Resources and Capacities 
Absorb Withstand external 
pressures and 
disturbances without loss 











Bahadur, (2010).  
Adapt Undergoing change in 
order  to prepare for and 








-Problem solve and act 
-Self-organisation  
-Self-efficacy 
-Financial capital   
 mobilisation 
-Diversity of capacities 










Transform The ability to adapt and 
change into a more 
sustainable trajectory 







-Competent communication   
  networks 
-Up-skilling 
-Flexible Governance  
-Use of infrastructure 
O’Rourke, (2008);  
Twigg, (2009); 













The transfer of information 
assisting risk reduction 




-Access to information 
Mayunga, (2007);  
Empowerment Enabling communities to do 
more for themselves. 




-Shared decision making 
-Organisational 
capacities 





The positive sense of 
community. This is closely 
linked with place 
attachment, belonging and 
densely networked 
communities. 
-Bonding, bridging and 
linking social capital. 








Walker et al (2004); 




Twigg, (2009).  
IOTWS, (2007); 
Schrieb, (2010); 
Paton et al, (2001); 









Questioning of actions by 
the community and 
Government to reduce 
risk and considering 






Zaida and Pelling 
(2011); 








utilising new knowledge 
and integrating new 
technologies. 
The willingness to try new 
approaches to reduce risk 





Twigg (2009);  





Assess and review risks 
after a disaster. Build on 
past experiences and 
integrate with new 
knowledge, in a way that 
allows you to build back 
better. 
-Assess, manage and    
 monitor risks. 
- Build back better 




Policy change The ability of policy to 
adapt and change in 
response to changing 
needs and environments. 
 
Effective and flexible 







4.8 Framework outline 
 
The review of frameworks throughout this chapter generated key insights informing 
the design of a framework appropriate to the context and objectives of this research. 
Further, it informed the selection of fundamental components of resilience and 
indicators of resilience appropriate to the research (Section 4.6-4.7). The objective 
of the proposed framework (Figure 4.12) is to act as a guide towards the holistic 
identification of indicators of community resilience (both inherent and dynamic). As 
outlined in Chapter 3, disaster communities in the context of this thesis are 
understood as a group of people who share a common interest or goal, but are not 
necessarily bounded by physical geography. The following section outlines the 
proposed theoretical framework and its key components, which inform and guide 
the empirical phase of this research.  
The framework comprises a two-phased mixed methods approach. Phase 1 
focuses on quantitative, inherent resilience (See Section 4.6.2) and Phase 2 on the 
dynamic capacity of communities. Phase 1 represents the contextual background or 
inherent resilience within the community and is assessed through four resources, 
namely: human; economic; environmental; and physical. As discussed in Section 
4.6, these inherent assets are recognised as influencing the level of potential 
resilience in a community, and vary depending on conditions within each 
community. Hence, to facilitate transferability of the framework and to focus the 
research on community resilience, it was decided to position these issues outside 
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the framework and employ a deductive and quantitative method to derive the 
contextual resilience of each community through these four assets (Table 4.10).  
Phase 2 of the framework comprises the four ‘dynamic’ resilience components, 
namely: hazard risk; connectedness; dynamic resources and capacities and 
learning (Figure 4.12). In respect of its constituent components, Phase 2 begins by 
highlighting the importance of ‘risk’ (1) awareness and acceptance as the first step 
in any resilience building framework. The framework aims to capture the dynamic 
attributes of a resilient system and, as such, allows for the capturing of dynamic 
interactions of community resilience through the interplay of ‘resources and 
capacities’ (2) and the ‘connectedness’ of the community. In line with 
transformational thinking, this dynamic interplay between resources and capacities 
enables the community to absorb change (Nelson et al, 2007), adapt (Twigg, 2009), 
or reorganise and transform (including policy) (Folke, 2006); in the face of adversity. 
The application of these dynamic components is enhanced by the extent of 
connectedness of the system and also, critically, by the ‘learning’ component of the 
system. Further, the proposed framework acknowledges that capturing 
transformative capacity is not without its challenges and explains the lack of 




Figure 4.12 Proposed theoretical framework. 
 
Ultimately, it is anticipated that this framework has the potential to capture the 
dynamic properties of resilient systems and represents a guiding tool for enabling 
and operationalising resilience at the community level. The broad range of 
contextualised indicators used in Phase 2 is reflective of the complex and diverse 
nature of the resilience concept. As such, it is expected that the framework will elicit 
a range of resilience indicators reflecting the diversity of the system or context in 
which they are situated. The following Chapter Five outlines the design 
methodology proposed to populate the framework, capturing both the inherent and 






































Chapters 2 and 3 have identified gaps in the existing knowledge base and, together, 
they set the context for the empirical aspect of this study. Underpinned by an 
analysis of existing frameworks, Chapter 4 developed a theoretical resilience 
framework to both assess and assist in the operationalisation of community 
resilience (Figure 5.1), thus meeting objective 3 of this thesis. In this regard, the 
proposed theoretically anchored framework serves as a hypothesis to be tested and 
validated. This chapter centres on the process of populating this framework, by 
allowing for the extraction of contextualised resilience indicators that determine both 
the effectiveness and viability of the framework. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Position of Chapter 5 within the thesis structure.   
 
In order to meet the objectives outlined at the outset of the thesis (Section 1.3), a 
methodological framework was adopted to guide progress through the 
operationalisation of the framework (Somekh and Lewin, 2005). The hierarchical 
model of research methodology proposed by Kagioglou et al (1998) was used to 
highlight the main arguments and justify the selection of an appropriate research 
approach, research methods and research philosophy (Figure 5.2). The ‘nested’ 
model illustrates the framework of methods which drove/dictated the wider research 
approach and research philosophy.  
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Figure 5.2 Hierarchical model of research methodology within this thesis, adapted from 
Kagioglou et al (1998).  
 
Accordingly, the chapter first outlines the mixed methods approach used to guide 
the research approach and research philosophy (Section 5.2). Primary and 
secondary methods were selected to populate the quantitative (Phase 1) and 
qualitative (Phase 2) (Section 5.2.1) aspects of the thesis framework. Section 5.3 
follows by presenting the case-study methodology employed to empirically address 
the fourth objective of this thesis, namely the development of a framework to bridge 
the gap between immediate recovery and long-term disaster reconstruction. Section 
5.4 highlights the importance of social networks in disaster recovery through a 
Social Network Analysis (SNA) of both ‘physical’ and ‘virtual’ communities. Section 
5.5 explains the “framework method” of data analysis using the Qualitative Data 
Analysis (QDA) software NVivo. This systematic approach to data analysis assisted 
the interpretation and synthesis of resilience indicators. Section 5.6 follows by 
outlining steps taken to ensure that research integrity and ethics were followed 
throughout the study. The chapter closes with a conclusion in Section 5.9.  
 
5.2 Research approach and research philosophy 
 
Chapter 1 outlined how a mixed methods approach was chosen to guide the 
direction of the research. Viewing the quantitative and qualitative elements as 
complementary, rather than conflicting, the mixed methods approach reflects the 
complexity of current disaster research. A mixed methods approach questions the 
 125 
meaning of ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ in qualitative and quantitative disaster 
research. Contrary to extant research, this thesis does not assume that only 
positivist (quantitative) research can be objective, nor does it assume that 
qualitative and subjective research is less robust (Philip, 1998). On the contrary, the 
research dismisses the subjectivity-objectivity argument, arguing that value 
judgement plays a role in the research process (Holt-Jensen, 1988). Further, due to 
complexities inherent in data collection, no research is ‘entirely objective and error 
free’ (Philip, 1998). The research acknowledges that subjectivity plays a role in 
‘purist’ qualitative or quantitative research and, as such, the two approaches are not 
mutually exclusive. Accordingly, any attempt at a purely objective (quantitative) 
approach is also not entirely achievable. In this regard the research seeks to move 
beyond the qualitative-quantitative divide, selecting research methods with due 
consideration for their weaknesses relative to the specific research goals. 
 
Natural disasters by their nature are extreme events and often involve disruption 
and stress. Given the sensitive nature of the subject matter, it is of particular 
importance that the study remains objective. In this regard, the (impartial) viewpoint 
of professionals and experts alike will play a crucial role during the empirical 
aspects of this research. The mixed approach adopted offers a broader (subjective) 
understanding of community resilience that moves beyond a quantitative ‘snapshot’ 
assessment, to include the underlying mechanisms that operationalise the concept.   
 
The philosophical stance of critical realism (CR) complements the data-driven, 
methodologically grounded approach to Framework development outlined above. 
Sympathetic to the nature of the research objectives, the data-driven approach 
underpins the methodological pragmatism of this research. In this regards, the CR 
approach complements the intention to understand the subjective (qualitative) 
nature of human resilience during a disaster, whilst also accounting for the objective  
(quantitative) resilience reality. Application of the theoretical Framework through a 
critical realist lens, enables the identification of causal mechanisms driving disaster 
resilience activities, but also maintains an objective reality. Further, this ‘objective 
subjectivity’ or ‘qualitative-quantitative dualism’ (Philips, 1997) helps to identify 
tangible and intangible resilience indicators.  
 
This methodological pragmatism helps to reconcile some of the entrenched 
differences between qualitative and quantitative research. Hence, the two-pronged, 
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mixed methods approach (Figure 5.3)5 to assessing resilience through a qualitative 
(Phase 1) and quantitative (Phase 2) process is the most appropriate fit for this 
thesis.  
 
5.2.1 Application of mixed methods approach to framework 
 
The quantitative phase (Phase 1 in Figure 5.3), concerns an assessment of 
baseline resilience through resilience variables extracted from publically available 
data. Phase 1 was designed to acquire appropriate robust information surrounding 
the socio-demographic profile of the selected case-study communities. Based on 
publically available datasets, this approach was both time and resource efficient, 
and allowed for the assessment of existing baseline resilience of at-risk 
communities. The purpose of the Phase 1 is limited to serving as a baseline of 
existing community assets (human, economic, environmental, physical) against 
which the Phase 2 empirical indicators derived from the case-study data can be 
reflected.   
Accordingly, Phase 2 enhances the robustness of indicators by grounding the 
selection of indicators (derived from the theoretical framework components in 
Chapter 4) within the empirical case-studies. Chapter 3 articulated that resilience is 
best realised after a disaster has occurred, highlighting the importance of this 
phase, which instead of measuring resilience in isolation, reflects the empirically 
grounded indicators against a priori indicators in the framework to reveal actual 
contributions to resilience.  
                                                
5 Highlighting the two-phased approach to framework development as first illustrated in Chapter4, Section 4.8 
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Figure 5.3 Highlighting mixed methods approach of Phase 1 (quantitative) and Phase 2 
(qualitative) within the framework. 
 
Phase 2 focuses on qualitatively capturing community resilience in respect of its 
constituent components and sub-components, highlighting the transformative and 
dynamic elements that quantitative assessments neglect. Guided by the theoretical 
framework developed in Chapter 4, this approach steers the focus of inquiry 
towards an investigation of framework components underpinning community 
resilience. In effect, whilst deductively guided by the framework, the approach is 
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abductive in nature as it also permits axial coding6. Kothari (2004: p275) refers to 
this open process of analysis as a ‘voyage of discovery’, in that it accepts 
components and themes that stray from the framework. Collectively, the two phases 
(Figure 5.3) act as a bridge between a quantitative, top-down assessment (Phase 1) 
and a qualitative, bottom up investigation (Phase 2). Ultimately, this hybrid 
approach should ensure that the subtleties and nuances of resilience, which may be 
overlooked in solely quantitative datasets, are captured through the qualitative 
element of the framework.  
 
5.3 Case-study approach 
 
Chapter 1 established the justification for the selection of a case-study methodology 
lay in its flexibility towards behavioral actions and its degree of focus on 
contemporary (as opposed to historical) events. The flexibility offered by studying a 
phenomenon within its surroundings allows for a contextualised and in depth 
analysis of resilience behaviour within a disaster context without losing the meaning 
or significance of the issue had it been studied out of context (De Vaus, 2001).  
 
5.3.1 Unit of analysis: Case type 
 
The aim of this thesis outlined in Chapter 1 (to enhance an awareness of resilience 
in post-disaster affected communities) guides the research to explore evidence of 
indicators representing operationalised resilience. In this context, a “case” is both 
the “unit of analysis” and the “object” under investigation (De Vaus, 2001:p8). The 
research phenomenon is a disaster event that impacts upon the resilience levels of 
a community. In particular, it seeks to address the dearth of empirically verified 
resilience indicator frameworks, building upon past framework research, by 
validating and grounding the findings within the empirical case-studies (Schipper 
and Langston, 2015: p19).  
 
Accordingly, the ‘case’ required the selection of a disaster type to anchor the in-
depth analysis on. As articulated in Chapter 2, the ‘case’ should constitute a 
disaster by fulfilling the criteria established by EM-DAT. Further, in order to capture 
performed dynamic resilience, the case-study requires a disaster that has recently 
occurred and has memory of the recovery process or is still active in that phase. As 
                                                
6 Axial coding is a form of open coding which combines both inductive and deductive (abductive) methods of 
analysis (Phase 2) to deduce themes.  
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such, the selection of the ‘phenomena’ or disaster type under investigation required 
the fulfillment of the following criteria:  
 
Table 5.1 Criteria for case-study selection as outlined by the thesis.  
Criteria  Case-study selection  
Criterion 1 Costliest disaster within Europe in terms of monetary costs  
Criterion 2 Most frequent disaster within Europe as identified by the EM-DAT, thus providing 
opportunities for the implementation of lessons learned. 
Criterion 3 Substantial enough in scale to require outside assistance thus providing development 
scale and yielding a sufficient level of detailed data.  
Criterion 4 Include both an urban and rural settlement for comparison purposes.  
Criterion 5 Disaster event has occurred in the recent past < two years since the event. 
  
Chapter 2 reported that research commissioned by the Swiss Re (Sigma Re) 
research institute (2014) demonstrated 90% of the global disaster bill is attributed to 
three forms of natural disasters, namely: floods; tropical cyclones and earthquakes. 
Hydrological disasters such as storms and flooding accounted for the most 
frequently reported disaster in Europe in 2016 (EM-DAT). Further, as outlined in 
Chapter 2, flooding in the UK equated to the highest disaster bill, standing at £2.9 
billion for the year 2015 (EM-DAT, 2016). Beyond these figures, the wider economic 
impact is estimated at £5.8 billion per year when under-insurance, infrastructure, 
business loss and flood defence repairs are taken into consideration (House of 
Commons, 2016). Considering the above, the empirical element of this thesis 
focuses upon flooding within a UK context, as discussed in more detail below.  
 
The UK has a long history of recurrent flooding, with the increasing risk and impact 
of flooding being described as the peril of our nation (Lamond, 2014; National Flood 
Forum, 2015). Thus, in line with criteria 2 (Table 5.1), the UK ranks highest for flood 
frequency within Europe, standing at 14 floods over the last decade 2005-2015 
(EM-DAT, 2016). During this same period, repeat flood events per annum were 
recorded in six of the ten years.  In addition, reduced recovery time between 
recurrent floods incurs economic losses beyond direct damages, having a knock on 
effect on the wider economic climate. Further, recurrent flood events offer 
opportunities for lessons learned (Cosgrave, 2014), thus offering a suitable context 
within which to gain a more in-depth understanding of the ‘learning’ component 
within the theoretical framework.  
 
The backdrop of the ‘Making space for water’ (DEFRA, 2005) flood strategy and the 
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subsequent Pitt review report (2008) after the devastation of the 2007 summer 
floods across the UK, marked the beginning of a paradigm shift towards no longer 
viewing recurrent flooding as a preventable structural issue and instead adopting an 
approach to management of probabilities and consequences of flood risk. The 
continuum of change towards viewing the social aspect of flood management, led  
the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) (the Westminster 
department with overall national responsibility for policy on flooding in England7) to 
formally acknowledge the value of communities in flood resilience through the flood 
strategy report entitled ‘Understanding the risks, empowering communities, building 
resilience’ (2011). This saw the emergence of a new flood risk landscape across the 
UK, leading to similar publications in Wales8, Northern Ireland9 and Scotland10. It 
prompted a change in the division of responsibility from a top-down approach to an 
appreciation of a bottom up approach, making this an opportune time to study the 
paradigm shift in flood resilience practice.  
 
Within Europe, the UK represents the country with the highest amount of affected 
people as a consequence of flooding, to the extent that outside assistance is 
required during the response and recovery phase (criterion 3, Table 5.1). This level 
of risk is largely attributed to the high percentage of development within flood plains 
in expanding urban areas (RICS, 2015). Such development in flood plains has 
resulted in a situation whereby one in six properties in the UK are at risk of flooding, 
accounting for 5 million homes and 300,000 businesses across the UK (RICS, 
2015). Indeed, there has been a long history of floods affecting populated areas 
within the UK (Fagan, 2000; SEPA, 2011a; Rivers Agency, 2013). It is reported that 
over 80% of the UK population live in urban areas and are reported as having a low 
ability to adapt (Lindley et al, 2011). Whilst the figures of affected population in rural 
areas is lower, the impact felt per head of population is significant (EA, 2016). 
Unable to meet the cost benefit for investment, these areas tend to exhibit higher 
levels of resilience at the community level. For consistency, the research followed 
the Government (England and Wales) Urban-Rural classification 2011, where 
settlements with a population above the threshold of 10,000 are designated ‘urban’ 
cities. Settlements with a population below this 10,000 threshold are designated as 
                                                
7 As of April 2013, the Environment Agency (EA) (sponsored by the United Kingdom government's Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA)) no longer has responsibility for flood protection in Wales. It has 
been replaced by Natural Resources Wales, a body sponsored by the Welsh Government. 
8 Public Accounts Committee. Coastal flood and erosion management in Wales. 
9 Doe (2006) Towards an integrated Coastal Zone Management Strategy for Northern Ireland; PEDU report (2012) 
Review of responses to flooding on the 27th and 28th June 2012.  
10 Flood Risk Management (Scotland) Act (2009) and Mapping Flood Disadvantage (Kazmierczak et al, 2015) 
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‘rural’ villages. The ‘town’ category straddled both the urban and rural divide, in that, 
depending on which side of the urban/rural threshold (10,000 population) it sat, a 
town might be categorised as either a ‘sparse’ urban area or a ‘town and fringe’ 
rural area. As such, the settlement hierarchy is comprised (in the first instance) of 
urban or rural, including (1) cities (urban), (2) villages (rural) and (3) towns 
(urban/rural depending on density). Accordingly, in fulfillment of criterion 4 (Table 
5.1), case-studies include a range of settlement hierarchies from the ‘urban’ city to 
the ‘rural’ town and/or village, thus providing a means to explore the nuances 
between urban and rural resilience on a comparative basis.  
 
To best reflect dynamic resilience indicators (Phase 2) against inherent (baseline) 
resilience (Phase 1), a recent past flood event was required to capture this post-
disaster context. The winter flood events of 2015 were the wettest on record in the 
UK since 1910, significantly affecting northern parts of England, Southern Scotland 
and Northern Ireland as illustrated in Figure 5.4 (NERC, 2016). Noting the 
unprecedented rainfall (that exceeded the capacity of the local community), the 
extent of damage and its wider economic implication on society, it was decided to 
base the case-studies on the winter floods 2015 disaster across the UK.  
 
5.3.2 Case-study regions 
 
Northern Ireland was selected as the case-study area within which to test the 
framework prior to its application on the larger scale main studies. The area is 
representative of the flood risk issue within the UK having witnessed significant 
long-term recurrent risk associated with sustained rainfall events  (Figure 5.4), (5 
inches in 24 hours in winter 2015) resulting in almost annual flooding (NIAO, 2016) 
(criterion 2, Table 5.1). It is estimated that 46,000 (5%) properties across Northern 
Ireland are at high risk from flooding due to their location on river or coastal flood 
plains (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2015). In addition, Northern Ireland surface 
water flood maps illustrate that approximately 20,000 (over 2%) of properties are 
situated within a flood risk area. The extent of this risk has exceeded the capacity of 
the local community and created the impetus for the establishment for the Regional 
Community Resilience Group (RCRG) to assist communities with the recovery 




Figure 5.4 The accumulated rainfall amounts for the UK for the period December 2015- 
February 2016, highlighting rainfall peaks over the Lake District in Cumbria and significant 
levels in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Source: NERC (CEH), 2016.  
 
The two selected case-studies represent an area within Belfast to illustrate an urban 
area and a rural settlement, Fintona in the west of NI (criterion 4, Table 5.1). Both 
case-studies have a flood protection standard with a high annual exceedance 
probability (AEP)11 of between 0.5% (1 in 200 year) and 1% (1 in 100 year). 
However, East Belfast has recently had structural flood defences put in place whilst 
Fintona relies on community resilience actions, thus highlighting the disparity in 
needs between at-risk remote12 rural and urban communities (criterion 5, Table 5.1). 
The above discussion serves to highlight the increasing impact and severity of flood 
risk within Northern Ireland, thus making the case for its selection as a pilot case-
study to assess the resilience levels demonstrated during the recent winter floods 
2015 (criterion 6, Table 5.1) and evaluate the viability of the research instrument. 
                                                
11 Annual Exceedance Probability (AEP) is the likelihood of a flood occurrence (expressed as a percentage) in any 
one year (EA, 2015). 




Figure 5.5 Map indicating location of Northern Ireland case-study areas. Source: annotated 
from DARD, 2015a. 
  
The damage bill of flooding in England stands to breach the £5 billion (criterion 1, 
Table 5.1) barrier for the year 2015 (EA, 2010; KPMG, 2015; EA, 2018). The worst 
hit area, Cumbria in the North West of England, has a longstanding and devastating 
flood history, recording significant levels of damage and disruption as a result of 
both recurrent (criterion 2, Table 5.1) and first time flooding events (Pitt, 2008; 
Tapsell and Tunstall, 2008; EA, 2009d; CCC, 2016). Furthermore, the level of 
flooding has exceeded the capacity of the local community in the past and required 
outside assistance with danger to life a critical issue (EA, 2011). During the recent 
winter 2015 floods, one loss of life was recorded and an Emergency Officer noted  
“It’s a wonder more people didn’t die” (The Guardian, 2015). Cumbria was the most 
severely impacted county in England during that period (criterion 5, Table 5.1), 
experiencing more than a month’s rain in one day on Saturday 5th December 2015, 
causing main rivers all across Cumbria to exceed the highest levels ever recorded 
(Figure 5.6). It was the region most severely affected in terms of flood levels, the 
number of affected properties and disruption to critical infrastructure and services 
(JBA, 2015; Cumbria County Council, 2016; House of Commons, 2016).  
 
Social connectedness and the dynamics between settlements of various contexts 
and densities is an important factor in the evaluation of community resilience (EA, 
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2011). As such, the unprecedented flooding events are investigated in detail 
through the lens of 8 micro case-study settlements, both urban and rural, within 
Cumbria (criterion 4, Table 5.1). Whilst each of these 8 settlements possesses 
unique characteristics, they are broadly representative of other populated 
settlements in England (House of Commons, 2006). From a flood-risk perspective, 
the settlements are representative of a variance of protection standard from 0.5 -
1.35% Annual Exceedance Probability (AEP). This informed the decision to include 
settlements which were structurally and non-structurally defended. The settlements 
chosen comprised the city of Carlisle, the market towns of Appleby, Kirkby Stephen, 
Keswick, Kendal and the villages of Shap, Eamont Bridge and Glenridding (Figure 
5.6). The presence of existing Flood Action Groups (FAGs) is also a significant 
indicator of resilience and a mix of communities with and without the presence of 
FAGs was deliberately chosen.   
 
 
Figure 5.6 Map indicating the location of the Cumbrian case-study and the 8 case-study 
settlements. Annotated from BBC, 2016a.  
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Scotland similarly witnessed extreme rainfall and subsequent flooding in the winter 
of 2015 (criterion 6, Table 5.1) as illustrated in Figure 5.4 (Aberdeenshire Council, 
2017a; CEH, 2016). The rising annual flood damage bill in Scotland is estimated to 
average £31.5 million from inland flooding (river and surface water flooding) and 
£19.1 million from coastal flooding. Together with wider business disruption costs, 
this places a significant financial burden upon wider society (Werritty et al, 2007) 
(criterion 1, Table 5.1).  
The transposing of water policy into Scots law (2009) in the form of the Flood Risk 
Management (Scotland) Act, was a consequence of the increased extent of 
recurrent flooding suffered in the country (Scottish Government, 2009a). The UK 
Climate Projections data reiterates the increased and recurrent frequency of 
flooding, describing it as an issue that shows no sign of waning and warn that 
increased rainfall and rising sea levels, is a trend that is set to continue (Spray et al, 
2014). 
Acknowledging this growing issue, the Scottish Parliament passed the Community 
Empowerment (Scotland) Bill (SCDC, 2015), promoting a community centric 
‘working with’ approach, as distinct from the former ‘working against’ (defense) 
approach, to flooding. It was argued that strengthening community voices and 
enabling management of their own risks serves as an enriching context within which 
to uncover community resilience indicators in practice. However, unprecedented 
events such as the ‘winter floods’ 2015, exceed the capacity of many local 
communities. Such events increase the risk to life and well-being (DEFRA, 2011) 
and require outside assistance to bounce back (criterion 3, Table 5.1). 
SEPA (2015) reports that an estimated 170,000 residential and commercial 
properties are estimated to be at risk of flooding in Scotland. This equates to 1 in 22 
homes or over 4% of the built environment (SEPA, 2015). The majority of these 
properties are in the larger cities where most funding is concentrated (Lindley et al, 
2013). Consequently, isolated villages are more at risk as a result of being cut off 
from emergency services and limited investment in flood defences (Lindley et al, 
2013). As a consequence of the aforementioned, case-studies were selected to 
represent a hierarchy of settlements ranging from village to market town and city 
(criterion 4, Table 5.1).  
Rainfall levels across Scotland during the winter 2015/2016 were the wettest ever 
recorded since records began in 1910 (Met Office, 2016). Met Office statistics 
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further reveal that an of 760mm of rainfall was recorded across Scotland during the 
months December 2015- February 2016. In particular, the effects of this ‘remarkable 
winter’ were most felt in North East Scotland, where “exceptionally high rainfall” led 
to widespread flooding across Aberdeenshire (Met Office, 2016; NERC, 2016;). 
(See Figure 5.4). In terms of risk, Aberdeenshire Council (2016c) estimate that 
13,000 residential and 3,600 non-residential properties are at risk of flooding across 
the North East Local Plan district. All four case-study settlements (Figure 5.7) hold 
risk classifications which stand at the most severe rank of ‘very high risk’ and are 
identified as Potentially Vulnerable Areas (PVA) within the Government Flood Risk 
Assessment Maps, under the Flood Act (SEPA, 2011b). Consistent with the 
approach taken in Northern Ireland and Cumbria, case-studies, settlements were 
chosen to represent various settlement hierarchies. Aberdeen city (including the 
suburb of Peterculter13) represented the urban city scale, Inverurie represented the 
town scale and Ballater was representative of the village scale (Figure 5.7). Further, 
the selection of case-studies is representative of both structurally defended and 
non-defended communities through a range of AEP percentages from 0.1- 0.5%. As 
such, each settlement was acknowledged to retain an element of residual risk 
directly related to exposure to low probability / high consequence flood hazards 
(Faber, 2006; SEPA, 2011b). Prior to the 2015/2016 flooding, only the suburb of 
Peterculter had an established and operational resilience group.  
The selection of the three case-studies across three jurisdictions in the UK, is 
representative of recurrent flooding issues within the UK. Wales was not included in 
the selection for two reasons. Firstly, the Flood Risk Management structure in 
Wales is similar to England, as it operated under the auspices of the EA until 2013, 
thus potentially offering less new material in comparison to a different Flood 
Management Body such as SEPA in Scotland. Secondly, whilst Wales suffered 
greatly from the effects of the Winter Floods 2015, the impact was not as severe as 
that felt in England and, in particular, the worst hit area of England, Cumbria. For 
these reasons it was felt that Cumbria was a better fit for the thesis and through the 
inclusion of the Scottish jurisdiction greater transferability of lessons learned could 
be offered. The selection of case-studies at different settlement scales is illustrative 
of the differences of impact at the varying levels highlighting the nuances between 
urban and rural resilience needs. All case-studies lie within flood management plans 
developed by statutory bodies as part of the current flood management policy in 
                                                
13 Peterculter is a large village within Aberdeen city and a former village in its own right prior to incorporation into 
the city’s Lower Deeside ward in 1996.  Peterculter (qua village) comprises a separate case-study to offer 
comparative analysis of nuances between resilience at urban and rural villages.  
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accordance with the EU Directive (2007/60/EC). Thus, they permit an examination 
of flood management strategies and practices from central government, through to 
implementation at the local authority and at community level.  
Figure 5.7 Map indicating the North-East Scotland Case-study settlements. Annotated from 
SEPA, 2017b. 
5.3.3 Multiple case-study approach 
 
In order to capture the wider perspective of flood-risk context and experiences 
across the UK, a multiple case-study approach as proposed by Yin (2014). As 
outlined in the previous section following initial pilot testing in Northern Ireland, this 
thesis adopts two main case-study regions (Cumbria and North-East Scotland), 
embedding micro case- studies (Figure 5.8). These are differentiated by three 
hierarchical scales comprising village, town and city. 
The decision to adopt a multiple case-study approach was based on three key 
reasons. First, the comparative dimension enables a more comprehensive in-depth 
analysis, identifying data patterns and relationships cross case-studies (Yin, 2014). 
Second, broadening the contextual background across two case-study regions, 
allows for more generalisable conclusions to be drawn. Third, the introduction of a 
hierarchy of scales (city, town, village) enhances the transferability of the framework 
(Campbell, 1975). The settlement scale (city, town, village) was guided by the 
‘England and Wales Urban-Rural Population Thresholds’. Their settlement hierarchy 
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differentiates between urban and rural settlements, describing ‘urban’ (city) as 
settlements with a population above 10,000.  Populations below 10,000 are 
categorised into three standard profiles, namely: ‘Rural town and fringe’ 
representing the ‘town’ scale and ‘rural village’ representing the village scale. The 
categorisation also includes ‘dispersed’ dwellings, which are not representative of 
the community focus of the research and therefore  are not considered. 
Similar (if not identical) hierarchies are currently implemented in Scotland through 
the ‘Scottish Government Urban Rural Classification 2013-2014’ and in Northern 
Ireland through the ‘Statistical Classification and Delineation of Settlements’ 2015. 
As such, this settlement hierarchy was considered transferable across the UK 
context of this research. 
In addition, pattern matching across the multiple scales enhances the level of 
confidence and validity of the research. For example, the inclusion of both urban 
and rural scales enabled the research to reveal the nuances and subtleties of how 
resilience manifests itself across scales (Cloke, 2006). In particular, Wheater and 
Evans, (2007) highlight how variances of physical, environmental (including policy), 
human and economic contexts at the urban and rural scale, can significantly 
influence community resilience levels. For example, higher density and lack of 
green spaces associated with urban areas, can reduce flood resilience due to 
reduced capacity to store excess water in green ‘sponges’ potential (Wheater and 
Evans, 2007). As such, individual data-collection with each case-study allows 
provides the opportunity for rich data-comparison across the two case-study 
regions. The comparative capacity of the multi-case design is discussed in more 




Figure 5.8 Example of proposed comparative multiple-case design, Cumbria. Adapted from 
Yin, 2014. 
5.4 Research methods 
Successfully carrying out the case-studies required a variety of research methods to 
capture the complexity of resilience within a bounded context (case-study 
locations). As outlined in Chapter 4 (Section 4.6.2), it is necessary not only to 
identify empirical indicators of community resilience after a disaster (Phase 2) but 
further test those measures against pre-disaster baseline data (Phase 1). It is 
anticipated that this multi-faceted approach of reflecting Phase 2 data against 
Phase 1 data, may inform as to why some communities recover quicker than others 
in the same disaster, despite similar resilience baselines (human, physical, 
economic, environmental).  
Accordingly, to fulfill the aim of this thesis a mix of both qualitative and quantitative 
methods are employed. Secondary data collection was achieved through document 
analysis and by identifying publically available official data sets, while primary data 
collection was collectively achieved through a mix of observation, semi-structured 
interviews at the community and practitioner level and social network data. These 
methods are described in more detail in the following sections.  
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5.4.1 Secondary data methods 
 
Document analysis was utilised in this research to corroborate and segment 
evidence from other sources, allowing for inferences and insights for further 
research (Yin, 2014). The process began by analysing policy reports, planning 
documents and academic reports (listed in Appendix 3), to develop an 
understanding of the current flood risk policy landscape. These documents set out 
the political and legislative context for the investigation and assisted in forming a 
background resilience profile for the pilot and two main regional case-studies.  
5.4.2 Background resilience assessment (Empirical Phase 1) 
 
Beyond archival and policy documents, secondary data sources were employed to 
assess the contextual baseline resilience of both case-study regions. As discussed 
in Section 5.3.1, an assessment of the four community assets (physical, human, 
economic, environment) constituting Phase 1 of the theoretical framework (Section 
4.6.2), was made to form a baseline resilience level for the communities. By way of 
an example, Figure 5.9 illustrates where Phase 1 sits within the overall theoretical 
framework and presents the Cumbrian case-study variables. It is anticipated that a 
baseline assessment of resilience founded on their existing community assets will 
serve to highlight areas of resilience weakness. Building community resilience 
requires a process of progressively addressing areas of low resilience, in line with 
the interpretation of resilience as a process (as articulated in Chapter 3).  Mapping 
resilience weaknesses identified in Phase 1 against indicators of performed 
resilience in Phase 2, provide the opportunity to implement resilience strategies and 
resources directly where the greatest resilience deficit lies.  
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Figure 5.9 Theoretical framework proposed by this thesis highlighting the Phase 1 baseline 
resilience assessment. 
Phase 1 can be interpreted as a top down assessment of the resilience within the 
community based on their existing assets (physical, environmental, economic, 
human). The synthesised list of 21 variables (Figure 5.9) arrived at were based on 
their prominence in the literature base, use in past research and availability of data 
(Section 4.6.3). In terms of the four community assets, comprising the contextual 
resilience background, the variables group into physical asset (5), environmental 
(2), economic (5) and human (9). The variables are guided by the four community 
assets, which collectively comprise the contextual resilience background to each 
community as identified by the proposed resilience framework in Chapter 4.   
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The research is cognisant of the fact that for the most part disaster data are not held 
centrally and considerable emphasis was placed on collating publically available 
official data for each variable. The readily available official data permitted a certain 
amount of flexibility, and the research sought, where possible, to use the same 
variables for each case-study, however slight variations were inevitable. These 
differences in case-study variables are highlighted in bold in Appendix 2. The 
majority of selected variables were derived from the underpinning data set of the UK 
Census, however others were from environmental land cover maps, flood maps and 
risk assessments. The number of variables in each of the four assets/resources 
(Physical, Economics, Environmental, Human), is outlined in Figure 5.9.  
The choice of data scales (geographies) used was dependent upon the availability 
of suitable data at a useable/practical scale (Lindley et al, 2013). Northern Ireland 
used Super Output Areas (SOAs), Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs) were used 
for England and Scotland used Data Zones (DZs). SOAs have a minimum of 1,300 
residents and a mean of 1,900, LSOAs a minimum of 1,000 and a mean of 1,500 
and DZs between 500 and 1,000 residents. Despite the difference in terms, the 
geographical units are of comparable size, facilitating transferability and 
comparability as required.  
5.4.3 Data aggregation and normalization 
With the variables defined and data sources established, the next step was to select 
a way of normalising the data for each variable. The publically available official data 
sets used to assess the 21 variables were derived from multiple sources that 
included various raw counts, percentages, ratios, differences and averages. 
Accordingly, it was necessary to adjust the values of the different scales to a 
notionally common scale by normalisation14 using the min-max scaling technique 
common to indicator research (Cutter, 2008). Min-max normalisation provides linear 
transformation of raw source data whilst maintaining a link to the original data. It is a 
relatively simple technique that can specifically fit data in a pre-defined boundary. A 
process of rescaling was undertaken in instance where a high variable value 
equates to low resilience (Cutter et al, 2010). For example, high unemployment 
equates to low resilience and as such the variable score was inverted. This process 
involved inverting the value such that low resilience equated to zero (worst 
score/low resilience) and high resilience equated to one (best score/ highest level of 
                                                
14 Normalisation refers to rescaling all the indicators using one method (Min-Max) so that all the data obtain 
comparable reference points. Min-Max rescaling is a method in which variables are standardised within a range of 0 
to 1. In the context of this research zero equates to low resilience and 1 equates to high resilience.  
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resilience). This is referred to in the literature as min-max scaling (Cutter et al, 2010; 
Miller et al, 2016). The variables were then summed within each of the four 
resources and the average produced for each resource set (physical, human, 
economic, environment). These scores were then mapped on a radar diagram 
within Excel to highlight the variations in resilience levels between the components. 
An example of this process is illustrated in Table 5.2 highlighting the ‘Economic’ 
asset aggregation within a Northern Ireland context. A worked example for the 
‘economic’ resource is included in Appendix 2. 
Table 5.2 Example of individual variable and aggregated scores for the ‘Economic’ asset, 
Fintona (village), Northern Ireland. 
Community 
Asset: 
Variable Fintona Data source 
3. Economic resource 
Livelihood 
stability 
% of working age that is 
employed 
0.6 Census 2011  
 
 % unemployed 0.2 Census 2011 /Labour market 
report 2017. (NISRA - Economic 
and Labour Market Statistics)  
 
Income Income Deprivation 
domain  
0.1 Multiple Deprivation Measure 
2017 *2 
 Employment 
Deprivation domain  
0.1 Multiple Deprivation Measure 
2017 *2 








 2.3 Total asset score (scale 1-5)= 
1.9 
Each of the (Phase 1) four Community assets (human, environmental, physical and 
economic) was equally weighted and there was no weighting of their corresponding 
variables. The approach was taken as certain communities may have a greater 
number of relevant variables than others, however that does not necessarily equate 
to higher resilience. Furthermore as outlined by Cutter et al (2010:p10), the chosen 
method of data aggregation without weighting, is “transparent and easy to 
understand”, a criterion that was considered important for its intended users, for 
example policy makers, community champions and third sector community 
organisations. Further, there is currently no empirical evidence (theoretical or 
practical) to substantiate the prioritisation or greater weighting of one variable over 
another (Keating et al, 2015).  
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5.5 Primary data collection (Empirical Phase 2) 
 
Once case-study sites had been selected and baseline resilience assessments 
undertaken (Phase 1), the research then focused on the substantive aspect of the 
methodology, namely the collection of primary evidence (Phase 2). This information 
comprises two elements: first, field notes from observation exercises and, second, 
interview transcripts from community level and practitioner/key informant interviews, 
including Social Network analysis. The intention of this data is to capture post-
disaster indicators of operationalised ‘dynamic’ resilience. It is anticipated that, 
when analysed by reference to the baseline findings from Phase 1, resilience 
weaknesses will be identified.  
5.5.1 Observation 
 
The observation method added to the research, capturing information that 
transcends people’s perceptions and attitudes towards flooding, by analysing 
community resilience in a natural setting (Gray, 2009). Observational techniques 
employed throughout the case-studies included: direct observation; field visits and 
transect walks. Direct observation was used as a stand-alone technique and 
informs the contextual background information for the case-study evaluation. In line 
with Yin’s (2014) interpretation of direct observation, descriptive reporting was 
undertaken to convey important contextual and background information about the 
case-study sites. For example, in Cumbria, guided field visits to flooded catchments 
by private water company ‘United Utilities’ provided a more comprehensive 
overview of the complex flooding situation. These field visits afforded critical insight 
into the profiling and understanding of the wider environmental issues affecting the 
communities.  
 
The transect walk is a research approach that observes and evaluates an 
environment by walking through it with a facilitator (Taplin, 2002; USAID 2009). The 
facilitator or ‘community champion’ facilitating this research was an active member 
of the community who had either been directly affected by the floods or voluntarily 
assisted the flood recovery process. The facilitator in each community was identified 
through a variety of community groups, such as church organisations, voluntary 
recovery organisations or flood recovery groups and had no professional 
involvement in FRM. Transect walks serve to create a narrative in respect of the 
case-study, highlighting specific resources, community perspectives and landscape 
features (World Bank, 2013). The walks provided the opportunity to clarify issues 
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pertinent to the study that could not be accessed via desk research prior to the 
fieldwork. The walks further permitted the observation of general conditions within 
each respective case-study, such as: the layout and orientation of the village; 
geographical location; socio-demographics; community activities and services of 
particular significance. The walks allowed the facilitator and affected community to 
express their knowledge of flooding issues and the measures in place to plan and 
mitigate against them. In addition, observational data was also collected in a 
passive manner at flood conferences, community flood meetings held by the lead 
local flood authority and the Environment Agency, workshops and other events 
across the disciplines (Appendix 3.2).  
5.5.2 Collecting and recording observational material 
 
A systematic data collection process was used to ensure data integrity, which also 
helped the follow up analysis. In this respect, data was initially filed chronologically 
before undergoing critical analysis through coding in NVivo  (Gray, 2009). Key 
themes and insights could be drawn from the data and coded into ‘nodes’ in NVivo. 
Gathering data in this way allowed access to intangible resilience characteristics 
that otherwise would have been difficult to capture (Neutons and Rubinson, 2010). 
Indeed, in their community resilience study on disasters across Europe, emBRACE 
(2012a; 2012b), note that capturing the dynamic contextual background within 
disaster contexts is challenging and is often missed by rigid techniques such as 
survey methods. In this regard and for the purposes of this study, observation 
complements the other data collection methods employed by informing the 
contextual backdrop that frames communities’ interactions and relationships. 
5.5.3 Semi-structured interviews 
 
The interview method was undertaken as a means to further investigate the 
opinions and perceptions of resilience that emerge in a post-disaster context. The 
semi-structured interviews moved away from the rigidity of structured interviews by 
including prompt questions. As such, the interview process benefitted from “the 
free-wheeling quality” of unstructured interviewing, ensuring unexpected data could 
be captured (Bernard, 1994:p138). The following sections outline the content of the 
questions set for the semi-structured interviews, designed to elicit information on 
indicators relating to the four key themes of the theoretical framework (Phase 2); 
risk, resource and capacity dynamics, connectedness and learning (Figure 5.3). 
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5.5.4 Interview question set 
 
Set in a post-flooding context, the community level question set centred on 
addressing the four main components of the framework, articulated in Chapter 4. 
The framework provides the structure upon which the Phase 2 qualitative analysis is 
based through the identification of indicators emerging from the data representing 
each of the four components. As discussed in Chapter 3, it is important to stress 
that a resilient community, within the context of this thesis, is one which has the 
ability to absorb, adapt or transform as necessary in order to withstand and recover 
from adverse flood events. The questions are designed in a manner to elicit how 
communities perceive risk and their level of understanding and acceptance of risk. 
In particular the interviews question the capacity of the community to harness 
resources and expertise to help themselves recover from flooding events and 
assess how their actions complement or impede the work of other disaster 
stakeholders. Existence of social capital and network ties at multiple levels are 
questioned in order to discern the existing mechanisms to assist communities. 
Evidence of lessons learned and application of local knowledge is also examined. A 
full list of the questions is presented in Appendix 5. 
 
The practitioner level question set was similarly designed around the four main 
components of the theoretical framework and tailored to suit their job description 
and responsibility in flood risk management. Insights from key informants within 
these agencies can serve to complement the broader information gleaned through a 
review of the literature, by offering a more site specific perspective. Initially, all 
individuals were asked to describe their role and their experience. Interviewees 
were then asked a series of questions about their knowledge and experience of 
flooding and the role of their agency or institution in the recovery process after a 
flood event. Interviewees were also asked about their understanding of concepts 
such as resilience and how they personally applied, promoted and resourced these 
concepts within their respective community. As with the community level interviews, 
the questions focused on eliciting the practitioners’ perspective on the four 
constituent components of the framework, namely: risk awareness, dynamic 
resources and capacities, connectedness and learning.  Key-informant interviews 
proved to be a valuable method of inquiry as, whilst the interviewees represented 
the perspective of their formal agency or organisational role, they also provided 
particular insights of local challenges from the perspective of formal operational 
parameters.  
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5.5.5 The sampling frame 
 
As outlined in Chapter 1, this thesis is located at the community level however it 
acknowledges influence from systems at both lower and higher levels (Constas et 
al, 2014). As such, the interviews took place at both the community and practitioner 
level, ensuring that the sample closely reflects the full range of opinions and 
perceptions of the community. In this way, the research takes into consideration 
actions outside the community level domain and includes the resilience enabling 
environment by encompassing the statutory level perspective through key-informant 
interviews.  
Participants involved in community level interviews were chosen based on the 
fulfillment of certain criteria (Table 5.3).  Participant were selected who were directly 
affected by a flooding event and reside within a flood risk area as formally indicated 
on a flood map. Adults above the age of 18 were interviewed as they are more likely 
to hold responsibility for the contents and structure of the affected property. In line 
with this thinking, adults are arguably the household members with the greatest 
capacity to initiate resilience measures, thus enabling the identification of resilience 
actions through the mobilisation of resources and capacities. Both affected 
household members and businesses are included in the sample cohorts drawn from 
the pilot and main case-studies. In doing so, nuances between how resident 
communities and businesses participate and contribute to social networks during 
the recovery phase could be identified. Further, affected business community 
members may not reside in the community and it may prove interesting to 
understand the influence of this on their risk, attitude towards risk and their 
potentially reduced capacity to adapt as a consequence of fewer community ties.  
Table 5.3 Criteria for sampling selection at the community level. 
 Participant selection criteria 
1. Reside in a flood risk area on a flood map 
2. Adults over 18 years 
3. Members of the community (Businesses or residents) 
 
Recruitment at the community level was purposive and initiated through contact with 
a ‘facilitator’ or community champion. Facilitators in smaller settlement hierarchies 
were easier to identify through the community council, local church or flood recovery 
groups. The bigger urban areas required multiple strategies including notices on the 
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local radio, posts on Flood Action Group (FAG) web/facebook pages and assistance 
from resilience team members within the local council.  
 
The recruitment process took place during a period when the majority of the 
affected community members were still displaced. For example, during the 
recruitment process for the Cumbria region case-study less than 15% of the 
population had returned to their property. In this instance, the facilitator was 
invaluable to the research by assisting with the identification and location of affected 
members in each community as well as delivering an expression of interest form by 
hand. Having read an outline of the research, individuals who wanted to take part in 
the study were requested to return an expression of interest form. As the case-
studies progressed, trust and rapport was built-up with certain key figures involved 
in the case-study communities, generating greater access to affected members of 
the community and yielding increased participant numbers.  The snowball sampling 
technique was also used to recruit new participants as recommended by existing 
participants. In total 233 interviews were undertaken at the community level across 
the three case-studies. Details of the participant interviews are outlined in sections 
6.4.1, 7.5.2 and 8.5.2 respectively.  
Running in parallel to the community level interviews, a range of sampling 
techniques were employed to select the practitioner level interviewees. The sample 
was selected based on their role in flood risk management within the UK. Initially an 
analysis of policy documents, reports and web based research formed the basis for 
selection. To synthesise the results, additional criteria for selecting participants were 
that they had a direct role or were in some way influential in decision making and 
communication with the affected community in relation to flood recovery activities.  
The first step in practitioner level/key informant interviewing involved a stakeholder 
mapping exercise in order to identify the most influential stakeholders in risk 
reduction activities. Hence, practitioner stakeholders were organised into categories 
(policy-prevention; recovery and reconstruction; emergency management; 
independent and industry) across institutional and geographical scales (Figure 5.10) 
and a list of key stakeholders at the statutory level was developed. The selection 
process of the stakeholders was iterative, beginning with the identification of 
participants that were representative of these groups but was re-evaluated as the 





Figure 5.10 Overview map of stakeholders within the disaster risk management landscape in 
the UK. Adapted from JBA, 2015.  
The starting point for practitioner level purposive sampling was a review of recent 
policy publications from the relevant statutory authorities in each jurisdiction. 
Government reports and consultation documents from the Environment Agency 
(EA), Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA), Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural affairs (DEFRA), Rivers Agency and the former Office 
of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM), now Department for Communities, were 
consulted. Government strategies and policy outlines for flood management 
together with select committee reports were further consulted for potential interview 
candidates. Staying within the policy domain, planning guidance such as Public 
Policy Guidance 25 (Equivalent to PPS 15 in Northern Ireland and SPP 7 in 
Scotland) highlighted the relevant parties in respect of land use and development 
planning.  A web search of the official websites of industry and independent 
organisations provided contact details for applicable interviewees. A full list of the 
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reviewed documents is listed in Appendix 3. Collectively the documents highlighted 
over 170 key figures within flood management institutions. The decision was taken 
to select key organisations that had a direct role in regards to flood recovery and 
reconstruction.  
Individuals were selected with the intention of exploring their understanding of their 
institution's strategies and policies on flood resilience building and their impressions 
of risk awareness, mobilisation of resources and capacities, connectedness and 
lessons learned within the case-study populations. Once potential participants were 
identified through a search of relevant websites, contact was made primarily 
through email or by telephone. Purposive sampling targeted key informants from the 
following four key functions: 
 
1. Policy and Governance: Devolved Government has a primary role in flood 
management activities and is responsible for implementing a strategic 
approach to floods.  
2. Recovery and reconstruction: Public investment in flood risk management 
through the auspices of the Environment Agency (EA) in England, SEPA in 
Scotland and Rivers Agency in Northern Ireland, where resilience officers 
and flood incident managers are responsible for flood forecasting (with 
assistance from the Met Office) and communication of potential flood risk to 
the community. The recovery phase also involves the county or district 
council, depending on the jurisdiction, acting as lead local flood authority 
including roles such as planning and development officers, resilience team 
members and managers and organisations such as the National Farmers 
Union and community foundations. The EA, SEPA and Rivers Agency have 
powers in relation to planning, however they are limited to providing 
guidance and placing objections. Local Councils or districts (planning 
departments) approve or deny the planning applications. 
3. Emergency Management: Local and district authorities and councils have 
emergency managers responsible for coordinating emergency plans by 
organising the chain of responses undertaken by the relevant authority 
departments and officers during emergencies.   
4. Independent/Industry: Independent charities such as the National Flood 
Forum (NFF), the Scottish Flood Forum and the Regional Community 
Resilience Group (RCRG) (Northern Ireland) represent communities at risk. 
The Association of British Insurers (ABI) are a trade body representing the 
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majority of the insurance industry that offer risk transfer of flooding in the 
form of insurance. Engineering consultancy firms offer informed advice on 
the design, construction and implementation of flood management schemes 
for the authorities, developers and individuals investing in flood 
management. This category also included representation from local 
councilors, elected officials, MP’s, MSPs and MLAs acting in the best 
interests of affected community members within their constituency. They did 
so by engaging and lobbying on flood resilience issues within their 
respective settlements. 
 
Following a purposive sampling process, snowball sampling was utilised to broaden 
the sample frame. In total 63 interviews were undertaken across the three case-
studies at practitioner level. Further detail in respect of participant interviews is 
outlined in sections 6.4.1, 7.5.2 and 8.5.2 respectively. Participants were asked to 
recommend or suggest further potential participants they considered as influential in 
relation to flood management and recovery (Berg, 2007). Once interviewees had 
been identified, discussions with statutory authorities were framed within a semi-
structured interview process. This approach facilitated specific themes and ideas to 
be targeted whilst maintaining a degree of flexibility to draw unexpected ideas and 
experiences (Garson and Horowitz, 2002). Each interview was guided by an 
‘interview guide’, which was adapted and tailored in accordance with the framework 
component output from Chapter 4. Interviews were recorded with permission and 
lasted approximately 30-45 minutes. A sample interview guide, participant 
information sheet and consent form is included in Appendix 4.  
5.6 Social Network Analysis (SNA) 
 
A key learning outcome emanating from the pilot (Chapter 6) findings was the 
extent to which social networks contribute to community resilience. The literature 
base articulates that the social infrastructure of a community is integral to 
community resilience (Aldrich, 2012; emBRACE, 2015a; Semaan et al, 2015). The 
premise of Social Network Analysis (SNA) is that a diverse and dense social 
network enhances community resilience. Consequently, it was decided to include 
Social Network Analysis (SNA) as part of the main case-study analysis.  Social 
networks in the context of this research refers to both the physical networks ‘of 
place’ within a community and also ‘virtual’ networks created through social media 
platforms such as Facebook. 
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The use of SNA benefits the research in three main ways. Firstly, it investigates 
network structure (physical or virtual), as depicted through a pattern of connections 
and actors (nodes). Second, it identifies the ability of the network to interact and 
mobilise resources and assistance when required over space and time. In doing so 
the analysis identified key actors or ‘ego’s’ who maintain the greatest influence 
within the social structure. Third, SNA identifies structural holes in the multi-scalar 
communication structure, which may act as barriers to the distribution of resources 
and reduce resilience. It is anticipated that greater knowledge of the 
interdependencies in behavior and relationships between network configurations 
can inform strategies to promote greater social connections. The process of SNA is 
outlined in greater detail in Appendix 4.1. 
5.6.1 Mixed methods approach 
 
A recent growth in social media offering real time dissemination of information 
during a disaster, together with access to wider social connections post-disaster, 
informed the decision to include ‘virtual’ communities. A mixed method approach 
was used to undertake structural analysis of both physical and ‘virtual’ networks 
networks. First, quantitative data was ‘mined’ from the social media platform 
‘Facebook’, in order to determine the structure of different ‘virtual’ networks. The 
data collection and extraction application ‘Netvizz’, allowed data to be ‘mined’ in 
standard file formats from the relevant Facebook pages for analysis in the open-
source Social Network Analysis (SNA) software ‘Gephi’. The mining of data was 
limited to the three month period directly after the winter floods of 2015/2016. 
Selection of the relevant Facebook pages was also carried out using the Netvizz 
application ‘search’ function.  
 
In addition, qualitative data was derived from interview discourse informing ‘ego-
centric’ analysis of key community actors. Ego-centric analysis focuses on the 
individual rather than the community, by analysing the structure, function and 
composition of the networks within which it operates and influences. Ego’s were 
selected through a process of purposive sampling. The recall method was used to 
allow interviewees to elicit key sources of assistance during the recovery process 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  The emerging data (nodes and edges) were 
subsequently formatted in excel columns and exported as a .CSV file for 
interpretation in ‘Gephi’ network analysis software. The resulting data was mapped 
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into social network visualisations for interpretation and interrogation in the Gephi 
platform.  
5.6.2 Analysis framework 
 
Crowe’s (2007) characterisation of networks framework (Figure 5.11) guided the 
structural analysis of social networks. The framework illustrates how interpretation 
of network structures can shed light on functional relationship ties between nodes. 
For example, it can be seen that bonding social capital is reflected in complete or 
clustered (factional)15 structures, whereas weaker bridging ties are typically found in 
separated cluster (coalitional) 16  and bridging structures. Crowe’s framework 
suggests that network structures that appear as a ‘continuum’ rather than discrete 
groups are considered more cohesive. 
 
 
Figure 5.11 Network structure properties analysis framework. Source: Berman, 2014; 
adapted from Crowe, 2007.  
 
It is argued that increased activity and denseness within networks stands as a 
foundation for community empowerment (Hoppe and Reinelt, 2010). As such, it was 
important for the research to understand how network density or ‘modularity’ 
impacts upon the mobilisation of resources and capacities within a network. Further, 
the research analyses the potential of ‘key actors’, to act as catalysts within the 
community, by facilitating the mobilisation of resources. Gephi software assisted 
                                                
15 Factional structures exhibit separate clusters that maintain high k-core 1 or above. 
16 Separate clusters that maintain high K-core and evidence ties outside of the cluster. 
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this process of analysis by providing tools to calculate and measure key network 
statistics such as network density and centrality (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). 
These descriptive values and measures are discussed in more detail in Appendix 
4.1.  
 
5.7 Indicator development and analysis 
As discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.3.2), resilience is a process of iterative 
change and development in pursuit of an improved state. Due to its intangible 
nature, the concept of resilience is not directly observable (Keesssen, 2013). As 
such, the thesis seeks to identify proxies representative of the resilience process, 
i.e. characteristics of capacity building and resilience actions (emBRACE, 2015; 
Schipper and Langston, 2015). Further, the subtleties of resilience change are 
arguably best identified at the community level by discreet indicators (specific 
proxies), as opposed to by more generic, composite indicators (Spearman and 
McGray, 2011).  
The first step in defining an indicator type is to ensure that it aligns with the framing 
of resilience as outlined by this thesis. As postulated in Chapter 3, resilience in 
describes a system’s capacity to absorb disturbance whilst still maintaining or 
improving function of the system. Such a system is characterised by its ability to not 
only re-organise into a fully functioning state that existed before the disturbance, but 
also to transform as a consequence of learning and adaptation.  
Proxy indicators can be classified into various categories, namely: process, output 
and outcomes (Bours et al, 2014). Outcome indicators assess resilience as the end 
goal by assessing the broader results achieved through the provision of resources 
and capacities. Similarly output indicators assess the extent to which a project has 
delivered certain resilience activities and their quality. Outputs and outcome 
indicators are highly specific thus reducing their transferability.  
The definition of resilience describes the ongoing iterative process of resilience and 
as such is viewed as a process not an outcome (Section 4.4.2). Process indicators 
never intend to represent a state of completeness or an end result. Instead, they 
represent a position along the continuum of resilience (Cutter et al, 2008). In doing 
so they capture the incremental process of development and its contribution (both 
positive and negative) towards long-term resilience goals. Embedding the resilience 
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indicators within post-disaster empirical case-studies, enables the research to 
capture the processes and drivers of post-disaster resilience action (embrace, 
2012b; Keating et al, 2015). This approach captures pro-active action taken to 
prepare, mitigate, adapt and recover from an adverse event. Focusing on the 
process rather than the outcome enables the identification of incremental adaptive 
change over time which may ultimately lead to transformational change within the 
system. 
Three approaches are available for the development and analysis of these discreet 
indicators, namely: deductive, inductive and normative through expert judgement 
(Hinkel, 2011). As outlined previously in Chapter 4 (Section 4.6.2), the theoretical 
framework acts as a scaffold to guide deductive analysis of resilience indicators 
aligned to the four core components. However, the analysis also permits axial 
coding (inductive) to ensure that new and case-specific indicators are not 
overlooked. As such a flexible abductive approach is undertaken, accommodating 
the context-specific nature of indicator development by including unique indicators 
outside of the pre-defined components (Figure 5.13). The approach described 
above highlights the flexibility and transferability of the framework to operate at a 
higher level across different scales and contexts, while still producing local level 
community specific indicators. As such, the framework serves two functions. First it 
operates as a higher-level heuristic device that can be transposed across various 
case-studies, to guide resilience building. Second, situated at the local level, the 
framework provides an approach to extract a list of indicators that are appropriate 
and meaningful at the community level. The following section explains further how 
this abductive process was carried out in practice.  
5.7.1 Framework analysis in NVivo 
 
This research adopts a systematic process to deriving qualitative resilience 
indicators from the Phase 2 qualitative information namely observation, semi-
structured interviews (at the community and practitioner level) and SNA. To assist 
with this process, the structured ‘framework method’ as expounded by Pope et al 
(2000) was adopted in this research. This method was selected as a means to order 
the vast amount of textual qualitative data in the form of transcripts and 
observational field-notes. Framework analysis was chosen within this study due to 
its highly structured approach to synthesis and analysis of high amounts of data 
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through techniques such as framework codes and matrices, as will be discussed 
later in this section. 
The systematic approach guided by the framework method allows for the process of 
indicator extraction to be carried out in a structured manner. The key characteristics 
of this method are its hierarchical approach to components, subcomponents and 
indicators, with each key component forming one ‘matrix’ in the analytical 
framework. In this manner, the subcomponents and indicators emerging from the 
four components of the framework analysis in Chapter 4 are synthesised.  
5.7.2  Extracting indicators from qualitative data 
 
Stage 1: Transcription and familiarisation 
 
Prior to carrying out the analytical steps, a significant task was to transcribe 
verbatim the community and practitioner level semi-structured interviews. The goal 
of these ‘decontextualised conversations’ (Bazaley, 2007:p47) is to be as true to the 
conversation as possible, yet pragmatic in dealing with the data.  Once transcribed, 
the data were anonymised such that the participants’ identity could not be revealed 
from the transcripts.  
 
The coding process of interviews was assisted through the use of the Qualitative 
Data Analysis (QDA) package NVivo 11 (QSR, 2011). The software was chosen 
over other analysis software such as Atlas.ti and Ethnograph as the coding methods 
adopted by this thesis translate naturally into the NVivo analysis structure. Each 
audio-recording and transcript was reviewed iteratively through immersion within the 
text. This process allowed the researcher to become fully emersed with the 
interview discourse and forms an important step in data  interpretation  
 
Stage 2: Categorisation of codes 
 
This stage involved the creation of ‘cases’ for the participants. Firstly, a socio-
demographic profile of all participants was created, imported into the NVivo 
casebook and an attribute table developed. The codebook comprised age, gender, 
employment status and length of time living in the community. Essentially, this 
process created storage containers for each participant to hold the codes derived 
from the data during the coding stage 3. The cases enable data interrogation and 
the identification of patterns between specific demographics, such as age, gender, 
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employment status and emerging codes. 
  
Stage 3: Developing an analytical framework 
Once the cases have been created, the coding process could begin. The 
transcripts, together with field notes, were read line by line, applying a ‘code’ or 
label to the text in NVivo. Codes highlight important elements of the interview 
discourse, acting as a shorthand interpretation of the data. The deductive approach 
adopted in this research means that these coded nodes can be assigned to the 
components derived from the framework, namely: risk, dynamic resources and 
capacities, connectedness and learning. A misconception associated with 
qualitative data analysis software is that the researcher relies on the software to 
interpret the data. On the contrary, the computer is used solely for its efficiency in 
organising data, not as a means to analyse or interpret the data (Krueger and 
Casey, 2000).  
To increase the rigour of the analysis, some ‘open coding’17 was undertaken to 
ensure important passages of the data were not overlooked. By approaching coding 
in this manner, line-by-line coding can often highlight additional sub-components or 
indicators to consider which may remain unidentified as they do not directly ‘fit’ 
within the pre-defined framework. This approach to coding challenges the nuances 
revealed in the data, serving to make the analysis stronger. Figure 5.12 shows a 
sample NVivo ‘coding matrix’ hierarchy chart undertaken as part of the pilot study. 
The figure illustrates the distribution of coding across the four components, 






Figure 5.12a NVivo weighted distribution of the four ‘dynamic’ components.  
                                                









Figure 5.12b A sample NVivo ‘coding matrix’ hierarchy chart, highlighting the weighted 
distribution of the four ‘dynamic’ components. 	
Stage 4: Charting 
This stage involves the organisation of the indicator data into charts (themes) by 
reference to a set of criteria (Table 5.4). Past literature criticises the quality and 
limited standardisation of data collection in disaster research (Redman, 2004; 
emBRACE, 2012b; UNDP, 2014). The system of indicator identification proposed in 
this research seeks to address this issue and ensure appropriate rigour is attached 
to the development of indicators.  
Table 5.4 Structured data collection of empirically grounded resilience indicators.   
 
 
Table 5.5 Sample ‘charted’ indicator. 
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This set of attributes was then applied to all subsequent transcripts. Attributes were 
grouped together within their theme codes using a tree diagram function within 
NVivo. This clearly indicates the defined codes and establishes and analytical 
framework to guide further analysis. Essentially the process maps the illustrated 
components of the theoretical framework into NVivo (Figure 5.13). It is likely that the 
analytical framework will undergo a process of iterative coding until no new codes 
emerge and a refined analytical framework is achieved. 
 
 
Figure 5.13 Overview of desktop in NVivo highlighting the mapping of the four components 
via the ‘Framework method’ within NVivo.  
 
Stage 5: Analysis of framework data 
 
The analytical framework was applied across the remaining transcripts. To ensure 
anonymity of the data, the ‘codes’ were assigned a number, which also helped the 
identification and management of data (Richie and Spencer, 1994). The main 
benefit of NVivo here was its ability to expedite the analysis process, and leave a 
‘paper-trail’ so that data can be efficiently accessed later in more in-depth 
comparative analysis.  
 
The Matrix output at stage 5 is the defining feature of framework analysis (Gale et 
al, 2013).  The example matrix shown in Figure 5.16 provides a structure to assist 
data analysis by organising the data in: codes (cases); columns (codes); and ‘cells’ 
of synthesised data (Gale et al, 2013). Comparing and contrasting ‘cases’ and 
codes is an essential element of the data interrogation. The matrix assists data 
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comparison “across cases as well as within cases”, producing highly structured and 
robust data outputs. The synthesised matrix data was subsequently displayed in a 
‘charted’ spreadsheet (known as ‘indexing’), summarising the matrix data by 
category (1.1,1.2) from each transcript (Pope et al, 2000). This ‘indexing’ process 
served to reduce the dataset without sacrificing meaning or ‘feel’ of the 
interviewees’ words. Figure 5.16 is an example of illustrative quotations that help to 














Figure 5.14 NVivo Matrix example from Cumbria case-study.  
5.7.3 Final analysis 
 
Located at the community level, a key objective of the framework is to derive 
indicators from ‘the bottom up’. Grounding the indicators based on the empirical 
evidence driven by the framework permits a meaningful understanding of resilience 
at the community level. The components within the theoretically anchored 
framework guided the extraction of indicators (deductive), however it did not 
determine them. Rather a flexible abductive approach permitted the identification of 
unique indicators through an additional layer of axial coding (inductive). Thus, the 
analysis provides a method by which locally contextualised indicators were related 
to a broader conceptual framework that can be transposed and applied within any 
community.  
 
As the emerging data was collected and analysed, the mixed-methods approach 
began to show context-specific results of the different analyses. The quantitative 
methods assessed the contextual inherent (baseline) resilience of the community, 
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based on its four assets/resources  (human; environment; physical and economic). 
The role of the qualitative techniques was not to confirm these phenomena, instead 
it sought to uncover the respondents’ subjective (and often contradictory) 
perceptions of resilience. This contextualised approach should not however limit 
transferability; rather, the higher-level framework guides the emergence of 
contextualised indicators at a lower scale, generating indicators which are both 
relevant and practically applicable at the community level. The issue with a context 
specific approach, is its potential to lead to less comprehensive and less 
transferable indicators (Yoo et al, 2011). However, the approach taken in this 
research mitigates against this risk by identifying empirically driven, context-specific 
resilience indicators from within the affected communities themselves. As such, the 
framework design can be considered cross-scalar, connecting community resilience 
(local level) and higher-level resilience within the one framework. The higher-level 
framework moves beyond the creation of isolated, community-level indicators, to 
actually understanding the causal mechanisms and operation of these indicators as 
part of a resilient system.   
5.8 Data reliability  
 
Validity refers to the extent to which research assesses what it purports to measure 
and how credibly the findings reflect what is being observed or analysed (Finlay, 
2006). In order to ensure validity, reliability and credibility, certain precautionary 
steps were taken as discussed below.  
5.8.1 Pilot study 
 
A pilot study was undertaken to test the feasibility of the research by trialing a small-
scale version of the study within Northern Ireland. It was considered important to 
test the adequacy of the research instrument before rolling it out across within the 
main case-study regions of Cumbria and North-East Scotland. In effect, the pilot 
enhanced the robustness of the study by adhering the researcher to practice and 
assess the effectiveness of the case-study methodology and allow for refinement of 
procedures where necessary before the large-scale study is undertaken. This pilot 
experience and the lessons learned from it are discussed in further detail in the 
following Chapter 6.  






To gain a more accurate and balanced set of indicators, triangulation was 
incorporated into the study, as a means to assess and ensure the validity of the 
findings (Cozby, 2001). This was achieved by adopting a mixed-methods approach 
through which data were generated from a combination of semi-structured 
interviews at the community level and key informant interviews and secondary data 
sources. Interviews were conducted at both the community and practitioner (key 
informant) level and in doing so the research presents a balanced perspective of 
resilience within the case-studies. The representation of data from multiple sources 
enables the verification of findings and alternative perspectives thereby achieving a 
truer representation of the data. 
5.8.3 Research ethics 
 
Involving affected community participants in a resilience analysis prompts ethical 
issues such as respect for privacy, vulnerability and dignity (Geale, 2012). 
Cognisant of the importance of research ethics, all stages of the research were in 
compliance with the University of Ulster’s research governance and ethics. 
Protecting the identity of social media users was a key ethical consideration in the 
SNA. Only social media that was ‘open’ was accessed (Boyd and Crawfoed, 2012) 
and the anonymity of participants was maintained throughout the study (Narayanan 
and Shmatikov, 2009). These steps ensured no harm or distress would be caused 
to the participants as a consequence of the study (British Psychological Association, 
2013). 
 
In addition, the research complied with a checklist of ethical issues based on 
appropriate moral and legal principles (Sanjari et al, 2014). To ensure validity of 
research findings a number of further considerations summarised in Appendix 6 
were taken into account, in adherence with the University guidelines.   
5.9 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has outlined and justified the methods adopted throughout the 
empirical phase of this research. It began with an explanation of the framework that 
guided the methods employed to fulfill the objectives set out by this thesis.  
Adopting a critical realist stance within a case-study methodology, the chapter 
describes the selection of primary and secondary data sources and explains the 
sampling strategy used to recruit interviewees that possess attributes representative 
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of a flood-affected community. 
 
The chapter explains how the two aspects of the research were undertaken through 
a quantitative analysis of publically available official secondary data, while 
qualitative methods used observation, semi-structured interviews and SNA 
methods. Guided by the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 4, the analysis 
was structured on its four main components: risk; dynamic resources and 
capacities; connectedness and learning. Collecting data on corresponding 
indicators in a systematic manner assisted the extraction of contextualised 
resilience indicators.  
 
Data validity concerns were addressed to ensure that data collection and findings 
accurately reflect reality. Acknowledging the importance of data validity and 
robustness, steps were taken to enhance data rigour by embedding the framework 
within empirical case-studies. Deriving empirical indicators in this manner mitigates 
against robustness criticisms often associated with other theoretical frameworks 
(Luthar,2000). As such, the framework bridges the gap between theoretical and 
practical frameworks, by deriving contextualised indicators to enhance resilience, 
whilst simultaneously validating the theoretical framework in practice. 
 
From the outset of this chapter, the methodological process was guided by the 
research model proposed by Kagioglou et al (1998). Figure 5.17 provides an 
overview of the overall methodological design, illustrating how the chosen critical 
realist approach to a case-study methodology, sits within Kagioglou’s nested model 





Figure 5.15 Overview of the final methodological process embedded within Kagioglou et al’s 
(1998) research model. 
 
Having outlined in detail the methodological approach of this thesis the next step 
was to pilot the various aspects of the research before utilising it a larger scale. The 
next chapter outlines the pilot studies undertaken in Northern Ireland and describes 
the lessons learned that shaped the final research instrument going forward to the 







































Chapter 4 described the development of a theoretically anchored framework to 
guide the research and allow for the extraction of empirically grounded resilience 
indicators (the ‘Framework’). Chapter 5 outlined and justified the selection and 
application of specific techniques used to identify, collect and analyse data to 
populate this Framework. This chapter, detailing evidence from pilot case-studies, 
concerns the usability and effectiveness of the proposed Framework within a post 
flooding Northern Ireland context, before scaling across two further regional studies. 
It does so by testing the framework on a small-scale version of the main study, 
including participants from both a rural and urban context, similar to those to be 
recruited in the main case-study.  
 
 
Figure 6.1 Position of Chapter 6 within the thesis structure.   
The pilot chapter is structured to meet four main goals. Firstly, the pilot developed 
and tested the research instruments and identified logistical issues associated with 
the application of the chosen research methods in populating the Framework. To 
achieve this goal it first outlined the twin case-studies, representative of a Northern 
Ireland flood context (Section 6.2). The case-studies serve as the testing ground for 
the application and validation of the Framework.  
Section 6.3 followed by outlining the application of the quantitative (Phase 1) of the 
framework, designed to evaluate the baseline resilience levels within both case-
studies. Section 6.4 tests the qualitative research instruments through the 
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application of the research methods adopted in the qualitative phase (Phase 2) of 
the Framework. In fulfillment of the second goal of the chapter, the research 
instrument was piloted in order to assess the appropriateness and practicality of the 
sampling frame and its corresponding recruitment approach (Section 6.4.1). In 
doing so, potential issues such as community access and ‘buy in’ from community 
members were highlighted as key factors. Section 6.5 allowed the researcher to 
practice and assess the effectiveness of the case-study methods. This process 
permitted refinement of procedures where necessary before rolling out the large-
scale study (Kim, 2011).  
Fulfilling the third goal, Section 6.6 served to evaluate the ‘framework method’ data 
analysis procedure by clarifying the effectiveness of the analytical methods and the 
richness of the emerging data. Finally the fourth chapter goal was achieved by 
determining the feasibility of the project in terms of the viability of extending it to a 
full-scale project. The chapter closes with Section 6.7 outlining reflections on the 
process and the refinement of procedures (where necessary) before application in 
the main case- studies. 
6.2 Case-study sites in Northern Ireland 
Chapter 5 outlined how a study of community resilience within recurrently flood-
affected communities in Northern Ireland met the five criterion of case-study 
selection, proposed by this thesis (Table 6.1). Fulfilling criteria 1 and 2, both case- 
studies are located within significant high-risk flood areas, as identified through 
Northern Ireland Rivers Agency flood maps. Further, floods were found to be the 
costliest natural hazard in Northern Ireland (EM-DAT, 2016). Specifically, recurrent 
flooding exceeded the resources of flooded communities and required outside 
assistance from statutory agencies through the auspices of the Department for 
Infrastructure (DfI) (criteria 3, Table 6.1). The following sections introduce the twin 
case-studies of rural Fintona and urban East Belfast, which serve to provide an 
understanding of the varied fabric of both rural and urban settlements. Their location 






Table 6.1 Criteria for case-study selection as outlined by the thesis.  
Criteria  Case-study selection  
Criterion 1 Costliest disaster within Europe in terms of monetary costs  
Criterion 2 Most frequent disaster within Europe as identified by the EM-DAT, thus providing 
opportunities for the implementation of lessons learned. 
Criterion 3 Substantial enough in scale to require outside assistance thus providing 
development scale and yielding a sufficient level of detailed data.  
Criterion 4 Include both an urban and rural settlement for comparison purposes.  




Figure 6.2 Location map of two pilot case-studies of Fintona and East Belfast in Northern 
Ireland18. Source: annotated from DARD, 2015a. 
6.2.1 Rural case-study profile 
The selected rural case-study (Criterion 4, Table 6.1) is the village of Fintona, a 
townland in County Tyrone, Northern Ireland. Fintona lies within the North Western 
River Flood Risk Management Plan area (DARD, 2015b). The mountainous 
topography contributes to the low average population density in the district, with the 
village comprising a population of just over 1,300 residents. It has a long history of 
                                                
18 Figure previously presented for explanatory purposes in Chapter 5, Figure 5.5. 
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recurrent flooding (criterion 2, Table 6.1), including highly irregular and unpredicted 
flash flooding in 2011 and 2014, exceeding the capacity of the community and 
requiring outside assistance (Criterion 3, Table 6.1) Since 2011, Fintona has 
experienced an increasing level of recurrent annual fluvial and pluvial flooding 
(Criterion 5, Table 6.1), during which homes and businesses have suffered (Figure 
6.3), the village has become isolated as roads have become impassable and on at 
least one occasion elderly residents have been evacuated from their flooded 
properties. Further details on Fintona’s flood profile are available in Appendix 7.1. 
Figure 6.3 Flood Risk Map, Fintona Town. Source: Rivers Agency, 2017. 
6.2.2 Urban case-study: Belfast  
Situated at the western end of Belfast Lough and at the mouth of the River Lagan, 
Belfast is the capital of and largest city in Northern Ireland. At the 2011 NI census, 
Belfast city had a population of 286,000 making it an appropriate urban context 
within which to situate the Northern Ireland pilot (criterion 4, Table 6.1). In particular, 
the area of East Belfast was identified as a hot spot for recurrent flooding by the 
 170 
Rivers Agency (criterion 2, Table 6.1), further evidenced by the high number of 
multiple flood relief payments received in the city (DOE, 2016; Appendix 13).  
The Connswater Greenway is a project ongoing since 2014 that seeks to alleviate 
the extent of flood impact in East Belfast. Prior to this development, the area 
benefitted from little structural defence and the extent of flooding required outside 
assistance (criteria 3, Table 6.1). Through a £40 million investment, the project has 
created a 5.5 mile linear park through East Belfast, following the course of the 
Connswater, Knock and Loop Rivers, connecting certain open and green spaces. 
The communities of Sydenham, Clara Wood Park and Orangefield (Figure 6.4-6.5) 
are those most affected by recurrent flooding in recent years (criterion 4, Table 6.1) 
and as such the three communities comprise the East Belfast pilot case-study area. 
The areas collectively suffer from various flooding types including fluvial, pluvial, 
surface water and, in the case of Sydenham, tidal and sewage water flooding from 
the adjacent Waste Water Pumping Station. Despite the geographical proximity of 
the three selected communities in East Belfast, the socio-economic profile of each 
community varies from the top to the bottom quartile of the most deprived areas in 
Northern Ireland (NIMD, 2017). Further details on their socio-economic profile of the 
area is available in Appendix 7. 
Figure 6.4 Clarawood and Orangefield flood risk map. Source: Rivers Agency, 2017. 
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Figure 6.5 Sydenham tidal flood risk map. Source: Rivers Agency, 2017. 
6.3 Application of the Framework phases and their methods 
 
The primary intention of the proposed Framework (Chapter 5) was to produce a 
structure that could operationalise community resilience and, as such, it is 
imperative that the Framework can be delivered on a practical level. This section, 
therefore, concerns the testing of the Framework instrument and its associated 
methods, through a two-phase process as outlined in Chapter 5. This approach 
began with a top down quantitative assessment (Phase 1), relying on secondary 
data to assess the existing baseline resilience levels within both communities. The 
subsequent qualitative element (Phase 2) took into account perceived changes in 
resilience performance, through a qualitative assessment grounded in the present, 
thus revealing moments of resilience change and dynamics. The value of this two-
phased approach reveals itself when indicators of community resilience identified 
from Phase 2 can be targeted to areas of low resilience identified from Phase 1.  
6.3.1 Application of Phase 1 Secondary data  
Application of research methods was sequenced in line with the critical realist 
approach identified in Chapter 5, thus assisting the researcher’s familiarisation 
within the case-study sites prior to undertaking the qualitative fieldwork interviews. 
In this regard, Phase 1 began with a documentary analysis of secondary data 
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including policy reports, planning documents and academic reports (as discussed in 
Chapter 5, Section 5.4.1, Appendix 3), gaining an overview of the flood risk 
landscape within Northern Ireland and an understanding of the availability of 
publically available data sets. Having established the socio-demographic profile 
through document analysis, the research moved towards the identification of 
suitable variables. As discussed in Chapter 5 (Section 5.4), the starting point for this 
identification of variables had its origins in Cutter et al’s (2008) DROP model but 
was adapted to comprise the four community resources (physical, human, 
economic, environment), constituting Phase 1 of the theoretical framework (Chapter 
5, Figure 5.9). The intention was to maintain the underpinnings of a capital based 
approach and adopt alternative variables within the literature. Accordingly, 36 
variables were selected to represent the four community assets (Chapter 4, Section 
4.7) but were adapted to a Northern Ireland flood context, to meet variances in 
policy and data set availability. The majority of variables selected were obtained 
from UK Census data however others were derived from statistical or environmental 
services data as listed in Table 6.1. The readily available publically available data 
permitted a certain amount of flexibility in terms of transferability across jurisdictions 
and sought where possible, to use the same variables for each case-study. 
However inevitably slight variations were inevitable, for instance, the use of different 
data scales (geographies) between the Northern Irish, English and Scottish 
variables. However, as explained in Chapter 5 (Section 5.4.2) differentiation was in 
name only and does not compromise case-study data comparison. Accordingly, 
Super Output Areas (SOAs) with a minimum of 1,300 residents and a mean of 
1,900 were used. Further data variations stem from the fact that certain data is 
centrally held and remains with statutory organisations within the respective 
jurisdictions. For instance, historical flood map data are held by the Rivers Agency 
in Northern Ireland, the Environment Agency in England and Scottish Environment 
Protection Agency (SEPA) in Scotland. Multiple deprivation indexes and variables 
also comprise jurisdiction variances.   
Further details on the variables are shown in Table (6.2) together with their 
corresponding data sources. Those highlighted in bold are indicative of the use of 





Table 6.2a Northern Ireland sample of individual variable and aggregated scores for the 
‘Physical’ resource.  
Community 
Asset: 
Variable Fintona East 
Belfast 
Data source 
1. Physical resource 
Exposure Flood risk from 
rivers (AEP) 
0.6 0.01 Rivers Agency historical flood 
zones (DfI)*2 
 Flood risk from 
surface water 
(AEP) 
0.2 0.2 Rivers Agency historical flood 
zones (DfI) *2 
 Tidal flood risk 
(AEP) 
N/A 0.8 Rivers Agency historical flood 




services score  
0.2 0.8 Income: Multiple Deprivation 
Measure 2017 *4 
 % of people 
working further 
than 30k from 
home 
0.9 0.9 Belfast city Council/ 





 2.8 3.5  
Table 6.2b Northern Ireland sample of individual variables and aggregated scores for the 
‘Environmental’ resource.  
Community 
Asset: 
Variable Fintona East 
Belfast 
Data source 





0.7 0.6 Sport Northern Ireland’s (SNI) *5 
 No. of public 
parks in 3 mile 
radius 
0.7 0.8 Belfast city council/ Fermanagh 




0.4 0.4 Environment: Model- Multiple 
Deprivation Measure 2017 *4 
Aggregated 
score  
 3.0 3.0  
 
Table 6.2c Northern Ireland sample of individual variables and aggregated scores for the 
‘Environmental’ asset.  
Communit
y Asset: 
Variable Fintona East 
Belfast 
Data source 
3. Economic resource 
Livelihood 
stability 
% of working age that 
is employed 
0.6 0.8 UK Census 2011  
 
 % unemployed 0.3 0.7 UK Census 2011  
 
                                                
19 Score (0 least  resilient, -1 most resilient)  
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Income Income Deprivation 
domain *4 





0.1 0.5 Multiple Deprivation Measure 
2017 *4 
 % households owner 
occupier 
0.6 0.8 UK Census 2011  
Aggregate
d score  
 1.6 3.4  
Table 6.2d Northern Ireland sample of individual variables and aggregated scores for the 
‘Human’ asset.  
Communit
y Asset: 
Variable Fintona East 
Belfast 
Data source 
4. Human resource 
Community 
capacity 
% of population over 
the age of 65 
0.6 0.4 UK Census 2011  
 % of population <15 0.5 0.6 UK Census 2011  
 % of population 
stated general health 
was good or very 
good 
0.7 0.7 UK Census 2011  
Equity % of college degree 
or higher (Level 4 or 
above) 
0.4 0.5 UK Census 2011 
 % of population with 
no or low 
qualifications (L1) 
0.2 0.3 UK Census 2011  
 Education, skills 
and training rank  




Crime and disorder 
rank  
0.3 0.3 Multiple Deprivation Measure 
2017 *4 
 % voter participation 
in last election   
0.8 0.8 Electoral Office for Northern 
Ireland (2013) *6 
Local 
knowledge 
% from outside the 
area  
0.6 0.6 UK Census 2011 
Aggregate
d score  
 2.5 1.9  
 
6.3.2 Normalisation of variables  
Once suitable variables were identified and altered to suit Northern Ireland data 
availability, the process of normalising the data for each variable began. As 
discussed in Chapter 5 (Section 5.4.3), due to the various raw counts and 
percentages, ratios and differences within the raw data, the values were adjusted 
from the different scales and a notionally common scale was established through 
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normalisation. The process of normalisation was achieved through the min-max 
scaling technique, thereby providing a linear transformation of raw data whilst 
maintaining a link to the original data. It is a relatively simple technique that can 
specifically fit data in a pre-defined boundary. A process of rescaling was 
undertaken in instance where a high variable value equates to low resilience (Cutter 
et al, 2010). 
As such, in instances where high scores equated to low resilience the dataset was 
inverted. For instance, taking the example of equity as a variable of the “Human’ 
resource, a measure of the ‘% of population with no or low qualifications’ was used. 
A high % in this case would mean low resilience and as such the raw counts 
needed to be inverted to be consistent with the other interpretations with zero 
equals low resilience and one represents high resilience. As outlined in Chapter 5, 
the choice was made to apply an equal weighting approach and there was no 
weighting of the corresponding variables (Section 5.4.3). The variables were 
summed within each of the four community assets and the average produced for 
each resource set (physical, human, economic, environment). Mapping the scores 
on a radar diagram served to highlight that a community’s resilience actions do not 
operate in isolation. Interlinking with Phase 2, the results serve to highlight resource 
areas where intervention would be of most benefit to the enhancement of overall 











Figure 6.6 Phase 1 (baseline assessment) results, Fintona and East Belfast.  
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The marginal difference in ‘Physical’ resource scores between both communities 
was attributed to their comparable proximity of properties to a watercourse and 
susceptibility to surface water flooding. It was noted that urban Belfast benefited 
form close proximity to services. 
Despite its rural nature, Fintona was found to have a similar ‘Environmental’ 
resource score to Belfast. This may be attributable to increased investment in 
recreational parks in Belfast (for example the Connswater Greenway project), and 
the fulfillment of recommendations from the ‘Active Places Report’ (Sports NI, 
2009). The ‘Economic’ scores indicate that Belfast held higher economic resilience, 
as a consequence of its greater employment and homeownership rate, coupled with 
a lower deprivation ranking. By contrast, the lower economic capacity of Fintona 
would benefit from resilience action, as their already depleted economic resources 
do not have the excess capacity and resources needed to bounce back after a flood 
event (Kapucu et al, 2013).  
An older population was found across both communities, thus explaining the low 
‘Human’ resource in each location. Further, low educational achievement and high 
crime rates reduced the resource scores.  
This statistical ‘snapshot’ assessment characterises baseline resilience ‘of place’ 
within both communities, and importantly served to highlight areas where resilience 
intervention is most needed. Phase 2 sought to capture indicators of performed 
resilience, identified through empirical case-studies where the dynamic and 
actionable attributes of resilience are played out in practice. The Phase 2 findings of 
performed resilience were subsequently reflected  against the Phase 1 baseline 
data in order to determine which resilience interventions are needed and where 
these would be most effective. The following section details the application of this 
qualitative approach.  
6.4 Phase 2 research methods 
Maintaining the critical realist approach, the qualitative research methods in Phase 
2 were arranged to assist the researcher’s grounding within the contextual reality of 
the fieldwork sites. In this regard, observation techniques (including direct 
observation and transect walks) were initially undertaken to provide a contextual 
overview of the case-study areas prior to undertaking further fieldwork methods. A 
guided transect walk accompanied by a facilitator was undertaken in Fintona, with 
 177 
examples of resilience recorded in a fieldwork journal.  The walk served to provide 
critical insight into the contextual flood risk situation in the village and an 
understanding of the wider environmental issues affecting the communities. 
Association with a facilitator built trust and legitimacy with community members, 
assisting both the recruitment and interview process. By contrast, an accompanied 
transect walk was unfeasible in Belfast, as the recruitment of a willing facilitator via 
an identifiable community group proved unachievable. Nonetheless, information 
attributing to the wider profiling of the East Belfast flood risk area was highlighted on 
a map, by a community representative prior to undertaking the transect walk. This 
approach proved beneficial towards gaining an understanding of the area, however 
a critical insight into the issues affecting the communities was not forthcoming at 
this early stage in the pilot study due the absence of a facilitator.  
6.4.1 Process of recruiting interview participants 
 
The successful application of a research instrument lies in its capacity to recruit 
interviewees using an appropriate sampling frame. In fulfillment of the second goal 
of the chapter, the pilot served to test and develop the adequacy of the proposed 
research sampling frame, thus fulfilling the second goal of this chapter. A crucial 
early stage of the research and one that impacts on the selected methodology is the 
ability to create contacts and relationships with community members and statutory 
organisations acting on behalf of affected community members. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, a combination of snowball and purposive sampling was employed, thus 
allowing for the sample respondents to be chosen in accordance to the criteria 
outlined by the thesis (Chapter 5, section 5.6.5) 
In the first instance, attention was given to establishing contact with a ‘community 
champion’ to assist recruitment at the community level. Acting as a facilitator the 
‘community champion’ served to gain ‘buy in’ from the community (Pasick et al, 
2010). With initial contact established, a meeting with the willing facilitator was 
organised to explain the purpose and procedure of the project and ascertain their 
willingness to assist with the recruitment and distribution of expression-of-interest 
forms amongst interviewees. As a gesture of goodwill in appreciation of research 
participation, it was agreed that the results of the research would be compiled into a 
summary and made available to the community. 
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The existence of an established Flood Resilience Group (FRG)20 in Fintona eased 
the recruitment process considerably through its network of key stakeholders 
involved in flood risk management. The organisational structure and contacts 
attached to this group provided the means by which to engage and recruit potential 
respondents. Participants fulfilling the selection criteria  (Chapter 5, Section 5.6.5.) 
were identified with the assistance of the facilitator and expression-of-interest letters 
were distributed among them. In contrast, in the absence of a facilitator in East 
Belfast, gaining buy-in at the community level proved challenging. The lack of a 
Flood Resilience Group (FRG) was attributable to the dispersed nature of the 
affected properties, traversing different sub-markets and different communities. 
Consequently, recruiting a facilitator active in all three East Belfast communities 
was not achievable, thus necessitating a strategy of engagement with multiple 
stakeholders from within all three communities. Despite the existence of a residents’ 
association, no representative could be found in the Clarawood community. A 
facilitator was recruited in Orangefield and Sydenham, however the absence of an 
attachment to a FRG limited the extent of their connectedness within the flood risk 
community and is reflective of the comparably lower number of recruited 
participants (Table 6.3). A key learning outcome from this phase of the pilot 
highlighted that without gaining ‘buy in’ through a willing facilitator, engagement and 
participation at the community level would prove an unviable task.  
Table 6.3 Interview logbook of community-level participants in East Belfast and Fintona. 
Case-Study 
Area 




East Belfast  16  
 Sydenham:  
Park avenue and Lisavon Street 
4 B 1-4 
 Orangefield: Orangefield Drive and 
Orangefield Lane. 
4 B 5-8 
 Clarawood: Clarawood Park and 
Clarawood way. 
4          B 8-12 
Fintona  12  
 Fintona Town 12 F 12-28 
 Total 28  
 
 
                                                
20 A Flood Resilience Group is a community based group or ‘community of practice’, who join together in pursuit of 
a common goal to reduce flood risk. They often work in partnership with higher-level authorities.  
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Identifying practitioner interview participants adopted a similar purposive recruitment 
strategy, based on respective roles and responsibilities within organisations. A 
mapping exercise was conducted to identify individual stakeholders representative 
from three key areas namely; policy-prevention arena, emergency management; 
recovery and reconstruction; and industry or independent professionals involved in 
flooding (Figure 6.7).  
 
 
Figure 6.7 Targeted practitioners and organisations for Key informant interviews. Adapted 
from JBA, 2015. 
 
Those stakeholders with responsibility for flood risk management were identified 
from within the policy-prevention arena. The body with primary responsibility for 
flood risk in NI is The Department for Infrastructure (DfI), however no single 
Executive Department is responsible for all types of flooding (i.e. fluvial, pluvial). 
Instead a long-standing ‘Bateman Formula’ determines that central government has 
a responsibility to construct, maintain and repair defenses in their possession 
(Rivers Agency, 2013). As such, interviewees were sought from the Department for 
Infrastructure (DfI) Rivers Agency (RA) who are responsible for the maintenance of 
16 miles of sea defenses and tidal barriers. Transport NI (part of DfI) are 
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responsible for the protection of the public road and rail network. Further, in the 
rural context of Fintona, the Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural 
Affairs (DAERA) is charged with protecting the aquatic environment, including river 
basin management.  
 
These organisations also play a critical role in ‘emergency management’ as well as 
in the ‘recovery and reconstruction’ arenas. In particular, at the national level, the 
Rivers Agency, Met Office and Transport NI contribute heavily to flood risk 
management activities. At the regional and local level, representation from the 
district and city councils was sought. In addition, the voluntary ‘Regional Community 
Resilience Group’ (RCRG), chaired by local government and the Rivers Agency, 
works collaboratively with the affected communities across Northern Ireland to 
enhance their resilience.  
 
Independent bodies and industry professionals involved in flood risk management 
and active in relevant research were also identified. Participants were sought from 
‘Environmental Link’, a forum and networking body for organisations interested in 
environmental issues such as flooding in Northern Ireland. Also participation was 
sought from The Regional Community Resilience Group (RCRG), acting as a 
multiagency partnership framework for Northern Ireland, which was established as 
the community voice towards flood resilience. The Northern Ireland Housing 
Executive (NIHE) is the strategic housing authority for NI. A percentage of their 
tenanted properties are located within flood risk areas and, as such, the NIHE is 
responsible for the provision of Property Level Protection (PLP)21 to its tenants 
within those areas. The Association of British Insurers (ABI) is the voice of the 
insurance industry across the UK, covering over 94% of the insurance business in 
the UK (ABI, 2016). A NI ABI member was sampled to provide more specific insight 
into insurance company procedures with regard to flood risk. In addition, the opinion 
of the farming community was sought through the Ulster Farmers Union. Finally, 
academics involved in both the policy sphere and flood risk modeling were identified 
for their roles in adaptation to climate change and flood risk impacts. All potential 
                                                
21 Property Level Protection describes measures taken to protect individual properties from the impacts of flooding. 
Such interventions extend beyond relying on sandbags, to include tools such as Homeowner Emergency Plans, 




participants were emailed an expression of interest form outlining the nature of the 
study and subsequently followed up with a phone call. Table 6.4 presents the 
number of practitioner level interviews conducted; a further codebook of all 
organisations interviewed is presented in Appendix 8. 
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6.5 Testing the research methods 
Returned expression-of-interest forms, including the contact details of the potential 
interviewees, served as the starting point for making contact with and confirming 
interviewee numbers. Contact was made via telephone to outline the purpose of the 
proposed interview, its procedure and offered the opportunity for the participant to 
ask any clarification questions or raise any concerns. Once confirmation of 
participation was agreed, arrangements were subsequently made to hold the 
interview at a public venue, at a time convenient to the interviewee and (where 
relevant) in the presence of the community facilitator.  
Prior to commencing the interview, the participants were read the procedure of the 
interview and were asked permission to audio record the interview in accordance 
with Ulster University’s research governance procedures. The questions were 
tested on a sample to ensure they were clear, unambiguous and designed in a way 
that allowed for the uncovering of explanatory and causal mechanics of resilience 
actions (Agee, 2009). Questions posed were designed to elicit their understanding 
and perception of the flooding event and their level of risk awareness, capability and 
self-efficacy to recover and reconstruct their lives after a flood disaster event. The 
questions sought to assess the variables that influence such capacity or lack 
thereof, and their perceived needs for different kinds of support to enable them to 
recover.  
Throughout the interview process, the questions were evaluated in relation to a 
number of key criteria namely:   
- Is the language appropriate, direct and familiar to the interviewees? 
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- Do the questions try to cover more than one point or are they ambiguous in 
nature? 
- Could any questions be deemed as leading questions? Is emotive language 
used? 
- Are the questions designed appropriately for the intended audience? 
- Do the questions give an adequate range of responses? 
- Do the questions encourage personal viewpoints as opposed to giving 
socially acceptable answers? 
- Can questions be shortened without losing the intended meaning? 
On average the community level interviews lasted 20 minutes22 with the longest 
lasting over an hour. By contrast, practitioner level interviews ranged from 45 
minutes to 2 hours. The process of interviewing was an iterative progression 
whereby reflective notes made after each interview were incorporated into the 
amended interview question set. As the interview process progressed, insight was 
gained on the phenomena under study, resulting in case-specific adjustments to 
prompt questions. In doing so, the contextual richness of data output was improved. 
It was difficult to ascertain the knowledge and expertise levels of practitioner level 
participants prior to interviews. As such, further prompt questions were included, so 
as to maintain the appropriateness of the questions to the particular audience. In 
doing so it avoided asking questions which were beyond the expertise of the 
respondent, thus mitigating the feeling that the respondent was not suitably qualified 
for the interview.   
The process of listening and reading through transcript recordings improved the 
structuring and the ease of movement between themes in the question set (Gale, et 
al, 2013). Further reflection on the questions, together with the process of verbatim 
transcription, led to amendments such as the exclusion of overlapping questions or 
those that did not elicit expected responses leading to re-wording or re-scaling as 
appropriate. Overall the process refined the interview technique prior to the main 
case-studies and advanced knowledge of the phenomena under study. A full list of 
the amended questions following the pilot is included in Appendix 9. 
                                                
22 Interviews were conducted during the recovery period, when emotions were still high, and on two occasions the 
interview had to be stopped as it was deemed unethical by the researcher and did not comply with good practice 
guidelines surrounding vulnerable participants. Those that found the interview emotional commented that it was the 
first time someone had asked them how they experienced the event, as their main priority had been on coping not 
reflecting. 
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6.6 Data analysis (Framework method in NVivo) 
 
The intention of Phase 1 was not to enhance resilience in itself, however 
highlighting areas of low resilience in combination with instances of performed 
resilience from Phase 2, served to inform what change was needed most. As such, 
the baseline assessment of resilience founded on existing community assets served 
to highlight areas of resilience weakness as illustrated in the radar diagrams (Figure 
6.6). To this end, mapping resilience weaknesses identified in Phase 1 against 
indicators of performed resilience in Phase 2, provides the opportunity to implement 
resilience strategies and resources directly where the greatest resilience deficit lies.  
 
This section extends beyond an analysis of data collection to include analysis 
processes, thus fulfilling the third goal of this chapter. The primary objective of the 
data analysis was to extract resilience indicators and determine their location within 
the theoretical resilience framework (Figure 4.13). In doing so, it permits the 
drawing of inferences about the operationalisation and practicality of the framework 
itself.  
 
In accordance with the structured ‘Framework Method’ of data analysis described in 
Chapter 5, the process began with Stage 1 ‘Transcription and Familiarisation’ of the 
interview recordings and field-notes. Initiated through a process of verbatim 
transcription of the recorded interviews, it allowed for familiarisation of the data. Due 
to the background noise associated with interviews in public spaces, the 
transcription was only possible with the assistance of notes taken during the 
interview. Consequently, transcription proved particularly time consuming and 
highlighted an underestimation of the time required to transcribe all the interviews.  
 
Stage 2 comprised the ‘Categorisation of the Codes’ and involved the creation of 
‘cases’ for the participants.  A codebook was created in NVivo for both case-studies 
in which the demographic data of participants was inputted so as to allow for 
interrogation and identification of patterns later in coding Stage 3. Essentially this 
stage set up ‘storage containers’ (known as cases in NVivo), in which information 
derived from the coding stage could be stored for interrogation. This process 
enabled NVivo to compare codes across the different cases, namely: gender; age; 
time in community; number of people in the household; location and flood 
experience (Table 6.5). 
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Table 6.5 NVivo case classifications.  
 
 
Stage 3 describes the process of developing a working “Analytical Framework”. 
After familiarisation with the transcripts and field-notes, the interview texts were 
considered on a line by line basis in order to apply ‘codes’ to data deemed as 
important and relevant to the components of the theoretical Framework namely; 
risk; resources and capacities; connectedness and learning (Figure 6.8). Aside from 
this deductive process, a process of open coding was undertaken to understand the 
causal mechanics of resilience actions. This abductive approach did not reveal new 
components within the two case-studies, however it did identify new sub-
components outside the original framework as highlighted in Table 6.6. A learning 
outcome from this process generated an awareness of the time demands of data 
coding and the need for sufficient time to be allocated for the main case-studies. A 
list of the synthesised 21 indicators are presented in Table 6.7 below. 
 
Table 6.6 Working analytical framework of allocation indicators identified within the Fintona 
and Belfast case-studies.  
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Table 6.7 Working analytical framework of allocation indicators identified within the Fintona 
and Belfast case-studies.  
Component Sub-components 
Risk awareness  
1.  Risk awareness 
2. Risk communication 
3. Risk acceptance and mitigation  
4. Risk experience 
5. Risk knowledge 
Dynamic Resources and 
Capacities 
 
6. Self organisation 
7. Capacity building/up-skilling 
8. Insurance 
9. Collaboration 
10. Innovation  
11. Self-efficacy 
12. Flood responsibility 
Connectedness  
13. Social capital 
14. Integration of Social networks 
15. Sense of belonging 
16. Higher-level trust 
Learning  
17. Problem Definition 
18. Critical Reflection 
19. Experimentation  
20. Transfer of  (local) knowledge 
21. Monitor and review 
 
 
Figure 6.8 Illustration of working analytical framework and allocation indicators within Nvivo. 
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The organisational focus of Stage 4 ‘Charting’ allowed for the indicator data to be 
compiled in a structured manner under component themes. An example of a 
charted indicator is presented in Table 6.8 below. Identified indicators were 
categorised in accordance with a set of attributes within their component theme 
(Chapter 5, Section 5.7) and applied to all subsequent transcripts from both case-
studies. Attribute categories were set within the spreadsheets (Tables 6.9-6.12), 
stipulating the indicator title, method used to obtain the indicator, the relationship to 
the resilience (positive or negative), the scale of application as well as context and 
hazard specificity. Systematically collecting the indicator data in Stage 3 allows for 
the pragmatic but informed identification of the indicators within the Framework. The 
diversity of indicator outputs (Table 6.7) reflects the ability of indicators to vary 
across scales (urban-rural) and contexts depending on the impact sustained.  
 
Table 6.8 Stage 3 identification of indicators.   
 
 
Stage 5 comprised the application of the above mentioned analytical framework, 
involving the indexing of subsequent transcripts. Each code was assigned a number 
or abbreviation for easy identification (ensuring anonymity and saving time). 
Expedited through the capabilities of NVivo, the process provided an effective 
means to store and collate the indicator data making it accessible for analysis. To 
this end, the following section presents the synthesised indicator results 




















Emerging ‘risk’ indicators support the argument that risk awareness is a key driver 
of resilience building (Conrad et al, 2006). Both pilot case-studies revealed 
indicators representative of the complex link between risk awareness (Indicator 1) 
and subsequent resilience action. Interview discourse indicated those most 
vulnerable to risk were not in receipt of a flood alert warning, thus highlighting the 
importance of risk communication (Indicator 2) as an indicator of resilience building. 
Poor communication was attributed to a corresponding low social connectedness 
and reluctance to engage with risk communication technology, thus eroding 
resilience further.  
 
Knowledge of flood maps and the location of their property within such maps  is a 
known indicator of risk awareness (Cutter et al, 2012). This proxy indicator 
evidenced that 86% of residents reported that they were unaware they resided in a 
flood risk area until they were flooded for the first time. Hence the apparent 
correlation between flood awareness (Indicator 1) and risk knowledge (Indicator 5) 
is related to previous flood experience. 
 
Chandra et al’s (2011) assumption that risk experience leads to improved resilience 
action proved positive in the flood prone areas of both Fintona and East Belfast, 
whereby mitigation efforts (Indicator 4) such as early warning systems and 
community flood plans were available. In the case of Fintona, mitigation efforts were 
further identified through the introduction of an active FRG. By contrast, risk 
awareness and knowledge (Indicator 1) was also seen to reduce resilience, 
whereby those aged 65 and above felt the need to bury their head in the sand for 
fear it “would get in on them” (F12). Consequently, this had a negative knock on 
effect on risk mitigation (Indicator 4) uptake. 
 
The second framework component ‘Resources and Capacities’ is dynamic in nature 
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Table 6.10 Resources and capacities component indicators 
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Evidence of the mobilisation of ‘resources and capacities’ was most prominent 
among those with past flood experience, particularly those afflicted by annual 
recurrent flood events. Self-organisation (Indicator 6) led to proactive responses by 
the affected community in order to expedite the recovery process, thus 
demonstrating an understanding of the demands this phase placed on both the 
community and statutory agencies. Further, it indicated an acknowledgment of the 
desire to transform out of the recovery phase in an expedited fashion through 
mitigative resilience action in advance of the next potential disaster.  
 
 
Community resilience actions presented themselves through both technical (internal 
changes to property) and behavioural (moving furniture upstairs) measures at the 
individual level. Recurrent flood victims were notably more likely to take 
responsibility (Indicator 12) for their own recovery in comparison to first time flood 
victims, through resilience and resistance measures and in doing so enhanced the 
feeling of preparedness ahead of potential future flood events. Insurance (Indicator 
8) uptake was highest among repeat flood victims, highlighting how insurance as a 
resource is a critical part of flood recovery. Cited in the literature as having the 
potential to act as a resilience tool (Surminski and Eldridge, 2015), the case-studies 
found that (financially) insurance helped the recovery process however technically 
its inflexibility to accommodate Property Level Protection (PLP) and replacement of 
like for like, rendered it a barrier to long-term resilience building. NVivo codes of the 
behavioural and technical resilience actions mentioned above, are illustrated in 




Figure 6.9 Resilience actions undertaken by both communities during the recovery and 
reconstruction phase. 
 
Forward thinking approaches to resilience were also present at the statutory level, 
through employee resilience training (Indicator 7). This is indicative of the 
commitment by agencies and serves to strengthen the collaborative (Indicator 9) 
links within the community through the incorporation of both vertical and horizontal 
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social ties. Collaborative action in practice was demonstrated through the 
establishment of an active FRG in Fintona indicating the self-efficacy levels within 
the community by way of growing membership numbers.  
 
The third component ‘Connectedness’ identifies how social network typologies 
interact, both horizontally between communities and vertically between statutory 
agencies (Table 6.11). In doing so, this component evidences the extent to which 
diverse relationships and social capital (Indicator 13) play a key role in community 
resilience building. A key finding from both pilot studies revealed that ‘bonding’ 
social capital is advantageous during the recovery phase, particularly in the 65 and 
above age profile. The literature suggests that residents possessing a low level of 
social connectedness are unlikely to receive the necessary information or support 
during a flood (Tunstall et al, 2007). This assumption proved true in the case of the 
Fintona pilot, where 66% of the elderly population were unaware of the existing 
FRG in the village. This reinforces the concern attached to singular forms of social 
capital. Not unique in this finding, gaps in communication were similarly found within 
the East Belfast case- study. In particular, the lack of bridging and linking 
relationships within the community, translated to 76% of the residents stating in the 
event of a subsequent flood event they were unaware of who to contact for 
assistance. In Fintona, the high level of bonding social capital, in contrast to lower 
bridging and linking social capital, was largely attributed to the ‘sense of community’ 
(Indicator 15) felt by its inhabitants. This was apparent within the interview 
discourse by way of the community’s reluctance to move property in the face of 
close to annual disturbance due to flooding. However, despite the benefits attached 
to bonding social capital at the individual level, it can also act as a barrier to 
community resilience through over reliance on a single relationship form.  As such, 
cross-scalar engagement through relationships with the statutory agencies (bridging 
and linking) was shown to have the potential to enhance community resilience. In 
particular, the interview discourse noted a relationship between higher-level trust 
(Indicator 16) and bridging and linking social capital. Positive relationships through 
horizontal ties were visible throughout the process of forming a FRG.  
 
The social capital indicators uncovered gaps in patterns of linking and bridging 
connections between communities and higher level connections, highlighting 
communication barriers and difficulties that can lead to power imbalances and a 
lack of a joined up approach inhibiting community resilience.  
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The ‘Learning’ component of the framework offered examples of flexibility to 
experiment, innovate and to provide novel solutions (Indicator 20) to ever -changing 
resilience challenges. In this vein, the local FRG in Fintona provided a medium 
within which the community could analytically discuss (Indicator 17) the extent of 
their future risk after the flood. Further evidence of ‘learning’ was apparent through  
the process of critical reflection (Indicator 18), leading the community to conclude 
that any actions undertaken by the community themselves would stand to improve 
resilience, particularly in situations where statutory agency resources are 
overextended and prioritised in densely populated areas.  
 
Moreover, critical reflection prompted communities to experiment and innovate 
(Indicator 19), by operationalising resilience action strategies as outlined in their 
Community Resilience plan. Demonstration of collaboration and self-organisation, 
assisted through the organisational structure of the FRG, led to increased mitigation 
action. In the absence of a FRG in East Belfast, indicators of critical reflection and 
analytical thinking were limited. Consequently, identified examples of innovation 
occurred largely in isolation on an individual basis.  
 
The interviews acknowledged the value of untapped pre-existing community 
capacities and local knowledge (Indicator 21) suggesting effective distribution of 
such resources was attributed to a feeling of empowerment by the community. The 
value of this indicator lies in its ability to take account of local human and physical 
vulnerabilities, for instance, an awareness of those most exposed within the 
community. This was acutely demonstrated in Fintona whereby those most 
vulnerable and at risk were assisted first by the community. In the case of Fintona, 
collaboration between agencies and the community was greatly assisted through 
the medium of FRG demonstrated by its broadening ‘sphere of influence’, allowing 
for enhanced information flows between the various levels.  
 
Moreover, the interview discourse highlighted that local knowledge was channelled 
into risk monitoring (Indicator 21) roles within the community and subsequently 
became embedded into their everyday routine. For instance, checking river levels 
while walking the dog provides one simple example. In contrast, this indicator was 
not as pronounced in the East Belfast case-study, arising from the transient nature 
of the community as demonstrated by the above average rental occupancy of 46%. 
Indicators of the fourth component, ‘learning’, are synthesised in Table 6.10.  
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The process of completing the above 4 stages led to the production of the defining 
feature of the Framework analysis in terms of a matrix output (Gale et al, 2013). 
Comprising Stage 5, the matrix consisted of rows (cases), columns (codes) and 
‘cells’ of synthesised data, guiding the analysis by case and code (Section 5.7, 
Figure 5.16). This process served to reduce the data without sacrificing meaning or 
‘feel’ of the interviewees’ words. The information within the matrix comprised 
summarised data and quotes from each transcript by category. Ultimately the 
Framework serves as a means of extracting key higher-level indicators, whilst 
simultaneously recognising a longer list of more context specific indicators for each 
case-study. Additionally, it assists potential transferability between other case-study 
areas. Further, approaching the organisation of data in this structured manner 
mitigates against the criticism attached to qualitative data collection surrounding a 
lack of standardisation of data (Ranger and Suminski, 2013). To this end, Table 
6.13 below presents as an example, the charted data for the ‘Learning’ component. 
An extended list of component charts is presented in Appendix 10, illustrating how 
indicator data can easily be compared and contrasted for further interrogation. 
 
6.6.1 Expert validation of data indicator results  
 
The Framework approach articulated in Chapters 4 and 5 resulted in a list of 21 
higher-level indicators (Tables 6.7 - 6.10). The research acknowledges that 
qualitative research inevitably runs the risk of encapsulating some form of research 
bias through its subjective coding process (Norris, 1997). In order to mitigate 
against this, the results were disseminated through a presentation to a group of 
statutory level participants in Belfast, in September 2016. Details of the response 












Table 6.13 ‘Learning’ component chart representing the Belfast case-study at the community 




6.6.2 Interlinking two phases of the Framework 
 
The results from Phase 1 revealed that across both case-studies the ‘Human’ 
resource was the weakest of all four resources. This is largely attributed to: the 
above average age of case-study area populations and low education levels.  
Moreover, Fintona ranks in the top 15% for crime in Northern Ireland and has an 
above average unemployment rate. In contrast to the aforementioned statistics, the 
Phase 2 analysis identified that Fintona demonstrated greater resilience through 
self-organisation (Indicator 6) and collaboration (Indicator 9) in comparison to East 
Belfast. The overarching reason for this finding is attributable to Fintona’s more 
extensive use of social capital (Indicator 13) and the strong sense of belonging 
(Indicator 15) within the community. Housing tenure was a variable of the 
‘Economic’ resource, however it is noteworthy that high rental tenure in East Belfast 
(attributable to the transient nature of urban areas), significantly reduced the sense 
of belonging (Indicator 15) within the community. 
 
Overall however, Belfast scored higher than Fintona in respect of its ‘Economic’ 
resource. This finding is typical of rural communities (Cutter et al, 2016) and 
provision should be made within Fintona to ensure business continuity.  For 
instance, flood damage has a knock-on effect on the provision of employment and 
services and as such, a long-term approach towards business investment should be 
a priority for the village (Sahebjamnia et al,  2015).  
 
Phase 2 demonstrated that through working together as a community, the FRG 
assisted in reducing community vulnerability and in doing so further reduced the 
social isolation of their elderly residents. In turn, these actions eventually fed-back 
by increasing the overall capacity (Indicator 7), empowerment and self-efficacy 
(Indicator 11) levels of the community.  This finding highlights that resources should 
be targeted to improve the ‘Human’ resource but equally attention should be 
concentrated on building and integrating social networks (Indicator 14) through the 
establishment of a FRG.   
 
The ‘Physical’ resource scores in Phase 1 did not reflect the investment in flood 
alleviation in East Belfast, as a consequence of the lagging-effect associated with 
official statistics.  Moreover, it is important to note that this investment was counter 
intuitive, while enhancing flood protection it simultaneously erodes community 
resilience as residents become complacent and misinformed about flood risk 
(Indicator 5) as they feel protected. The ‘Physical’ resource further identified the 
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important role of risk awareness (Indicator 1) and communication of this risk 
(Indicator 2) play in communicating the percentage of properties at risk through their 
location on a flood map. Phase 2 reveals that it is this awareness that creates the 
impetus for communities to take resilience action. However, contrary to the 
literature, proximity to services was not found to enhance resilience. The findings 
reveal that an awareness of this vulnerability led rural Fintona to ‘Take resilience by 
the scruff of the neck” (F27) and establish a FRG. 
	
The overlapping of the above resources (Phase 1) with resilience indicators (Phase 
2) demonstrate the inter-connectedness of community resilience. Phase 1 served to 
provide a range of important insights about the origins of a community’s baseline 
resilience and Phase 2 followed by identifying indicators that can be targeted to 
have the greatest impact on enhancing resilience to flood events. Importantly, 
holistic approaches that can work with the highly interconnected issues facing 
communities will be needed to address the challenge of climate change. 
6.7 Conclusion  
The pilot was undertaken to test four key areas of this research. First, it served to 
test the application of the theoretical framework within case-studies in Northern 
Ireland.  The application of the research framework proved more time consuming 
than anticipated as a consequence of the lengthy transcription process.  Audio 
recording was of poor quality due to location of interviews in public places with 
considerable background noise. As such, it was only possible to transcribe interview 
recordings with the assistance of detailed notes taken throughout the interviews to 
avoid omitting important data. Second, it aimed to establish the suitability and 
practicality of the sampling frame. The decision to engage a facilitator to assist with 
the recruitment of interviewees via purposive sampling proved very effective. The 
researcher is aware that without this assistance the case-study would not have 
been possible. Should a facilitator be unidentifiable in the main case-study, it will be 
necessary to resort to an alternative case-study option. Testing the research 
method allowed for the development of interview skills, in particular in relation to 
executing the critical realist perspective, whereby the researcher seeks to take 
meaning from participants’ experiences in order to understand their perceptions, 
viewpoints and understanding of the recovery process after a flood event. The semi-
structured interview question set was found to be effective, however some 
refinements were made to improve clarity and yield more concise answers 
(Appendix 9). In particular, prompt questions were added to the practitioner level 
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questions so as to ensure the appropriateness of the questions when the exact 
knowledge/expertise of the participant is unknown prior to undertaking the interview.  
Third, the pilot allowed for the evaluation of the ‘framework method’ of analysis, 
assessing the richness and usefulness of the data in populating the framework. This 
procedure entailed the time consuming task of coding interviews and the experience 
informed what was deemed a feasible sampling size going forward into the main 
case-studies. The data analysis, assisted by NVivo, uncovered 21 resilience 
indicators common to both case-studies. The multifaceted approach of comparing 
empirical indicators of performed resilience (Phase 2) against baseline data (Phase 
1), provided understanding of resilience gaps and weaknesses currently limiting 
community resilience. The findings revealed that whether a risk perception is high or 
low is not the most important factor, rather it is an individual’s awareness and 
understanding of disaster risk that encourages long-term and anticipatory strategies 
that require significant investments in the home. Furthermore, it is important to 
uncover the nuances which shed light onto how risk perceptions shape incremental 
adaptation and transformational resilience actions. Conversely, flood awareness 
was seen to have a negative effect on elderly victims of recurrent flooding. As such, 
an investigation into the links between flood experience (on the one hand) and 
resilience actions or resilience erosion (on the other), calls for further investigation 
in the main study. The data revealed variances between how urban and rural 
communities cope, adapt, and transform through mobilisation of resources and 
capacities after a disaster. Contrary to the literature, it was found that close 
proximity to services did not necessarily enhance community resilience. By contrast, 
awareness of the community’s vulnerability due to their isolated location in rural 
Fintona, prompted the community to develop a FRG as they were aware that in 
practice the services were unable to arrive immediately.  
Of note, it was found that the variable ‘proximity to services’ within the Phase 1 
‘Economic’ resource, does not necessarily increase resilience. Conversely it was 
found in the case of Fintona that acknowledgment of their vulnerability, due to 
remoteness, prompted the community to take responsibility for their own flood risk 
and action their Community Flood Resilience plan ahead of the statutory services. 
Urban areas tend to display higher resilience due to proximity to services. However, 
this was not found to be the case in the Belfast case-study, where a transient 
population and subsequent lack of community participation and engagement was 
found to limit resilience actions. Critically, the absence of a FRG proved to 
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significantly impede their resilience actions due to the absence of any organisational 
mechanism to mobilise their resources. 
The ‘Connectedness’ component proved to be the lynchpin for how successfully 
communities engaged in adaptive and transformational resilience actions. Fintona 
held both vertical and horizontal networks and consequently evidenced greater 
incremental change and transformational actions.  Particularly, given the absence of 
a FRG, East Belfast evidenced individual resilience however overall community 
resilience levels were low due to the absence of an organisational mechanism in 
place to facilitate resilience action. Over-reliance on bonding social capital led to 
coping and adaptive resilience but due to the lack of a developed ‘social 
infrastructure’ beyond horizontal ties, transformational resilience was restricted. 
As a consequence of this finding, it was decided to further explore the critical role 
social networks play in building resilience by including Social Network Analysis 
within the main case-studies.  Finally in fulfilment of the fourth goal, it is anticipated 
that addressing the above outcomes will enable the development of a more 
cohesive, robust study with better potential to contribute to disaster resilience 
knowledge. As such, it was determined that extending this pilot to a full-scale case-
study (studies) project is a feasible option that will deliver the richness of data 
required to populate the proposed Framework and aid the fulfillment of the 



































Chapter 5 outlined the two-phased application of the Framework developed in the 
methodology (Chapter 4). Chapter 6 followed by detailing the pilot study undertaken 
in Northern Ireland to test the research instrument and described the considerations 
and refinement applied to the main case-study going forward. Figure 7.1 illustrates 
the positioning of this empirical chapter within the empirical knowledge element of 
the thesis. The chapter does so by presenting evidence in respect of the first main 
case-study conducted in this research, namely Cumbria. Section 7.2 sets the 
context of flood-affected communities by framing the flood risk landscape in 
England, through an evaluation of its historical context. It does so by describing 
significant policy changes in recent years, revealing the paradigm shift from flood 
defence to an integrated catchment wide approach. Section 7.3 maps the key flood 
risk management stakeholders involved in this shift and outlines their roles, 
responsibilities and the rationale for their selection as part of the case-study 
interviews.  
 
Section 7.4 introduces the Cumbrian case-study through a description of its spatial 
geography and socio-economic profile. This articulates the varied flood challenges 
faced by the region depicting the three river catchment areas as well as the eight 
settlements which constitute the overall case-study area. The core analysis 
underpinning this case-study follows in Section 7.5 to 7.8. Section 7.5 outlines the 
application of the quantitative Phase 1 resilience baseline assessment and is 
followed by Phase 2 analysis of the affected communities’ perception of resilience 
after the 2015 winter floods. It does so by highlighting resilience indicators that 
enhance and impede a community’s ability to recover. Social Network Analysis was 
carried out in Section 7.6, illustrating the important role social networks play in 
creating these indicators through enhanced mobilisation of resources and 
capacities. Section 7.7 follows with a comparative analysis of the distribution of 
revealed indicators at different settlement scales. Section 7.8 articulates further 
analysis on how these indicators can be fed back into weaknesses identifies in 
Phase 1 to enhance overall community resilience levels. The chapter closes with 
conclusions drawn from the Cumbrian case-study (Section 7.9), highlighting the 




 Figure 7.1 Position of Chapter 7 within the thesis structure.   
7.2 History of flood risk management in England 
 
The following section expands on the evolving Flood Risk Management (FRM) 
policy landscape in England, as it is incrementally shaped by (1) high incident 
events and (2) a shift away from hard engineering towards catchment flood 
management. Historically, a period of intensified farming after World War 1 led to 
increased flooding. In response to this, the Government introduced a hard 
engineered approach to flood management (Scarse and Sheate, 2005). Despite this 
hard engineering intervention, increases in industries and homes on floodplains 
(SCA, 1998; Butler, 2007), together with the growing effects of climate change, 
inevitably led to the realisation that a hard engineering approach was not a panacea 
for the flood issue. This prompted a re-think on a defence approach and 
subsequently led to the introduction of the ‘Making Space For Water’ (2005) 
strategic approach to flooding. The strategy marks a shift towards empowering 




Further, findings from an independent, Government-commissioned flood review, the 
Pitt Review (Pitt, 2008), reaffirmed this transition towards local empowerment. 
Recommendations following the 2007 floods across England were drawn from 
existing Flood Action groups (FAGs) and findings supported collaboration between 
local groups and local organisations. The Pitt Review further acted as a driver 
towards the passing of the Flood and Water Management Act (2010). In line with 
Pitt Review findings, this Act was premised on the idea that hard-engineering 
schemes have their limitations. It advocated the concept that flood risk can be 
managed through a portfolio of strategies, of which community resilience was 
strongly supported (Schelfault, 2011; Sayers, 2016).   
 
The 2015 floods both in England and across the rest of the UK further galvanised 
the need for a change in thinking towards an integrated, decentralised and 
collaborative approach to FRM. More specifically, the Cumbria Floods Partnership 
was established and tasked with “improving flood defences” however it also 
included broader catchment wide themes. Indeed, the partnerships policy paper: 
“Cumbria Flood Action Plan - reducing flood risk from source to sea” included 
‘resilience’ as one of its five themes for action as well as highlighting the complexity 
of the systemic issue of flood resilience (Deeming, 2011; EA, 2016; Sanders et al, 
2016) where flooding is no longer viewed as an ‘engineering pursuit’ but as a ‘social 
endeavour’ (Sayers, 2016).  
 
Set against a backdrop of austerity communities are realising their potential to 
contribute to flood recovery (Wright, 2016). In this vein community groups began to 
emerge with the focus of lessening the impact of flooding rather than trying to 
prevent flooding. This pattern of localism is not to be mistakenly viewed as the 
government withdrawing from their duty to protect society from hazards. 
Conversely, it is about empowering communities to utilise their resources and 
capacity through community participation and collaboration with the local 
authorities.  
 
Thus a new paradigm reflecting a move away from the classic, engineering 
approach to a community centred portfolio of solutions is being proposed 
collaboratively with statutory agencies. At the heart of this decentralised approach is 
the promotion of FAGs, which serve as a vehicle for communities to harness their 
resources and capacities, in a way that complements the work of the flood 
authorities.  
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7.2.1 Flood history in Cumbria and England 
 
Flooding has a long history affecting populated areas in England (Fagan, 2000; 
EA,2009f; EA, 2017).  It is estimated that more than five million properties are 
located within flood risk areas (EA, 2009a). Increased developments within 
floodplains has created a situation whereby one in six properties are at risk of 
flooding, accounting for 2.4 million homes and 185,000 businesses in England and 
Wales (ICE, 2016). The number is expected to increase as a consequence of 
climate change and increased urbanisation (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2011). 
Research by the Environment Agency projects that by 2080, river flows may 
increase as much 30% to 70% above the 1961-90 baseline. The UK Climate 
Change Risk Assessment (2015) forecast a similarly negative outlook, reporting that 
future flood risk is set to increase the vulnerability of communities as a direct result 
of extreme weather conditions and wetter winters.  
 
Cumbria, in the North west of England, has witnessed a devastating flood history, 
recording significant levels of damage and disruption as a result of both recurrent 
and first time flooding (Bye and Horner, 1998; Pitt, 2008; Tapsell and Tunstall, 
2008;EA, 2009d; EA, 2009f; EA, 2010d; EA, 2017). However, the research 
presented in this thesis focuses specifically on the ‘flood event’ of the winter floods 
2015 brought by the high winds and heavy rainfall of storm ‘Desmond’ and ‘Frank’. 
Cumbria was the worst-hit UK county experiencing more than a month’s rain in one 
day on Saturday (5th December) with all main rivers across Cumbria exceeding the 




Figure 7.2 River flows across the UK in December 2015 (relative to annual rainfall 
averages). Source: CEH, 2015.  
As the 2015 floods occurred during the formative stage of research, the scale of 
flooding offered a timely opportunity to assess the recovery strategies and decision-
making processes at a time of heightened engagement from all stakeholders. 
Across Cumbria 6,300 properties and business owners were affected (Figure 7.3), 
with 63 per cent of affected groups being from older social groups (65 and above) 
(Cumbria Intelligence Observatory (CIA), 2010).  
The intense rainfall in a short period of time onto an already saturated ground led to 
rapid surface run-off causing record river levels  (JBA, 2015). For example, the 
towns of Appleby, Keswick and Kendal recorded a height of 0.28m, 0.75m and 




Figure 7.3 Estimated number of flooded properties across the Cumbrian region 
(Environment Agency, 2016). 
Despite previous floods with significant impacts during 2003, 2005 and 2009, the 
geographic scale and impact of the 2015 winter floods was unprecedented (JBA, 
2015; House of Commons, 2016), exceeding the capacity of the community and 
requiring outside assistance. The following section articulates the key stakeholders 
involved in providing this assistance at a multi-scalar level. 
7.3 Flood Risk Management stakeholders 
 
The following section outlines the role of Flood Risk Management stakeholders 
involved in Flood Risk Management (FRM) within Cumbria. Through policy 
document analysis (Appendix 3), key stakeholders and institutes are identified. In 
order to gain a clearer understanding of the role and responsibilities of the 
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stakeholders, flood risk organisations are broken down into three categories in 
accordance of their hierarchical level namely; national, regional and local but all are 
evaluated in the context of Cumbria, as illustrated in Figure 7.4. 
7.3.1 National level 
 
The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) is tasked with 
protection against flood risk, through flood warnings and the development of flood 
risk management strategies. National policies (England) developed by DEFRA set 
the mandate for responsible authorities (Environment Agency’s (EA) and the Lead 
Local Flood Authority’s) to follow to mitigate flood risk. Through funding from 
DEFRA the EA is responsible for river and coastal defense, whilst maintaining a 
strategic overview of flood risk management (JBA, 2015). As such, the building, 
maintenance and performance of flood defences is the sole responsibility of the EA. 
The EA also works closely with the Met Office, providing flood forecasts as part of 
the Agency’s Floodline and early warning flood service. The Department for 
Communities and Local Government (DC) holds responsibility for planning policy in 
England and the prevention of flooding through management and enforcement of 
spatial planning policy. Beyond their responsibilities in planning the Department also 
acts as the lead government department in recovery from flooding events.  
 
7.3.2 Regional level 
 
A government-commissioned review into the 2007 flooding across England called 
for greater flood risk management at the local level, recommending local authorities 
take responsibility for local flooding (Pitt Review, 2008). This prompted the 
introduction of the Flood and Water Management Act (2010), devolving power to the 
county council level through their new leadership duties as the appointed Lead 
Local Flood Authority (LLFA). Under the Act, the Council was charged with the 
development, management and implementation of local flood risk strategy. In this 
regard, clearly defined roles and responsibilities for all stakeholders enabled 
effective collaboration between the LLFA and the other relevant authorities, namely: 
local councils, EA, Highways England and private water companies (United 




7.3.3 Local level  
 
The prominent stakeholders at the local level include those involved in Local 
Resilience Forums (LRFs) and third sector charitable organisations. The umbrella 
role of the Cumbria Local Resilience Forum (CLRF) allows all stakeholders involved 
in FRM in Cumbria to collaborate together and deal with local problems at the most 
immediate local level. The forum comprises both category 1 and category 2 
responders, operating under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 23 . Category 1 
members are predominantly made up of emergency services, local authorities, 
health bodies and Environment agency (Cumbria County Council (CCC), 2017). 
Category 2 members comprise “co-operating bodies” involved directly in flood 
incidents including: United Utilities (water company), Highways England (transport) 
and communication operators. The forum holds decisive power, however the 
importance of local decision-making is advocated and supported where necessary 
at a higher level.  
 
The local level also witnessed considerable support from charities (such as the 
National Flood Forum) and third sector organisations (for example Cumbria 
Foundation) throughout the recovery phase both in 2015 and during previous flood 
events. The National Flood Forum24 works on behalf of the affected residents and 
businesses to find ways of minimise the effects of flooding, through the medium of 
FAGs the Forum engages with local authorities and other organisations to reduce 
the risk of flooding. A further example of this engagement is the Cumbria Floods 
Partnership. Created with the best interests of the community at its core the group 
seeks to create a long-term (25 year) ‘flood action plan’ for those areas most 





                                                
23 The Civil Contingencies Act (2004) is an Act of Parliament which sets out a framework under which category 1 
and category 2 responders can deal with a disaster event. 
24 The NFF assist flood-affected communities to prepare, mitigate and build the capacity needed to reduce flood risk 
within their communities. Acting as the voice of the community they lobby the government on their behalf. Further, 
they work collaboratively with agencies and government to ensure that flood policy and strategies place the 








The above section has outlined the policy backdrop against which the multi-scalar 
stakeholders operate in FRM. The following section presents the contextual setting 
of the Cumbrian case-studies in which these complex organisational structures 
operate. It does so by describing the impact of the 2015 winter flooding event on 
Cumbria and presents and an overview of the socio demographic background of the 
region (Appendix 7.3). Further, it introduces the eight case-study areas by 
presenting each settlement profile in their respective catchments: Eden; Derwent 
and the Leven and Kent (Appendix 7.4).  
 
7.4 Introduction to Cumbrian case-study context 
 
The following section presents an overview of the Cumbria region in which the eight 
case-studies are situated. The sparsely populated county of Cumbria is situated 
                                                
25 Figure previously presented for explanatory purposes in Chapter 5, Figure 5.10. 
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within rural North West England. Cumbria is the most mountainous county in 
England, contributing to its long flood history as excess run off comes down from 
the fells. The county is a designated “area of outstanding natural beauty” (AONB), 
as it is home to the Lake District National Park. The county of Cumbria comprises 
six districts (Allerdale, Barrow-in-Furness, Carlisle, Copeland, Eden and South 
Lakeland) as illustrated in Appendix 7.3.  The Cumbria Intelligence Observatory 
state that the county population is 499,100, with the city of Carlisle comprising the 
largest urban settlement (CIO, 2012). The ethnic homogeneity of the county is 
evident through its high percentage of White British residents, comprising 95.1% of 
the population (Census, 2011). However, this percentage was more in line with the 
English national average in the larger towns.  
 
The socio-economic profile of the area is affected by factors including: population 
demographics; deprivation level; education; access to services; health and housing. 
These factors are discussed in detail in Appendix 7.3.  
 
7.4.1 Overview of selected case-study areas 
 
The unprecedented flooding events of storm Desmond in December 2015 acted as 
a lens through which resilience of the eight case-studies could be explored. The 
Cumbria region in particular was chosen, as it was the region most severely 
affected by Storm Desmond in terms of flood levels, number of affected properties 
and disruption to critical infrastructure/services (House of Commons, 2016). The 
event was significant enough to exceed the capacity of the local community and 
require outside assistance. Furthermore, danger to life was a critical issue causing 
one loss of life and leading an Emergency Officer to comment “It’s a wonder more 
people didn’t die” (BBC, 2016b).  
 
As outlined in Chapter 5, case-studies were selected in order to include a balance 
of urban and rural settlements with a varied flood history and defence investment. 
Furthermore, in order to access levels of social connectedness it was deemed 
important to include a mix of settlements that had either established, new or no 
FAGs.  
 
Cumbria has a unique and varied flood history (Deeming, 2016). As such, both first 
time and recurrent flood communities were selected, to allow for analysis between 
the multiple case-studies and to offer an opportunity to investigate evidence of 
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lessons learned. Flood defence proximity to properties is frequently understood to 
reduce risk of flooding (UCEM, 2006). This irrational interpretation equates to 
communities being more willing to purchase a property in a location with an Annual 
Exceedance Probability (AEP) of 1% with defences in place rather than in a low risk 
area AEP 0.5% but is undefended. Furthermore, over reliance upon flood defences 
causes complacency and decreases motivation for local flood resilience activities 
(Committee on Climate Change, 2014). 
  
Considering the above, settlements were chosen that offered a variance of 
protection standard from 0.5 -1.35% AEP. This decision allowed for the inclusion of 
settlements which were structurally and non-structurally defended. At the same 
time, however, each settlement was also formally acknowledged to retain an 
element of residual risk, which was directly related to their exposure to low 
probability / high consequence flood hazards (Faber, 2006). All these factors, which 
informed the decision to select these eight communities, are discussed in more 
detail in the following section. 
 
Social connectedness and the dynamics between settlements of various 
densities/population size are important factors in the evaluation of community 
resilience. In particular, the presence of FAGs was found to be a fruitful medium 
through which multi-scalar ties could be analysed and understood. As such a 
hierarchy of settlements, with and without FAGs, were chosen to reflect the 
variance of social capital across Cumbria. The eight settlements selected are the 
city of Carlisle26, representing the top level of the urban hierarchy in Cumbria, the 
market towns of Appleby, Kirkby Stephen, Keswick, Kendal and at the lower end of 
the hierarchy the villages of Shap, Eamont Bridge and Glenridding (Figure 7.5).  
 
A broad range of literature has been drawn upon to provide information about the 8 
case-study profiles and their respective flood histories. Future plans for the 
protection of the towns from flood hazards have also been outlined, through 
reference to contemporary flood-risk management documents. An overview of the 
catchment areas and an evaluation of the cultural history of each case-study within 
it, is presented in Appendix 7.4. 
 
 
                                                
26 The Carlisle case-study focused on the areas most affected by flooding, namely: Warrick Road (St.Aidans and 





Figure 7.5 Map indicating the location of the 8 case-study settlements27. Annotated from 
BBC, 2016a.  
 
 
The above sections introduced and presented the socio-economic profile of the 8 
micro case-studies (Appendix 7.3-7.4) and set the Cumbrian region within the 
backdrop of current Flood Risk Management practice. The section discussed the 
incremental policy changes that led to the shift from flood defence toward a holistic 
catchment approach have been outlined. It is clear that communities and agencies 
are now realising that a portfolio of solutions, both hard and soft are required to 
address the complex flooding situation. Instrumental to the functioning of this is a 
collaborative approach between agencies and communities. Breached flood 
defences have expedited this thought-process, making communities accept residual 
risk and work with agencies to address the issue. The dearth of FAGs highlights 
that this process is in its infancy. Further, the socio-economic profiles have revealed 
                                                
27 Figure previously presented for explanatory purposes in Chapter 5, Figure 5.6. 
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a disparity in inhered resilience across the community. This galvanises the need for 
communities to acknowledge these weaknesses and direct attention towards a 
process of ‘learned’ resilience through capacity building. The following section is a 
practical response to this issue. It outlines the application of proposed framework to 
build resilience within communities facing complex flood issues. It begins by 
outlining Phase 1 of this process.  
7.5 Framework application 
 
As outlined in chapter 5 (Section 5.5.1), the Framework application comprises two 
phases. It begins with a top-down quantitative assessment, drawing on secondary 
data to assess the existing inhered resilience levels within the 8 case-study 
communities (Phase 1). Chapter 4 further outlined how the foundational resilience 
tool developed by Cutter et al (2008) was drawn upon and adapted to fit a flooding 
context. Illustrated in Figure 7.6, the refined community assets identified in Section 
4.6.2 comprise: economic, infrastructure (Physical), social community (Human) and 
institutional, together with their associated variables. The 21 variables 
(corresponding to the four assets) (Figure 7.6) were predominantly drawn from 
publically available data such as the census (2011) and environmental data from 
the EA. An exhaustive list of these variables and their data sources are set out in 
Table 7.1 a-d. Framework variables contained within these community assets were 
adjusted slightly to meet English data availability and flood policy variations. Those 
variables highlighted in bold indicate the use of an alternative variable data source. 
For example, the English Indices of Deprivation, compiled by the Ministry of 
Housing, Communities and Local Government and published by the Office of 
National Statistics were accessed on the ‘Cumbria Observatory’ website. The 
baseline assessments are presented at the three hierarchical scales, beginning with 
the urban scale and proceeding to the village scale. 
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Figure 7.6 Theoretical Framework proposed by this thesis, highlighting the Phase 1 baseline 
resilience assessment28. 
 
7.5.1 Data aggregation and normalisation. 
 
Having established the variables, a process of normalising the data began and data 
sources were adjusted to meet Cumbrian data availability (Chapter 5, Section 5.4.3 
detailed how raw counts from differing data sources were normalised using the min-
max scaling technique). After conversion, each score was decomposed into a range 
from 0 to 1, with scores of zero equated to low resilience and one equating to high 
resilience. The variable scores were subsequently aggregated within each asset 
                                                
28 Figure previously presented for explanatory purposes in Chapter 5, Figure 5.9. 
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(physical, human, economic, environment) and visually represented through a radar 
diagram.  
 
In the discussion of methodology (Chapter 5), the decision to apply equal weight 
across the variables was argued. This approach was taken as certain communities 
may have a greater number of relevant variables than others, however that does not 
necessarily equate to higher resilience. The variable scores were summed for each 
of the four community assets and the average produced for each resource set 
(physical, human, economic, environment). In doing so, a separate radar diagram 
was produced for each community (Figures 7.7) which allowed for comparative 
analysis of baseline resilience levels. Table 7.1 outline this process using Carlisle29, 
Kendal and Glenridding case-studies as examples. A fully worked example is 
presented in Appendix 2. 
Table 7.1a Examples of individual variable and aggregated scores for the ‘Physical’ resource in the 




                                                
29 Carlisle data refers to those areas directly affected by flooding. For example, St. Aidans (006D/E), Botchery 
(004A), Castle (008A/B) and Denton Holme (008C) wards.  
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Table 7.1b Examples of individual variable and aggregated scores for the ‘Environmental’ resource in 
the context of Carlisle, Kendal and Glenridding. 
 
Table 7.1c Examples of individual variable and aggregated scores for the ‘Economic’ resource in the 








Table 7.1d Examples of individual variable and aggregated scores for the ‘Human’ resource in the 








Figure 7.7a Comparative baseline assessment (Phase 1) results: city; town; and village 
scale.  
 
Figure 7.7b Baseline assessments (Phase 1) results, town scale. 
 
Figure 7.7c Baseline assessment (Phase 1) results, village scale.  
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The baseline assessment results (Figure 7.7) indicate that low physical resource 
scores are attributed to the settlement’s location in high flood risk zones (level 3). 
The village scale (in particular Shap) ranked higher in terms of its environmental 
resource score as a consequence of the quality of the outdoor environment and 
proximity to parks. The village scale ranked highly in terms of economic resources, 
due to employment from its farming and tourism sectors. However, the percentage 
of economically active residents was comparatively low at the city scale, which may 
be attributed to the low level of education and skills. Reaffirming this assumption, 
Carlisle (city scale) ranked lowest of the three scales in respect of ‘human’ capacity, 
with lower educational attainment a significant contributor to this. A high crime rate 
at was also found to reduce social capital at the city scale. In addition an aging 
population whose average age was well above the English average (low percentage 
in 0-15 years) reduced the  ‘human’ resource at the all there scales. This statistical 
‘snapshot’ characterises baseline resilience ‘of place’ within each of the 
communities and has highlighted areas where resilience intervention is most 
needed. The following section captures indicators of realised resilience, identified 
through the Phase 2 empirical analysis.   
7.5.2 Phase 2 recruitment and sampling  
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, purposive sampling was employed to allow respondents 
to be chosen in accordance with the criteria outlined by the thesis (Chapter 5, 
Section 5.6.5). The pilot study highlighted the importance of engaging a facilitator to 
gain a contextual grounding of the site context whilst further assisting access to 
potential affected community members. Further, this process gained trust and 
legitimacy among the affected community and eased the recruitment process 
considerably. To begin this process key figures were contacted through residents’ 
associations, parish councils, churches and in particular flood action groups. In the 
case of Cumbria, the organisational structure attached to FAGs proved an 
invaluable method of engaging interviewees. 
 
However, Shap, Kirby Stephen and parts of Carlisle, proved to be the exception as 
recruitment of a facilitator was not feasible. Low incident level coupled with sparse 
populations in Shap and Kirby Stephen, contributed to low community engagement 
and subsequent difficulty recruiting a facilitator. Despite widespread flooding in 
Carlisle city, engaging a facilitator across all affected areas across the city proved 
difficult. On these occasions contact with a local councilor, parish council and 
 222 
Environment Agency resilience officer was established to create links into the 
community.   
 
A further difficulty arose from the timing of the interviews. This research concerns 
the recovery and reconstruction phase of the Disaster Management Process. As 
such, entering the field seven months after the event meant a large proportion of 
affected residents had not completed the renovation works to their properties and 
were residing in temporary accommodation. This presented an issue when trying to 
contact interviewees as home telephone numbers were not in use, temporary 
accommodation had limited access to the internet and contact details for their rental 
property was not known by the FAG facilitator. 
 
In a bid to overcome recruitment issues, attendance at post-flooding community 
meetings proved to be vital. These events, organised by the council and EA as part 
of their remit as LLFA under Section 19 of the Flood and Water Management Act 
(2010), brought together affected individuals. During this period of heightened 
engagement, large numbers of flood affected community members were in 
attendance, with numbers exceeding 250 at the city scale. Leaflets explaining the 
nature and purpose of the research together with contact details, were made 
available at these events. This recruitment method yielded 23% of the overall 
interview count. 
 
Attendance at the North West Regional Flood and Coastal Committee Floods 
Conference proved a valuable means of populating the Framework and further 
presented an opportunity to engage and recruit additional practitioner participants. 
Contextual understanding of the flood devastation was afforded through a guided 
tour of the damaged United Utilities infrastructure on privately owned lands, 
otherwise inaccessible without their kind collaboration. 
 
In addition to the above purposive recruitment methods, snowball sampling was 
used to ensure a balanced sample of gender and age profiles (Figure 7.14), flood 
experience levels (Figure 7.15) and time lived in the area (Figure 7.16) was 






Table 7.2 Interview logbook of community level sample. 
Case-Study Area Properties affected Number of Interviews  Interview Codes 
(NVivo) 
City Hierarchy    
Carlisle  2500 46 C 22-68 
Town hierarchy    
Appleby 176 21 A 1-21 
Kendal 2150 42 K 92-133 
Keswick  515 13 K 134-147 
Village hierarchy    
Eamont Bridge 72 12 E 69-81 
Glenridding 15 9 G 82-91 
Kirby Stephen 20 8 K 148-156 
Shap 20 3 S 157-159 
Total   159  
 
The sample was evenly distributed across the three age categories, namely: 65 and 
above; 46-64; and 18-45 (Appendix 11). Further, the sample included a spread of 
flood experience levels ranging from first time victims to those flooded three times 
or more (Table 7.3). This allowed for analysis as to the influence of flood experience 
on resilience levels. In addition, a range of  ‘time spent in the community’ was 
evident across the sample (Table 7.4), permitting comparative analysis on the 
influence of place attachment, belonging and social cohesion on resilience levels.  
 
Table 7.3 Distribution of interviewee flood experience levels (NVivo). 
 
 
Table 7.4 Distibution of ‘time spent in the community’ case category (NVivo) 
 
Lessons learned from the pilot study interview process (Chapter 6) informed 
refinements to the interview design, structure and location. For example, every 
effort was made to ensure that interviews took place in a quiet location, allowing for 
 224 
clear audio recording for ease the transcription. This was unfortunately not always 
feasible and the need to consult handwritten notes did lengthen the transcription 
process. The practitioner level interviews ranged from 45 minutes to an hour and 
half long. In respect of community level interviews, it became apparent that the 
timing of the interviews so close after the flood event meant that emotions were still 
high. Interviewees tended to focus on the day of the flood event itself, rather than 
reflecting on the recovery process. Consequently, prompt questions were used to 
steer the interview discourse away from the response phase towards the thesis 
focus, i.e. on mechanisms relating to the recovery and reconstruction process.  
7.5.3 Practitioner level interviews 
 
As outlined in Chapter 6, practitioner level interviewees were purposively recruited 
based on respective roles and responsibilities within their organisations. Consistent 
with the approach outlined in Chapter 5 (Section 5.5.5), a mapping exercise was 
conducted to identify individual stakeholders representative of four key areas, 
namely: (1) policy and prevention; (2) emergency management; (3) recovery and 
reconstruction; and (4) independent industry arena. Section 5.5.5 further outlined 
the sampling and recruitment strategy used to identify suitable participants based 
on their area of expertise. A full list of ppractitioner level interviewees together with 
their NVivo codes are listed in Table 7.5.  
Table 7.5 Codebook of Practitioner level interviewees.  
Organisation Responsibility Interview codes 
(NVivo) 
Policy and prevention 
Environment Agency Asset Engineer P165 
United Utilities Head of water programme P167 
Carlisle City Council Principal planning officer P171 




Met Office Flood forecasting and communicating. P174 
Environment Agency Resilience officer P163 
Allerdale Borough  
Council 
Flood Risk Team P175 
Cumbria County 
Council 
Flood Risk Management Team P168 
Recovery and Reconstruction 
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Environment Agency Asset manager P176 
Cumbria County 
Council 
Development and infrastructure planning P177 
Cumbria County 
Council 




Carlisle City Council Community and economic development P162 
Carlisle Churches Flood Recovery Team P164 
Cumbria CVS Flood Recovery Manager P166 
Industry and Independent 
Red Cross Community adviser P180 
Farmers Network Managing director P161 
Cumbria action for 
sustainability 
Property resilience manager P170 
National Farmers 
Union 
Vice president P169 
Property level 
Protection 
Business manager P181 
ABI representative Risk adviser P182 
 
In accordance with the structured ‘Framework Method’ data analysis outlined in 
Chapter 5 (Section 5.7.1), the five systematic phases of analysis was transposed 
and applied in NVivo (Table 7.6). 
Table 7.6 Transposing the 5 stage ‘Framework method’ of analysis into NVivo 
 
The process began with Stage 1 ‘Transcription and Familiarisation’ of the interview 
recordings and field-notes. Once familiar with the data, Stage 2 followed with 
‘Categorisation of the Codes’ involving the creation of ‘cases’ for the participants 
(Table 7.7). This was an important step as it permitted interrogation and 
identification of patterns later in coding (Stage 3) of the framework analysis. The 
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cases were categorised into different case profiles, namely: gender; age; time in 
community; number of people in household; community location and flood 
experience.  
Table 7.7 Stage 2: Screenshot example of ‘case profiles’ in NVivo to ease 
comparison between cases.  
 
Stage 3 followed by describing the application of the “Analytical Framework” 
proposed in Chapter 6. Transcripts were ‘coded’ line by line, with relevant data 
being placed within the applicable pre-defined thesis Framework, namely; risk; 
resources and capacities; connectedness and learning (Table 7.8).  
 
Table 7.8 Stage 3: Coding framework of component ‘nodes’. 
 
 
A process of ‘open coding’ allowed for new or unique sub-components (child nodes) 
to emerge outside of those found within the Chapter 6 pilot study. For example, 
Figure 7.8 highlights how the “awareness” sub-component can have many ‘child 
nodes’ or indicators (e.g. knowledge or possession of a disaster plan) which stand 









Figure 7.8 Stage 3: Coding framework of ‘parent nodes’ (components) and ‘child 
nodes’ (sub-components).  
 
Stage 4 comprised the method of ‘Charting’ the indicator data in a structured 
manner within the pre-defined spreadsheet template outlined in Chapter 6. Firstly, a 
word frequency query was run for each of the four components within NVivo to 
ensure no new emerging themes were overlooked. The resulting ‘clustering (tree) 
diagrams’ (Figure 7.9) assisted with the synthesis of vast amounts of indicators into 


















Figure 7.9c Stage 4: Process of charting the ‘Connectedness’ component indicators. 
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Figure 7.9d Stage 4: Process of charting the ‘Learning’ component indicators. 
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By way of example, the resulting “Risk” indicators are set out in Table 7.9 (a full list 
of all indicators is presented in Appendix 12). 
 
Table 7.9 Stage 5: Indexed “Risk” component indicator list. 
 
 
Stage 5 concludes the structured “Framework method” by indexing indicators within 
their respective components. Results from this stage led to the creation of twenty-
two ‘community resilience’ indicators as listed in Table 7.10.  Those highlighted in 










Table 7.10 Comparison of indicator allocation for Northern Ireland pilot and Cumbrian case- 




Pilot Study Cumbria 
Risk awareness 
 1.Risk awareness 1. Risk awareness 
2. Risk communication 2.Risk experience 
3. Risk acceptance and mitigation  3.Risk communication 
4. Risk experience 4. Risk understanding 
5. Risk Knowledge 5. Risk acceptance and 
mitigation 
Resources and Capacities 
 6. Self organising 6. Self organising 
7. Capacity building/upskilling 7. Redundancy 
8. Insurance 8. Local knowledge 
9. Collaboration 9. Resourcefulness 
10.Innovation  10. Self-efficacy 
11. Self-efficacy 11. Flood responsibility 
12. Flood responsibility 12. Preparedness 
 13. Property 
 14. Governance 
Connectedness 
 13. Social capital 15. Cohesive community 
14. Integration of Social networks 16. Multi-scalar interaction 
15. Sense of belonging 17. Higher-level Trust 
16. Trust in authorities  
Learning 
 17. Problem definition 18. Analytical thinking 
18. Critical Reflection 19. Integrated development 
planning 
19. Experimentation  20. Experimentation and 
innovation 
20. Transfer of  (local) knowledge 21. Knowledge feedback and 
review 
21. Monitor and review 22.Skills and training 
 
Figures 7.10 and 7.11, give an overview of the weighted breakdown of coded 
indicators (number of codes per indicator theme), together with their respective 
components. The findings reveal ‘Risk’ as the most prominent component, followed 
by “Resources and Capacities” and “Connectedness” in almost equal measure. 
“Learning” was referenced the least, despite its critical role in transformational 
resilience. The outer ring of coding in Figure 7.25 illustrates the number of 
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indicators representative of the sub-components or ‘child nodes’ (middle ring), 
which in turn represent the key component indicators (innermost ring). Taking the 
four components in turn, an analysis of the “risk” component and its respective sub-
component indicators is presented in more detail below 
 
 




Figure 7.11 NVivo hierarchy visualisation of coded component ‘nodes’.  
 
7.5.4 Risk indicators 
 
 
Chapter 6 highlighted the complex relationship between risk awareness as a driver 
towards resilience mitigation action. Using knowledge of flood maps as an indicator 
of ‘risk awareness’ (Indicator 1), it was found that 96% of first time flood victims 
were unaware of their proximity to or in a flood zone and as such were apparently 
unaware of their risk. A matrix query was run in NVivo isolating ‘flood experience’ 
case profiles: three times and above, second time and first time flood victims. In 
doing so, it allowed comparison between these case categories and the indicator 
node ‘risk awareness’ (Indicator 1). The comparative results highlight a lack of flood 






Figure 7.12 NVivo matrix coding query highlighting low risk awareness among first time flood 
affected residents. 
 
Corroborating Cutter et al’s (2010) assumption that risk awareness levels lead to 
preparedness action, it was found that communities with higher awareness had 
community disaster plans in place (Section 6.6). With the exception of Keswick, 
none of the case-study communities had a resilience plan in place prior to the winter 
flood 2015. In addition, communities affected by a high first time flood percentage 
were prompted to establish a FAG post event. As part of this positive resilience 
action, many are in the process of developing flood action plans to “Get everyone 
around the table and shape a plan for a safer city” (C55). 
 
Table 7.11 Indicator 1, Risk Awareness. 
 
 
‘Risk experience’ (Indicator 2) emerged strongly from the NVivo coding (word 
search query) by reference to previous flood events in 2005, 2009 and 2012 (Figure 
7.9). However, whether this experience leads to positive mitigative action (Chandra 
et al, 2012) relies on two factors:  a correlation between high frequency of event (3 
times or more) and a corresponding higher uptake of property level protection. For 
example, an elderly couple flooded for the third time in Keswick ‘flipped’ their house 
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by relocating the kitchen upstairs during post flood renovations: they can live in the 
property during potential future renovations: 
 
“The hardest part is constantly moving from temporary accommodation to 
temporary accommodation during the renovations. With the kitchen now upstairs we 
can close the door at the bottom of the stairs and carry on with life as the 
renovations get underway” (K 112) 
 
Risk experience did not, however, always result in positive resilience action. In this 
regard, a relationship was found between a lower than average time of years spent 
living in the community (<10 years case category) and an unwillingness to invest in 
resilience measures. When asked the question “Would you be willing to invest in 
flood resilience measures for your property?”, Carlisle was found to have the lowest 
‘Yes’ response at 67% in comparison to an average of 86% over the other case- 
studies.  
 
This could be attributed to the transient nature of the Carlisle population, typical of 
many urban settlements30. An above average rental tenure in the city (25.6 %), 
coupled with lower than average time spent living in the community (54 % in the <10 
years case category), potentially led to a reduced sense of belonging as proposed 
by Cutter et al (2012). Highlighting this assumption, a tenant renting in Carlisle 
commented: “I’m not going through this again. Once I get sorted with a new house 
to rent I’m out of here” (C 51). Equally, reduced time living in the area led to one 
property owner of six years to comment: “I’m selling the house at auction, cutting 
my losses and getting out. Life is too short to be living in a house that is a 
construction site” (C 51). 
 
Table 7.12 Indicator 2, Risk Experience. 
 
 
                                                
30 Carlisle holds a comparatively higher rental tenure (29%) to that of the Cumbrian average. This is partly 
attributable to the student population attending the University of Cumbria campus (9,500 students enrolled).  
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Risk communication’ (Indicator 3) was measured by the percentage of members 
signed up to the EA flood alert system. The low percentage in Kendal was attributed 
to the high number of flooded properties that were not in an EA flood risk area. As 
such, they did not receive a warning and it “Wasn’t until the water was running down 
the street that we had any idea we were going to flood” (K 129). This highlights the 
need for a portfolio of communication options. In addition to formal communication 
channels such as the EA flood alert, the Met Office website and television/radio 
news, it was found that informal methods were also effective. The interview 
discourse revealed that Keswick informed at-risk-residents through their flood 
warden scheme by knocking on residents’ doors. Word of mouth and social media 
(albeit to a lesser extent in rural villages) served as informing channels in all 
communities. The apparent relationship between flood experience and flood 
communication was visible through the manner in which some Carlisle residents 
became aware of the threat of flooding: “When I heard that Appleby was flooded 
then I knew we were next”  (C 42).  
 
In particular, local knowledge played a role in more localised flooding: "It's the 
drains in the street behind that flooded us. Myself and the neighbour have a look at 
them every so often, particularly when it rains" (K142). Additional evidence was 
noted in Eamont Bridge where properties overlooking the river use visual 
monitoring, together with a river level gauge, as additional means of informing.  An 
early warning system using the Appleby fire station siren was used to communicate 
flood threat in that location. However, evidence cited in the interview discourse 
regarding operational failure of the river gauge and human error over the siren in 
Appleby, highlight the need for multiple forms of informing.  
 
Further, it was found that the type of communication needs to be tailored to the 
community demographic. Social media, texts and email alerts may not be suitable 
for all community demographics, particularly in respect to the elderly who often rely 
on more informal methods of risk communication:  
 
“You know yourself by looking out the window at the river levels. My neighbour was 
good to me too. He warned me to get ready to leave… he helped me put some 





Table 7.13 Indicator 3, Risk Communication. 
 
 
An apparent link between ‘risk understanding’ (Indicator 4) and subsequent ‘risk 
acceptance’ (Indicator 5), leading to mitigation action was noted in the Cumbria 
case- studies. It was apparent that risk understanding was evident through the 
community’s deep understanding of how river behaviour impacts upon their 
community: “When the river gets up to the height of the fence there, that’s when I 
know to knock on the neighbour’s door and drive up the hill to park the car” (E79). 
The interview discourse further revealed how understanding informed potential 
monitoring and solution approaches:  
 
“That river needs to be cleared out. It hasn’t been cleared for years. The water then 
can’t get through the bridge quick enough, gets backed up and then we flood in a 
matter of hours” (C 47). 
 
It was also found that the misinterpretation of technical language by the community 
can erode resilience. Technical terms such as Annual Exceedance Probability 
(AEP) and ‘1 in a 100 year flood’ were found to be understood by many 
communities to mean that they should expect a flood every one hundred years. “I 
bought this house after the 2009 floods, I had thought that it wouldn’t flood for 
another 100 years” (C53). This reinforces the viewpoint of Catto (2010), who argues 
that the use of technical jargon at the local level exacerbates the flooding issue by 
limiting a community’s ability to articulate or appreciate their own risk. 
 




Acceptance of risk as a by-product of awareness (Indicator 1), experience (Indicator 
2) and indeed understanding (Indicator 4) is argued to prompt communities to 
mitigate their risk with appropriate resilience action (Chandra et al, 2012).  
 
Both the community and practitioner levels agreed establishing FAGs was an 
immediate resilience “win” that could stand to benefit the community in the long 
term.  The community interview discourse (particularly with those flooded more than 
once) demonstrated adaptation measures, including property level protection and 
maintenance of gulleys, drains and rivers.  
 
However, both practitioners and the communities argued the need for proactive 
change and updating in relation to flood risk maps, building codes, standards and 
enforcement. These data point to an acceptance from both practitioners and the 
community that existing strategies are not calibrated to the increasing level of risk 
and proactive change is required. In response to the need to account for this 
residual risk, the development manager at Carlisle City Council stated “It’s clear 
flood defences designed to withstand past floods will not withstand the increasing 
pressure that climate change presents” (P162). In addition, practitioner discourse 
pointed to a concern over a “lack of long term funding” (P169), suggesting present 
risk acceptance levels are not tailored to appropriate Government long-term funding 
strategies.   
 






7.5.5 Resources and capacities indicators 
 
Once adequately informed of their risk, it is important to understand the factors and 
processes that drive the mobilisation of resources (Magis, 2010). As such, this 
component focuses on a community’s ability to develop and engage with resources 
in a way that allows them to thrive during the uncertainty that characterises the 
post-flood recovery phase. 
 
The process of ‘self-organisation’ (Indicator 6) was found to increase the capacity of 
a community to come together as a collective to sustain, change or develop action. 
An indicator of this collective capacity was evident in the interview discourse 
through the introduction of FAGs or other, more informal resilience groups using 
existing networks such as the parish council. The findings show that self 
organisation enhanced resilience during the temporal preparedness, recovery and 
reconstruction phases: “Resilience plans made us (as a community) more prepared 
should we get hit once again” (K146): “We help each other out throughout the 
rebuilding” (K142), with the overall aim of improving the situation to ensure “Our city 
is safe for its residents” (K142) in the future.  
 
Table 7.16 Indicator 6, Self organising. 
 
‘Redundancy’ in terms of the ability of a community to rely on extra resources when 
faced with adversity, was highlighted in Chapter 4 as a key aspect of resilience 
theory (Norris et al, 2008; Biggs et al, 2012). The findings from Cumbria reinforce 
this argument by highlighting the relationship between redundancy and a 
community’s corresponding ability to share resources. Use of redundancy (Indicator 
7) was identified through (1) access to specialist equipment, (2) stable and diverse 
economy, (3) risk transfer (insurance) and (4) access to public buildings. Taking 
each resource in turn, access to resources such as tractors, diggers, chain saws 
and shovels were drawn upon in rural areas, such as the following example from 
Glenridding:  
 
“First thing we got a chain saw and pulley to the tree trunk blocking the passage of 
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water through the bridge, it was acting like a dam….We got diggers from a local 
contractor loaned to us to get the rubble out of the river…we removed tonnes” (G 
90). 
 
Whilst this resource was evident in a rural context, it should be noted (by contrast) 
that no evidence of access to machinery was available in an urban context. 
However, despite the immediate benefit brought about by this type of intervention, it 
does raise questions about consent and safety when operating heavy machinery in 
a river. 
 
Economic diversity was a concern across all communities. In particular, reliance on 
the ‘McVities’ factory in Carlisle (a major employer within Carlisle which flooded) led 
to situation where many locals (many of whom flooded themselves) were out of a 
job during a period of mounting renovation costs: “In the space of a day I lost my job 
and my house. It was such a disruption to my life I still haven’t recovered” (C52). 
The associated financial stress illuminated the need for communities to build in 
some personal financial redundancy:  
 
“I learned the true meaning of saving for a rainy day. I had to pay for a deposit for a 
new house to rent, new clothes for the baby, hotel meals as we were out of the 
house...and all within the space of a few days. The insurance company is slow to 
pay out “ (C45).  
 
The practitioner level discourse acknowledged the need for a public building to act 
as a rest centre during evacuation procedures in the preparedness phase: "We are 
working with communities, particularly those with FAGs to set up rest 
centres…central points for people to go and register as flooded after being 
evacuated. Somewhere to dry off, get a cup of tea, clothes and be safe. Many end 
up sleeping there until alternative accommodation is found" (P163). 
 
The evidence above highlights how the provision or absence of these four 
redundancies is a critical aspect of resilience theory. Redundancy provides 
communities with the capability to switch between numerous available resources in 





Table 7.17 Indicator 7, Redundancy. 
 
 
Local knowledge (Indicator 8) was found to be a critical resource during the 
Northern Ireland pilot (Chapter 6), particularly in relation to warning and informing. 
Evidence from the Cumbrian community level discourse reaffirmed this initial 
finding, with an affected resident noting: “You know we can tell when it’s going to 
happen (flood)…you can tell by looking at the river there. When it rises to the level 
of that fence I know we are done for” (K141). The practitioner level further 
reinforced this finding, with a Flood Risk Manager from CCC commenting: “No one 
knows a community better than someone who has lived in it all their life...it’s 
invaluable” (P163).  
 
The value of local knowledge further presented itself through alerting local 
authorities to potentially inappropriate planning developments: “I knew that site 
would flood, I objected to it when the planning application was going through. That 
very site was a lake in December” (E76).  
 
Table 7.18 Indicator 8, Local Knowledge. 
 
 
Proactive responses to risk were consolidated in the indicator “resourcefulness” 
(Indicator 9). At an individual scale, PLP glavanised household resilience ahead of 
the next potential flood. After being flooded for the second time, an Appleby resident 
explained the extent of their PLP efforts: 
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"We tanked up the wall to about a foot higher than it was after the last flood. We dug 
up the floors and put damp proof membrane and then put concrete on top of that. 
We dug down one or two feet. Concrete then epoxy resin matrix and then on top of 
that a flooring sandwich of insulation and a floor surface on top of that. It worked" 
(A13). 
 
In addition, evidence of innovatively calibrating resilience actions to increasing risk 
was demonstrated through preparedness actions: “As soon as I got the alert I knew 
to take my car to higher ground. I knocked on a few neighbours’ doors to let them 
know. A lot of people still lost their cars though" (K113).  
 
Recovery efforts were also aided by small, impromptu resourceful actions such as 
offering to charge affected residents’ phones: “I took all their phones and brought 
them to my house to charge. The town was completely cut off with no electricity" 
(A4). Other members of the Appleby community utilised social media and notified 
the local school (which served as a rest centre) that they could offer some 
accommodation to those displaced. “We offered up spare bedrooms in our house 
on Facebook. We also rang the grammar school and let them know that we had 
spare beds available if they knew someone who may need them" (A4). 
 
An apparent correlation was noted between flood experience and an 
acknowledgement that innovative measures, beyond the current provision of hard 
defenses, are required if a pathway to transformational resilience is to be realised: 
 
 “We need to start thinking beyond flood walls…we can see they didn't work. In the 
FAG we are looking at a range of possible solutions from leaky dams further 
upstream, dredging the river, holding back the water…." (C61 ). 
 
The above evidence corroborates Fazey et al’s (2017) assumption that a dialogue 
about transformational change and potential opportunities is a fundamental step 
towards re-shaping more sustainable future trajectories.  
 
Table 7.19 Indicator 9, Resourcefulness. 
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The presence of ‘self-efficacy’ (Indicator 10) was found to play a critical role in 
realising resilience actions. It was found that a belief in what they could achieve 
(“We know what to do now” (K135)) left communities feeling empowered: “The FAG 
is well set up now. We all have our roles, we have done dry runs. We are in as good 
a position as we can be should it happen again" (K137). This quote from a resident 
in Keswick highlights the fundamental role FAGs play towards empowering 
communities to galvanise their potential.  
 
Table 7.20 Indicator 10, Self efficacy. 
 
 
The pilot chapter findings uncovered an apparent relationship between ‘flood 
responsibility’ (Indicator 11) and ‘flood experience’ (Indicator 2). A matrix query was 
run in NVivo, across all Cumbrian case-studies, isolating the former node for 
comparison against the case profile ‘Flood experience’. The results indicate that 
flood responsibility increases in line with flood experience (Figure 7.13).   
 
 
Figure 7.13 Matrix coding highlighting the influence of time living in an area on the resilience 
indicator ‘Flood responsibility’.  
A further query was run to explore the relationship between ‘time spent in the 
community’ (Case profile) and increased flood responsibility (Figure 7.14). It was 
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learned that residents in more established communities, who have resided in the 
area for a longer period, are more likely to undertake resilience measures.  
 
 
Figure 7.14 Matrix coding highlighting the influence of time living in an area on the resilience 
indicator ‘Flood responsibility’.  
 
Evidence from interview discourse uncovered three potential factors, signifying 
acceptance of a community’s own responsibility towards mitigating flood risk. The 
first recognised a pattern between installing PLP and insurance uptake as having a 
potential influence on a community’s propensity to accept responsibility for their own 
risk. “It’s our house and obviously we want to protect it. We have taken up the 
resilience grant and made our home as flood proof as possible" (S158).  
 
However, reluctance on the part of insurance companies to facilitate resilience 
measures was found to impede resilience: “I put in some resilience measures with 
the money from the grant. I'd like to get a bit more done, concrete in the floor and 
raise plug socket levels but the insurance won’t pay for that and I don't have the 
money" (C38).  
 
A further commitment to flood responsibility was demonstrated through the EA flood 
alert registration figures. Flood experience played a role in increasing these 
numbers, however, many previously flooded still felt it was a once off and did not 
calibrate this risk with a need to receive a formal flood warning. By contrast, those 




“You are constantly checking the river when there is heavy rain. You’d be listening 
to the radio and watching the news as well….when you hear Pooley (further up-
river) is flooded then we need to be alert. We have a river gauge too that we can 
monitor from the laptop. As a community the neighbours would be talking about it, 
letting people know if they thought they needed to put their flood gates up” (E79).  
 
Table 7.21 Indicator 11, Flood Responsibility. 
 
 
Evidence of evacuation plans and multi-scalar co-ordination were found to enhance 
the preparedness of at-risk communities. ‘Preparedness’ (Indicator 12) did not 
emerge as an indicator in its own right but instead it formed part of the ‘flood 
responsibility’ indicator. The lack of ‘preparedness’ evidence cited within interview 
discourse by contrast to the Cumbrian context, is largely attributed to higher level of 
impact sustained in Cumbria. The evidence from the Northern Ireland pilot did not 
present flooding as a risk to life. However, floodwater reached a height of over 1.4 
metres in some Cumbrian properties. A household in Carlisle which had flooded 
twice previously explained their preparedness routine: 
 
“As a family we have a household resilience plan. My husband is very organised 
like that and insisted we make one. Last week we got a flood alert and I was out 
shopping. My son rang me and said we moved the TV and valuables upstairs and 
that I should get home" (C49). 
 
Other flood-affected members highlighted their preparedness by keeping a ‘grab 
bag’ (K142) ready for evacuation, whilst residents in Carlisle reaffirmed the 
importance of PLP: "I've taken all the resilience measures I can to make the house 







Table 7.22 Indicator 12, Preparedness. 
 
 
‘Property’ (Indicator 13) is a new indicator that did not present itself as strongly in 
the Northern Ireland pilot. The indicator focused on the standard (flood resilience) 
and availability of accommodation needed to relocate as a consequence of post-
flood renovations. Relocation was frequently cited as the hardest part of the 
recovery process: “I could watch the flood water come and go but living out of a 
suitcase for months was very tough on the family” (K 126). The extent of 
widespread flooding resulted in an accommodation shortage across Cumbria, 
requiring displaced families to change alternative accommodation several times: 
“We’ve had to move 6 times over the 7 months. I used to be able to walk to work, 
now I have to drive an hour each way. On top of that I have the added stress of 
needing to check how the builders are getting on with the renovations” (C65). NVivo 
coding related to ‘Property’ further reinforced the importance of PLP (Indicator 9) as 
a means for communities to increase their individual resilience. Frustration over 
restrictions to the implementation of property level protection within conservation 
areas was expressed in the discourse:  
 
“How can they tell me to be resilient and then turn around and say you’re not 
allowed put in a flood gate without getting planning permission. There really is a 
lack of common sense there on the behalf of the Council” (A21). 
 
Table 7.23 Indicator 13, Property. 
 
 
Modes of ‘Governance’ (Indicator 14) and flexible-decision making have been put 
forward in the literature as critical aspects of transformational change (Biermann et 
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al, 2012). The case-study communities expressed a desire for a more long-term 
Government approach to FRM: "I would prefer if the Government kept their £5000 
(resilience grant) and instead pooled it together to solve the problem" (K121). 
Further, the need for the Government to take stock of increasing risk was expressed 
by many: "I don't think the Government are aware how bad the situation is. We feel 
like we have been forgotten about. We need to see some changes" (E72).  Contrary 
to the community’s perception, the practitioner level expressed an understanding of 
increasing flood risk and a need to calibrate responses accordingly: “We have 
moved away from an approach of building defences to looking at a portfolio of 
solutions. This ties in with our joined up approach" (P162).  
 
In light of the above evidence, it has become apparent that a ‘politics as usual’ 
approach may stand as a roadblock to positive transformation (Dryzek and 
Stevenson, 2011). The evidence from Cumbria suggests that a more adaptive 
approach to policy may help meet the changing demands imposed by an uncertain 
environment. 
 
Table 7.24 Indicator 14, Governance.  
 
7.5.6 Connectedness indicators 
 
As outlined in Chapter 6, the ‘Connectedness’ component, presents evidence of 
how horizontal and vertical interactions are integral to the effective functioning of 
community network typologies. The section below discusses how the presence of 
(1) cohesiveness, (2) multi-scalar interaction and (3) trust in authorities are integral 
to a community’s ability to mobilise resources and capacities in the face of 
adversity. 
Evidence of ‘cohesiveness’ (Indicator 15) was apparent in the relationship between 
place-based social cohesion and resilience. This was shown through membership 
of clubs and organisations and engagement levels in FAGs and other resilience 
groups: “We came together as a group to see what we can do as a community to be 
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more prepared but even beyond that ….I know you can’t stop the rain but we want 
to see what can be done better so that we aren’t in this mess again” (G90).  
The findings revealed an apparent relationship between settlement scale 
(urban/rural) and cohesiveness. Referring to the cohesiveness of rural areas, an 
Appleby resident commented: "Appleby is one of those nodding hello type of 
places" (A19). By contrast, evidence from urban Carlisle presented the opposite: 
“You just get on with it (recovery) don’t you. Everyone around here has enough to 
be worrying about without worrying about how you are getting on” (C62). 
 
The presence of a ‘cohesive community’ (Indicator 15) also extended to a desire to 
remain in the area, referred to in the literature as ‘sense of belonging’ (Nowicki, 
2008).  Despite the adversity faced, a resident in Appleby commented: "I didn't want 
to leave the house, it was my house, it was my home, I wanted to stay here despite 
the flooding" (A19). Another resident also expressed reluctance to move out of 
Appleby during the reconstruction process: "I didn't want to see my belongings 
leave Appleby" (A1). The literature suggests that ‘sense of belonging’ may be more 
prominent in established communities (Cutter et al, 2012). Further, low levels of 
renting, (typical in rural villages) could also be attributed to increased sense of 
belonging and community cohesiveness.  
 
The practitioner level further vindicated this initial finding that rural communities 
exhibit higher cohesiveness over their urban counterparts: “What we tend to find is 
that the rural villages come together more easily. It's the practicalities of their size 
more than anything else" (P163). 
However, certain communities within Carlisle highlighted inconsistencies regarding 
the assumption that urban areas are isolating and non-cohesive. In Carlisle, it was 
also found that distinct neighbourhoods/communities acted as ‘urban villages’ within 
the city fabric. For example, the community of Caldewgate in Carlisle had strong 
ties to the local biscuit factory, employing 800 staff, many of whom lived in the 
Caldewgate area. This localised pattern of employment created a stable population 
within the community. One retired lady commented: 
 “ I grew up smelling the biscuits in the playground at school…. I’ve been working 
there since I failed my 11+ exams…. We (neighbours) helped each other out (after 
the floods) with cleaning and so on. A few in the street mucked in.” 
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Evidence of local connection, kinship and cohesion, stemming from shared 
employment as well as living together in the same neighbourhood, cuts across the 
preconcieved view of Carlisle as a ‘cold’ city and instead recognises certain 
communities (such as Caldewgate) as an ‘urban village’ within Carlisle city. 
 
Table 7.25 Indicator 15, Cohesive Community.   
 
 
The evidence from Cumbria acknowledges the need for ‘multi-scalar interactions’ 
(Indicator 16) and, as such, this section presents evidence of relationship ties. In 
particular, it reveals attempts by communities to extend beyond internal ties 
(bonding, bridging) to engage and interact with outside resources such as statutory 
agencies (linking). Taking each relationship tie in turn, the following section 
presents evidence of these ties in practice. 
7.5.6.1 Bonding ties 
 
Bonding ties were found to facilitate communities in receiving flood warnings, taking 
mitigative action, arranging alternative accommodation and accessing resources 
and capacities needed to plan for long-term recovery (Table 7.28). Conversely, it 
was found that while businesses are integral to the functioning of a community, 
evidence of businesses drawing on bonding capital was limited: “We just get on with 
it ourselves. Between the staff and the insurance company we got it done” (C68). 
This may, however, be attributed to the temporal nature of less established small 
businesses whose owners/managers may not live in the area affected by flooding.  
 
Table 7.26 Coded quotes indicating use of bonding social capital.  
1. "I gave a key to my neighbour and she saved what she could" (A18) 
2. “A lot of my husband’s friends are burly so they helped me with the clear out” (C22) 
3. "We know who to call here in the village...it's that kind of place" (G90) 




The findings corroborate Tunstall et al’s (2007) assumption that the elderly have an 
over reliance on bonding social capital. Further compounding this vulnerability was 
the fact that these ties were not geographically located in the community. For 
example, an elderly lady speaking of the assistance she received from her son in a 
town over fifteen miles away, commented:  
 
“My son is very good to me. He’s a good lad and helps me with everything since my 
husband died. I moved into his house (in another town) with his wife for five months 
while the builders were in. I’d be lost without him” (K127). 
 
A number of residents commented that they were unaware FAGs existed in their 
areas. Of this number, 73% were in the >65 age group. This evidence draws an 
apparent correlation between elderly residents and low bridging and linking social 
connectivity.  Affirming this belief, an elderly resident in Carlisle commented: “I don't 
get out much, I wouldn't know much of what goes on in the town. I rely very much 
on my son” (C43).  
7.5.6.2 Bridging ties 
 
The previous section presented evidence of how bonding ties can potentially restrict 
network innovation by resisting outside assistance. By contrast, bridging ties are 
evidenced to expedite recovery through the connecting of two loosely related ties 
(Levin and Walter, 2011). Most commonly found in heterogeneous groups, evidence 
of a community’s ability to access new information and resources was seen through 
a variety of institutions and organisations, including: charities, churches, 
nongovernmental organisations, clubs, societies and local businesses.  These more 
fragile ties were cited as enhancing the community’s ability to recover by providing 
wider access to resources and capacities. In particular, many residents in Kendal 
referred to receiving vital support from the church: 
 
“I relied on the church a lot for support. I’m not sure I’d be sitting here today if it 
wasn’t for them…and that’s the truth of it. I’m not talking financial support now but 
advice…form filling and that kind of thing. It was a place to go when you were down, 
have a cup of tea and pull yourself together again. There were other volunteers that 
came around too, again religious groups, the muslims came and a friend who I play 
bridge with helped me too with clearing out the house” (K133). 
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Displacement to temporary accommodation was found to negatively impact upon 
community relations. Exacerbating the already stressful situation, one resident 
commented:  
 
“You don’t see your neighbours once you move out unless you bump into them 
when you come to check up on the builders. People are coming and going from one 
temporary accommodation to the next... you can’t keep track” (E79). 
7.5.6.3 Linking multi-scalar interactions 
 
Linking social capital was the least evident dynamic within the Cumbrian networks. 
However, it could be argued that it is the most important for resilience as it is the tie 
that connects community members with those in power.  
 
Evidence of multi-scalar dynamics (Indicator 16), including linking ties, were 
demonstrated through FAGs - the primary means of engagement between the 
statutory level and the community level. Formally established in Carlisle, Keswick 
and Kendal and informally through parish councils in Glenridding, FAGs displayed 
characteristics of vertical and horizontal ties and form the main data source for this 
analysis.  
 
The findings indicate that the extent of integration between the community and 
statutory agencies is largely dependent on the degree of flood responsibility 
(Indicator 11) accepted by the community. This is reflected in the reasoning behind 
establishing a Flood Action Group. Irrespective of the group title (FAGs, Resilience 
Groups, Flood Groups), these groups were found to comprise two main forms: 
pressure groups and action groups.  
 
Evidence from pressure groups found that flooding was viewed as the responsibility 
of the government. As such, they form after a flood in response to a perceived 
contractual breach by the agencies who, from the community’s perspective, 
“allowed us to be flooded” (C59). Their intention is to “hold government agencies to 
account” (C59) for this breach through consultation with the agencies or in extreme 
cases they pursue direct action by taking over responsibility for the breach 
themselves (for example river maintenance). A member of the Carlisle pressure 
groups commented: “The Government need to stand up and take this issue 
seriously. It’s not my fault I’m flooded is it?” (K 155). 
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Action Groups view engagement and collaboration with statutory agencies as a 
collaborative exchange of skills and resources. Linking (vertical) ties were found as 
a source of empowerment, facilitating the community to develop skills and 
knowledge to reduce their flood risk. Corroborating this viewpoint, a Keswick 
resident commented: 
 
“We know what to do now. We all have roles and they know where we fit in the 
overall plan. I think people feel comforted by this, you know that can be useful and 
help it” (K146). 
 
The effectiveness of this re-delegation of responsibility to the community level 
(linking ties) is dependent on the existence of trust with authorities. 
 
Table 7.27 Indicator 16, Multi-scalar interaction.   
 
 
The last of the connectedness indicators ‘higher-level trust’ (Indicator 17), concerns 
building relationships of trust between communities and authorities. Overall, a 
sentiment of distrust between the two actors was evident: "You don't see them from 
one flood to the next" (C35). The main concern from the community’s perspective 
was the disrupted nature of engagement which appears to intensify only when an 
event occurs: "You only see them when we’re flooded" (G82).  The communities 
expressed the view that local knowledge was not adequately taken into account by 
authorities: "They came from all over the country descended on us with all sorts of 
ideas, come up with suggestions and then we never see them again" (G82). In 
addition, their dissatisfaction extended to the process of engagement: “No one is 
listening” (A15).  
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Conversely, those who engaged with authorities through FAGs spoke positively of 
the relationships built: "It's nice to know there is someone in an office somewhere 
working on our behalf" (K142). Equally, the practitioner discourse commended 
community engagement via FAG channels: “We work with communities through the 
channel of the Parish council or FAGs. This is an effective route for us. Over time 
this relationship builds and strengthens" (P168).  
 
Despite this progress, practitioners did acknowledge that communication channels 
with communities could be improved: "I think there is a lack of understanding of 
public sector protocol that we must follow. It can be frustrating for both sides" (162). 
The above narratives are suggestive of a breakdown in communication between 
both sides, despite sharing a common goal. These gaps in linking and bridging 
connections highlight structural communication holes within community networks. 
The importance of this key component justifies further research as to the causal 
mechanisms of these structural holes. As such, Social Network Analysis (SNA) is 
carried out in Section 7.6 to further reveal the barriers and drivers to a joined up 
approach to recovery.  
 
In reference back to ‘bonding social capital’ in the previous component, a 
relationship was found between communities exhibiting dense bonding networks (in 
particular the >65 demographic) and a lack of trust of outside agencies. Dense 
networks (unfamiliar with working with actors outside their network), were found 
have a tendency to resist external support until a relationship of trust is established: 
“They come in here in with their shiny shoes and clipboards, having never stepped 
foot in the village before. They don’t even introduce themselves or tell us what they 
intend to do. How can you trust them when they carry on like that” (K120). 
 
This suggests that density of bonding ties alone can potentially act as a barrier to 
accessing outside formal assistance that could potentially lead to transformational 
resilience.  
 




7.5.7 Learning indicators 
 
 
This component illuminates opportunities to facilitate and navigate positive 
transformational change through learning. It reveals potential factors that have been 
highlighted in the Cumbrian interview discourse as a means to shape new 
trajectories towards transformational change.  
 
The first of the learning indicators ‘analytical thinking’ (Indicator 18) considers 
reflective framing of the flood issue based on past experience. Critical reflection 
(through the medium of FAGs) in the aftermath of a disaster provides the space for 
communities and practitioners to critique current societal recovery patterns and to 
suggest new thinking and pathways going forward.  
 
The FAGs presented an effective platform from which communities could discuss 
and reflect on past flood issues. In doing so, communities were able to iteratively 
calibrate mitigative action: “The purpose of the group (FAG) is more than just 
support. Yes we chat with others who have flooded and are in the same boat, but, 
we also look at ways of coming together to be more prepared next time”  (K142). 
 
Table 7.29 Indicator 18, Analytical thinking.   
 
 
‘Integrated development’ (Indicator 19) emerged as an indicator in response to the 
extent of interview discourse surrounding inappropriate planning and development. 
Respondents presented the argument that inappropriate development contributed to 
the flooding: “Those houses shouldn't have been built. They are what has us in this 
mess" (A5). 
 
Further, there was concern that local knowledge on development issues was not 
adequately accounted for by the authorities: "I objected to the planning application. I 
remember the site used to be a marsh field and I'd play in it with the frogs as a child. 
Is it any surprise it flooded. It shouldn't have been granted permission" (K153). 
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Residents expressed concern over developments knowingly built in flood plains but 
granted planning permission on account that resilient measures were taken: “These 
houses are built right beside the river but designed with the garage below and the 
living space above. They were designed to withstand a 1 in 100 year flood…so they 
knew the area was a flood risk. Now here we are sitting on garden furniture inside a 
gutted house" (A19).  
 
Practitioners also expressed the need to account for future climate change risk 
when granting planning permission: “What's fit for purpose today might not be fit for 
purpose in 20 years time…you need to bear climate change in mind” (P168).  More 
positively, the council commented that “steps forward” (P 168) taking account of 
climate change are being made within planning. In particular, practitioner discourse 
did make suggestions as to the cause of the underlying planning issue: “They are 
planners not hydrologists…that is the issue” (P162).  
 
This highlights an apparent understanding of the limitations of the current planning 
system in relation to FRM. The above discourse suggests that future development 
decisions need to be set against a backdrop of future climate risk.  
 
Table 7.30 Indicator 19, Integrated development planning.   
 
 
Examples of ‘experimentation and innovation” (Indicator 20) were shown through 
advances in individual PLP measures: "We put a lot more resilience measures in … 
tiled floors, raised plug sockets and raised flood defence wall outside…hardwood 
doors and flood barriers. We got the advice from builders" (E81). Further examples 
included resilient furniture: "We've had new furniture installed to be flood resilient" 
(K135) and the use of the resilience grant to part fund concrete floors: "We used the 
grant to concrete in the floor so when it floods again it will dry out much quicker" 
(C33).                                                                         
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By contrast, Shap and Kirby Stephen demonstrated a relationship between 
communities who displayed low cohesion and in turn limited evidence of 
experimentation and innovation: 
 
"My son is a builder so he re-done my house and then did the same with his own 
house. What else can you do, you just have to accept it’s just one of those things 
isn't it" (S158) 
 
In part, this can be attributed to the fact that flooding was isolated and not widely felt 
across the Shap and Kirby Stephen settlements. As such no FAG was established 
leaving little opportunity for the affected community to discuss potential strategies to 
reduce flood risk.  
 
Further measures, challenging the status quo in other case-studies, included the 
creation of a community register to prioritise assistance to those who need it the 
most: "We are trying to create a register of who on the street is elderly, lives alone 
or is disabled…they should be getting help first" (C22).  
 
Table 7.31 Indicator 20, Integrated development planning.   
 
 
‘Knowledge feedback” (Indicator 21) describes the process of taking lessons 
learned and reinterpreting them as positive resilience actions. The most prominent 
proxy for this indicator was recognition of local knowledge being accounted for by 
tailoring mitigative actions accordingly. For example, flood affected residents 
commented that poor river maintenance exacerbated the extent of flooding: “We've 
put it to the council that they need to manage the river better. We used to be able to 
dive off the river bank into it. You'd need a crash helmet to do that now” (E76). 
 
Improvements in communication as a consequence of the Flood and Water 
Management Act (2010) have provided opportunities for communities to present 
their account of events at LLFA organised meetings:  
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“Dealing with communities is not something this agency would typically have done 
in the past. We are learning, we are getting better at it. It's a different language. We 
need to communicate flooding in an understandable manner, to allow us to move 
forward together" (P168). 
 
Highlighting this positive development, a council representative commented:  
“Community meetings as part of the section 19 report were a great way to learn 
more about what happened on the day” (P168). This evidence reaffirms the need 
for higher-level acknowledgment of the local knowledge resource, a council 
representative commented: “Particularly in relation to planning objections we need 
to take local knowledge seriously" (P171). 
 
A notable finding, at both the practitioner and community level, was a call for 
updated standards in line with the increasing risk. "I think there needs to be some 
form of resilience standards. Why did they suck the insulation out of that house and 
not mine? Too many cowboy builders out there" (K132). The practitioner level 
corroborated the need to adapt policy and regulations in line with increasing risk: 
“We need to keep our policy in line with climate change and this needs constant 
monitoring and adaptation to ensure we are making the right decisions!” (P171). 
However, this sentiment was not shared by all practitioners with some feeling the 
recovery process as it stands is still reactive: "I have battered my head trying to get 
them to take on the recovery process and they haven't" (P164). 
 
Table 7.32 Indicator 21, Knowledge feedback.  
 
 
The above findings highlight an apparent relationship between knowledge feedback 
(as a consequence of flood experience) and lessons learned has the potential to 
lead to informed future risk strategies. The Cumbrian findings suggest that actions 
emerging from lessons learned can positively equate to communities reflecting on 
past flood experience and integrating new knowledge. For example, a business 
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owner in Carlisle commented: “As a business we were completely unprepared. Now 
we are investing some time in business contingency plans....it's a resilience plan 
really. We could have had the shop back open a lot quicker had we been prepared" 
(C37). 
 
The above discourse reaffirms the argument in literature that “skills and training’ 
(Indicator 22) have the propensity to enhance a community’s recovery (UNDP, 
2012).  
 
FAGs represent another arena in which resilience skills can be practised and 
developed: “We had the idea of getting a resilience group together before the 
floods. Now we really are working on it, fine tuning it. It's come a long way and we 
are much better prepared. For starters everyone knows each other" (C43). 
Individually, community members have also sought advice from council flood teams 
regarding PLP: “We got advice from the council and made use of the resilience 
grant" (K114). In addition, training was offered to ensure PLP was installed 
correctly: "We got some training on how to put in the flood gates. We hadn't a clue 
before. The firemen had to put them in but it was too late anyway" (A19). 
 
In addition, positive developments in relation to increased surveys to investigate 
long-term strategies were proposed in the practitioner level discourse: “We need to 
be looking at long term strategies for flooding but actually a lot of the funding 
available is time restricted so it's actually quite reactive” (P165). Further, sustainable 
urban drainage SUDs and alternative catchment wide soft approaches were 
proposed as potentially reducing flood risk: 
 
“There needs to be more education on the benefit of soft engineered approaches 
such as SUDs. Not just at council level but communicating the benefits to 
developers as well. They are actually cost effective but that message hasn’t been 
reinforced very well I don’t think’ “ (P170). 
 
Overall, a long-term focus on betterment through education is apparent throughout 
the practitioner discourse. Acceptance of increased risk: “The figures this year are 
higher than the last flood” (P165), prompting “changes in policy” (P162) has created 
a roadmap for improvement. Ensuring staff have updated knowledge, skills and “the 
appropriate training” (P164) is integral to this process of betterment.  
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Table 7.33 Indicator 22, Skills and training.  
 
7.6 Social Network Analysis  
 
The ‘connectedness’ indicators (19-21) identified in the previous section 
demonstrate that community social structures ‘of place’ have the potential to enable 
communities to recover more quickly after a flood event. In that light, this section 
explores wider, non-geographic connections obtained from social media networks. 
As such, data from the social media platform ‘Facebook” was ‘mined’31 to uncover 
wider, multi-scalar connections otherwise difficult to detect through interview 
discourse.  The resulting network visualisation maps present an opportunity to 
assess social structure and patterns of relations that reflect social capital (Aldrich et 
al, 2015).   
 
Accordingly, Social Network Analysis (SNA) was applied to (1) determine the 
structure of different support networks; (2) provide Ego-centric analysis of key 
brokers facilitating multi-scalar interactions; and (3) identify the barriers to 
development of multi-scalar social networks. Further knowledge of the structure and 
gaps, that characterise social networks will inform how networks can positively 
influence the nature and level of resilience in a community.  
7.6.1 Methods and application of SNA 
 
This analysis focuses on understanding the network structure at village, town and 
city scale, as represented by Glenridding, Kendal and Carlisle respectively. A 
mixed-method approach was applied to achieve the three aims of the section. 
Firstly, in order to determine the structures of different support networks, 
quantitative data ‘mined’ from social media was analysed. Secondly, the 
quantitative data provided an opportunity to identify evidence of multi-scalar 
relationship ties through analysis of their visualised networks. Thirdly, barriers and 
                                                
31 Data mining refers to the practice of analysing large pre-existing databases with the intention of revealing novel 
information. 
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drivers of multi-scalar networks were qualitatively analysed from interview 
discourse. Taking each point in turn the following section outlines the approach to 
social structure analysis.  
7.6.2 Analysis of Social Network Structure  
 
‘Data mining’ of the social media platform ‘Facebook’ was conducted to draw 
quantitative information on network structures beyond their immediate ‘of place’ 
geographical community. The process of identifying wider multi-scalar links began 
by using the open source Social Network Analysis software ‘Gephi’. The data 
collection and extraction application, ‘Netvizz’, allowed data to be ‘mined’ in 
standard file formats from the relevant Facebook pages for analysis in Gephi. 
Selection of the relevant Facebook pages was also carried out using the Netvizz 
application. Selecting pages representative of the three scales was conducted by 
the application of “mining” search words in Netvizz including; ‘Cumbria’, ‘flood’, 
‘Flood action group’, ‘FAG’ and/or ‘Kendal’, ‘Carlisle’, ‘Glenridding’, ‘Shap’, ‘Kirby 
Stephen’ and ‘Eden’. Of the thirteen Facebook pages identified, those with the 
highest number of members representative of the city, town, and village scale were 
selected and analysed (Table 7.34). However, pages were restricted to those that 
were publicly ‘open’ with no privacy restrictions, meaning access to personal 
accounts was not necessary. As no dedicated page existed at the village scale, a 
district level page encompassing three Eden villages was used as a proxy.  
 
Following the data extraction process, the four pages selected were analysed to 
identify both physical and virtual ties within communities. In doing so, comparative 
interpretation of properties and structure such as degree, distribution, modularity, 
cohesion (k-core) and community detection was possible.  
 
Table 7.34 Data sources representative of community groups within Cumbria. Data was 
‘mined’ from Facebook using the data collection and extraction application ‘Netvizz’. 
Page ID Name Category Members Group/Page 
1731271137092519 Carlisle Flood Action 
Group 
Community 783 Page 
1607232116235659 
 
North East Kendal 
Flood Action Group 
Community - Group  
525779977593445 Support Eden 
Cumbria Flood 
Volunteers 
Cause 340 Page 
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7.6.3 Framework for Social Network Analysis 
 
This section outlines the structural analysis of mined data against Crowe’s (2007) 
characterisation framework of networks (Section 5.6.2, Figure 5.11). The framework 
illustrates how interpretation network structures can shed light on the mechanisms 
of relationship ties within them. For example, it can be seen that bonding social 
capital is reflected in complete or clustered (factional)32 structures, whereas weaker 
bridging ties are typically found in separated cluster (coalitional)33 and bridging 
structures. Crowe’s framework suggests that network structures that appear as a 
‘continuum’ rather than discrete groups are considered more cohesive. 
 
In order to analyse cohesiveness and overall network structure, k-core and 
modularity measures were carried out. K-core referred to the number of connections 
a member has within a community. The higher the k-core (cohesiveness), the less 
structural holes a network holds and the less likely a system will collapse. In 
addition, modularity analysis and partitioning in Gephi assisted structural analysis 
by dividing the structure into sub-networks.  
7.6.4 Structural analysis findings  
 
Having extracted the connection data via Netvizz, the analysis of connection 
structure commenced in Gephi. The overall findings for all four communities are 
presented in Table 7.35. The ‘Nodes’ in the table represent the people or ‘actors’ in 
the relevant network. The ‘edges’ represent the connections between the nodes, 
while ‘active communities’ refers to the clusters or groupings found within the 
network. 
 
Taking each community network in turn, the city results for “Carlisle Flood Action 
group” revealed a relatively low or ‘sparse’ network density of 0.007. A network’s 
density is the ratio of the number of edges in the network over the total number of 
possible edges between all pairs of nodes. This measure is used to determine the 
connectedness or how ‘closely knit’ a social community is. A perfectly connected 
network is called a ‘clique’ and has density =1. The low-density score in this 
example can be attributed to the high number of actors outside the network core 
(grey, blue, orange and green nodes illustrated in Figure 7.15). However, while the 
                                                
32 Factional structures exhibit separate clusters that maintain high k-core 1 or above. 
33 Separate clusters that maintain high K-core and evidence ties outside of the cluster. 
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overall density score may be low, the K-core34 results supports the view that the 
network has a cohesive core. Running K-core analysis at >1 eliminated only one 
category of nodes (10) (Figure 7.16).  
 
 
Table 7.35 Structural findings on community networks in Kendal, Carlisle and Eden villages. 
‘Cumbria Flood recovery 2009’ page was included to illustrate the rise in social media use 




















192 144 70 0.470 1.709 0.012 
Support Eden 
flood Volunteers 









Figure 7.15 Gephi social network visualisation of “Carlisle Flood Action Group”.  Visual 
representation using Force Atlas algorithm.  
                                                
34 K-core is a visualisation of structural cohesion. It prunes all vertices and their respective edges that hold a degree 
less than k <1 leaving only cohesive nodes remaining (Seidman, 1983).  
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Figure 7.16 Gephi social network visualisation of K-core >1 for “Carlisle Flood Action 
Group”.  Visual representation using Force Atlas algorithm. 
 
Degree distribution35 is representative of the number of connections between nodes. 
Standing at 2.588 (Figure 7.16), this figure is higher than the Kendal and Eden 
examples. It demonstrates greater engagement between nodes with less reliance 
on key brokers to mobilise resources. While enhanced distribution is overall a 
positive for network resilience, weakness in the network was revealed through an 
over-reliance on one actor in Carlisle holding 38.5% of connection distribution 
(Figure 7.15).  
 
This imbalance in degree (number of connections) across the network, is illustrated 
through the tapering off of nodes on the x-axis of the Degree Distribution results 
(Figure 7.17). Application of Crowe’s (2007) theory reaffirms this apparent 
imbalance of network ties, revealing a fractional network with signs of separate 
clusters (coalitonal) causing structural holes. Reference back to Crowe’s 
Framework (Figure 5.11), illustrates this apparent clustering through isolated 
grouping (factional) of bridging and linking capital outside the network core.  While 
evidence of bridging and linking connections are positive for a network, the isolated 
nature of the clustering potentially attributes to the overall low network density 
distribution. Further, its dense connected core is further represented in its 
modularity results of 0.427 as illustrated on the x-axis (0-14) in Figure 7.18. 
                                                
35 The ‘degree’ of a node refers to the number of connections between nodes within its network. Degree distribution 




Figure 7.17 Average distribution measure of 1.294. Carlisle Flood Action Group. 
 
 
Figure 7.18 Modularity distribution measure  of 0.47, Carlisle Flood Action Group. 
 
Similar to the previous example, the town results derived from the “North East 
Kendal” group revealed a relatively ‘sparse’ network density of 0.012. Further, a 
relatively low degree distribution of 1.709 (Appendix 4.2) reveals that 
communication is loosely distributed and reliant on four main ‘brokers’ holding 
69.5% of interaction (Figure 7.19). Corroborating this evidence, Figure 7.19 depicts 
a colour coded spatial visualisation of the network using the ‘degree centrality’ 
metric to highlight reliance on key brokers.  The illustrative map shows larger nodes 
with a higher centrality measures (degree of connectivity), representative of the 




Figure 7.19 Gephi social network visualisation, “North East Kendal” FAG. Presented using 
Force Atlas algorithm.  
  
Dense ‘Degree centrality’ was found as only 1.3% of the network does not have a 
K-Core >1. In this instance, the 1.3% removed were found to be from the ‘Donations 
and support’ (10) category, who rather than weakening the network are considered 
to strengthen it (Appendix 4.2). However, the low degree of distribution (1.709) is 
indicative of structural holes across the network, through its uneven ‘distribution’ of 
connections. Further, modularity results of 0.470 reaffirm this finding, by highlighting 
a dearth in connections beyond its dense core.  
 
Applying Crowe’s (2007) theory once more (Figure 5.11), the social network 
visualisation map (Figure 7.19) correlates with the earlier findings of a dense 
fractional network, also referred to as clustering (Crowe, 2007). The network 
visualisation shows how these broker connections act as a valuable bridging 
channel for loose connections as regards warning and informing (4) and donations 
(10). The network visualisation also presents evidence of linking social capital as 
seen through re-posts and sharing of high level information concerning upcoming 
EA and LLFA authority events.  
 
The final SNA analysis relates to the “Support Eden Flood Volunteers” page, which 
served as a proxy for the village scale. Due to the relatively small scale of the 
settlements, no dedicated page existed to examine a specific village network. The 
lack of social media engagement is potentially attributable to poor internet access 
and an aging population unfamiliar with technology, typical of rural areas (Cutter et 
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al, 2016). As such, the analysis is based on ten active communities within the 
network. Degree distribution (0.443) and modularity (0.944) scores are typical of the 
other groups analysed, however the network is highly vulnerable to collapse due to 
a 57.6% and 30.7% reliance on two actors (Figure 7.20).  
 
 
Figure 7.20 Gephi social network visualisation for “Support Eden Flood Volunteers”.  Visual 
representation using Force Atlas algorithm.  
 
The imbalance in connections is evident through the high degree distribution of 
nodes (Average distribution measure 0.944). Critically, while the modularity score is 
typical of the other two communities (0.443), it is dependent on only two nodes. The 
over-reliance on two key actors reinforces the fragility of the network and 
emphasises the need for investment in other forms of social capital at the village 
scale. Further detail on average distribution measure and modularity are presented 
in Appendix 4.2. 
 
The presentation of the three case-studies above highlighted a variance in network 
structure across the scales. The city scale presented more linking social capital, 
demonstrated through engagement with authorities and non-geographic links. The 
nature of bridging and linking connections varied from support for authorities, to 
funding and donations from ‘virtual’ community members. Further, the social 
network provided an organisation structure for volunteers from outside the 
geographic community to offer their skills and services. Kendal also displayed 
evidence of bridging and linking social capital, however overall the structure was 
less ‘clustered’ (fractional) than Carlisle. Carlisle exhibited more clustering which 
may in part be attributed to the spread of flooding affecting different sections of the 
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city. For example, a large percentage of support in Carlisle was directed at a 
particular street (Warrick Road), as it was reported as being the worst affected area. 
By contrast, Kendal suffered widespread flooding in separate areas across the 
town, however, its smaller scale allowed support/assistance to be offered to the 
town as a whole. The sparse ‘Eden’ network stands in stark contrast to the two 
previous examples. The analysis clearly highlights an imbalanced network, with little 
evidence of bridging and linking ties.  
 
The analysis of network structures above highlighted an imbalance in network ties 
across all three settlement scales. Such ‘Structural holes’ limit the potential of 
networks to mobilise resources and capacities, thus reducing resilience capacity. 
Similarly, an overdependence on bonding capital known as a ‘closed’ network, 
resist outside assistance and underutilise the resilience potential of the network.  As 
such, the development of a balanced network of bonding, bridging and linking ties 
are critical to the functioning of resilient networks. ‘Brokers’ are integral to the 
development of bridging and linking ties, serving to connect loosely related ties. As 
such, ‘Key Brokers’ or Egos are explored in more detail below.  
7.6.5 Ego-centric analysis 
 
The section above focused on the potential contribution of multi-scalar interactions 
towards robust and complete network structures. Integral to this are brokers or 
‘egos’36, who are influential members of a network. They have the potential to act as 
an agent by connecting members, horizontally and vertically, to other members 
outside their immediate ties (Fernandez and Gould, 1989).  
 
A mixed method approach to ego-centric analysis is outlined, which relies on 
quantitative mined data in addition to qualitative interview data. The methodological 
process began prior to the empirical fieldwork by purposively and quantitatively 
identifying brokers. This was achieved by running an Ego Network query in Gephi. 
In doing so, nodes with high in-degree37 and betweenness centrality38 (Chapter 5, 
Section 5.6.6) measures were isolated and their ‘Node ID’ examined to reveal their 
identity. The results revealed that founding members of FAGs/Flood groups were 
those most influential in the network.  
                                                
36 An Ego is a key player in a social network. Ego-centric analysis is a methodological tool used to understand the 
structure, function and composition of network ties around a key actor or ego. 
37 In-degree centrality is a measure of the centrality of a particular individual in a network relative to all other 
individuals within that network.  
38 Betweenness centrality concerns the centrality of a node within a network. The measure is calculated by the 
number of shortest paths from all vertices to all others that pass through that node (Freeman, 1977). 
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Qualitative data was drawn upon through subsequent fieldwork interviews to 
understand the sources of assistance, information or resource. The recall method 
(as proposed by Wasserman and Faust, 1994) was used, allowing interviewees to 
list assistance sources without being prompted. The qualitative data elicited was 
subsequently formatted in excel in preparation for interpretation and visualisation in 
Gephi. Character interaction data (i.e. actors in the network) were inserted into 
excel columns and exported as a .CSV file to be read by the Gephi software. The 
ego-network maps (Figure 7.21–7.23) represent ‘key brokers’ in Carlisle, Kendal 
and Glenridding respectively.  
 
The centrality of the actors were differentiated by size (those with more ‘edges’ or 
influence are represented with bigger node sizes). Beginning at the urban scale, it is 
apparent that the Carlisle ‘Ego’ drew upon all 3 multi-scalar levels (Figure 7.21). 
Active engagement between the FAG and statutory agencies is clearly 
demonstrated through the larger nodes on the map: LLFA, Environment Agency 
and to a lesser extent United Utilities and Carlisle City Council. Bridging social 
capital was apparent through third sector organisations and volunteers such as 
Cumbria Foundation, National flood Forum, Church and various volunteers. The 
final capital was illustrated through the large bonding ‘friends’ and, to a lesser 
extent, neighbours.  
 
 
Figure 7.21 Ego centric map for key actor in Carlisle FAG.  
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By contrast, the Kendal example is indicative of a close-knit community reliant on 
friends and family (Figure 7.22). Linking capital was limited to a reference to the 
council. Rather than a form of collaborative interaction, the connection was in 
relation to waste collection and the provision of skips. Bridging capital was evident 
through assistance and services offered by third sector organisations including the 
Cumbria Community Foundation and the Red Cross. The contribution of the third 
sector emerged in interview discourse through the church’s capacity to expedite the 
recovery process in Kendal. One Kendal resident commented “I wouldn’t have been 
able to cope without them” (K94), whilst others acknowledged their presence but felt 
she could manage by herself and “Left that service for those who needed it more” 
(K131).  
 
Figure 7.22 Ego centric map for low resilience actor in Kendal FAG.  
 
Conversely, the  ‘Eden’ example exhibited tight-knit bonding ties through friends 
and family and had limited reliance on external linking capital (Figure 7.23). The 
stark social capital imbalance in ‘Eden’ is highlighted through large bonding and 
bridging nodes, by contrast to a solitary linking node. Bridging capital was 
evidenced through the Parish Council and local contractors whose support 
expedited the recovery process. Examples included local businesses donating free 
lunches to volunteers and contractors loaning (at no cost) heavy machinery such as 




Figure 7.23 Ego centric map for low resilience actor for Glenridding (Eden) resident.   
 
To conclude this section, the Ego-centric maps reaffirm earlier findings of structural 
holes and communication weaknesses with respect to linking capital in particular. 
Although linking capital was evident through the Carlisle FAG, the nature and 
intention of this engagement influences the resilience capacity of the community. 
For example, the interview discourse revealed that many Carlisle FAG members 
viewed the FAG as a pressure group to hold the statutory agencies to account, as 
opposed to a vehicle to work collaboratively with authorities. Whilst this is not the 
viewpoint of all members, it was commented by an agency representative that this 
approach was “unhelpful” (P168). The following section seeks to understand the 
barriers to multi-scalar engagement and concludes the SNA by providing drivers to 
promote these relationships. The barriers and drivers to multi-scalar engagement 
are discussed in further detail in Appendix 4.3.  
7.6.6 Enhancing social networks for improved resilience 
 
An important learning point from the above findings, it that it is not necessarily the 
level of participation that is most important, rather the form of engagement. 
Engagement with linking social capital through FAGs can take two forms, either as 
(1) a pressure/lobby group or as (2) a collective FAG. The “blame game” evident in 
the former group can be attributed to a lack of understanding from the communities 
as to what agencies are responsible for in FRM. Consistent and regular 
engagement from the agencies would help improve the level of trust between the 
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two groups and potentially lead to less of a blame culture and a more harmonious 
approach to FRM, as exhibited by some FAGs. By contrast, Keswick FAG emerged 
on the understanding that their role was both equal and complementary to the 
efforts of the authorities. Their respective roles were well defined and local 
knowledge led to empowerment through the acknowledgment of the full capabilities 
of the community resource.  
 
In concluding this section on SNA, the evidence presented of indicators influencing 
multi-scalar interaction makes the case for FRM to broaden strategies beyond 
physical infrastructure to include social infrastructure. The evidence has shown that 
social capital is not a constant asset (flood memory), it needs maintenance to avoid 
degradation. As such, investment in strategies to improve trust between the 
community and the statutory/institutional level has the potential to facilitate linking 
social capital.  
7.7 Comparative settlement hierarchy  
 
This section presents the distribution of community and practitioner level resilience 
indicators in Cumbria as presented in Figures 7.24-7.25. In doing so, patterns, 
relationships and gaps between indicator codes are revealed at each hierarchical 
scale. An exploration into the relationships between these weighted indicators at the 
city, town and village scales is presented in the flowing sections. 
 
Figure 7.24 illustrates the extent of resilience indicator coding identified across the 
case-studies, at both the community and practitioner level. Coding was found to be 
highest at the town scale (Appleby), with significantly lower coding at the smaller 
village scale (Shap). At the town scale, high ‘risk communication’ (Indicator 2) and 
‘multi-scalar interaction’ (Indicator 16), attributed to greater mobilisation of 
resources and capacities. Further, high ‘flood responsibility’ (Indicator 11) coding 
was also found at this scale as a result of the above mentioned multi-scalar 
interaction. ‘Cohesive community’ interaction was the most frequently coded 
indicator across all case-studies, albeit coding was significantly lower at the urban 
scale. This may be attributable to the transient nature of the city, as a consequence 
of high rental levels and a knock-on reduced sense of community (Chavis and 
Wandersman, 1990).  As such, a relationship between low ‘cohesiveness’ (Indicator 
15) and low ‘multi-scalar interaction’ (Indicator 16) may explain the root cause of 
limited resilience action at the urban scale.  At the practitioner level the highest 
coding concerned ‘integrated planning and development’ (Indicator 19). This fact 
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indicates higher-level recognition that historical development in flood plains has the 
potential to exacerbate flood risk.  
  
 
Figure 7.24 Matrix coding of community and practitioner level resilience indicators codes.  
 
A heat map query, run in NVivo (Figure 7.25), shows the hierarchical coding for 
each indicator at the different settlement scales. The most frequently coded 
indicators are represented by a darker gradient of colour (ranging from 0.0-43.00). 
Complementing data presented in Figure 7.25, it was found that the highest coding 
was at the town scale (Appleby), which may be attributable to its high ‘multi-scalar 
interaction’ indicator coding. Further, historical flooding in the town has led to higher 
‘risk awareness’ (Indicator 1) and ‘risk communication’ (Indicator 2) coding. 
Practitioner level coding results further highlight the fundamental role a ‘cohesive’ 
(Indicator 15) community plays in building community resilience, through its high 
coding of that indicator. The heat map reiterates higher-level acknowledgment of 
the role of ‘integrated planning and development’ through high coding of Indicator 
19. Figure 7.24 serves as a useful point of reference for indicator comparison 




Figure 7.25 Matrix query heat map of community and practitioner level resilience indicator 
codes.  
7.7.1 Village scale 
 
The villages of Shap and Kirby Stephen had the lowest representation of coded 
resilience indicators (Figure 7.25). This is potentially attributable to the separate and 
isolated nature of the flood incidents. As a consequence of this, no widespread 
recovery plan was in place (no FAG).  Affected residents predominantly relied on 
close bonding networks and evidence of outside assistance (bridging and linking) 
was limited (Figure 7.26). Consequently, instances of ‘resources and capacities’ 
being drawn upon was scant, with equally low evidence of ‘learning’ indicators 
revealed (Figure 7.26). 
 
By contrast, Glenridding village exhibited high mobilisation of the ‘resources and 
capacity’ component and relatively significant evidence of ‘learning’. The heat map 
query matrix (Figure 7.25) highlights four indicators that may help to explain this 
finding: (1) risk indicators; (2) cohesive community; (3) self-efficacy; and (4) 
redundancy.  Indeed, of the four villages, Glenridding had the highest 
representation of indicators in the ‘Risk’ component (Figure 7.25). Importantly, these 
five risk indicators were balanced across the ‘Risk’ component. Conversely, Eamont 
Bridge presented a similarly high ‘Risk’ component representation (Figure 7.27), 
however, the higher ‘risk awareness’ (Indicator 1) and ‘risk communication’ 
(Indicator 3) did not lead to ‘risk acceptance and mitigative action’ (Indicator 5).  
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Figure 7.27 Matrix code presenting weighted risk indicators at the village scale. 
 
The tight knit community of Glenridding exhibited stronger ‘community cohesion‘ 
(Indicator 15) than the other village case-studies (Figure 7.25). This may be 
attributed to the fact that, unlike Glenridding, the other villages have no established 
flood group/FAG. This collaborative work in Glenridding potentially influences 
increased ‘risk acceptance’ (Indicator 5) and ‘self efficacy’ (Indicator 10) levels of 
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the community, enabling them “To crack on and get the work done” (G 82). The 
evidence from Glenridding also corroborates the argument in literature that remote 
communities are more resourceful (redundancy) as a result of access to resources 
not easily accessed in urban areas. The remotest of all the case-studies, 
Glenridding, drew on ‘redundancy’ (Indicator 7) within their resilience system by 
acquiring chain saws and a tractor to remove debris blocking the bridge and 
borrowing heavy machinery from local contractors. In addition, they fundraised over 
£30,000 to assist further recovery efforts demonstrating the potential of community 
cohesion to act as a catalyst for the mobilisation of resources and capacities.  
7.7.2 Town scale 
 
The variety in resilience indicators uncovered across the town hierarchy settlements 
reinforces Taylor’s (2011) argument that communities are not homogenous and a 
‘one size fits all’ approach is not appropriate. Appleby’s flood history was 
represented by its comparatively high ‘risk awareness’ (Indicator 1) and ‘risk 
communication’ (Indicator 2) weighting over the other town settlements, Keswick 
and Kendal (Figure 7.25). In the case of Kendal, lower ‘risk awareness’ (1) is 
attributable to the limited level of ‘risk experience’ (Indicator 3) as many properties 
(not on an EA flood map) were flooded for the first time in winter 2015. Keswick has 
a history of flooding, however, due to its location in an area of outstanding beauty in 
the Lake District, it has a higher than average second home ratio (or a lower than 
average ‘usual residents’) (Census, 2011). Consequently, its lack of full time 
inhabitants may influence its lower ‘risk awareness’ (Indicator 1) and ‘risk 
communication’ (Indicator 2) levels. For example a second homeowner commented: 
“I stopped getting the flood alerts on my phone. What use are they when I live in 
Liverpool. There is nothing I can do to stop the water from there” (K138). 
 
In respect of the ‘Resources and Capacity’ and ‘Learning’ components, four findings 
emerged strongly from the interview discourse in the towns that were not as 
prominent at the village scale: (1) ‘integrated planning and development’; (2) 
‘property and accommodation’; (3) flood responsibility; (4) redundancy (Figure 
7.28). Firstly, ‘integrated planning and development’ (Indicator 19) played a greater 
role in interview discourse as a consequence of increased development pressure 
not typically found at the village scale. A potential driver of this development 
emerged at the town scale, through an apparent high demand for properties, 
consequently leading to a lack of alternative accommodation for those displaced 
post-flooding. For example, Appleby’s high representation in the ‘property’ (Indicator 
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13) was a consequence of its conservation area status (Figure 7.28). As such, 
many affected residents expressed concerns over their inability to implement PLP 
as they were refused planning permission to do so. Unique to the Appleby case- 
study, this indicator was found to reduce resilience levels and further had a knock-
on negative impact on ‘higher-level trust’ (Indicator 17).  
 
Secondly, ‘redundancy’ (Indicator 7) was apparent in the interview discourse in 
relation to risk transfer through insurance. It was noted that those renting had no 
control over resilience measures opposite the building structure. Landlords were 
often underinsured and consequently slow to carry out resilience works. Being at 
“the mercy of landlords” highlighted a lack of regulatory protection for tenants and 
the importance to having “enough savings for a deposit elsewhere” (A17). In 
addition, a link was revealed between ‘property’ (Indicator 13) and economic 
‘redundancy’ (Indicator 7) where affected residents were rehoused outside Appleby 
but lost their jobs as a consequence of being unable to get transport to work (Figure 
7.28).  
 
Figure 7.28 Matrix query highlighting four ‘Resources and capacity’ and ‘Learning’ indicators 
prominent at the town scale.  
 
 
Third, “flood responsibility’ (Indicator 11) in Appleby was found to be comparatively 
high relative to the other town hierarchies. An apparent relationship was found 
between ‘flood responsibility’ and the presence of high coding in ‘higher-level trust’ 
(Indicator 17); ‘community cohesion’ (Indicator 15); and self-efficacy (Indicator 10) 
indicators. High ‘community cohesion’ in Appleby was attributable to the small scale 
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“nodding hello” (A19) nature of the town. In both Keswick and Appleby, it was found 
that community cohesion acted as a springboard towards the establishment of a 
formal or informal FAG or flood volunteer group. This led to greater ‘self-efficacy’ 
and, through collaboration with statutory agencies, ‘trust in authorities’ ultimately 
strengthened (Figure 7.29). By contrast, flooding in more populated Kendal, 
affected separate communities across the town. As such community cohesion was 
at a more micro scale that did not extend much beyond immediate neighbours. 
Consequently, collaborative interaction extending to the statutory scale was not 
evident. The contrast in cohesion levels across the village scale, together, with its 
knock on effect on self-efficacy and trust in authorities, is illustrated in Figure 7.29.  
 
 
Figure 7.29 Matrix query highlighting prominent indicators at the town scale.  
 
7.7.3 City scale 
 
Carlisle presented high ‘risk awareness’ (Indicator 1), similar to the results identified 
at the town and village scales (with the exception of Kendal). The interview 
discourse was dominated by the process of property reconstruction. This may be 
attributable to the fact that a large part of resilience exhibited at the city scale was 
individual resilience rather than community resilience. The reduced presence of 
three indicators may contribute to the assumption that the city scale presented 
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higher individual rather than community resilience: ‘cohesion’ (15), ‘self-efficacy’ 
(10) and ‘self organising’ (6). The SNA (Section 7.6) presented an active ‘virtual’ 
community and while a physical FAG exists, it is important to note the nature of the 
group which was established to “make Carlisle a safer city” however they also 
expressed a wish to “hold agencies to account” (C59). Known in the literature as a 
‘pressure’ group, the indicator results show that this approach did not necessarily 
lead to positive community resilience, for example a low ‘community cohesion’ 
coding and its knock-on effect on ‘self organising’, which would normally be 
associated with action groups.  
 
Carlisle’s high ‘higher-level trust’ (Indicator 17) is partially misleading, as the coding 
reference includes both positive and negative codes. Although engagement through 
the FAG strengthened links with authorities, the nature of these links were 
‘pressure’ driven and not collaborative. As such, the sustainability of these 
relationships is arguably questionable. ‘Redundancy’ (indicator 7) was a further 
pronounced indicator due to job losses as a consequence of the temporary closure 
of a flooded factory (McVities) which is as a major employer in the city.  
7.7.4 Overview of settlement comparative analysis (community level) 
 
The comparative analysis presented similarities and variances of indicators across 
the scales.  The matrix query ‘heat map’ visualisation presents a summative 
overview of the three scales (Figure 7.30). The heat map highlights high ‘risk 
awareness’ across all scales with the exception of Kendal (attributable to the high 
number of first time flood victims). However, ‘risk understanding’ (Indicator 4) and its 
spinoff effect on ‘risk acceptance and mitigation’ (Indicator 5) was generally low, 
particularly at the town and city scale. This infers a gap between risk awareness 
and ultimate translation into mitigative action with the level of ‘community cohesion’ 
(Indicator 15) playing  a pivotal role in the resulting mobilisation of the ‘Resources 
and capacities’ component. Further, the interplay between ‘Resources and 
capacities’ and ‘higher-level trust’ (Indicator 17) significantly influenced the level of 
‘multi-scalar interaction’ (Indicator 16). Communities that had an established FAG or 
flood group tended to exhibit higher ‘self efficacy’ (Indicator 10) and ‘flood 
responsibility’ (Indicator 11) levels.  
 
‘Learning’ was the least represented component across all three hierarchies and is 
indicative of communities that have not fully realised the potential of multi-scalar 
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social capital (Cutter et al, 2012). Indicators found to positively influence 
transformative, multi-scalar interaction included ‘resourcefulness’ (Indicator 9) and 
‘redundancy’ (Indicator 7). Combining these two indicators with an established 
‘cohesive community’ (relationships extending from bonding to linking social capital) 
assists the potential to realise transformational resilience action. Through the 
channel of formal FAGs and parish council flood groups examples of these actions 
were noted. The FAG in Keswick established a flood warden scheme that operates 
hand in glove with the emergency services. Complementing the work of the 
agencies and emergency services, the scheme acts as a warning and informing 
service prior to the event and offers support and advice post event. Throughout the 
year, flood memory was kept alive through dry-run table-top exercises in 
collaboration with the emergency services. In a similar vein, Glenridding established 
a parish flood group on the back of the 2015 floods. Over time, relationships have 
improved with the authorities and fundraising efforts by the locals are partially 
match-funded by the local authority to help drive long-term recovery reconstruction 
strategies in the village.   
 
 







7.7.5 Practitioner level analysis 
 
This section outlines the distribution of practitioner level indicators (Figure 7.25; 
7.31) and in doing so highlights the disparity in prioritisation relative to those at the 
community level. The even distribution of ‘Risk’ component indicators suggests an 
understanding of risk awareness at the practitioner level (Figure 7.31). Figure 7.31 
illustrates two prominent indicators at this level are ‘integrated planning and 
development’ (Indicator 19) and ‘cohesive community’ (Indicator 15).  
 
The interview discourse presented a shift away from ‘isolated’ planning decisions 
towards a catchment-wide (holistic) approach to ‘Integrated planning and 
development’, taking account of the effect of planning decisions on the whole 
catchment. The empirical evidence also presented an apparent understanding of 
the need to consider climate change within planning policy, decision-making 
process and enforcement strategy. Of note was an understanding of the need to 
“Take on board local knowledge”…as “No one knows their area better than those 
that live in it” (P165).   
 
Practitioners described various levels of successful engagement at the community 
level, highlighting the practicality of the village scale as more “manageable and 
effective”. (P163). The disparity in cohesion levels across the eight case-studies 
reflect this finding, highlighting the greater ease of engagement with cohesive 
communities who already have a FAG/flood group in place. The highly coded 
‘cohesive community’ indicator (practitioner level) as shown in Figure 7.31, is 
somewhat indicative of the difficulties encountered by practitioners engaging across 
the different settlement scales. 
 
By contrast to the community level, practitioners evidenced greater 
acknowledgement of the need to invest in ‘learning’ indicators as part of their long-
term strategy. This is shown through the comparatively high learning indicators (18-
22) at the practitioner level (Figure 7.31) compared to at the community level 
(Section 7.7.1-7.7.3). Acceptance that “flood defences are not the only solution” led 
practitioners to promote the idea of considering “a portfolio of strategies to reduce 
flood risk” (P163). Although ‘governance’ (Indicator 14) did not emerge strongly 
from the practitioner data, acknowledgment of the ‘Learning’ component suggests 




Figure 7.31 Practitioner level resilience indicators codes. 
 
Having presented an overview of resilience indicators at the community and 
practitioner level, the following section explores the application of these indicators 
against the resilience weaknesses identified through the Phase 1 resilience 
baseline assessment (Section 7.5.1). 
 
7.8 Feedback of indicators from Phase 2 to Phase 1 
 
Taking each settlement hierarchy in turn, the application of Phase 2 indicators 
against Phase 1 weaknesses is discussed below in respect of Glenridding, Kendal 
and Carlisle. 
7.8.1 Village scale 
 
The Glenridding Phase 2 indicator results were analysed against the backdrop of 
the Phase 1 baseline assessment results (Figure 7.5.1). The empirical results found 
that the ‘environmental’ community asset was enhanced by resource ‘redundancy’ 
(Indicator 7), through the loaning of heavy machinery to clear 30,000 tonnes of 
rubble from the river. ‘Local knowledge’ (Indicator 8) of the changing ‘Behaviour of 




Further, maintenance of the ‘physical’ community asset was shown to be positively 
influenced by ‘flood responsibility’ (Indicator 11), through maintenance and removal 
of debris blocking water infrastructure (such as gulleys, culverts, drains, bridges). 
This further demonstrates ‘self-efficacy’ (10) and ‘self organising’ (6) on behalf of 
the community, adding a layer of resilience to maintenance work already carried out 
by authorities. ‘Resourcefulness’ (Indicator 9) in the form of property level protection 
were found to further enhance the physical resource. Likewise, ‘Integrated planning 
and development’ (Indicator 19) has the potential to positively influence the 
‘environmental asset’ by maintaining open spaces free from development to act as 
natural water storage sponges. Reduced pressure on the sewage infrastructure 
would improve ‘physical’ resilience by limiting run-off water from impervious 
developed land.  
 
The establishment of a parish flood group demonstrated the ‘self-organising’ 
(Indicator 6) and ‘cohesive’ (Indicator 15) capacity of the community. These highly 
coded indicators (Figure 7.32) influenced the extent of innovative and ‘resourceful’ 
(Indicator 9) actions undertaken and stood to bolster the human resource through 
enhanced ‘self-efficacy’ (Indicator 10) and empowerment. However, the tumultuous 
relationship with authorities ultimately affected ‘higher-level trust’ (Indicator 17). 
Whilst this indicator is coded heavily (Figure 7.32) the coding was negative, 
referring to distrust with authorities. Improved engagement with authorities has 
strengthened the relationship however the absence of ‘linking’ capital within the 
‘multi-scalar interactions’ (Indicator 16) as shown in Figure 7.32, is indicative of the 
need for more collaborative work between the two levels.  
 
Figure 7.32 presents low coding of the ‘Learning’ component, reflective of a dearth 
in ‘multi-scalar interaction’. The absence of an active FAG, working in parallel with 
the authorities, reduces opportunities for ‘learning’ and betterment. As such, the 
above-average education levels (Human resource) across Cumbria were not 
realised to their potential in respect of the ‘Learning’ component indicators: 
‘knowledge feedback’ (21); ‘skills and training’ (22); ‘experimentation and 
Innovation’ (20) and ‘problem definition’ (18) (Figure 7.32).   
 
The final ‘economic’ community resource presented an over-reliance on two 
industries within Glenridding: tourism and farming. Flooding badly affected both 
industries, with the impacts extending beyond those who flooded due to job losses 




Figure 7.32 Glenridding community level resilience indicators codes, village scale. 
 
Figure 7.33 illustrates how building in ‘redundancy’ (Indicator 7) through wider 
economic diversity, business continuity plans and insurance, could enhance 
economic resilience levels. In addition, Figure 7.33 illustrates how ‘preparedness’ 
(Indicator 12) measures (such as business resilience and evacuation plans) can 
lessen impact and expedite the recovery process.  
 
Concluding the village scale analysis, the indicators discussed above can be 
targeted to enhance community asset weaknesses identified in Phase 1 (Section 




Figure 7.33 Application of Phase 2 indicators to Phase 1 resilience baseline assessment 
results, Glenridding.  
 
7.8.2 Town scale 
 
At the confluence of three rivers, Kendal’s ‘environmental’ resource presents a high-
risk challenge for the community. The empirical discourse revealed that the 
‘environmental’ community asset was enhanced by clean-up days organised by the 
community, occasionally in partnership with third sector organisations such as 
‘Cumbria Action for Sustainability’. Despite this demonstration of community ‘flood 
responsibility’ (Indicator 11), it was found that resilience efforts were mostly limited 
to the individual rather than community level. As such, the majority of innovative and 
‘resourceful’ (Indicator 9) actions were predominantly focused on household PLP 
measures. These measures increased protection of the ‘physical’ community asset 
by protecting property, but did not extend to protecting water infrastructure assets 
as in the Glenridding example. This apparent focus on individual resilience could be 
attributed to the fact that 2,150 properties within Kendal were flooded. Of those 
affected, 13 of those interviewed were first time flood victims. This fact further 
exacerbated the issue as a consequence of the community’s low ‘risk experience’ 
(Indicator 3) and correspondingly low ‘preparedness’ levels (Indicator 12), as shown 
in Figure 7.34. The lack of a strategy to implement PLP within a conservation area 
raised frustrations and eroded ‘higher-level trust’ (Indicator 17), as illustrated 
through its low coding in Figure 7.34. A flexible and “common sense approach” 
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(K102) to recovery ‘governance’ (Indicator 14) was a clear request made by the 
community throughout the interview discourse. 
 
‘Human’ investment in terms of an organisational structure to enhance ‘community 
cohesion’ (16), such as a FAG, could potentially enhance self-organising (6), self-
efficacy (Indicator 10) and the utilisation of ‘local knowledge’ (8), as evidenced in 
the Glenridding example. Such an organisational structure could serve to build 
relationships and ‘higher-level trust’ (Indicator 17), leading to greater ‘multi-scalar 
interaction’ (Indicator 16). Empowering communities through the collaborative work 
of a FAG or flood/resilience group enables learning from  ‘flood experience’ and 
tailors lessons learned (learning component) with appropriate innovative and 
‘resourceful’  (Indicator 9) actions.  
 
By contrast to Glenridding, Kendal presents greater employment opportunities as a 
consequence of its larger scale and the existence of an industrial park. However, 
this does not lead to an enhanced community ‘economic’ asset, as the industrial 
park is located within a flood plain. This example highlights the importance of 
economic ‘redundancy’ (Indicator 7) (highly coded, Figure 7.34) and diversity but 
also the influence of  ‘integrated planning and development’ (Indicator 19) on the 
‘physical’ and  ‘economic’ community resource.  
 
 
Figure 7.34 Kendal community level resilience indicators codes, town scale. 
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Concluding the town scale analysis, the indicators discussed above can be targeted 
to enhance community asset weaknesses identified in Phase 1 (Section 7.5.1) and 
are presented in Figure 7.35.  
 
 
Figure 7.35 Application of Phase 2 indicators to Phase 1 resilience baseline assessment 
results, Kendal.  
 
7.8.3 City scale 
 
At the city scale a resilience gap was revealed through the lack of indicators 
directed towards enhancing the ‘environment’ community asset. Many residents 
viewed assisting flood risk activities as the authorities withdrawing from their 
obligations as a statutory authority. Rather than owning their own flood risk, few 
residents expressed an acceptance of the need to increase their ‘flood 
responsibility’ (Indicator 11) in line with increasing demands imposed by climate 
change.  
 
The ‘physical’ community asset was found to be compromised by the lack of 
alternative temporary accommodation for displaced affected residents, leading to 
high coding for the indicator ‘property’ (Indicator 13). Accommodation demand and 
development pressures further reinforced the need for a more ‘integrated approach 
to planning and development’ (Indicator 19), ensuring future development reduces 
the exposes of properties in or near flood plains.  
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The city scale indicator results similarly reflect the importance of ‘multi-scalar 
interaction’ (Indicator 16) to enhance the “human’ community asset. “Flood 
experience’ (Indicator 3) was found to lead to high ‘risk awareness’ (Indicator 1), as 
indicated through its high coding in Figure 7.36. However, the difficulty uncovered at 
the city scale lies in translating this awareness into collaborative resilience action 
beyond individual resilience measures. Low ‘cohesion’ (Indicator 15) is indicative of 
a transient city with high rental tenure, consequently ‘local knowledge’ (Indicator 8) 
received a low coding percentage (Figure 7.36). The low cohesion call into question 
the nature of the ‘higher-level trust’ (Indicator 17) established through the medium of 
the new Carlisle FAG. For example, the previous section discussed how the nature 
of engagement between authorities and ‘pressure’ groups can actually serve to 
erode resilience if the intent of the group is to “hold Government agencies to 
account” (C59) rather than work together towards a similar goal. 
 
Although Figure 7.36 indicates low ‘learning’ coding, the five ‘learning’ indicators 
were more highly coded than at the other settlement scales. Increased ‘learning’ is 
potentially attributed to the ‘analytical thinking’ (indicator 18) activities (problem 
definition) pursued through FAG meetings. Altering a revised ethos of the FAG from 
a ‘Pressure group’ towards a collaborative ‘Action group’ could potentially realise 
more of this ‘Learning’ potential.  
 
Finally, the ‘economic’ resource presented a similar scenario to that of Kendal. 
Industrial development in flood plains further exacerbated the impact of some flood-
affected members who also lost their jobs. This evidence emphasises the need for 
economic ‘redundancy’ in terms of financial savings for “a rainy day” (C45) and 
employment diversity.  In addition, the above example highlights the relationship 





Figure 7.36 Carlisle community level resilience indicators codes, representative of the city 
scale. 
 
Concluding the town scale analysis, the indicators discussed above can be targeted 
to enhance community asset weaknesses identified in Phase 1 (Section 7.5.1) and 
are presented in Figure 7.37.  
 
 
Figure 7.37 Application of Phase 2 indicators to Phase 1 resilience baseline assessment 





This chapter has presented the application of the thesis Framework developed in 
Chapter 4. The Cumbria case-study region has been outlined generally, together 
with an overview of the eight micro case-studies. The baseline resilience 
assessments in Phase 1 highlighted the disparity in inhered resilience across the 
settlement hierarchies and, as such, emphasised the need for a bespoke resilience 
approach. Application of the highly structured ‘framework method’ (Phase 2) of 
analysis permitted the extraction of 22 realised (operational) resilience indicators. 
The interaction and relationship between these indicators was discussed at the 
three settlement hierarchies. Further, the prioritisation of these coded indictors 
against the practitioner perspective was also discussed.  
 
The key finding emanating from this case-study is that the ‘connectedness’ of a 
community acts as a lynchpin for the successful mobilisation of resources and 
capacities. Those communities that exhibited a cohesive community core were 
more likely to engage in innovative and resourceful mitigative action. Risk 
awareness and experience critically influenced the extent of flood acceptance and 
responsibility by communities to undertake resilience action, however, it was the 
presence of an organisational structure such as a FAG that was the key to 
unlocking multi-scalar/collaborative action.  
 
It was found that FAGs presented an opportunity to analytically assess risk together 
with agencies and through feedback of lessons learned, offered communities the 
potential to transform into a more sustainable trajectory ahead of the next disaster. 
In addition, the practitioner level reaffirmed the need for communities and 
authorities to work collaboratively towards a common goal. On a positive note, 
collaborative steps have been made through the implementation of Lead Local 
Flood Authorities (LLFA) under the Flood and Water Management Act (2010). 
However, of critical importance is the nature of this collaborative action with 
communities (pressure or action group), with authorities warning that a ‘blame 





































Chapter 7 outlined findings from the application of the thesis Framework to the 
Cumbria case-study. This chapter explores whether the Framework’s applicability 
can be transposed successfully to a different case-study location. The positioning of 
this chapter within the overall thesis structure is illustrated in Figure 8.1.  Together 
with Chapters 6 and 7, this chapter provides empirical evidence to inform the overall 
conclusions of the study in Chapter 9.  
Figure 8.1 Position of Chapter 8 within the thesis structure   
In particular, this chapter seeks to substantiate four key findings from the Cumbrian 
case-study as articulated in Chapter 7. Firstly, to establish whether FAGs or 
Resilience Groups demonstrate a similar level of connectedness as revealed in 
Cumbria. Secondly, to verify whether lower flood risk awareness (associated with 
lower incidence in North-East Scotland) acts as a barrier to resilience action. 
Thirdly, to explore variances in resilience levels as a consequence of urban and 
rural localities. Fourthly, to assess the extent of inappropriate planning and 
development and it’s potential negative influence on resilience.   
More generally, the Chapter seeks to corroborate the Cumbrian findings through the 
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North-East Scotland case-study. North-East Scotland sustained significant flooding 
as a consequence of Storm Frank in December 2015 and January 2016. The case-
study focuses on four sites at the city, town and village scale.  
Against this background, the Chapter starts by introducing the case-studies and 
outlines the legislative history in respect of flood risk management in North-East 
Scotland (Section 8.2). As regards the legislative history, the Chapter notes a policy 
shift from “flood defence” towards a more holistic and sustainable approach to flood-
risk-reduction, as most recently represented by the Flood Risk Management 
(Scotland) Act 2009 (Scottish Government, 2009a).  The key stakeholders involved 
in this transition are outlined in Section 8.3. Section 8.4 introduces the North-East 
Scotland case-study, outlining key aspects of the region’s geography.  It also 
includes an overview of the socio-economic profile and explains the varied flood 
issues faced by the four micro case-studies.  
Sections 8.5 - 8.8 include the core analysis underpinning this case-study. Adopting 
a mixed-methods approach, Section 8.5 presents the application of the quantitative 
element (Phase 1) of the Framework, illustrating the baseline resilience levels of the 
four communities. The qualitative element follows (Phase 2), presenting an analysis 
of the affected communities’ perception of resilience after the winter 2015/2016 
floods. The critical role community networks play in expediting flood recovery is 
illustrated through Social Network Analysis (SNA) in Section 8.6. A comparative 
analysis of resilience indicators across the settlement hierarchies (city, town, 
village) is discussed in Section 8.7, while Section 8.8 critically evaluates the 
complementarities between Phase 1 and Phase 2 indicators.  
The Chapter concludes with Section 8.9 drawing conclusions from the North-East 
Scotland region and considers the extent to which the four specific questions posed 
from the Cumbrian case-study are transferable to the North-East Scotland study.   
8.2 History of flood risk management in Scotland 
 
The following section explains the incremental Flood Risk Management policy shift 
in Scotland from a ‘piecemeal’, reactive and predominantly hard engineering 
approach, towards the current promotion of ‘sustainable flood management’. In 
addition, this section highlights cross-cutting policy that supports the concept of 
building community resilience to flooding. 
One of the earliest pieces of flood legislation in Scotland was the Land Drainage Act 
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1958. Introduced to improve the agricultural potential of land, the Act encouraged 
the use of hard-engineering flood protection. The Flood Prevention (Scotland) Act 
1961 was introduced to give local authorities the power to mitigate the impact of 
river and tidal flooding on non-agricultural land. However, the Act was heavily 
criticised for its promotion of hard defenses, which created the impression that 
flooding can be ‘prevented’ (RSPB, 2007). In addition, surface water flooding was 
considered through The Roads (Scotland) Act 1984, which gave road authorities the 
power to take mitigative action.  In contrast to the hard-engineering approach, The 
Water Environment and Water Services Act (2003) promoted a more sustainable 
approach to flood management, including soft engineering strategies. The distinct 
approaches impeded progress in overall flood risk reduction and ultimately created 
the impetus for the introduction of a new, sustainable approach to flood risk 
management (FRM). Furthermore, the Scottish Parliament identified that the siloed 
and fragmented responsibility of FRM required co-ordination from a single 
responsible body. 
In response, the Flood Risk Management (Scotland) Act 2009 was introduced as 
the key legislation governing all flood types across Scotland. The Act established 
clear lines of responsibilities for the collaborative co-ordination of various 
stakeholders, including: the Forestry Commission, Scottish Environmental 
Protection Agency (SEPA), Scottish Water and Local authorities. The Act seeks to 
gather more data and information on the causes and impacts of floods (CREW, 
2012). Indeed, it is argued that the promotion of sustainable flood management 
represents the biggest change brought about by the Act (CREW, 2012), by 
broadening the scope of strategic actions from a hard-engineering approach to 
include soft engineering strategies (SEPA, 2013). 
Further, the sustainable focus of the Act stands as a response to the need for 
greater resilience development against climate change (Scottish Government, 
2009b; Scottish Government, 2014). The Act promotes a joined-up approach to 
flood risk management by imposing new responsibilities on local authorities, SEPA 
and Scottish ministers to reduce flood risk in an integrated and collaborative 
manner. The Act marks a shift from a reactive, hard-engineered and siloed 
approach towards a joined-up, catchment-wide approach that acknowledges the 
benefits of both hard and soft engineering strategies (Spray et al, 2009). 
In addition to the above Acts, cross-cutting resilience legislation in three fields:   
planning, resilience and emergency management supports the concept of building 
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community resilience to flooding.  
First, the control of new development is governed by the Planning etc. (Scotland) 
Act 2006, which outlines that planning applications within a flood plain require 
consultation with the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA). In addition, 
national guidance on appropriate planning and development is presented in Scottish 
Planning Policy (SPP)7.  Preventative in nature, these policies advocate that built 
development should not be permitted in a functional flood plain. Further, SPP 7 
states that development in a sparsely populated or undeveloped area should not be 
permitted in ‘medium to high’ flood risk areas. In addition, Planning Advice Note 69 
further galvanises this preventative strategy to development in flood plains by 
outlining measures to ensure that future developments are restricted in flood risk 
areas (Aukerman et al, 2008). 
Secondly, the Scottish Government takes responsibility for the implementation of 
the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) and (Scotland) Regulations (2005), aimed at 
reducing disruption from an emergency event. The legislation acknowledges the 
role actors both within and outside the local authority play in the reduction of flood 
risk. Further, the Act explicitly sets out and develops scenario-based plans to 
develop organisational capacity to maintain the functioning of infrastructure when 
faced with adverse events (Civil Contingencies Act, 2004). 
Thirdly, in the Community Empowerment (Scotland) Act (Scottish Parliament, 
2014), passed in 2015, acknowledges the important role communities play in flood 
risk reduction. Acknowledging the social impact of floods on Scottish society 
(Werritty et al, 2007), the Act strives to legitimise the community voice in flood 
decision-making by seeking to empower communities to manage their own flood 
risks and have greater control over community assets (Scottish Community 
Development Centre, 2015).  
8.2.1 Flood history in Scotland and the North-East Scotland region 
Across Scotland, 108,000 properties sit within flood risk areas, representing a key 
concern for the country (Kazmierczak et al, 2015). The UK Climate projections 
expect that an increased level of flood incidents is a trend that is set to continue and 
the current level of properties at risk (4%) in Scotland could rise further (Brooker et 
al, 2014; Sayers et al, 2014). 
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There is limited recorded information in respect of the country’s detailed flood 
history, however, reports of flooding date back to the Muckle Spate flood of 1829.  
In more recent times surface water flooding has been reported as an issue in cities, 
with the most serious incidents occurring in Glasgow in 2002 and Aberdeen during 
July 2015 (Kazmierczak et al, 2015). Significant river flooding was also reported in 
Elgin, Moray in winter 2013, 2014 and 2015/2016. In terms of coastal flooding, 
Stonehaven as well as coastal towns and villages in Moray (e.g. Portknockie and 
Banff) sustained recurrent flooding in 1995, 2002, 2005 and 2009. Of the properties 
at risk across Scotland, 13,000 residential and 3,600 non-residential at risk 
properties lie within the North East Local Plan (Aberdeenshire Council, 2016c).  
In late December 2015 and early January 2016, Storm Frank (and two subsequent 
periods of persistent rain) resulted in ‘unprecedented’ rainfall across North-East 
Scotland (Aberdeenshire Council, 2016a). A major incident was declared on two 
occasions (30th December, 2015 and 8th January, 2016), requiring extensive outside 
assistance from authorities. The situation was exacerbated by the extent of rainfall 
in November 2015 (the highest ever recorded) leading to ground saturation which 
was compounded by further rainfall from storm Eva and Frank. The Polhollick 
Monitoring station, near Ballater on the river Dee, recorded the highest water level 
on record of 3.3m (usually 1.5m) and, in Braemar, 64mm of rain fell between 
midnight to 2pm on 30th December 2015 (See Figure 8.2). The combined effects of 
these factors led to widespread flooding across North-East Scotland (Aberdeenshire 
Council, 2016a). Significant damage was caused, creating long term, high cost 
infrastructure and community impacts. Although many of the affected communities 
had experience of low-level flood incidents, the scale and intensity of flooding 
brought about by Storm Frank exceeded the capacity of the community and 
required outside assistance. The following section outlines the key stakeholders 





Figure 8.2 Localised flooding in North-East Scotland. Source: NERC (CEH), 2016. 
8.3 Flood risk management stakeholders 
 
Set against the backdrop of the Flood Risk Management (Scotland) Act (2009), the 
following section outlines the key stakeholders involved in the mobilisation of the 
Act and wider flood risk reduction strategies in North-East Scotland. A review of 
secondary data  (policy documents) (Appendix 3), key stakeholders and institutes 
are identified. Consistent with the approach taken in the previous two chapters, 
stakeholders were broken down into three categories, namely: policy and 
prevention; recovery and reconstruction; emergency management and 
industry/independent organisations.  The hierarchical stakeholder map (national, 
regional and local) is discussed below and presented in Figure 8.3. 
 
8.3.1 National level 
 
The Scottish Government is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the 
Flood Risk Management (Scotland) Act (2009). In addition, Scottish ministers are 
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charged with raising awareness and disseminating information regarding flooding 
through the ‘Ready Scotland’ campaign. The National Government provides 80% of 
the funding to deal with flooding (Scottish Parliament, 2017). 
Under the Flood Risk Management (Scotland) Act (2009), the Scottish Environment 
Protection Agency (SEPA) is assigned as the designated flood risk authority. SEPA 
also works alongside the Met Office to provide a flood warning service (Floodline) 
(SEPA, 2017c). Beyond its warning and informing duties, SEPA acts as a statutory 
consultee on planning applications within potential flood risk areas, however, the 
local authorities make the final judgment on applications. In collaboration with the 
‘Ready Scotland’ campaign and local authorities, SEPA enhances education and 
awareness of flood risk management and preparedness in communities 
(Aberdeenshire Council 2017b). 
8.3.2 Regional level 
 
Local authorities are charged with the management of flood defences and flood 
prevention schemes. Their position as lead local flood authorities (LLFA)39 under the 
Flood Risk Management (Scotland) Act (2009) extends their responsibilities to the 
maintenance and assessment of watercourses and drainage systems (gulleys and 
drains). Local authorities also assist with softer measures including raising 
awareness, capturing local knowledge and sharing information before a flood event. 
Of note, local authorities have no legal obligation to provide sandbags or similar 
property level protection as this is the responsibility of the homeowner.  After a flood 
event, they assist by providing accommodation for evacuated residents and 
assistance through the coordination of emergency services.  
Since the introduction of the Flood Risk Management (Scotland) Act (2009), 
Scottish Water works in partnership with SEPA, local authorities and other 
responsible organisations to implement flood risk management strategies. In 
particular, Scottish Water is responsible for monitoring the discharge of water from 
drainage systems and sewers and is tasked with organising the maintenance/repair 
of burst mains and water supply in reservoirs (Aberdeenshire Council 2017b). 
Under the Flood Risk Management (Scotland) Act (2009), the Cairngorms National 
Park is also a designated a responsible authority in flood risk management. Working 
in partnership with SEPA, local authorities and other responsible bodies, they assist 
                                                
39 Lead Local Flood authority is charged with developing, maintaining and implementing a local flood risk strategy, 
including maintenance of flood risk assets register.  
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in the development of flood risk management strategies by informing on appropriate 
and sustainable land use (SEPA, 2017a). In addition, the Forestry Commission was 
designated a responsible authority in 2012, to complement the sustainability aspect 
of the Flood Risk Management (Scotland) Act 2009 by promoting natural flood 
management strategies (SEPA, 2017a).  
8.3.3 Local level 
 
In contrast to the Environment Agency (EA) in England, SEPA clearly outlines the 
responsibility of communities to assist in the management of their own flood risk. 
For example, affected communities are reminded of their responsibility to sign up to 
the flood warning system (Floodline), to check their risk level on publicly accessible 
flood maps and to avail of flood insurance. A newly created agreement between 
Scottish Government and the insurance industry (FloodRe, April 2016), means 
affordable home insurance is available for residential properties built prior to 2009 
within a flood risk zone.  
The Scottish Flood Forum acts as a communication channel between the 
community and authorities. Funded by the Scottish Government, the organisation 
seeks to create awareness, support and provide advice on flood related issues 
across Scotland. Working on behalf of the affected community, the overall aim of 
the organisation is to establish a network of resilient communities across Scotland 
who can learn from each other and promote best practice (Scottish Flood Forum, 
2017). In addition to the work of the Scottish Flood Forum, Community Councils40  
are a formal representative of the community at the local level, acting as a channel 
for statutory agencies to engage with the community. They are the most local tier of 
statutory representation and serve to make the views and concerns of the 
community (regarding flooding issues) heard at the local authority level. Many 
resilience and flood action groups are formed through this medium.  
 
                                                
40 Made up of elected members, the Community Council is the representative voice of the community in statutory 
matters. 
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Figure 8.3 Institutional Disaster management landscape, North-East Scotland (Adapted 
from JBA, 2015). 
The above section presented the policy backdrop against which the multi-scalar 
stakeholders operate in FRM. A contextual overview of the North-East Scotland 
case-studies is presented in the following section, by outlining the socio 
demographic background of the region. Further, it presents a more detailed profile 
of the four micro case-study areas (Appendix 7.5), namely: Aberdeen city (including 
the suburb of Peterculter), Inverurie town and Ballater village. 
8.4 Introduction to North-East Scotland case-study context 
 
This section presents an overview of the North-East Scotland region before 
outlining the socio-economic profile of the area. The North-East Scotland region is 
one of 32 council areas in Scotland and is divided into six devolved local area 
committees (Figure 8.4). The four micro case-studies that comprise the North-East 
Scotland case-study are located across the Aberdeenshire Council and Aberdeen 
City Council local authority areas. The North-East Scotland region is a 
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predominently rural, with an economic base which extends beyond a heavy reliance 
on the oil and gas sector to include rural industries such as forestry, agriculture, 
fishing, milling, brewing, distilling and tourism. The area’s industrial past relied on 
hydropower from the Dee, Don, Ythan and Ugie rivers to drive many of the paper 
and corn mills across the council area (Gazetteer for Scotland, 2017). Indeed, the 
historical use of hydropower hints at the fluvial flooding issue faced by the area.  
 
Flooding from inland, minor watercourses and coastal streams is an on-going issue 
throughout Scotland (Aberdeenshire Council, 2017c; Aberdeenshire Council, 
2017d). As a consequence of major flooding events over the last two decades, 
significant investment in hard-engineering protection can be seen through recent 
flood protection schemes in Huntly (2015-2018) and Stonehaven (July 2017) 
(Aberdeenshire Council, 2017c; Aberdeenshire Council, 2017d). However, the 
winter 2015/2016 floods across North-East Scotland highlighted the unpredictability 
of the flooding issue. The perceived high-risk areas of Huntly and Stonehaven 
emerged from storm Frank unscathed, however 850 properties and 120 businesses 
were affected across the region (Aberdeenshire Council, 2016a). Of these figures, a 
large proportion of the damage was sustained by the small village of Ballater, where 
300 homes and 60 businesses were flooded. In Aberdeen city, the millside area of 
Peterculter, Granhholm in The Bridge of Don and commercial premises along 
Garthdee road in Deeside received the most damage. The commuter town of 
Inveruie sustained significant flooding in the south west suburb of Port 
Portelphinstone. Further details of the flood impact sustained by the thesis case-





Figure 8.4 Map indicating the location of the four micro case-studies within North-East 
Scotland (Aberdeenshire Council, 2011). 
 
This section presented the socio-economic profile of the four micro case-studies 
(Appendix 7.5) and situated the case-studies within the wider North-East Scotland 
Flood Risk Management context. The policy review highlighted a shift away from a 
hard engineering ‘defence’ approach to FRM towards a holistic catchment 
approach. Key to this approach is community centred resilience, by building the 
capacity to do more for themselves. As such, the following section is a practical 
response to this need, through the empirical application of thesis Framework within 
a Scottish context.  
 
8.5 Application of thesis Framework 
 
This section outlines the two-phased approach to Framework application as 
discussed in Chapter 5 (Section 5.5.1). It begins by explaining the application of 
Phase 1 before moving on to Phase 2 (Section 5.3.1). Chapter 5 discussed how 
Phase 1 comprised a top-down assessment of resilience variables by drawing on 
secondary publically available official data (Appendix 3). Chapter 5 further explained 
how the assessment drew upon the baseline resilience assessment as proposed by 
Cutter et al (2010), but was adapted to suit a flooding context. The adapted 
assessment comprised four key community assets namely: physical, economic, 
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human and environment. The four community assets together with their 
corresponding  variables are outlined in detail in Appendix 2. The list of 22 variables 
is largely consistent with those used in the previous case-studies (Chapter 6 and 7) 
however, due to data availability slight variations were unavoidable and are 
highlighted in bold in Table 8.1.  
8.5.1 Data aggregation and normalisation 
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, once the 26 variables were established, the process of 
normalising the variables took place (Section 5.5.3). The process of normalisation 
aggregated the raw data and allowed the variable scores to be presented on a 
uniform scale. The original data units were translated into a linear scale for 
comparison by applying a technique known as Min-Max normalisation. On the scale 
of 0 and 1, the value of 0.5 equated to neutral. In terms of resilience, 0 indicates low 
resilience whereas 1 indicates high resilience. The aggregated results for each 
‘asset’ were subsequently illustrated on a radar diagram for comparison.  
 
Chapter 5 (Section 5.5.3) further explained the decision to apply equal weighting 
across the variables, to avoid an artificially high resilience score across assets 
(physical, environmental, economic, human). This was due to the fact that variable 
numbers were unequal across the four community assets and more variables does 
not equate to higher resilience. A worked example of Ballater’s ‘Physical’ asset is 
outlined in detail in Appendix 2. Table 8.1 presents the baseline assessment results 
in respect of the four case-study communities. Aggregated scores for the four case-
study settlements are presented in Figure 8.9.  
Table 8.1a Variable and aggregated scores for the ‘Physical’ resource. 
Community 
Asset: 
Variable Aberdeen Peter- 
culter 
Inverurie Ballater Data source 
1. Physical Resource 
Exposure Number of 
properties 
exposed to river 
flooding return 
period: 1 in 200 
year  










period: 1 in 200 
year  











period: 1 in 200 
year  





 SEPA Flood 
Priority 






domain rank *2 










 3.7 3.0 3.2 3.5  
Table 8.1b Variable and aggregated scores for the ‘Environmental’ resource.  
Community 
Asset: 
Variable Aberdeen  Peter-
culter 
Inverurie Ballater Data source 
2. Environmental resource 
Environment
al exposure 
Parks per 1  
mile radius *4 
















 2.2 3.25 4.25 1.75  





Inverurie Ballater Data source 
3. Economic Resource 
Livelihood 
stability 
% of working 
age that is 
economically 
active 
























0.7 0.7 0.4 1.0 Multiple 
Deprivation 
Measure 
                                                
41 Score (0 least resilient, 1 most resilient)  
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2015. 
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Figure 8.5 Radar results for the four micro case-studies within North-East Scotland: 
Aberdeen; Inverurie; Ballater; Peterculter. 
The baseline assessment results (Phase 1) (Section 8.4.1), show that Aberdeen 
scored high in relation to the ‘physical’ asset due to prioritised investment received 
as a result of its high SEPA ‘Flood priority’ score.  Overall, across the case-studies, 
high exposure from all three flood types (as indicated by historical flood maps), led 
to low scoring in this resource (Figure 8.9). The high employment rate in Ballater, 
coupled with its diverse range of industries from tourism, farming and employment 
further afield in the oil and gas industry, equated to a comparatively high score in 
this asset.  Aberdeen served as an employment base for commuter villages and 
towns such as Inverurie. However, the city had a high unemployment figure relative 
to the area, which may be partly attributable to the low education level.  
All four case-studies had a higher than UK-average proportion of their population 
within the 65 and above age category, particularly in rural areas. The crime rate in 
the city of Aberdeen and Inverurie town was comparatively greater than that found 
at the village scale, thus reducing the social capital score for both locations. This 
snapshot of Phase 1 resilience highlights the existing resilience of place (inherent 
resilience) by identifying areas of weakness where resilience intervention is needed 
most. The following section presents the application of Phase 2 of the Framework 
which seeks to capture evidence of resilience indicators through analysis of 
empirical case-study data. 
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8.5.2 Phase 2 recruitment and sampling 
As with the previous pilot case-studies in Chapter 6 and the Cumbrian case-study in 
Chapter 7, a facilitator was engaged to ease the recruitment process and gain 
further contextual understanding of the case-study area. Initiating the community 
level purposive sampling process (Section 5.6.5), community champions and 
representatives were contacted through a mix of residents’ associations; parish 
councils; a SEPA community resilience advisor; flood support groups and, in 
particular, resilience groups. As was the case in previous urban case-studies 
(Carlisle and Belfast), Aberdeen city was the most difficult case-study area to 
engage interviewees due to the lack of a facilitator. This was in part due to the 
dispersed nature of the flooding pockets across the city.  
The interviews were undertaken almost 18 months after the winter 2015/2016 
flooding, representing a different period of the reconstruction process compared to 
Cumbria. By the time of the North-East Scotland field study, the majority of 
residents had returned to their renovated properties (89% of interviewees) and had 
time to reflect on the recovery process. Indeed, the reflective nature of the 
interviews had the advantage (relative to Cumbria) of informing the ‘learning’ 
component of the Framework and thereby facilitated an added value component to 
this case-study.  
Consistent with the approach discussed in the methodology (Section 5.6.5), in 
addition to purposive sampling, snowball sampling was also undertaken to ensure a 
balanced representation of those affected. In doing so, a comparable representation 
of gender, age profile, flood experience and length of time lived in the area was 
achieved. Table 8.2 summarises the number of community and practitioner level 
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Chapter 5 (Section 5.6.5) outlined the purposive sampling techniques used to 
recruit practitioner interviewees. Consistent with this approach, participants were 
selected based on their respective roles and responsibilities within their 
organisation. In this context, Figure 8.10 illustrates the mapping exercise carried out 
to identify the key organisations within the fields of policy and prevention; 
emergency management; recovery and reconstruction; and industry/independent 
organisations.  
Interviews within the ‘policy and prevention arena’, included representation from 
SEPA flood advisors and council members responsible for the implementation of 
the Flood Risk Management Strategies. The ‘emergency management’ field was 
represented by a resilience co-ordinator involved in the ‘Ready Scotland’ resilience 
campaign. In addition, emergency warning and informing (flood alerts) was 
discussed with the Met Office. The ‘recovery and reconstruction’ phase involved 
resilience co-ordinators from ‘Ready Scotland’ together with representation from 
both Aberdeen City Council and Aberdeenshire Council. Interviewee roles included: 
flood team manager, infrastructure engineer and planning and development officers. 
In addition, responsible authorities involved in the delivery of flood risk management 
strategies were interviewed, including, Scottish Water and the Cairngorms National 
Park Authority. Finally, the ‘industry and independent’ field incorporated views from 
the Scottish Farmers Union, risk advisors (insurance), property level protection 
company manager and third sector sustainability and research organisations. In 
total 15 interviews took place at the stakeholder level (Table 8.3), the details of 
which are included in Appendix 8.3. 
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8.5.3 Data analysis using the Framework  
 
In accordance with the structured ‘Framework Method’ data analysis (Chapter 5), 
Stage 1 was the ‘Transcription and Familiarisation’ of the interview recordings and 
field-notes. Stage 2 ‘Categorisation of the Codes’ involved the creation of ‘cases’ for 
the participants as illustrated in Table 8.4 Consistent with the approach taken in 
Chapter 7, this involved categorisation into different case profiles, namely: gender; 
age; time in community; number of people in household; community location and 
flood experience.  
 




The “Analytical Framework” as proposed in Chapter 5 was adhered to in Stage 3 of 
the analysis with transcripts ‘coded’ in line with the four components of the 
Framework namely: risk; resources and capacities; connectedness and learning 
(Table 8.5). The process of ‘open coding’ followed, where new or unique sub-
components (child nodes) were allowed to emerge. The coding was largely 
consistent with the findings from Chapter 7, however variances were evident in 








Table 8.5 Stage 3: Coding framework of component ‘nodes’. 
 
 
Stage 4 involves the process of ‘Charting’ indicator data within a pre-defined 
spreadsheet as outlined in Chapter 6. Word frequency searches were run in NVivo 
to ensure that no key indicator themes were overlooked. Whilst descriptive in 
nature, the resulting ‘clustering (tree) diagrams’ (Figure 8.6a-d) acted as a starting 
point to assist the synthesis of indicators into a more manageable scale.  
 
 
Figure 8.6a Stage 4: Process of charting the ‘risk’ component.  
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Figure 8.6b Stage 4: Process of charting the ‘resources and capacity’ component.  
 
Figure 8.6c Stage 4: Process of charting the ‘connectedness’ component.  
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Figure 8.6d Stage 4: Process of charting the ‘learning’ component.  
 
The final indicator output is compiled and presented in Stage 5 framework analysis 
or ‘Indexing’ (Table 8.6), as outlined in Chapter 7 (Section 7.5.3). In total 23 
resilience indicators emerged from the North-East Scotland analysis that aligned 
with the the NI pilots and the Cumbria case-study. Whilst the weighting of indicators 
was found to present variances from the finding in the Cumbria context, the 
indicator labels were transferable, though one exception was the inclusion of 
‘Psychological support’ (Indicator 15), which emerged strongly in the North-East 












Table 8.6 Comparison of indicator allocation for Northern Ireland pilot and Cumbrian case-




Cumbria North-East Scotland 
Risk awareness 
1.Risk awareness 1. Risk awareness 1. Risk awareness 
2. Risk communication 2.Risk experience 2.Risk experience 
3. Risk acceptance and 
mitigation 
3.Risk communication 3.Risk communication 
4. Risk experience 4. Risk understanding 4. Risk understanding 
5. Risk Knowledge 5. Risk acceptance and 
mitigation 
5. Risk acceptance and 
mitigation 
Resources and Capacities 
6. Self organising 6. Self organising 6. Self organising 
7. Capacity 
building/upskilling 
7. Redundancy 7. Redundancy 
8. Insurance 8. Local knowledge 8. Local knowledge 
9. Collaboration 9. Resourcefulness 9. Resourcefulness 
10.Innovation  10. Self-efficacy 10. Self-efficacy 
11. Self-efficacy 11. Flood responsibility 11. Flood responsibility 
12. Flood responsibility 12. Preparedness 12. Preparedness 
 13. Property 13. Property 
 14. Governance 14. Governance 
  15. Psychological support 
Connectedness 
13. Social capital 15. Cohesive community 16. Cohesive community 
14. Integration of Social 
networks 
16. Multi-scalar interaction 17. Multi-scalar interaction 
15. Sense of belonging 17. Higher-level trust  18. Higher-level trust 
16. Higher-level trust   
Learning 
17. Problem definition 18. Analytical thinking 19. Analytical thinking 
18. Critical Reflection 19. Integrated development 
planning 
20. Integrated development 
planning 
19. Experimentation  20. Experimentation  21. Experimentation  
20. Transfer of  (local) 
knowledge 
21. Knowledge feedback and 
review 
22. Knowledge feedback and 
review 





Figure 8.7 illustrates the even distribution of codes across the four key Framework 
components from the North-East Scotland case-study. In contrast to the Cumbrian 
results, the ‘Learning’ component was more pronounced, potentially as a 
consequence of the reflective nature of the interview discourse 18 months after the 
event.  Further, it was found that ‘Risk’ was not as heavily coded, which may be 
attributed to the low awareness levels across North-East Scotland as a 
consequence of the high number of first time flood victims (58%).  
 
 
Figure 8.7 NVivo hierarchy visualisation of coded component ‘nodes’.  
 
8.5.4 Risk Indicators 
 
In Chapter 7 the complex relationship between risk awareness and mitigative 
resilience action was discussed. Consistent with the approach taken in both 
Chapters 6 and 7, knowledge of flood maps was used as a proxy indicator for ‘risk 
awareness’ (Indicator 1). The interview data revealed that 76% of first time flood 
victims were unaware of their proximity to or location within a flood zone. This 
observation supports findings from Chapter 7 that first time flood victims are 
unaware of their risk: “I thought to myself at the time (of the floods) this area doesn’t 
flood. I wasn’t worried…I am now” (A7). 
 
In seeking to confirm this finding, a matrix query was run in Nvivo to isolate ‘flood 
experience’ case profiles enabling comparison between ‘risk experience’ case 
categories and the indicator node ‘risk awareness’ (Indicator 1). Figure 8.8 
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illustrates greater prominence in risk indicators amongst those with ‘3 or more times’ 
experience and illustrates comparatively lower risk awareness amongst the first and 
second time flood victims.   
 
 
Figure 8.8 NVivo matrix: low risk awareness among first time flood victims.  
 
 




Correlation between ‘risk awareness’ and ‘preparedness’ was evidenced in the 
Cumbrian case-study with those communities with higher awareness tending to 
have community disaster plans in place (Section 7.6). However, in North-East 
Scotland, Peterculter was the only community with an existing resilience plan in 
place, although Ballater had one in draft format. Figure 8.9 illustrates how these two 
communities demonstrated higher ‘preparedness’ as a consequence of ‘risk 
understanding’. In contrast, (with the exception of Peterculter), Aberdeen showed a 
reliance on authorities, revealing a situation where resilience activities were driven 
by the authorities and emergency services: “The police came and told us to 
evacuate. They told some people to move their cars to higher ground. I’m not sure 
I’d have known what to do otherwise” (A3).  
 
Table 8.7 Indicator 1, Risk Awareness. 
 
 
‘Risk experience’ (Indicator 2) from recurrent floods was found to contribute to 
greater risk acceptance in Chapter 7. In the North-East Scotland case-studies, 
communities flooded on a recurrent basis were found to implement greater property 
protection measures and also tended to be members of a resilience group.  
 
“We flooded back in 2012 and to be honest I just accepted it as a freak event. Now 
that I’ve been flooded twice I need to think about this seriously. That’s why I’ve done 
all that I can (resilience measures). It was a considerable investment but it’s worth it 
knowing that I have done what I can to protect my home” (B13).  
 
Relative to Cumbria (Chapter 7), risk experience was lower with 37 of 46 
interviewees across the North-East Scotland case-studies first time flood victims. 
Whilst this experience prompted many to take resilience action, others adopted the 
attitude that this was an: “Unprecedented event…you just need to accept it as one 
of those things…bad luck, and move on from it” (B11). 
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In particular, a reluctance to accept risk was most prevalent in Aberdeen, where 
commercial rather than residential properties were most affected. A manager of a 
large commercial premises stated: 
 
 “It’s never happened before and it more than likely won’t happen again in my 
lifetime. Personally it didn’t really affect me…I still had my job at the end of the day. 
We were back in operation within two weeks….We haven’t taken any preventative 
steps. It’s a case of we will deal with it at the time should it ever happen again”’ 
(A6). 
 
The evidence suggests that a lack of disruption to personal life reduces the 
likelihood to take mitigative action. On the whole the ‘risk experience’ indicator 
findings reaffirm that risk acceptance is potentially dependent upon the level of risk 
experience, however as noted, exceptions (lack of personal attachment) do exist. 
 
Table 8.8 Indicator 2, Risk Experience. 
 
 
The percentage of people signed up to the SEPA flood alert system was used as a 
proxy for ‘Risk communication’ (indicator 3). While the majority of communities in 
Aberdeen were signed up to the system, many misunderstood the alert warning 
system. One resident in Ballater explained the confusion and difficulties 
encountered with the system: 
 
“Yes I get the warnings. But they don’t make it clear what is the difference between 
a warning and an alert. Should I come home early from work or a weekend away if 
there is a warning?” (B16). 
 
Further, residents expressed dissatisfaction over the extent of geographical detail 
attached to the warnings: 
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“I’m getting the same warning as someone in Moray…that’s over 80 miles away. 
Can you imagine if they did that further south? That would be like sending the same 
flood warning for Edinburgh, Glasgow and Dundee. Well you can imagine the chaos 
that would cause” (I20). 
 
Consistent with evidence from Cumbria (Chapter 7), one resident reaffirmed the 
value of multiple forms of risk communication: 
 
“Yes, we get the flood warnings but it’s hard to know how accurate they are. You 
often get warnings and then nothing happens. You get a better idea by looking at 
the river and there would be talk on the street too if we ever thought something was 
about to happen…. I knocked on the neighbours door to warn them” (B15).  
 
By contrast, urban Aberdeen relied on social media, rather than word of mouth and 
local knowledge, commonly found with smaller close-knit communities: 
 
“I was checking Fubar (Social media news page) for updates and that’s when I 
started ringing the council for sandbags. People were forwarding me the alerts on 
Facebook and asking me if I was okay” (A5). 
 
The evidence from North-East Scotland supports findings from Cumbria that a 
bespoke communication plan is necessary for each specific community. More rural 
communities relied on local knowledge and word of mouth. Conversely, fragmented 
urban areas relied on social media for risk informing. All four North-East Scotland 
case-studies expressed criticism that the flood warnings lacked specificity and 
frequently caused needless concern.  
 
Table 8.9 Indicator 3, Risk Communication. 
 
 
The Cumbrian findings suggested a potential correlation between ‘risk 
understanding’ (Indicator 4) and subsequent ‘risk acceptance and mitigation’ 
(Indicator 5). The Ballater case-study supports this finding, revealing that increased 
risk understanding led to greater risk acceptance and subsequent mitigative action. 
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However, evidence from Peterculter revealed how a low level of ‘risk acceptance 
and mitigation’ was the consequence of an unwillingness to accept risk. A local 
Resilience Group member explained: 
 
 “There are a few that view this resilience protection as scaremongering. 
Underneath it all is a fear that if we acknowledge our risk and put in flood doors or 
whatever then we will have issues selling our house” (C 26). 
 
In this vein, Figure 8.14 illustrates contrasting levels of ‘risk understanding’ between 
the more established communities of Ballater and Peterculter suburb, and the more 
transient nature of parts of Aberdeen city. In addition, the above quote highlights the 
complexity attached to risk acceptance, as outside forces (perceived loss in 
property values) can potentially impede a community’s ability to take mitigative 
action. 
 
Table 8.10 Indicator 4, Risk Understanding. 
 
 
The above evidence illustrates that acceptance of risk as a by-product of risk 
understanding (Indicator 4) is not a certainty. Reaffirming findings from Cumbria, the 
overall evidence suggests a positive relationship between increased risk awareness 
(Indicator 1) and understanding (Indicator 4) as catalysts for ‘risk mitigation and 
acceptance’ (Indicator 5).  
 
Evidence of ‘risk acceptance’ (Indicator 5) was visible through the establishment of 
flood resilience groups (both Peterculter and Ballater have resilience groups). 
However, in the case of Ballater it took a serious flood event to reignite the dormant 
group. Evidence of mitigative action within the groups included: “Checking the 
gulleys and drains” (B 11); “Monitoring river levels” (P35); “Dry run of resilience 
plans” (B12); “Pushing for further research into what has happened” (B15) and the 
promotion and education of the benefits of property level protection (PLP). 
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Flooding of properties was historically perceived as the responsibility of the local 
authorities. However, clearer understanding of the roles and responsibilities in FRM 
prompted communities to take control of their own flood risk.  On the back of this 
understanding, Inverurie and Ballater established flood groups, and Peterculter 
continued to operate its existing flood group. No such group formed in Aberdeen 
which may be attributed to the low community cohesion associated with transient 
urban areas and that the properties flooded were largely commercial causing less 
personal disruption.  
 
Table 8.11 Indicator 5, Risk Acceptance. 
 
 
The evidence from the North-East Scotland case-study corroborates evidence from 
Cumbria suggesting that an understanding of the multi-faceted nature of ‘Risk’ is the 
first step in any resilience strategy. However, the current risk communication 
strategy offered through SEPA was flagged as an impediment to resilience 
preparedness and indeed the lack of specificity caused many residents to ignore its 
warning. In support of the Cumbrian findings, the North-East Scotland evidence 
makes the case for a bespoke approach to risk-informing including a portfolio of 
communication channels (social media, text, email, word of mouth). Integral to this 
approach is an understanding that communities are not homogenous and a ‘one 
size fit all’ approach is not appropriate.  
 
8.5.5 Resources and capacities indicators 
 
The following section outlines the factors and processes used to assist communities 
to develop and engage with resources. As shown in Chapter 7, the extent of 
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resource mobilisation can potentially expedite a community’s recovery back to 
normality. Supporting the findings from Cumbria, communities with an existing 
resilience group were found to exhibit the highest level of ‘self-organisation’ 
(Indicator 6). A resilience group member in Ballater explained the rationale behind 
establishing a resilience group: 
 
“We had a group in its raw form after a previous flood scare. However, the recent 
floods prompted us to formalise the resilience plan and activate the group…. With a 
firmed up plan, assigned roles with the group …(and) communication with the 
authorities….I think it is fair to say we are in a much better place” (B 13). 
 
Further, Inverurie interviewees commented that creating the “Inverurie and Garioch 
flood support group galvanised connections in the town and facilitated the 
community to “co-ordinate itself in a more effective way” (I21).  
 
Table 8.12 Indicator 6, Self organising. 
 
 
The findings from Cumbria highlighted the need for four types of redundancy within 
a resilient system. Reinforcing these findings, North-East Scotland also revealed the 
need for redundancy in terms of: (1) access to specialist equipment; (2) stable and 
diverse economy; (3) risk transfer (insurance); and (4) access to public buildings. 
Firstly, it was found that access to equipment, such as vehicles for evacuation, was 
critical to the survival of some residents. An interviewee in Ballater commented: “An 
elderly man who is deaf and blind in one eye had to be evacuated by sitting in the 
bucket of a local mans digger” (B14).  
 
Secondly, the temporary closure of many businesses significantly impacted the 
local economy through loss of sales and jobs. In response, the Ballater Business 
Group identified the need for a business resilience plan and for businesses to be 
part of the overall community resilience plan:  
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“Small businesses are critical to the sustainability of a community. Why is business 
treated as a dirty word sometimes? Businesses offer jobs to the community, attract 
tourists and need to be part of the community. Yes, some have closed and will not 
reopen. Others have had to adapt….selling books online when the shop was closed 
for business…. The bakery operated out of a pop-up van outside the shop (B15). 
 
In addition, the crash of the oil and gas industry further compounded the adversity 
faced by many: 
 
 “I was left with my passport and the wet clothes I was wearing. That’s all I had…. I 
lost my job a year ago during the oil crash. I really struggled to rent temporary 
accommodation as I couldn’t get the money for a deposit together” (I20). 
 
Thirdly, reinforcing evidence from Cumbria, insurance also emerged as a positive 
form of resilience through risk transfer. “Thankfully we had insurance….I’m not sure 
how we would have coped otherwise” (A6).  
 
Fourthly, the need for a rest centre serving as a central hub for recovery 
organisation was highlighted at both the community and practitioner level. “People 
gravitated towards the village hall” in Ballater as it was “Known as the central point 
for community activities” (B13). Emergency accommodation was also offered in the 
“army barracks for those who were evacuated. With the roads closed people had 
nowhere to go to and that resource was most needed”. (B12).  In addition, donated 
funds were used to: 
 
 “Upgrade the village hall with internet, laptop, sleeping bags, kettles...allowing 
people to cope better should there be a crisis of any form” (B14). 
 




‘Local knowledge’ (Indicator 8) was evidenced as playing a critical role in warning 
and informing across North-East Scotland. Particularly at the village scale residents 
commented they “knew by the look of the river that something bad was going to 
happen” (B9). Word of mouth informed residents to be ready to evacuate: “I phoned 
the neighbours and knocked on doors to let people know there was a risk of 
flooding” (B2). In addition, those most at risk (elderly, disabled) were evacuated as 
a priority once locals informed emergency services: “I knew the old man lived on his 
own and was partially deaf …so I let the police know and he was evacuated early 
on” (B2).  
 
Echoing evidence from Cumbria, it was found that local knowledge informed 
objections to inappropriate planning applications: “It makes no sense to build there. 
We had to object. Poor planning is what has those poor people flooded” (C28). 
 
Table 8.14 Indicator 8, Local Knowledge. 
 
 
Evidence from Cumbria outlined the role innovation and ‘resourcefulness’ (Indicator 
9) played in building transformational resilience. It was revealed that greater ‘risk 
experience’ led to an apparent increase in innovative and resourceful action. Figure 
8.10 illustrates how increased exposure to flooding (3 times and above) in North-




Figure 8.10 NVivo matrix: ‘risk experience’ on “Resourcefulness” across North-East 
Scotland communities.  
All communities revealed some evidence of an attempt to protect properties with 
PLP to “protect our investment” (I2). However, as mentioned earlier, a fear of 
depreciated property values impeded residents in Peterculter from implementing 
these actions. Further, the £1500 contribution by the Government fell short of the 
funds needed to implement adequate PLP and coupled with the financial impact of 
the oil crisis, left some residents in Ballater to comment:  
 
“PLP is not our priority right now. £1500 only touches the surface… They got £5000 
in England... we still got the same amount of water through our living room. At the 
moment we are just focused on getting the house back together and putting food on 
the table...resilience will have to wait” (I18). 
 
Proactive warning and informing at the local level, through “door knocking” (B3), 
“facebook message” (A6) and “talk on the street” (B4), prompted interviewees to 
take preventative measures. A resident in Peterculter commented:  
 
“We moved our cars to higher ground and then we tried to move as much stuff 
upstairs as possible. It’s a three storey house so there was space to do that but we 
lost a lot in the garage” (C27).  
 
Post flood, many communities have taken PLP measures where finances allowed: 
“We used the £1500 from the council to cover air vents and a flood gate. When 
funds allows we will try and do more” (B10). Another group of residents came 
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together to raise the stone wall outside their properties which sat on the river bank: 
“Yes, it cost us £1400 each but we were happy to pay it to protect our homes” 
(B13).  
 
A further resident in Ballater who was used to working with boats made his own 
flood door protection with wood and mastic glue:  
 
“My wife came back from the hairdressers saying the village was about to flood. 
After years working on boats you learn ways of keeping water out of places it 
shouldn’t be. I fashioned a flood door of sorts with wood and mastic glue and it 
actually worked” (B16). 
 
The use of social media was seen to inform potential flood risk but also served to 
expedite the recovery process by efficiently matching resources and capacities 
almost instantaneously online. Facebook pages such as “Fubar’, “Hope floats’ and 
‘Inverurie and Garioch Flood Support Group” served as a catalyst for impromptu 
recovery actions. The founder of the ‘Inverurie and Garioch Flood Support Page’ 
commented: 
 
 “There was nothing there…we needed a way of communicating the help and 
support that was out there. After it (the Facebook page) was set up it just took off. 
We were getting donations from right across the country, it was incredible. 
Volunteers were reading the situation online and then turning up to support. When 
we put out a request, for example, for a sofa or a man with a van, we would get an 
offer in seconds sometimes. The page filled a gap that no authorities or 
council….were filling” (I19).  
 
Resourcefulness was evidenced in Ballater through the use of diggers by locals as 
a means of evacuation transport: “ We would have liked a more orthodox method of 
evacuation but it came down to saving lives….the emergency services were 
inundated” (B13).  
 
Aligned with the Cumbrian findings, there was an apparent acknowledgement that 
flood defences were not the only approach to FRM. The process of developing 
resilience plans led communities to appreciate the need for a portfolio of solutions. 
However, this sentiment was not shared by all. The pressure group- ‘Ballater Flood 
group’ was established as a separate entity to the ‘Ballater Resilience Group’. Its 
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intention was to gain further information on flood risk and hold the authorities to 
account. By contrast, the ‘Ballater Resilience Group’ was set up collaboratively with 
the authorities and emergency services, thus adding an extra layer of resilience to 
the community. Initiatives included dry runs of the newly updated resilience plan 
with the approval of emergency services: “delivery of laminated household flood 
plans to each household”; “creation of an up to date register of at risk residents” and 
the “organisation of a new rest centre” (B 13). 
 
Table 8.15 Indicator 9, Resourcefulness 
 
 
Consistent with findings from Cumbria, it was found that a belief in a community’s 
own potential to reduce risk is a critical component of community resilience. ‘Self-
efficacy’ (Indicator 10) was demonstrated through membership a of resilience 
group, enabling communities to play an active part in preparedness and recovery 
operations. Speaking of the role of the community in multi-scalar resilience group 
collaboration, a Ballater resilience group member described how they: “Developed 
the resilience plan together with the help of emergency services and the 
authorities”. Clear allocation of roles and responsibilities informed the community as 
to “when to step in and when to step out during a flood”, empowering the community 
to feel “more prepared should we get flooded again this winter” (B13). 
 
In line with the findings from Cumbria, the above quotes illustrate the potential of 
Resilience Groups to galvanise a community’s potential to contribute to resilience 
action.  
 




The Cumbrian findings indicated a relationship between ‘flood responsibility’ 
(Indicator 11) and ‘flood experience’ (Indicator 2). To help compare these findings in 
a North-East Scotland context, a matrix query was run to isolate the node ‘flood 
responsibility’, thus allowing for comparison against ‘flood experience’. The analysis 
substantiates evidence from Cumbria suggesting that flood responsibility increases 
as a consequence of flood experience (Figure 8.11) with flood responsibility 
greatest  amongst those who were flooded three times or more. By contrast, those 
flooded for the first time demonstrated low uptake of flood responsibility. 
 
 
Figure 8.11 Matrix coding: influence of time living in an area on the resilience indicator 
‘Flood responsibility’.  
 
A strong relationship was found between ‘time spent in the community’ (case 
profile) and subsequent acceptance of ‘flood responsibility’ in North-East Scotland. 
Corroborating evidence from Cumbria, Figure 8.12 clearly illustrates that flood 
responsibility increases with time spent in the community. A long-time resident in 
Ballater commented: “I’ve grown up here. I’m not going to move at this stage am I? I 
need to protect my home” (B14). By contrast, a tenant in Aberdeen remarked: 
“We’ve been in the area a year now…it’s the landlord’s job to protect the property. If 




Figure 8.12 Matrix coding:  influence of time living in an area on the resilience indicator 
‘Flood responsibility’.  
Consistent with findings from Cumbria, it was noted that increased flood 
responsibility was exhibited through a “need to protect my investment” (C29) by 
implementing PLP and taking out insurance for “financial piece of mind” (I21). 
Further, flood risk awareness through monitoring and alerts also emerged as an 
indicator of flood responsibility: “The SEPA text message is too vague. When I see 
it (water) inching up the stone wall there I know it could get bad (local knowledge)” 
(B10). 
 
Table 8.17 Indicator 11, Flood Responsibility. 
 
Closely linked to ‘flood responsibility’ was ‘preparedness’ (Indicator 12) and 
paralleling findings from Cumbria, it was found that resilience groups played a 
significant role in enhancing preparedness through the creation and practice of 
resilience plans. Further, personal household plans were found to advance 
preparedness levels at the household scale. One elderly lady, flooded for the third 
time, commented: “I keep my prescription and insurance documents in a waterproof 
pouch in a backpack … together with a spare change of clothes….I can just grab it 
when I’m being given five minutes to evacuate” (B14). 
 




The upheaval associated with relocation during property renovations emerged as an 
impediment to community resilience: 
 
“My parents in law were relocated to another town….they don’t drive and it was 
hard to check on the house and builder. I think the hardest part for them was that 
we were away from their friends in the community… no support, isolated” (B16).  
 
In addition, ambiguity over post-flood renovation standards was raised as an issue: 
“Absolute cowboy builders….they ripped out things that didn’t need to come out. 
They pulled out my radiators yet next door kept theirs” (B9). Further complaints, 
surrounding the efficiency of building standards and knowledge of flood renovations, 
emerged from the interview discourse: 
 
 “That poor elderly couple still aren’t back in. They’ve had about three building firms 
in and because they can’t stand up to the builders… The property is covered in 
mould….the builders blocked the air vents with timber and carpets from the strip out 
and never came to take it away. The building couldn’t breathe and now they are in a 
worse off state than before…there needs to be some protocol or standards that 
these builders should follow” (B15). 
 
Also, in corroborating evidence from Cumbria, issues related to the implementation 
of PLP within conservation areas emerged as a frustration amongst residents in 
Ballater: 
 
 “You can’t realistically tell us to be more resilient and then refuse to allow us to put 
in sympathetic flood doors. There is an element of common sense missing there 
and the council need to get organised and sort out the issue” (B13). 
 




Findings from Cumbria made the case for a more long-term Government approach 
to FRM. The practitioner level in North-East Scotland supported this view stating:  
“We are glad to get funding for each project but we would prefer to know the long-
term plan for funding streams. There is a risk that each project we do is just a one 
off and that funds don’t exist to replicate the project across the country…and that is 
the approach needed” (P36). 
 
Further, some communities feel that the Government and authorities are not 
calibrating the risk faced by each community with appropriate action. This 
perception led the newly formed ‘Ballater Flood Group’ to write a letter to the First 
Minister asking that the situation in Ballater be recognised as a national 
catastrophe: “We exchanged over 5000 correspondence in the space of 18 months 
(with Government and authorities)…we needed them to accept that our community 
should be assigned priority status” (B14).  
 
The above example signifies a degree of responsiveness by the Government, to 
engage directly with the community and understand their situation. However, “the 
piecemeal” (P36) approach to funding streams identified at the practitioner level is 
not conducive to a stable and equitable country-wide approach to FRM. The 
evidence from North-East Scotland is consistent with the findings from Cumbria, 
namely that a more adaptive approach to policy has the potential to meet the 
changing demands imposed by an uncertain environment.  
 




‘Psychological support’ (Indicator 15) is a new indicator which did not present itself 
as strongly in the other two case-study areas. As a consequence of the aging 
population across North-East Scotland, it was found that the elderly population 
living alone were the demographic “that felt it the most” (B11). Affected residents in 
Inverurie commented “You can see it on their faces….people have physically aged 
as a consequence of the flooding ordeal” (I18). Those responsible for establishing 
the ‘Inverurie and Garrioch Flood Support group’ commented: 
 
 “There was a real need for a place for people to come and chat ...just release their 
issues. They may come in for cleaning products and leave three hours later after a 
cup of tea and a biscuit, a cry and chat with others in the same boat” (I19).  
 
 
Table 8.21 Indicator 15, Psychological support.  
 
8.5.6 Connectedness indicators 
 
Evidence from Cumbria highlighted the catalysing influence ‘cohesive communities’ 
(Indicator 16) can have on the efficient mobilisation of resources and capacities. In 
addition, it was revealed that ‘multi-scalar interaction’ (Indicator 17) and ‘higher-level 
trust’ (Indicator 18) in authorities, were integral to establishing vertical ties with 
authorities. In the case of North-East Scotland and reiterating findings from 
Cumbria, it was found that ‘cohesiveness’ (Indicator 16) was highest among rural 
communities, thus cohesion levels in the village of Ballater were greater than those 
at the urban scale as evidenced by Aberdeen (Figure 8.13). Interestingly, cohesion 
levels were also high in Peterculter, a suburb of Aberdeen, but not in Aberdeen city 
itself. As such, the boundary between urban (non-cohesive) and rural (cohesive) 
was not clear cut. The suburb of Peterculter stands as an example of an 
administratively titled urban city, which masks a village up until 2006 (Appendix 
7.5.2). The high level of engagement and cohesiveness is arguably attributable to 
residual ‘village’ institutions such as the ‘Village Hall’ and ‘Cutter Mills Social Club’, 
which are the hub of community/village life. As such, the high level of engagement 
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found in Peterculter rebuts any universal concept of ‘non-community’ within 
suburban areas. The presence of cohesive social networks within the former village 
shows the potential for communities to be traceable within the urban scale, in the 
form of a ‘village within a city’ (Gans, 1962). The example of Peterculter highlights 
that cohesive neighbourhoods are not restricted to rural areas; rather, they can 
potentially emerge within cities through a feeling of solidarity over common territory, 
shared interest or employment.  
 
 
Figure 8.13 Matrix coding: cohesiveness evident at the different settlement scales.  
 
Reaffirming the benefit of village institutions often associated with small scale 
villages, a member of the Ballater Resilience Group described the process of setting 
up a rest centre in a small village: 
 
 “People just sort of gravitated towards the village hall…they knew if there was help 
to be got it would happen there. You get a sense for these things in small villages“ 
(B16).  
 
Ballater Community Council lists 36 clubs within the small village, highlighting the 
cohesiveness of the community. Further examples of cohesiveness included 
voluntary community clean-up days to remove tonnes of stone and debris from the 
golf course. By contrast, Aberdeen city (excluding the suburb of Peterculter) mostly 
relied on social media for information and support:  
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“Friends were tagging me in news reports about the floods and asking if I was 
okay….It was through the Facebook page that I realised I was entitled to a grant 
from Foundation Scotland. I wouldn’t have known otherwise to be honest” (A1).  
 
Highlighting the lack of cohesion amongst transient urban areas (areas of high 
rental tenure), one tenant commented: “If it were to happen again I’d just move. 
When it’s not your property you’re hardly going to stay and torture yourself with the 
hassle” (A6). 
 
Table 8.22 Indicator 16, Cohesive community 
 
 
A key finding from the Cumbria Social Network Analysis (SNA) was the need for 
multi-scalar interaction to facilitate transformational resilience. It was found that 
resilience groups were integral to building ‘bridging’ and ‘linking’ ties. Likewise, in 
North-East Scotland resilience groups in Ballater and Peterculter served as a critical 
medium for “Collaborative resilience building with communities (and authorities)” 
(C23). A virtual community was established at the town scale in Inverurie to meet ‘a 
support gap that the council was not offering” (I19). The online community extended 
beyond the town of Inverurie to include other flood-affected areas across the 
Garioch area. Considering the wide geographical area it supported, an online 
network proved an effective means of connecting needs and capacities which 
otherwise would have remained untapped.  
 
Figure 8.14 illustrates the higher linking capital amongst communities with physical 
resilience groups in place (Ballater, Peterculter), whilst linking capital in Aberdeen is 
presented as being high, it is important to note the nature of those relationships.  
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“I called the council for sandbags but once I’d done that it was really left up to them 
to control it” (A4).  
 
The above comment suggests a lack of collaboration between the community and 
the authorities, indicating a reliance on the council for short-term action rather than 
long-term collaboration and engagement. The online Inverurie and Garioch Flood 
Support Group facilitated bridging ties in the town, however linking ties with 
authorities were not as prominent (Figure 8.14).  
 
 
Figure 8.14 Matrix coding: multi-scalar action across the different settlement scales. 
 
Further, the sustainability of resilience groups emerged as a concern, particularly in 
rural areas. Certain rural communities felt an onus to volunteer in order to ‘keep the 
community afloat’ (B12). Highlighting the limited resource pool of volunteers, a 
resilience group member in Inverurie commented that it was “The same faces” (I21) 
at each community meeting, regardless of the purpose of the meeting. In a similar 
vein, a resident in Peterculter expressed concern over the sustainability of 
community groups who are heavily reliant upon elderly volunteers:  
 
“At the moment a 70 year old man is ferrying people through the flooded streets in 
his 4x4. Do you think he will still be doing this in 5-10 years time?” (C27). 
 
The above situations raise questions over the long-term sustainability of FAGs. 
Extant literature argues that passionate volunteers often ignore their own needs and 
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end up with ‘Volunteer fatigue’ and burn-out (Jenkins and Baird, 2002; Cadieux, 







Table 8.23 Indicator 17, Multi-scalar Interaction 
 
The final connectedness indicator concerns the strength of relationships and 
collaboration between communities and authorities. The evidence suggests that an 
absence of higher-level engagement during the time between floods stands to 
erode trust in authorities: 
 
 “I think the council were caught completely off guard. They were totally 
unprepared….it’s no wonder really, we hadn’t seen them since the previous flood in 
2012” (C27).  
 
‘Higher-level trust’ (Indicator 18) was found to be highest in communities with an 
established communication structure in place, such as a local resilience group. 
They felt their “Message is getting out there” (B13) and that getting the “Community 
council and the authorities around the table” assisted the development of “A good 
workable plan” (B13).   
 
The benefit of using the resilience group as a channel for multi-scalar interaction 
emerged from an interview with a council member, who described it as a “robust” 
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(P41) approach to communication between authorities and the community. Further 
he commented that residents in the FAG: 
 
“Have my mobile number... I think it means a lot to them that they can contact me 
directly…it’s more work for us admittedly but it’s a successful joined-up approach” 
(P41). 
 
Table 8.24 Indicator 18, Higher-level trust  
 
 
8.5.7 Learning indicators 
 
The learning component was evidenced in Cumbria as having a critical influence on 
positive transformational change. The analysis from North-East Scotland identified 
five indicators that are shown to assist transformational change. As discussed, the  
timing of the interviews almost 18 months after the flood event, was considered in 
this context to be more reflective in nature relative to Cumbria. ‘Analytical thinking’ 
(Indicator 19) emerged strongly in the interview discourse with affected communities 
presenting perceptions of the change needed ahead of the next potential flood, 
including: “cleaning of the rivers” (B11); “improved flood warnings” (A6); “funding for 
PLP” (I19); and “reinstatement of bund (defence) walls” (B16). In terms of recovery 
the community highlighted the need for a “two way system” (C23) of communication 
with authorities where the “views of the community are taken into account” (P34).  
 
Reiterating findings from Cumbria, the practitioner level interview acknowledged a 
deficit in sustained engagement at the community level. A “lack of resources” (P33) 
to meet the needs of a large geographical area was attributed to this. However, 
improved engagement through resilience groups was put forward as a means to 
“bridge the communication gap between authorities and the community” (P42). 
 




In support of the findings from Cumbria, evidence of ‘integrated planning and 
development’ (Indicator 20) emerged strongly, due to development pressure driven 
by the oil and gas industry. Residents in Peterculter, as a commuter suburb of 
Aberdeen, thought that increased development demand had led to inappropriate 
development in flood plains: 
 
“Yes we have a shortage of houses, as the ‘oilies’ want to live here and work in 
Aberdeen. I get that, but it is still not an excuse to build in a flood plain. Those 
houses at the old mill shouldn’t have been built. Now look at them flooded” (C26).  
 
In line with findings from Cumbria, it was found that local knowledge played a 
significant role in reducing development in flood plains by lodging objections to such 
development: “I don’t want to see history repeating itself like the flooding at 
Millside….houses should not be built in flood plains. Simple.” (C27). 
 
The practitioner level also acknowledged the issue of development in flood plains 
and explained they “worked closely with SEPA as a statutory consultee on all 
development in at-risk areas” (P38). Referring to failings in the past the authorities 
commented that there is: “A need to take account of future climate projections  
when granting application. Planning is a rigorous process and decisions can only be 
made with the information we have at the time….perhaps decisions struggle to keep 
pace with climate change” (P34).  
 




The Cumbrian findings identified examples of ‘experimentation’ (Indicator 21) 
through a combination of actions including: implementation of PLP; lobbying for 
policy change; acknowledgement of soft approaches to FRM. Further evidence from 
North-East Scotland highlighted that communities with low cohesion levels exhibited 
limited innovative and resourceful actions. In contrast, Ballater exhibited greater 
resilience innovation, which is largely attributable to the fact that cohesive 
communities are more likely to have a resilience group and are thus more 
conducive to experimentation and resilience action.  
 
Table 8.27 Indicator 21, Experimentation  
 
 
The Cumbrian findings revealed how ‘Knowledge feedback’ (Indicator 22) facilitated 
the process of transforming lessons learned into positive resilient actions. Echoing 
evidence from Cumbria, a SEPA representative commented on advancements in 
communication strategies since the winter 2015 floods: “Having a Resilience Group 
means we now have the ability to engage with the at-risk communities. They have a 
lot of knowledge, particularly in the more established, rural communities that we can 
tap into” (P41). Reaffirming the value of local knowledge in relation to planning 
applications, a practitioner commented: “As risk increases with climate change, 
flood maps need to be updated…. Scotland is a very rural area and many will tell 
you it is difficult to map everywhere. If a local objects and tells us a site historically 
flooded then we take this information seriously” (P 39).   
 
A notable finding from Cumbria was the lack of standards in flood renovation 
projects. Supporting this observation, evidence from North-East Scotland reaffirms 
the view that greater control and enforcement of newly established building codes is 
required: “They put the house back together and then realised they hadn’t sucked 
the water out from underneath the floorboards… The floor boards have to be ripped 
up now” (B9).  
 




Thus knowledge feedback (as a consequence of lessons learned) can lead to 
positive resilience action, also and consistent with evidence from Cumbria, ‘skills 
and training’ (Indicator 23) were shown to expedite a community’s recovery.   
 
 “Dry runs of the community resilience plan…meant we got to know everyone 
(authorities, emergency services)…..We learned a lot from the emergency 
services….they’ve been doing this for years and have a wealth of information for us 
novices” (B13). 
 
The North-East Scotland interview discourse expressed an apparent acceptance 
that hard-engineering solutions are not the only solution and promoted the idea of 
natural flood management. A practitioner summed up the current attitude towards 
natural flood management stating:  
 
“The public are very interested in NFM, particularly when there is an incentive like a 
grant for tree planting. That said, people were also quick to point the finger at the 
amount of debris in the river causing a backlog of water…there needs to be a 
greater understanding amongst the community of NFM but first we need the data. 
We need the data to show that it works, but we are not there yet unfortunately” 
(P36). 
 
The above quote highlights an apparent acknowledgment also of the potential 
benefits of NFM. However, due to limited data in the field, it identifies a need for 
increased research and training on the potential benefits of NFM. A unique step that 
Scotland, and indeed North-East Scotland, has taken is to include resilience as part 
of the school curriculum: 
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 “By educating the younger generation we are promoting awareness of extreme 
weather events, climate change and so on. Also we are encouraging students to be 
responsible citizens, resilient citizens…they are the future after all. They may even 
pass this information back to their parents at home” (P34). 
 
This evidence suggests that a long-term approach to ‘generational resilience’ 
involving training and education from a young age is a fundamental step towards 
betterment for potential future floods.  
 
 
Table 8.29 Indicator 23, Skills and training 
 
8.6 Social Network Analysis 
 
The Cumbrian case-study demonstrated the potential for community social 
structures (physical) to expedite the flood recovery process. This section explores 
how wider social networks (physical and virtual) can enhance the mobilisation of 
resources and capacities. Data from the social media platform ‘Facebook”, together 
with interview discourse from a networking mapping exercise was analysed. 
Facebook data was ‘mined’42 to reveal wider, multi-scalar connections otherwise 
difficult to detect through interview discourse.  Interview data informed network 
analysis of key ‘brokers’ or egos. The resulting network visualisation maps allow for 
analysis of network patterns and relations across case-study scales.  
 
To this end, Social Network Analysis (SNA) was applied to (1) determine the 
structure of different support networks; (2) support findings from Cumbria (Chapter 
7) that ‘virtual’ social networks facilitate the connectedness of disconnected 
communities;  (3) explore findings from Cumbria on the valuable role resilience 
groups play in promoting multi-scalar interaction; and (4) provide ego-centric 
                                                
42 Data mining refers to the practice of analysing large pre-existing databases with the intention of revealing novel 
information. 
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analysis of key brokers facilitating multi-scalar interactions. It is anticipated that 
greater knowledge surrounding each of these four aims will inform how networks 
can positively influence the nature and level of resilience in a community.  
 
8.6.1 Methods and application of SNA 
 
Consistent with the approach taken in Chapter 7 (Section 7.6.2), a mixed methods 
approach was applied to fulfill the four aims of the SNA. Firstly, quantitative ‘mined’ 
data was analysed to determine the structure of existing support networks. 
Secondly, the quantitative (mined) data presented the opportunity to identify 
patterns of multi-scalar interactions in support and resilience groups through 
analysis of their visualised maps. Thirdly, qualitative analysis of interview discourse 
with key community members explored their role as brokers (ego-centric) in multi-
scalar interactions.  
 
8.6.2 Analysis of social network structure 
 
The process of using the ‘netvizz’ application to ‘mine’ data from the social media 
platform ‘Facebook’ was outlined in detail in Chapter 7 (Section 7.6.2). Consistent 
with this approach, facebook pages were identified by searching for keywords in 
Netvizz, namely: ‘Aberdeenshire’, ‘flood’, ‘Ballater’, ‘Inverurie’, ‘Aberdeen’, 
‘Peterculter’, ‘Marr’, ‘Garioch’ and ‘Kintore’. Pages were selected based upon the 
number of members they held. Pages with the highest number of members 
representing the village, town and city scale were selected. ‘Fubar news’ served 
primarily as an information source for flooding across the Aberdeenshire commuter 
zone. The lack of a resilience group in Aberdeen city led this page to serve as a 
central point for connecting those in need with voluntary services and support, 
particularly in Aberdeen city. Whilst Inverurie is also located within the 
Aberdeenshire commuter zone, the town has an alternative flood support page. 
‘Inverurie and Garioch Flood Support’ is a dedicated page set up directly after the 
winter floods (2015/2016) to offer support to Inverurie and its surrounds during the 
recovery process. ‘Hope floats’ represents flooded areas in Deeside where the 
worst affected village of Ballater is located. The three pages are presented in Table 
8.30. 
 
Table 8.30 Data sources representative of community groups within North-East Scotland 
(mined from Facebook) 
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Page ID Name Category Members Group/Page 
402484413151679 Fubar News Community 126416 Page 
560443614110823 
 
Inverurie and Garioch 
Flood Support 
Community 1847 Page 
1709854219245427 Hope floats- Deeside 
Flood Response 
Network 
Cause - Group 
 
8.6.3 Structural analysis findings  
 
This section outlines the analysis of the ‘mined’ network data using the social 
network visualization software ‘Gephi’ (Chapter 7, Section 7.6.2). The mined data 
was sourced using ‘Netvizz’ software and presented in a .gdf (graph data format) 
file for further analysis and interpretation using the ‘Gephi’ software. Further detail 
on three ‘mined’ networks is set out in Table 8.31.The analysis included three 
structural measures. Firstly, a ‘modularity’ measure assessed the level of 
cohesiveness in a network, for example, by forming groups or communities. 
Secondly, a ‘degree distribution’ measure assessed the probability of connection 
across the network. Thirdly, the number of actual connections was assessed 
through a ‘network density’ measure. These measures are discussed in more detail 
opposite the visualised maps in the following section. 
 
Table 8.31 Structural findings for community networks in Aberdeen, Peterculter, Inverurie 
and Ballater.  
Community 
group/page 

















1549 819 30 0.513 1.891 0.018 
 
 
8.6.4.1 SNA at the city scale 
 
The results for “Fubar” (used as a proxy for Aberdeen city) revealed a ‘sparse’ 
network density of 0.007.  As such, it was found that the ratio of the number of 
edges over the number of possible edges was comparatively low. This result is 
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indicative of a community with a low network density, reliant on a key member or 
‘broker’ to bridge connections. In the example of ‘Fubar news’, the administrator 
holds 87.21% of connections within the network (Figure 8.15). This is attributed to 
the fact that the site serves as a noticeboard for warning and informing on pertinent 
news items such as flooding. Triangulating this evidence, Figure 8.15 presents a 
colour coded spatial visualisation of the network using the ‘degree centrality’ metric 
to highlight key brokers. Key brokers with greater influence on connections are 
represented by larger nodes on the visualised map. 
 
 
Figure 8.15 Gephi social network visualisation of “Fubar News”.  Visual representation using 




Figure 8.16 Gephi social network visualisation of K-core >1 for “Fubar News”.  Visual 
representation using Force Atlas algorithm. 
 
The application of K-core43  analysis at >1 removed only periphery node group: 1 
(administrator) and 2 (community member), highlighting a cohesive core within the 
network. This may be attributable to the high response count generated by the 
‘broker’ administrator. 
 
Figure 8.16 highlights the low number of connections between nodes (degree 
distribution) for Fubar News. The average degree distribution measure stands at 
1.220, a figure that is reflective of the low level of engagement between nodes, with 
the exception of those initiated by the administrator (broker). This imbalance in 
degree distribution (number of connections) across the network is illustrated through 
the limited cluster of nodes on the bottom left corner of the axis on Figure 8.17. 
Applying Crowe’s (2007) network theory, this ‘factional’ (Section 7.6.2) clustering 
reaffirms the apparent imbalance of ties through their over-reliance on one 
‘administrator’. That said, there is evidence of bridging and linking connections 
emanating from the ‘broker’ administrator node, which is a positive sign towards 
multi-scalar interaction within the network.  
                                                
43 K-core is a visualisation of structural cohesiveness 
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Figure 8.17 Gephi visualisation of average distribution measure 1.220. ‘Fubar News’ page.  
 
The modularity distribution measure 0.561 (Figure 8.18) is illustrative of the densely 
connected network core for Fubar News. The balanced distribution of nodes across 
the structure is represented along the x-axis. The density of the ‘administrator’ node 
revealed a peak at 11 on the x-axis. However, rather than detracting from the 
network’s cohesiveness, it served as a catalyst for increased engagement amongst 
other nodes. The administrator node enhances the resilience of the community by 
disseminating information across the network, using social media to reach actors 
who otherwise would not be informed. Further, the ‘administrator’ node galvanises 
and builds upon existing nodes creating more cohesive communities. However, the 
long-term sustainability and resilience of the network is jeopardised by its reliance 








8.6.3.2 SNA at the town scale 
 
Similarities can be drawn between SNA at the town and city scale. Representative 
of the town scale, “The Inverurie and Garioch Flood Support Group” was set up to 
“fill a support gap that was not offered by the authorities” (I19). The group presented 
a similarly ‘sparse’ network density of 0.011. Standing at 1.435, the degree 
distribution scores echoed the results from the urban scale and represents an even 
distribution of communication ties across six key ‘brokers’, each responsible for 10-
18% of interaction (Figure 8.19). Similarly, a comparatively even distribution of 
‘brokers’ across the network is indicative of an evenly spread ‘degree centrality’. 
The lack of larger nodes is indicative of an evenly weighted network. Wider 
engagement across the network should positively influence its long-term stability 
and sustainability. An increase in active ‘brokers’ reflects a more diverse and 
sustainable network, offering greater opportunity for community engagement.  
 
 
Figure 8.19 Gephi social network visualisation of “Inverurie and Garioch Flood Support”.  
Visual representation using Force Atlas algorithm.  
 
The dense ‘degree centrality’ is reaffirmed by K-core analysis of <1, where only a 
limited number of distant and/or temporary network connections were removed, for 
example ‘Donations’ nodes. On the other hand, the low degree distribution measure 
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(1.435) is representative of structural holes within the network. The modularity 
results (0.584) also reflect these gaps/weaknesses by highlighting the ‘factional’ 
(bridging) nature of the key brokers. Structural holes hinder the potential 
connectedness of the network, limiting access to information, resources and 
capacities. In particular, it reduces the potential for those least connected to receive 
the assistance and support they need to be resilient (McCann and Barlow, 2015). 
 
Application of Crowe’s theory reaffirms the above findings, highlighting evidence of 
‘Factional’ and ‘Coalitonal’ clustering across the network. Key ‘brokers’ operate as 
an important bridging channel to connect isolated nodes. In addition they act as a 
means to disseminate  ‘Flood advice’, ‘Help and assistance’ and ‘Donations’ which 
otherwise may be unattainable (Figure 8.19). The bridging of connections through a 
‘broker’ is an important component in adaptive capacity building, for example by 
helping to engage outside knowledge and innovation, and preventing collapse or 
fragmentation of the network. As such, the fostering of bridging ties has the 
potential to galvanise existing networks by adding a layer of diversity and access to 
wider resources, critical for community recovery. 
8.6.3.3 SNA at the village scale 
 
The final SNA explores connections at the village scale. An individual Facebook 
page representative of the village scale was unattainable. As such, the “Hope floats- 
Deeside Flood Response Network” page, representing several villages in the rural 
Deeside area was used as a proxy for the village scale (Ballater). The lack of a 
dedicated page, representative at this scale, was also an issue encountered at the 
village scale in Cumbria (Section 7.6.3).  
 
Taking in many villages, the network comprised 30 active communities, which 
surprisingly stands above figures at the town (20) and city scale (17) (Table 8.26). 
The figure for the nodes (1549) and edges (819) are comparatively higher than the 
other scales, indicating the high level of activity within the network. Further, degree 
distribution (1.891) and modularity (0.513) measures were higher than the other 
scales (Appendix 4.3.2).   
 
Application of Crowe’s theory reaffirms the high cohesiveness of the network as 
presented through high modularity and degree distribution scores. The ‘complete’ 
network is representative of dense ‘bonding’ capital (Crowe, 2007), often associated 
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with cohesive rural communities (Cutter, 2010). Evidence of some ‘coalitonal’ and 
‘factional’ clusters is evident in Figure 8.20. Despite these positive bridging and 
linking ties, the limited extent of their presence suggests that these ties are in their 
infancy and not representative of a ‘complete’ network. 
 
K-core measures support the view that the network holds a strong cohesive core. 
Running k-core analysis at >1 eliminated only minor periphery nodes (Appendix x). 
Whilst the structural analysis results present a balanced network with a cohesive 
core, limited evidence of ‘factional’ (linking) and ‘coalitonal’ (bridging) and is 
indicative of a slightly ‘closed’ network that could potentially resist outside 
assistance. Closed networks have the potential to become homogenised, thereby 
limiting innovation, access to diverse resources and ultimately reducing adaptive 




Figure 8.20 Gephi social network visualisation of “hope floats”.  Visual representation using 
Force Atlas algorithm. 
 
The presentation of the three network structures in the above Figures (8.15; 8.19; 
8.20) highlight variances across the different network scales. It became apparent 
that social networks played an important role in warning and informing at the urban 
scale. Once catalysed, these networks demonstrated a good level of engagement, 
however an over-reliance on a key broker created structural holes and potential 
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network collapse was a possibility. ‘Factional’ and ‘coalitonal’ structures, associated 
with bridging and bonding ties were more prevalent at the town scale. By contrast, 
the village scale demonstrated the most ‘complete’ network representing strong 
bonding capital. Whilst it is acknowledged that bonding capital is a key element in a 
balanced network, Chapter 7 (Section 7.5.5.1) highlighted that sole reliance on this 
network tie has the potential to restrict innovative resilience action by acting as a 
barrier to outside assistance. The above social networks are in their infancy, which 
perhaps explains the lack of practitioner level engagement through this medium 
nevertheless, the potential for social media to expedite recovery at both the 
fragmented urban and dispersed rural geographical scale has been presented.  
 
 
8.6.4 Ego-centric analysis 
 
SNA highlighted the variances in network structures, which are indicative of bonding 
(complete), bridging (factional and coalitonal) and linking ties. Key to the 
engagement of these ties are ‘brokers’ who act as a catalyst for engagement by 
linking nodes together.  
 
As outlined in Section 8.5.2, interview discourse was the data source for this 
analysis. Egos in each community were identified through the process of purposive 
sampling. Consistent with the approach taken in Chapter 7, the recall method was 
used to allow interviewees to identify sources of assistance during the recovery 
process (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The raw data outputs from this process are 
presented in Appendix x. The emerging data (nodes and edges) were subsequently 
formatted in Excel columns and exported as a .CSV file for interpretation in ‘Gephi’ 
network analysis software. The results of this process are presented in the ego-
centric maps, the degree of centrality is depicted by node size -those with more 
influence or ‘edges’ are illustrated through larger nodes.  
 
 
The ego-centric maps presented in Appendix 4, support earlier findings of structural 
weaknesses and communication gaps across all three scales. Linking capital was 
evident to some extent across the networks, however it is the ‘form’ of linking capital 
that is important. For example, reliance on the authorities to “sort out the flooding” 
(A3), as evidenced in Aberdeen, is representative of linking capital, however it is not 
conducive to a collaborative response. By contrast, the resilience group in Ballater 
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demonstrated its ability to act as an effective channel for multi-scalar co-operation 
between the community and authorities.  
 
As such, the results from the SNA analysis reaffirm the findings from the Cumbrian 
case-study (Chapter 7) that it is not necessarily the scale of participation that is 
most important, rather the objective of the engagement. Further, evidence of 
effective multi-scalar interaction through the medium of resilience groups makes the 
case for enhanced investment in resilient social infrastructure. The example of the 
dormant resilience group, reignited as a consequence of the floods, highlights the 
fragility of the social asset. Reaffirming evidence from Chapter 7 (Section 7.6.7), it 
became apparent that social capital is not a constant and requires investment to 
keep ‘flood memory’ alive. Finally, and as noted in Chapter 7, this section indicates 
the need for investment in strategies to enhance trust between communities and 
authorities, thus facilitating positive linking capital.  
 
8.7 Comparative settlement hierarchy  
 
This section presents the distribution of community and practitioner level resilience 
indicators across North-East Scotland at the three settlement scales: city, town and 
village. Reference is made to Chapter 7 (Cumbria), highlighting patterns and 
relationships common to both case-studies. This approach is designed to reveal 
indicator gaps at the individual North-East Scotland scales, but also explores the 
transferability of the findings through comparison with Cumbria (Chapter 7). An 
overview of the indicators is illustrated in Figures 8.21-8.22 and the relationships 
between these indicators are outlined in the following sections. 
 
Figure 8.33 illustrates the extent of resilience indicator coding found across the 
case- studies, at both the community and practitioner level. The level of coding was 
found to be highest at the village scale in Ballater and in the suburb (city scale) of 
Peterculter. High ‘cohesiveness’ (Indicator 16) (typical in small communities) may 
have enabled greater mobilisation of diverse internal resources. Further, the results 
show an attempt to reflect critically and build upon existing resilience through 
‘learning’. High coding of ‘analytical thinking (Indicator 19) and ‘knowledge 
feedback’ (Indicator 22) corroborate this assumption. ‘Cohesive community’ 
(Indicator 16) was found to be the most commonly coded indicator across the case-
studies, despite evidence of low collaboration, particularly at the urban scale. This 
highlights the potential for ‘multi-scalar interaction’ (Indicator 17) (bonding, bridging, 
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linking), however the lack of an organisational structure to facilitate these 
connections (for example a resilience group) has prevented multi-level 




Figure 8.21 Matrix coding of community and practitioner level Indicators. 
 
A heat map matrix query, run in NVivo, illustrates the varying density of indicators 
for each settlement and allows comparison across settlement scales. The heat map 
diagram (Figure 8.22) shows that the village scale displayed higher levels of 
resilience coding. Indicators that are coded more frequently are represented by a 
darker gradient of colour from 0.0- 43.00 and complementing data presented in 
Figure 8.21, it was found that cohesiveness (Indicator 16) was the most highly 
coded indicator across all case-studies.  In this respect, the analysis presented in 
Figure 8.22 acts as a helpful point of reference for indicator comparison across 






Figure 8.22 Matrix coding heat map of community and practitioner level Indicator.  
8.7.1 City scale 
 
Aberdeen city shows variability of coding across the four components as previously 
illustrated previously in Figure 8.22. Risk indicators were found to be low and  
(critically) ‘learning’ had a very poor coding representation.  
 
Figure 8.23 Matrix code query illustrating spread of coding for the four components at the 
city scale. 
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Nevertheless, Aberdeen shows high ‘risk awareness’ (Indicator 1) relative to the 
lower level of awareness found at the town scale supporting findings from Cumbria, 
where the city scale also exhibited high-risk awareness as a consequence of three 
severe floods in the past decade. However, as illustrated in Figure 8.24, the level of 
‘risk understanding’ (Indicator 4) does not reflect the level of awareness. This may 
infer   that residents and businesses accept that there is inevitably a risk attached to 
a “city by the coast with rivers running through it…..but it’s never that bad...we cope” 
(A2). Despite a publicised near miss from tidal flooding in 2014, the interview 
discourse suggests a misinterpretation of the potential risk exposure amongst 
residents and businesses. Furthermore, while ‘connectedness’ coding was high 
(Figure 8.23), there is an imbalance across the Aberdeen ‘connectedness’ 
indicators (Figure 8.24). High ‘cohesiveness’ (Indicator 16) is closely linked with 
‘multi-scalar interaction’ (Indicator 17) through bonding and bridging capital and  
‘higher-level trust’ (Indicator 18), (as presented in the SNA, Section 8.6), is closely 
related to linking capital. However, interview discourse revealed a reliance on 
authorities to “deal with the flooding” (A3). As such, the relationship with authorities 
was not collaborative explaining the low cohesion levels in the community to self-
organise and a lack of engagement with authorities leading to distrust.  
 
 
Figure 8.24 Matrix code of ‘resources and capacity’ and ‘connectedness’ component 
indicators at the city scale.   
 
 355 
Reaffirming the lack of collaboration amongst the community, Figure 8.24 illustrates 
the relatively low levels of ‘local knowledge’ (Indicator 8) and ‘self organising’ 
(Indicator 6). The absence of a physical resilience group, together with low multi-
scalar interaction’ (indicator 17), led to low ‘learning’ in Aberdeen (excluding 
Peterculter suburb) (Figure 8.23) in contrast to the other three, highly coded 
components. 
 
However, Figure 8.22 indicates that the higher ‘connectedness’ and ‘learning’ 
coding shown at the city scale (8.23) is heavily influenced by the higher extent of 
coding found in the city suburb of Peterculter. As such, it could be argued that the 
‘village within a city’ (Perterculter) is inflating the level of city coding as a 
consequence of its more connected and established community.  
8.7.2 Town scale 
 
The low ‘risk awareness’ (Indicator 1) in Inverurie is likely to be attributable to the 
low level of flood incidence (Figure 8.25). Also as observed through SNA (Section 
8.6) the newly established ‘Inverurie and Garioch Flood Support’ Facebook page in 
informing and disseminating information about flooding may have contributed to the 
higher ‘risk communication’ coding.  
 
Consistent with the Cumbrian findings, ‘property and accommodation’ (Indicator 12) 
was also found to be coded highly (Figure 8.25). The disruption caused by 
‘relocation’ (Indicator 21) and potential ‘devalued property’ (Indicator 22) were the 
key concerns raised. The establishment of the ‘Inverurie Flood Support Group’ and 
online Facebook page facilitated ‘self-organisation’ (Indicator 6) of ‘resourcefulness’ 
(Indicator 9) actions. In addition, it offered ‘psychological support’ (Indicator 15) to 
assist those “wearing the floods on their faces” (Indicator 19).  
 
The extent of mobilised ‘resources and capacities’ is reliant upon the 
‘connectedness’ (Indicators 16-18) of the community (Figure 8.25) and in this 
context Facebook formed the main channel of communication during the immediate 
recovery process, efficiently matching needs with capacities. However, due to the 
informal nature of the communication, it became apparent that the authorities were 
reticent to use the Facebook page. This could have reduced ‘higher-level trust’ 





Figure 8.25 Matrix code query illustrating spread of coding for ‘risk’, ‘resources and capacity’ 
and ‘learning’ component, representative of the town scale, North-East Scotland. 
 
The ‘learning’ component is characterised by average coding levels (Figure 8.22)  
though  reflective interview discourse led to high coding in the ‘knowledge feedback’ 
(Indicator 22). However, as represented in Figure 8.22, the same extent of learning 
was not evident across the other ‘learning’ indicators. This may be attributable to 
the fact that a large proportion of the ‘connectedness’, which facilitated the 
mobilisation of resource and capacities, was communicated via social media. By 
contrast, physical resilience groups in Cumbria were shown to have higher coding in 
the learning component as a consequence of ‘multi-scalar interaction’ (Indicator 17) 
with authorities. The evidence from the town scale in North-East Scotland indicates 
that ‘virtual’ groups alone do not offer sufficient ‘multi-scalar’ and ‘cohesive’ activity 
to facilitate its full ‘learning’ potential.  
8.7.3 Village scale 
 
In comparison to the other settlement scales, the village scale (Ballater) exhibited 
the highest level of indicator coding across all four components (risk; resources and 
capacities; connectedness; learning) (Figure 8.26). Echoing findings from Cumbria, 
it is noteworthy that Ballater had an operational resilience group. 
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Figure 8.26 Matrix coding heat map representative of the city, town and village scale.  
 
The low incidence of flooding relative to Cumbria is potentially reflected by the lower 
‘risk awareness’ (Indicator 1) exhibited at the village scale. ‘Risk understanding’ 
(Indicator 4) was the highest represented risk indicator (Figure 8.26/8.28), a finding 
that potentially reflects the extent of discussion communities have undertaken in the 
post-flooding phase. For example, a founding member of the Ballater Flood Group 
commented that the group was set up “with the objective of understanding the 
events that led to the unprecedented flooding in December 2015” (B16). 
 
The heat map query matrix (Figure 8.26) identifies a number of highly coded 
indicators which contribute to the overall high level of coding at the village scale. As 
illustrated in Figure 8.26/8.28 all indicators within the ‘resources and capacity’ 
component are highly coded, with the exception of  ‘self-efficacy’ (Indicator 10) and 
‘Governance’ (Indicator 14). The lower coding levels of ‘self efficacy’ contrast with 
the results from Cumbria and may be attributable to an aging population and the 
fact that Ballater is a popular retirement location where residents: “often go away to 
visit family, stay with the grandchildren. Now that we are retired we have the time to 
do these things…. go on holiday” (B13). The low ‘governance’ coding may be 
attributed to the perception by some locals that: “We are forgotten about up here in 




Heavy coding was also evident in the ‘connectedness’ and ‘learning’ components, 
as illustrated in Figure 8.27. The highest coded indicator was ‘cohesiveness’ 
(Indicator 16). As shown in Chapter 7 (Section 7.5.5), this is illustrative of a tight-knit 
network who work collaboratively in pursuit of a shared goal and often engaging 
outside support from authorities (higher-level trust’, Indicator 18).  Analysis from the 
SNA (Section 8.6) reaffirmed this finding, illustrating ‘factional’ (bridging) and 
‘coalitonal’ (linking) ties within the network.  
 
The medium of resilience groups facilitated discussion and review post flooding. 
The timing of the interviews, almost 18 months after the event, led to a more 
reflective interview discourse relative to Cumbria. This apparent increase in risk 
problemising and reflection is illustrated in Figure 8.27 through the highly coded 
‘analytical thinking’ (Indicator 19); ‘Integrated development’ (Indicator 20); and 
‘knowledge feedback’ (Indicator 22). The ‘Learning’ component is coded higher than 
Cumbria, however Figure 8.27 also illustrates that attention is needed to improve 
‘skills and training’ (Indicator 23), which can increase evidence of ‘experimentation’ 
(Indicator 21).  
 
Figure 8.27 Matrix code query of ‘Resources and Capacity’ and ‘learning’ component 
indicators at the village scale.  
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The matrix query coding visualisation (Figure 8.28) provides an overview of the 
prominence of indicators at the different scales. The village scale is represented by 
heavy coding in the ‘resources and capacity’ component and dense 
‘connectedness’ coding, as a consequence of engagement through physical flood 
resilience groups leading to a comparatively higher level of collaborative multi-
scalar interaction (Indicator 17). In this context, a virtual flood support group 
efficiently mobilised ‘resources and capacities’ component indicators during the 
immediate recovery. However, long-term collaborative engagement through 
resilience planning was not evident through this ‘virtual’ medium. Consequently, the 
positive extent of ‘learning’ evident at the village scale was not represented at the 
town scale. Conversely, the city scale exhibited the lowest level of resilience due to 
the absence of a virtual or physical resilience group.  
 
 
Figure 8.28 Matrix coding results for community and practitioner level Indicators. 
 
8.7.4 Practitioner level 
 
The following section outlines the distribution of practitioner level indicators (Figure 
8.29) from the North-East Scotland case-study.  In line with findings from Cumbria, 
the high ‘risk’ coding is indicative of ‘risk experience’ (Indicator 3) and ‘risk 
understanding’ (Indicator 4) (Figure 8.30).  ‘Resources and capacities’ were well 
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represented, however low coding in both the ‘connectedness’ and in particular 
‘learning’ components is indicative of resilience weaknesses.  
 
 
Figure 8.29 Matrix coding for the four Framework components at the practitioner level. 
 
 
Above average ‘resources and capacities’ coding was particularly notable in the: 
‘Flood Responsibility’ (Indicator 11); ‘Self-efficacy’ (Indicator 10); ‘Self-organising 
(Indicator 6) and ‘Redundancy’ (Indicator 7) indicators (Figure 8.45). These 
indicators emerged in the context of the Scottish Government’s push to encourage 
communities to “do more for themselves” (P40). The practitioner level interviewees 
were quick to point out that the responsibility for flooding of properties lies with the 
homeowner not the authorities. Beyond their role of “warning and informing” (P35), 
the authorities support the idea of communities taking responsibility for their risk and 
establishing Resilience Groups.  
 
The lack of ‘learning’ coding is indicative of a reactive state of coping rather than 
striving for ‘betterment’ ahead of the next potential disaster. In particular, low 
‘experimentation’ (Indicator 21) and ‘analytical thinking’ (Indicator 19) are indicative 
of a lack of proactive engagement. In particular, the Aberdeen Western Peripheral 
Route (AWPR) emerged as a key concern regarding potential future flooding. 
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Despite that “water is collecting in places that it never collected before” (P35) near 
the AWPR, the authorities commented that consent for the road underwent a 
thorough risk assessment process and “account for all future eventualities 
(flooding).” (P32) The practitioner interviews also expressed concern over short-
term funding streams and  “austerity measures” (P32), these were cited as 
roadblocks to resilience training, with budgets being described as “peanuts” (P33) in 
comparison to those in England.  
 
 
Figure 8.30 Overview of Practitioner level coding. 
 
8.8 Feedback of indicators from Phase 2 to Phase 1 
 
This section presents the process of applying Phase 2 indicators against Phase 1 
perceived weaknesses (Section 8.5.1) identified within Aberdeen, Inverurie and 
Ballater.  
8.8.1 City scale 
 
Consistent with results in Cumbria, low ‘flood responsibility’ (Indicator 11) and ‘local 
knowledge’ (Indicator 8) were reflective of the perception many residents had that 
flooding of properties “is for the authorities to deal with” (A3). Compounding 
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pressure on the ‘environmental’ community asset, high levels of impervious surface 
further attributed to surface water flooding across the city. Despite this risk, low ‘risk 
acceptance and mitigation’ (Indicator 5) echoed a lack of ‘flood responsibility’ at the 
community level (Figure 8.31). Increasing demand for properties led to 
inappropriate planning in flood risk areas, thus eroding the ‘physical’ community 
asset. However, the majority of properties flooded were largely commercial 
premises and did not impact at the household level.  Nevertheless, the evidence 
highlights the importance of appropriate ‘integrated planning and development’ 
(Indicator 20) to mitigate against further floods.  
 
As noted in Cumbria, ‘multi-scalar interaction’ (Indicator 17) emerged strongly in 
relation to the ‘human’ asset. However, the nature of the ‘linking’ capital revealed a 
reliance on authorities, rather than collaborative engagement between the 
community and authorities. Lack of participation at the community level is reaffirmed 
by the low ‘cohesion’ (Indicator 16) levels of the ‘human’ asset (Figure 8.31). 
However, the suburb of Peterculter was found to the exception. As a consequence 
of an active FAG the Peterculter community were found to exhibit high levels of 
cohesion. This may be attributable to the community’s ability to meet in residual 
village institutions such as the Culter Village Hall.  
 
In addition, holes in community capacity underlined further weaknesses in the 
‘human’ asset. Figure 8.31 illustrates an absence of both ‘self-organising’ (Indicator 
6) and ‘local knowledge’ (Indicator 8). The former can be attributed to the lack of an 
organisational structure to facilitate resilience action, such as a flood group. The 
suburb of Peterculter remains the exception, where an active FAG demonstrated a 
working organisational structure and strong resilience capacity. The absence of 
‘local knowledge’ could be attributed to the transient nature of city inhabitants (with 
the exception of Peterculter), together with high rental tenure rates and the high 
percentage of flooded properties that were businesses.   
 
From an ‘economic’ resource perspective, the lack of engagement by businesses 
raises concerns about the long-term sustainability of their ‘preparedness’ (Indicator 
13) plans (Figure 8.31). Similar to the situation at the town scale, it was found that 
economic ‘redundancy’ (Indicator 7), in terms of financial savings and employment 
diversity, could enhance the vulnerability of those reliant on the oil and gas industry. 
In addition, the low representation of ‘learning’ indicators at the city scale is 
suggestive of limited lessons learned. Echoing findings from the village scale, it is 
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apparent that business engagement is an integral component of any future 
community resilience plans. The indicators that form this discussion are presented  
(Figure 8.32) in relation to their respective community assets.  
 
  
Figure 8.31 Aberdeen city scale resilience indicators. 
 
 
Figure 8.32 Application of Phase 2 indicators to Phase 1 resilience baseline assessment 




8.8.2 Town scale 
 
Inverurie is highly exposed to flooding arising from geographical setting between 
two rivers, yet there was little evidence of environmental protection strategies by the 
community in the town. The establishment of a physical resilience group could, for 
example, help generate environmental strategies through ‘multi-scalar interaction’ 
(Indicator 17) in collaboration with authorities.  
 
The lack of previous flood incidents is illustrated in the low ‘risk’ component coding 
in Figure 8.33. Enhancing the ‘physical’ asset requires greater ‘risk awareness’ 
(Indicator 1) and ‘risk understanding’ (Indicator 2) in order for potential ‘risk 
acceptance and mitigation’ (Indicator 5) action to occur. Protection of the physical 
asset was predominantly through PLP at the individual level with limited ‘flood 
responsibility’ coding through the reinstatement of two bund walls to protect houses 
and businesses in the town. Further, ‘integrated planning and development’ 
(Indicator 20) through inappropriate planning consent in a flood plain emerged 
strongly in the interview discourse: “We bought this house based on the protection 
offered by that bund …. because it got through planning we thought we were safe” 
(I 20). 
 
The ‘human’ asset was bolstered through the Facebook group ‘Inverurie and 
Garioch Flood Support Group’, which catalysed ‘innovative and resourceful action’ 
in the town. The open nature of the ‘virtual’ group led to evidence of ‘multi-scalar 
interaction’ (Indicator 17) through fundraising and donations from people both inside 
and outside the immediate Inverurie community. The establishment of the rest 
centre in the British Legion’s club offered a hub for the community to engage with 
authorities and strengthened ‘higher-level trust’ (Indicator 18) over time. As shown 
by the high ‘self-organising’ (Indicator 6) coding, the establishment of the ‘Inverurie 
Flood Support Group’ page efficiently matched needs with capacities in an 
‘resourceful’ (Indicator 9) manner, meeting the direct coping needs of the 
community. However, the low representation of the ‘learning’ component (Figure 
8.33) is indicative of the coping nature of the recovery effort. In the absence of a 
physical resilience group, there was limited opportunity for collaborative reflection. 
However, an exception was noted by Flood Support Group members who 
‘analytically’ consider risk (Indicator 19) and acknowledged the need to “formalise 
the flood group” (I19) to assist long-term recovery. 
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As a consequence of the oil crash since late 2014 (PWC, 2015), increased 
unemployment compounded the financial impact of flooding in Inverurie. 
Accordingly, the interview discourse highlighted the need for ‘redundancy’ (Indicator 
7) in terms of financial savings and diverse employment opportunities to avoid being 
“left with only the wet clothes I was wearing” (I21). The indicators discussed in the 









Figure 8.34 Application of Phase 2 indicators to Phase 1 resilience baseline assessment 
results, Inverurie town. 
 
8.8.3 Village scale 
 
It was found that Ballater’s ‘environmental’ community asset was enhanced by a 
‘cohesive community’ (Indicator 16) which through ‘self-organising’ (Indicator 6) 
cleared debris and stone from the golf course and river banks: “The golf course was 
covered in rock… tonnes and tonnes were removed. An amazing community effort” 
(B13). In support of findings from Cumbria, ‘local knowledge’ (Indicator 8) informed 
necessary river maintenance issues, which had been neglected prior to the flooding. 
Also consistent with findings from Cumbria, ‘integrated planning and development’ 
(Indicator 20) identified the need for stricter enforcement of planning rules to 
enhance the ‘environmental’ asset of the community. In addition, reduced pressure 
on the drainage infrastructure could potentially reduce risk to the ‘physical’ asset.   
 
Echoing Cumbrian findings, it was also found that ‘flood responsibility’ (Indicator 11) 
and ‘resourcefulness’ (Indicator 9) led to increased protection of the ‘physical’ asset 
through implementation of PLP. ‘Self organisation’ (Indicator 6) was demonstrated 
by the establishment of the Ballater Resilience Group as an extra layer of resilience 
to the community. The ‘cohesive community’ (Indicator 16) demonstrated 
comparatively strong multi-scalar interaction (Indicator 17) by working 
collaboratively with the authorities and emergency services to enhance the 
preparedness (Indicator 13) of the community.  
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The ‘multi-scalar interaction’ between authorities and the community bolstered the 
human capacity of Ballater. Coding peaks in Figure 8.50 suggest that through ‘self-
organising’ (Indicator 6), the ‘cohesive community’ (Indicator 16) demonstrated 
‘flood responsibility’ (Indicator 8) by actioning ‘resourceful’ actions (Indicator 9) as 
part of their flood resilience plan. Conversely, the Ballater Flood Group was 
established to understand the events of the winter flooding by holding the 
authorities to account. ‘Higher-level trust’ (Indicator 18) in authorities was 
understandably poor at first. However, with time, these relationships strengthened 
as evidenced in the high ‘multi-scalar interaction’ and ‘trust in authorities’ indicator 
coding (Figure 8.35). In contrast to the Cumbrian results, a high representation of 
coding in the ‘learning’ component (Figure 8.35) is indicative of a reflective 
community which, as discussed, is potentially a consequence of the interviews 
taking place almost 18 months after the floods. However, the low ‘skills and training’ 
(Indicator 23) is reflective of the limited financial commitment from Scottish 
Government towards resilience training. The low ‘Governance’ (Indicator 14) coding 
further supports this concern. 
 
Figure 8.35 Ballater community level resilience indicators. 
 
 
The  ‘economic’ asset in Ballater (Figure 8.36) indicates a reliance on the tourism 
industry. Many small business, which make up the Ballater economy, were forced to 
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temporarily close with local job losses further compounding the issue. The Ballater 
Business Group highlighted that small businesses are integral to the functioning of 
the village and “need to be part of the community resilience plan” (B16). Businesses 
need to build in ‘redundancy’ (Indicator 7) through continuity plans that assist 
diversity. Moreover, preparedness (Indicator 12) measures, such as evacuation and 
business resilience plans, need to be acknowledged as a means of expediting the 
recovery process.  
 
Figure 8.36 Application of Phase 2 indicators to Phase 1 resilience baseline assessment 





As a consequence of the lower flood incidence, North-East Scotland displayed 
lower levels of ‘risk awareness’ relative to the findings of the Cumbrian case-study 
(Chapter 7). Consequently, fewer resilience groups were established, however two 
were founded subsequent to the floods with a  ‘virtual’ resilience group (Inverurie) 
providing an efficient means to match needs with capacities during the immediate 
recovery phase. However, physical resilience groups in Ballater and Peterculter at 
the village and city (suburb) scale, provided evidence of multi-scalar interaction. The 
benefit of social media extended to the dissemination of flood advice and flood 
warning. In the absence of a resilience group, social media filled a critical 
communication gap by acting as an additional flood warning service. The lack of 
higher-level communication through this medium reduced its potential and made the 
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call for the formalisation of social media as a legitimate resource in the immediate 
recovery process. 
 
In line with the findings from Cumbria, it was noted that communities with 
established resilience groups exhibited the highest ‘cohesion’ (Indicator 16), ‘higher-
level trust (Indicator 18) and subsequent evidence of ‘multi-scalar interaction’ 
(Indicator 17). By contrast, interaction with authorities in Aberdeen was largely 
limited to one-way reliance on the authorities to take responsibility for the flood 
issue. The lack of self-organisation (Indicator 6) and acceptance of ‘flood 
responsibility’ (Indicator 11) was found to be attributable to the transient nature of 
urban areas with high rental tenure and the fact that flooding predominantly 
occurred in large commercial premises where multi-national owners (with insurance 
cover) had little personal attachment to the property or area.  
 
The ‘learning’ component was more prominent than in Cumbria, a finding which was 
attributable to the timing of the interviews almost 18 months into the recovery 
process and the effective problemising of risk through the medium of resilience 
groups. In addition, many of the settlements comprised a high percentage of 
residents who work/worked in the oil and gas industry. The unique skill set acquired 
by these highly educated residents using “risk assessments on a daily basis” (P33) 
greatly informed the design of the resilience plan with many perceiving that the oil 
and gas industry was driving demand for housing in flood risk areas. Consistent with 
findings from Cumbria, ‘integrated planning and development’ (Indicator 20) 
emerged as a prominent indicator. Seemingly collaboration with authorities, a 
holistic, catchment-wide approach to flooding comprising both hard and soft 








































The main focus of this chapter is to present the overall conclusions and key findings 
emerging from the delivery of the thesis aim, which was to develop a framework to 
enhance community capacity and build resilience during the recovery and 
reconstruction phases of a disaster (Section 1.2).  
 
The development of this Framework has been achieved through the fulfilment of 
four key objectives, namely:  
1. to establish a theoretical and conceptual basis for the issues related to post-
disaster recovery and reconstruction within the Disaster Management 
Process (DMP) (Chapter 2);  
2. to define the properties that make a community resilient, exploring methods 
to facilitate capacity development for post-disaster reconstruction of the Built 
Environment (Chapter 3). 
3. to examine the existing post-disaster frameworks, including the extent of 
integration between top-down planning and bottom-up demands from the 
recovery to reconstruction phase (Chapter 4). 
4. to develop a framework to reconcile the gap between recovery planning and 
long-term recovery reconstruction. (Chapter 5, 6,7,8).  
 
The development of a resilience Framework resulted in three core outcomes, which 
will frame the structure for this section. First, the overall conclusions taken from the 
process of developing a novel, theoretically-anchored framework (Section 9.2). 
Second, the key findings of both the theoretical and empirical strands of the 
research  (Section 9.3). Third, it reflects on potential future testing of the framework, 
including:  refinement; areas for possible application; and potential methods of 
evaluation (Section 9.4). 
9.2 Overall conclusions 
 
The overall conclusions of the research emerge from the development of a 
resilience Framework, involving both theoretical (Chapter 2 and 3) and empirical 
contexts (Chapters 4-8), aligned with the research objectives. From a theoretical 
perspective, the research identified and analysed a substantial and complex 
literature base that presented no common definition for the term ‘disaster’ to act as 
a reference point. As a consequence, there was a need to identify a definition that 
was appropriate for the purposes of this research. This was achieved through the 
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synthesis of the literature and presented in Section 2.2. Further analysis of the 
literature also highlighted the significance of the recovery and reconstruction phases 
in the management of disasters. Chapter 3 analysed the factors considered 
important for the development and harnessing of community resilience. The 
research also reviewed the contemporary frameworks for assessing resilience and 
identified a number of interoperable deficiencies. This research sought to overcome 
these deficiencies through the development, testing and evaluation of a new 
conceptual framework for enhancing community resilience (Chapter 4-8). The 
overall findings emerging from this Framework development are presented below 
and relate to the following areas: the role of recovery and reconstruction; the 
community’s role in enhancing resilience; and gaps in the existing resilience 
frameworks.   
9.2.1 The role of recovery and reconstruction  
 
In reviewing the knowledge base positioned within a disaster management context 
(Chapter 2) the research highlights the increased frequency and magnitude of 
disasters, particularly in urbanised areas and the growing challenges that this poses 
for those tasked with managing and mitigating the potential impact of disasters. 
Indeed, as articulated in Section 2.2, these challenges were furthered by the 
absence of an agreed ‘disaster’ definition which in turn, inhibited a consistent 
approach to resilience frameworks. In response to this gap, the thesis sought to 
define a ‘disaster’ by reference to the context in which this research is set, within an 
affected community. A synthesis of literature helped construct a succinct definition, 
appropriate to the aim of this thesis: 
an unforeseen event ,derived from natural, partially human  or entirely 
human created sources, causing physical and social disruption which 
exceeds the capacity of the affected community, rendering them unable to 
function normally using their own resources. 
This definition characterised a disaster by reference to its agents: natural, man-
made or hybrid, and referred to the physical agent (hazard) as well as its impact on 
society (social), all common elements of other disaster definitions. Importantly, the 
definition adopted in this research distinguishes between a disaster and a less 
critical event, with the former characterised as an incident that only constitutes a 
‘disaster’ when the capacity of the community is exceeded and normal life is 
significantly disrupted.  
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The examination of the disaster management process (DMP) (mitigation, 
preparedness, response, recovery/reconstruction) in Chapter 2 (Objective 1.2.1), 
identified an underexploited ‘window of opportunity’ within the recovery and 
reconstruction phase. It became apparent that several factors (increased 
awareness, proactive planning, increased engagement and funding) can be 
capitalised upon in the aftermath of a disaster and that, by shifting the emphasis 
from a ‘bounce back’ to a ‘bounce forward’ approach, the disaster recovery period 
could in fact provide a ‘window of opportunity’ for the impacted community. 
Acknowledging the ‘window of opportunity’ that the post-disaster phases present, 
the thesis and related analysis was focused upon and situated within the recovery 
and reconstruction phases.   
 
In practice, and as noted in the literature, it is not always possible for communities 
to take advantage of the opportunities presented following a disaster event. 
Evidence of poor co-ordination of actors, communication gaps and a lack of 
planning were commonly found to act as barriers to long-term recovery (Section 
2.5). Further, the reconstruction phase struggled to balance the need for timely 
reconstruction with long-term resilience development. In response to these 
challenges, the literature placed reliance on the ability of communities to harness 
their own capacity and mitigate against such effects as a means of reducing the 
impact of disasters on society.  
9.2.2 Role of the community in enhancing resilience 
 
Enabling community resilience has become a key thread in the literature (Chapter 3; 
Objective 1.2.2). Through the literature, communities were shown to make 
significant contributions to disaster recovery and, accordingly, should be viewed as 
active rather that passive agents in resilience efforts. The literature indicated other 
additional benefits emerging from community level initiatives, for example use of 
local knowledge; resources and capacity; cost effectiveness; project ownership and 
empowerment. However, despite advances in the realisation of the resilience 
concept, the literature (Section 3.3) highlighted inconsistencies in how the concept 
is applied in theory, policy and practice. Consequently, the decision was taken to 
locate the thesis at the community level, so as to identify the characteristics that 
make a community resilient, and explore methods to facilitate capacity development 
for post-flooding recovery at the community level (Objective 1.2.2).  
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9.2.3 Gaps in existing resilience frameworks 
 
A review of extant resilience frameworks (Chapter 4) highlighted inconsistencies in 
how resilience was assessed and developed at the community level. When the 
Qualitative Data Analysis package NVivo was used to analyse existing frameworks, 
a number of potential gaps were identified: a lack of frameworks that were 
empirically grounded at the community level; limited evaluation of current, post-
disaster resilience on an empirical basis; and a limited number of frameworks that 
were practical in nature (Objective 1.2.3).  
 
To meet the first of these points, the thesis Framework was located at the 
community level to capture resilience needs often overlooked in top-down 
frameworks (Section 4.2). In order to address the latter two points, a Framework 
was developed and practically applied to empirically assess resilience at the 
community level. A review of existing frameworks identified the most prominent 
community resilience components as follows: risk; resources and capacities; 
connectedness and learning. To help take these concepts from theoretical insights 
to operationalisation, they were used as the underpinning components of the 
developed Framework (Section 4.6). Basing the case-study analysis on these 
components, the Framework acted as an analytical tool capable of assessing 
resilience in practice.  The proposed Framework was then applied and validated 
across three UK case-study regions (Northern Ireland, Cumbria and North-East 
Scotland), thereby contributing to an empirical assessment of post-disaster 
community resilience (Chapter 6-8).  
After applying the Framework, the highly structured ‘Framework Method’ of 
analysis, (most commonly used in medical research) was applied (for the first time) 
in a disaster resilience context. This pioneering method of structured analysis acts 
as a significant step forward in the identification of more robust and tangible 
indicators of resilience, sometimes criticised in the literature for their ambiguous 
nature (Levine, 2014; Sharifi, 2016). The systematic approach enables the in-depth 
exploration of data while simultaneously providing a transparent audit trail and 
ensuring more credible findings (Ritchie and Lewis 2003). Through its application in 
a number of  empirical case-studies, the research documents the application of this 
rigorous process and highlights its valuable contribution to qualitative methods in 
this disaster field. In doing so, the research demonstrates the ability of the 
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‘Framework Method’ to offer a methodical, flexible and pragmatic approach to data 
analysis.  
The methodical process of staged analysis provided a means to extract empirical 
indicators of performed/dynamic resilience, resulting in a synthesised list of 23 
indicators  (Section 8.5, Table 8.10). The list of indicators (Figure 9.1) serves as a 
knowledge base to draw from and inform long-term resilience-building strategies 
(Objective 1.2.4). Further, as they are derived from the bottom up, these 23 
resilience proxies (indicators) can inform communities of the resources and the 
capacities required to help build their own resilience. Significantly, the transparent 
nature of the ‘Framework Method’ permits easy access to original textual data, 
which allows others (researchers, community groups etc.) to formulate judgements 
and agree on appropriate indicators relevant to their particular community context. 
To this end, the Framework addresses the call for a transition from a theoretical to 
practical understanding of resilience (NRC, 2012; Levine, 2014; Keating et al, 
2015), by offering a practical tool for the empirical analysis of resilience drivers at 
the local level (Objective 1.2.4). The final list of indicators are presented opposite 
their framework components in Figure 9.2.  
 
 
Figure 9.1 Synthesised list of resilience indicators across the three case-studies.   
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Figure 9.2 Overview of indicators mapped onto framework. 
9.3 Key findings  
 
The following section outlines the five key findings from the multi-case application, 
population and rollout of the thesis Framework. First, the research highlighted the 
central role risk understanding plays in resilience building and how misinterpretation 
of ‘risk language’ can reduce resilience. Second, the research revealed nuances 
between how urban and rural resilience presents itself in practice. Third, the thesis 
underlines the necessity of a catchment-wide approach to integrated planning and 
development. Fourth, the research uncovered how ‘learning’ components acted as 
drivers of transformational resilience, allowing communities not only to return to a 
stable state but also transform to a more sustainable trajectory. Fifth, the research 
highlights the capacity for social networks to assist and leverage capacity building 
and resilience.    
 
 377 
9.3.1 The role of ‘risk’ in resilience building 
The research is testament to the need for greater risk awareness as a first step in 
resilience building activities. Risk awareness and understanding were found to be 
the pillars of the resilience Framework. In particular, and corroborating evidence 
from wider resilience studies (Kung and Chen, 2012), this thesis concludes that 
communities with greater risk experience were more willing to take mitigative action. 
The research shows that the relationship between risk awareness and subsequent 
resilience action is dynamic in nature and requires continued refreshing to avoid 
complacency and the erosion of resilience. The analysis stresses that risk 
awareness is not a constant asset and requires practice to avoid erosion of ‘flood 
memory’. As such, maintenance of ‘risk literacy’ through access to risk information, 
collaborative learning and engagement should remain a key element in any 
resilience Framework.   
The study found risk ‘language’ to be a key influencer in the way that risks are 
communicated at the community level. The use of probabilistic language has, for 
example, given communities a false sense of security through technical terms such 
as 1-in-100 year chance of a flood. The findings of this thesis across the different 
regions reveals that such terminology encouraged certain community members to 
ignore residual risk and purchase properties based on their misinterpretation of the 
term. The use of percentages within a more relatable time period, such as a forty-
year mortgage term, may be a more appropriate means of risk communication. As 
such, this research identifies the need for greater investment in risk understanding 
to foster more resilient behaviour.  
9.3.2 Urban and rural resilience in practice 
 
A second key finding relates to how resilience presents itself differently at the urban 
and rural scale. It was found that a variety of factors influence urban and rural 
resilience levels, including economic capital, practicalities of small-scale 
communities, remote geographic location, socio-economic profile, government 
funding priorities and ‘volunteer fatigue’. Taking each point in turn, the research 
confirmed assumptions from Cutter et al (2016) that greater economic capital, 
typically found in urban areas, led to increased coping capacity relative to small 
businesses in rural areas. By contrast, limited access to excess resources, coupled 
with single sector economic dependence, proved a challenge for small businesses 
continuity in rural areas. Small business owners residing locally often had to 
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contend with the double hit of reconstruction works to their home and business, 
exacerbating their vulnerability.  
 
Second, by virtue of their smaller scale, coupled with a high degree of local 
knowledge and tight knit connections, rural communities were found to be more 
proficient at mobilising resources than their urban counterparts. This capacity was 
assisted/bolstered in part by village institutions such as the ‘Village hall’ or ‘Legions 
Club’ (Ballater, Glenridding), which served as spaces to develop mutual 
understanding, trust and the development of social capital.   
 
Third, it was found that rural communities demonstrated greater adaptive capacity, 
stemming from a perceived vulnerability as a consequence of their remote 
geographical location. Isolation from external resources prompted greater adaptive 
capacity in the form of self-organisation and flood responsibility. Further, 
prioritisation of urban areas, in terms of public funding for infrastructure, such as 
flood defences, represented a significant spur to action for rural communities. 
However, it must be noted that the culture of independence, self-reliance and 
occasional skepticism of authorities found among rural communities (particularly 
Glenridding), was also shown to have the potential to inhibit collaborative growth 
and the effectiveness of potential outside assistance.  
Fourth, the economic profile and age demographic of some rural communities 
helped to catalyse resilience action. It was found that rural communities in 
comparatively affluent areas (such as Keswick, Ballater), displayed comparatively 
higher levels of community participation than that of their urban counterparts. The 
resilience momentum was driven by the higher number of ‘young retirees’ who were 
active members of FAGs. By contrast, the absence of a community led-catalyst 
(such as a FAG) in urban areas was found to impede individuals from coming 
together. In particular, commercial areas with a low residential population were 
found to have lower cohesion levels than more established (often rural) residential 
communities. However, urban areas were found to demonstrate stronger 
institutional resilience by nature of reliance on local or public authorities. 
Unfortunately, the nature of this engagement was not reciprocal and did not extend 
to collaborative resilience building at the community level.  
Fifth, the prioritisation of Government funded ‘hard’ flood prevention measures was 
found to be higher in urban areas with higher populations and a greater 
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accumulation of assets. Counter intuitively, the prevalence of hard engineering 
measures in urban areas was found to limit the potential for FAGs to add ‘soft’ 
resilience value.  
The sixth and final point relates to the sustainability of FAGs and recovery 
volunteerism in general in rural areas. Instances of ‘volunteer fatigue’, where an 
over-reliance on the ‘usual suspects’ and ‘the same faces’, was found to be an 
issue. This highlights a perceived obligation on rural communities to participate in 
volunteerism, in order to ‘keep the community afloat’. This can, unfortunately, place 
community members in hazardous situations such as transporting flood evacuees in 
digger buckets or cutting post-flood debris with a chainsaw in dangerous weather 
conditions. In addition, ‘dry guilt’ was found to prompt engagement, placing a 
perceived onus on those who escaped flooding to assist with the recovery process 
within their community.  As such, the research finds that volunteer expectations and 
potentially high-risk situations are significant contributors to ‘volunteer fatigue’ and 
burn-out, affecting the long-term sustainability of community resilience participation 
in rural areas. 
 
Importantly, the research contributes empirical evidence to the nuances between 
how resilience presents itself at the urban and rural scale. Understanding the 
resilience drivers at both scales stands as an empirical foundation for better 
targeted, more efficient resilience interventions and wider resilience policy. As such, 
the findings highlight that the different fabrics of urban and rural communities need 
to be understood and reflected in resilience policy and strategies.  
 
9.3.3 A catchment-wide approach to planning and development 
 
The third key finding of the study highlights the need for development of a 
catchment wide approach to planning and development. In view of increased flood 
exposure across the UK, a shift in thinking was noted, acknowledging that no single 
strategy to prevent flooding existed. Similarly, practitioner level discourse across the 
case studies argued the need for a portfolio of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ solutions. Moving 
beyond traditional flood management practice (flood defences), the findings of the 
study shows that by promoting measures that work with the natural features and 
processes of the landscape helps to reduce risk at the local level. However, to date, 
a lack of empirical evidence has hindered wide-scale implementation of such 
measures. Whilst the thesis findings do not quantitatively test the benefit of this 
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‘softer’ approach to flood management, it is apparent that significant appetite for 
such measures exists with practitioners. Indeed the research findings substantiate 
the call for a holistic approach to integrated planning and development, thereby 
enabling flood risk stakeholders to emerge out of their silos to collaboratively 
explore a portfolio of solutions across the catchment. 
 
One critical barrier to this approach was found to be the community’s reluctance to 
shift from the ‘safety net’ of flood defences towards a holistic ‘softer’ catchment wide 
approach to FRM. The results indicate that building trust by strengthening 
relationships between communities and authorities offset much of this early 
sceptism and can stand as a critical first step towards acceptance of this approach. 
In this vein, Flood Action Groups (FAGs) prove a most effective conduit to build 
trust and shape mind-sets towards collaboratively embracing softer approaches to 
FRM. Despite these efforts, the research shows that awareness and testing of a 
portfolio of catchment wide approaches (natural flood management, ‘slowing the 
flow’, sustainable urban drainage (SuDs) and policy change) are in their infancy and 
require further development beyond ‘piecemeal’ pilot studies. More data on the 
benefits of these wider options would make for a more convincing argument and 
enhance collaboration in such efforts. It is anticipated that long-term catchment-
wide approaches have the potential to offer a more cost-effective means of reducing 
risk, which hold social and environmental benefits also. 
 
Planning enforcement was found to be a crucial element in a catchment wide 
approach to FRM. Practitioners identified the role of planning policy, and its 
corresponding control of land-use, as the most significant tool to effectively reduce 
flood risk. However, a conflict was noted between increasing demand for housing 
and the preventative approach advocated by authorities to building restrictions in 
floodplains. Acknowledgment that ‘flooding does not respect county borders’, calls 
for a break down of the existing siloed approach to planning communication. 
Ultimately, findings stemming from this research highlight that the absence of a 
joined up approach to planning and development, significantly attributed to 





9.3.4 ‘Learning’ as a driver of transformational resilience 
 
The fourth key finding highlights the role ‘learning’ plays in assisting communities to 
‘thrive’ rather than ‘survive’ in response to uncertain environments. Leverage of 
‘learning’ component indicators (analytical thinking; integrated planning and 
development; experimentation; knowledge feedback; and skills and training) 
demonstrated the potential for communities to advance beyond the mere 
reinstatement of the status quo towards an improved state ahead of future 
disasters. This thread highlighted the need for communities to modify their 
behaviour to accommodate new knowledge and transform themselves into a more 
sustainable trajectory ahead of the next adverse event. In particular, the ‘problem 
definition’ indicator illuminated the need for communities to self-diagnose through 
reflection upon their risk experience. Doing so enabled communities to re-orient 
resilience action to reflect lessons learned, marking a critical step towards resilience 
betterment.  
 
The case-studies undertaken in this research offered practical insight into how 
resilience groups or Flood Action Groups (FAGs) presented an effective conduit for 
innovation, knowledge feedback and up-skilling at the community level. Resilience 
groups empowered communities to cultivate their own knowledge through self-
reflection in collaboration with authorities. However, this process was not without its 
challenges. Bureaucracy constraints and inflexible governance mechanisms at the 
regional level were found to impede the learning capabilities at the local level. 
Constrained by budgets, resources and competing priorities, the transformational 
culture was not found to be as pervasive at the higher level. As such, this research 
promotes a ‘learning’ agenda that responds to uncertain adversity and promotes 
‘betterment’ through implementation of lessons learned.  
 
9.3.5 The role of social networks in disaster recovery   
 
The fifth key finding focuses on the ‘connectedness’ component of the Framework, 
revealing the valuable role of social capital in community disaster recovery. In 
particular, empirical Social Network Analysis (SNA) revealed that the synergistic 
capabilities of network ties (bonding, bridging and linking) were found to expedite a 
community’s recovery process through: information dissemination; self-organisation; 
and resource access.  
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SNA revealed that a strong cohesive foundation of bonding capital was found to be 
the first step towards the development of ‘connectedness’ interaction. The process 
of visually mapping networks illustrated that ‘Key brokers’ acted as a lynchpin for 
successful transition from horizontal bonding connections towards vertical bridging 
and linking (multi-scalar) interaction. The presence of resilience groups was found 
to be higher in communities with high bonding capital and a strong cohesive core. 
Such resilience groups acted as a platform to bridge connections and promote 
sustained multi-scalar interaction and provided community members with a stake in 
resilience initiatives, thus increasing interest as flood memory fades. However, 
strong bonding capital was not always found to have a positive relationship with 
resilience. Engagement with outside bridging and linking ties was shown to be a 
slow burn for the more densely networked communities. In particular, isolated rural 
communities showed reluctance to engage with outside support unless prior links 
were established through trusted ‘brokers’. As such, the research highlighted that 
low linking capital (Sections 7.6, 8.6) acted as an impediment to multi-scalar 
interaction and the attainment of ‘transformative’ resilience. Further, SNA 
highlighted that over-reliance on one source of capital, or indeed one ‘broker’, risks 
network collapse. Ultimately, the SNA evidence base suggests that effort needs to 
be targeted on the development of ‘key brokers’ or ‘Egos’ who establish trust with 
their community over time. Bridging this link between horizontal and vertical ties, 
helps to access greater resources, and paves the way for the successful 
implementation of transformative strategies.  
 
SNA also revealed the important role social media played in connecting 
communities. Mined data from social media platforms (Facebook and webpages), 
were imported into network visualization software (Gephi) to analyse network 
connections. The network maps revealed that ‘virtual’ social networks form an 
added layer of communication beyond the typical, top-down approach to formal 
communication in the post-disaster environment. In particular, it provided an 
alternative, timely means to connect communities, which felt that formal 
communication strategies were lacking. The SNA within this study clearly 
highlighted the ability of social media to efficiently disseminate information and 
match urgent need with capacities. However, the nature of their establishment 
leaves a question over the long-term sustainability of the connections. The 
transformation of this virtual group into a functional long-term community will require 
formalisation to ensure its sustainability when the catalyst for its establishment 
fades. In addition, concerns were raised over monitoring the reliability of data 
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through a designated administrator. These issues will need to be resolved before 
higher-level engagement from risk averse authorities is likely.  
 
Analysis of ‘virtual’ networks in Gephi revealed that social media has the ability to 
reach a wider audience than physical communities, particularly in dispersed rural 
communities. Reflecting findings from Chapter 3 that no community is homogenous, 
communication strategies should be tailored to the community for which it is 
intended. As such, social media should not be considered a panacea for recovery 
communication. Rather, it should be considered as an extra layer of resilience to 
complement existing, more formal communication strategies.  
 
The results from this study underscore the need to invest in the ‘social 
infrastructure’ of communities. A combination of resilience groups/FAGs and social 
media groups offer a suitable means to bridge local‐level needs and national‐level 
policymaking. In addition, social media has proven to offer a timely means of 
communication during disaster recovery, and should be recognised as a valuable 
complement to formal communication strategies. This thesis has illuminated how 
empowered, cohesive communities can enhance their transformative capacity 
through collaboration with higher-level ties, thus ensuring national policies echo 
local needs and priorities.  
 
9.4 Future research  
 
Building on this research, further areas for potential study have been identified. 
Firstly, wider application of the Framework would help to generate a database of 
consistent, empirically grounded resilience indicators, enabling greater comparison 
across communities. It is, however, critical that the Framework is implemented at 
the appropriate scale to ensure transparent, accurate data set. In this regard, the 
research found that low engagement in urban community resilience was partly 
attributable to the diffuse nature of boundaries in urban areas, making it difficult to 
identify an appropriate ‘community’ scale for collaborative resilience activity. For 
example, the suburb of Peterculter in Aberdeen, stands as an example of an 
administratively titled urban city, but whose façade masks a former village up until 
2006. Far removed from the cultural institutions of the city centre, Peterculter acted 
like a ‘village within a city’, owing in part to the residual ‘village’ institution of the 
‘Village Hall’ and ‘Cutter Mills Social Club’. Peterculter therefore represents a 
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cohesive ‘urban village’ within a city, where investment in community organisational 
structures at the urban scale, helped promote community engagement.  
 
The Framework can also serve as a scalable approach to resilience building which, 
with minor adaptation, has the potential to be applied across multiple hazards. To 
promote wider use of the Framework, the data could be augmented by the 
development of a user-friendly web platform to serve as central point to collect, 
store and share this indicator data. This evidence base could serve as a building 
block towards the development of resilience strategies relevant to different scales 
(local, regional, national) and contexts (urban, rural). In the long-term, embedding 
guidelines and best practices within the platform design could serve to strengthen 
the Framework.  
 
Secondly, the investigation shed light on the demand for resilience standards in the 
built environment. In particular, ‘property and accommodation’ (Indicator 13) 
highlighted a need for assistance and guidance on appropriate resilience 
approaches and measures. The research highlighted that current property level 
protection plans are reactive and do not meet the long-term demands of increasing 
risk. Existing studies on resilience standards are in their infancy and require further 
investment to advance from a situation of expert opinion to technical evidence. 
 
Cooperation from industry, including built environment professional bodies such as 
the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA), Institute of Civil Engineers (ICE), 
Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS), could strengthen the argument for 
increased investment in resilience standards. In the absence of resilient building 
guidance, the development of resilience building regulations and, in due course, 
broader guidance would benefit design professionals faced with renovating at-risk 
properties.  
 
The research identified current insurance processes as a barrier to resilience by 
discouraging mitigative action, such as property level protection. However, if the 
financial benefit of resilience standards is not calculated, then insurance companies 
are not in a position to incentivise clients through reduced premiums in exchange 
for meeting resilience standards. Clear articulation of monetary benefit attached to 
resilience standards could serve as a positive step towards acceptance of a 
standards agenda by insurance companies.  
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As such, this thesis highlights how improved resilience standards within the built 
environment, could act as a benchmark for ‘betterment’ ahead of future disasters. 
Such ‘resilience standards’ could vary in scale from certificates, building codes and 
resilient products at the household scale, towards wider benchmarking systems and 
resilience design guidelines to foster resilient communities. Going forward, parallels 
could be drawn from sustainability accreditation such as Building Research 
Establishment Environmental Assessment Method (BREEAM). Such resilience 
benchmarking structures could serve as a means of assessing, rating and certifying 
the resilience of buildings. The development of resilience standards, therefore, has 
the potential to foster a long-term, proactive approach to resilience ‘betterment’ in 
the built environment.   
Thirdly, it was found that more work is needed to further unpack the critical role of 
‘learning’ in enabling communities to transform into a more sustainable trajectory 
ahead of future disasters. Whilst this study and others (Kelman, 2016; Parsons et 
al, 2016) have added to the argument for investment in ‘learning’, little is known 
about the exact triggers that prompt communities to transition from a state of coping 
towards adaptation and eventual transformation.   
The investigation highlighted that the extent of learning undertaken by a community 
is closely linked to their ‘risk experience’ over time. However, the time constraints of 
a PhD study did not allow this research to be truly longitudinal. As such, the findings 
highlight the necessity for further investigation into ‘learning’ triggers that foster 
resilience building over longer periods of time. Specifically, research is needed to 
understand the triggers that drive change at the different scales.  
Finally, a fourth area of further research is the potential for social media to enhance 
recovery communication. Removing the constraints of time and geography, social 
media has been shown to have the potential to galvanise community networks. In 
addition to the preservation of existing ties, interaction through social media offers 
potential to forge new connections otherwise untapped by traditional communication 
strategies.  
Increased use of information technology and communication through for example, 
mobile phones, and tablets and PCs has surpassed the use of traditional media 
forms such as television and radio. Creation of online, wider communication 
channels, unrestricted by geographical boundaries, act as an added layer of 
‘connectedness’ to build more resilient communities. Going forward, failure to 
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leverage the potential of this rapidly developing communication medium could prove 
detrimental to the future of disaster communication. In particular, the research 
highlighted a lack of higher-level participation in social media. There is currently an 
absence of guidance on how to harness the potential of social media in a 
systematic, coordinated manner. The findings from this research, for example, 
highlight the reluctance of practitioners to engage with social media (which would 
benefit from further research). Going forward, the development of strategic 
guidelines for practitioners could help to encourage greater uptake of social media 
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Appendix 1: Existing Disaster databases 
 
As outlined in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3), three main electronic databases dominate 
the global disaster data coverage, namely; Sigma; NatCAtSERVICE; and CRED 
(Table 4.12). The ‘Sigma’ database, which covers both man-made and natural 
catastrophe losses, was established in 1970 by reinsurer Swiss Re. Munich Re’s 
NatCatSERVICE was established closely after in 1974, seeking to build on earlier 
disaster loss databases. Its focus lies on natural disasters (Munich Re, 2003), with 
historical data going back to the eruption of Mount Vesuvious in AD 79. The Centre 
for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at Louvain University in 
Belgium is potentially the most recognised database, dominating the literature. EM-
Dat developed its Emergency Events Database in 1988 with the backing of the 
World Health Organisation (WHO) and the Belgian Government (CRED 2010). At a 
Europe-wide level, several initiatives have or are currently being developed to meet 
the standardisation of the disaster data gap. However, attempts to systemise data 
from organisations, such as various European Commission co-funded projects are 
still in their infancy.  
 
The standardised entry criteria and methodologies used by the above databases 
only allow for comparison at a global and national level. However, the information 
available for disaster impacts at lower, sub-national level or for smaller scale 
disasters is not detailed enough to enable comparison at this level. Given that the 
thesis is located at the community level, these databases are not useful for 
informing disaster indicators for the purposes of this research. As such, in line with 
the selection of indicators approach taken by Cutter et al (2008), the research 
identifies resilience variables already existing within framework literature.   
 
Table 1.1 Overview of existing disaster databases globally. 
 
Database  Organisation Created  Geographic coverage 
Global    
EM-DAT CRED 1500-present Global 
Disaster Inventory System UNISDR. 1994-present Global (partial) 
SIGMA SwissRe 1970-present Global 
GFDRR Global DL- DAT World Bank 1972-present Global 
Global-disaster specific    
Global Active Archive of 
Large Flood Events 
DFO 1985-present Global 
Significant earthquake 
database 








Europe    
EFIS European Forest 











1800-2010 Austria, Slovenia, Italian 
Alps, Bavarian Alps, Swiss 
Alps. 











































































Appendix 2: List of asset/resource variables for the three case-studies 
 
2.1  Example of individual variables in the context of Northern Ireland. 
 
Phase 1 variables selected for the three case-studies (Northern Ireland; Cumbria and North 
East Scotland). Variance in data sources used are highlighted in bold.  
 
Table 2.1 Example of individual variables in the context of Northern Ireland. 
Community Asset: Variable Data source 
1. Physical resource   
Exposure Flood risk from rivers AEP44 Rivers Agency historical 
flood zones (DfI)*1 
 Flood risk from surface water AEP  Rivers Agency historical 
flood zones (DfI) *1 
 Tidal flood risk AEP  Rivers Agency historical 
flood zones (DfI) *1 
Access to services Proximity to services score  Income: Multiple Deprivation 
Measure 2017.*2 
 % of people working further than 30k 
from home 
UK Census, 2011 *3 
 
Community Asset: Variable Data source 
2. Environmental resource 
Environmental 
exposure 
Shortfall of playing pitches Sport Northern Ireland’s 
(SNI) *4 
 No. of public parks in 1 mile radius Belfast city council/ 
Fermanagh and Omagh 
District Council *5 
 Living Environment domain  Environment: Model- Multiple 
Deprivation Measure 2017 *2 
 
Community Asset: Variable Data source 
3.Economic resource 
Livelihood stability % of working age that is employed Census 2011  
 
 % unemployed Census 2011 /Labour market 
report 2017. (NISRA - 
Economic and Labour 
Market Statistics)  
 
Income Income Deprivation domain  Multiple Deprivation Measure 
2017 *2 
                                                
44 Annual exceedance probability (AEP), where 1:30 is a 3.3 % of flooding in any one year. 
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 Employment 
Deprivation domain  
Multiple Deprivation Measure 
2017 *2 
Tenure % households owner occupier Census 2011  
 
 
Community Asset: Variable Data source 
4. Human resource 
Community capacity % of population over the age of 65 UK Census 2011  
 % of population <15 UK Census 2011  
 % of population stated general health 
was good or very good 
UK Census 2011  
Equity % of college degree or higher ((Level 4 
or above) 
UK Census 2011 
 % of population with no or low 
qualifications (L1) 
UK Census 2011  
 Education, skills and training rank  Multiple Deprivation Measure 
2017 *2 
Social capital Crime and disorder rank  Multiple Deprivation Measure 
2017 *2 
 % voter participation in last election   Elections NI (2017) *6 
Local knowledge % from outside the area  UK Census 2011 
 
 
Table 2.1b Variable data sources, Northern Ireland. 
# Variable data set 
1. Rivers Agency historical flood zones (DfI). https://dfi-
ni.maps.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=fd6c0a01b07840269a50a2f596b3daf
6 (Accessed on 01.01.18) 
2. Northern Ireland Multiple Deprivation Measure 2017, LSOA Level, Office of National 
Statistics. 
http://www.ninis2.nisra.gov.uk/InteractiveMaps/Deprivation/Deprivation%202017/SOA_Depriv
ation_Map/atlas.html (Accessed on 01.01.18) 
3. UK Census data (2011). Northern Ireland Statistics and Research agency. 
https://www.nisra.gov.uk/statistics/census/2011-census  (Accessed on 01.01.18) 
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4. Sport Northern Ireland’s (SNI), Active Places Report (2009). 
http://www.sportni.net/facilities/develop-a-sports-facility/does-my-area-need-a-new-sports-
facility/  (Accessed on 01.01.18) 
5. Belfast city council, Fermanagh and Omagh District Council. 
http://www.belfastcity.gov.uk/leisure/parks-openspaces/parksAtoZ.aspx. (Accessed on 
01.01.18) 









Variable Data source 
1. Physical resource 
 Flood risk from rivers or the sea *2 Environment Agency, Long-
term flood risk maps 
 Flood risk from surface water *2 Environment Agency, Long-
term flood risk maps 
 Flood risk from reservoirs *2 Environment Agency, Long-
term flood risk maps 
Access to 
services 
Barriers to housing and services rank *3 Income: Multiple Deprivation 
Measure 2011.*4 




Variable Data source 
2. Environmental resource 
Environmental 
exposure 
Number of public parks per 1 mile radius Cumbria County Council *5 





Variable Data source 
3. Economic resource 
Livelihood 
stability 
% of working age that is economically active UK Census 2011  
 
 % population unemployed UK Census 2011  
 
 Employment Rank*3 English Indices of 
Deprivation 2015. 
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 Income rank*3 English Indices of 
Deprivation 2015. 





Variable Data source 
4. Human resource 
Community 
capacity 
% of population over the age of 65 UK Census 2011  
% of population <15 UK Census 2011  
% of population stated general health was 
‘good’ or ‘very good’ 
UK Census 2011  
Health deprivation and disability rank *3 English Indices of 
Deprivation 2015. 
Equity % of college degree or higher (Level 4 or 
above) 
UK Census 2011 
% of population with no qualifications  UK Census 2011  
Education, skills and training rank *3 English Indices of 
Deprivation 2015. 
Social capital Crime rank *3 English Indices of 
Deprivation 2015. 




% from outside the area  UK Census 2011 
Table 2.2b Variable data sources, Cumbria. 
# Variable data set 
1. Environment Agency, historical flood zone maps. http://apps.environment-
agency.gov.uk/wiyby/151367.aspx  (Accessed on 01.01.18) 
2. English Indices of Deprivation 2015, LSOA Level, Office of National Statistics. 
http://dclgapps.communities.gov.uk/imd/idmap.html (Accessed on 01.01.18) 
3.  UK Census data (2011). UK data service Census. http://www.ukcensusdata.com/england-
e92000001#sthash.LyekO134.dpbs  (Accessed on 01.01.18) 
4. Cumbria County Council, Parks and Green Space. 
http://www.cumbria.gov.uk/az.asp?filter=P (Accessed on 01.01.18). 
5. UK Electoral Commission https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/our-work/our-
research/electoral-data (Accessed on 01.01.18) 
 
 
Table 2.3 Example of individual variables in the context of North East Scotland. 
Community Asset: Variable Data source 
1.Physical resource 
 Number of properties exposed to 
river flooding return period: 1 in 100 
SEPA Potentially Vulnerable 
Areas NFRA *1 
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year  
 Number of properties exposed to 
surface water flooding return period: 
1 in 100 year  
SEPA Potentially Vulnerable 
Areas NFRA *1 
Number of properties exposed to 
coastal water flooding return period: 
1 in 100 year  
SEPA Potentially Vulnerable 
Areas NFRA *1 
SEPA Flood Priority SEPA Potentially Vulnerable 
Areas NFRA*1 
Access to services Geographic access to services Scottish index of Multiple 
Deprivation 2016 *2 
 
Community Asset: Variable Data source 
2. Environmental resource 
Environmental 
exposure 




Land cover map Scotland-% urban 
land cover 
Eunis Land Cover map 
Scotland  *4 
 
Community Asset: Variable Data source 
3.economic resource 
Livelihood stability % of working age that is economically 
active 
Scotland’s Census 2011 *5 
 
% economically inactive  Scotland’s Census 2011  
 
Income domain rank Multiple Deprivation Measure 
2015 *2 
Employment domain rank Multiple Deprivation Measure 
2015 *2 
Tenure % renting Scotland’s Census 2011  
 
% households owner occupier Scotland’s Census 2011  
 
 
Community Asset: Variable Data source 
4. Human resource   
 
Community capacity 
% of population over the age of 65 Scottish Census 2011 
% of population <16 Scottish Census 2011 
% of population stated general health 
was good 
Scottish Census 2011 




% of college degree or higher (Level 4 
or above) 
Scottish Census 2011 
% of population with no or low 
qualifications (L1) 
Scottish Census 2011 
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Education, skills and training 
domain rank  
Multiple Deprivation Measure 
2016 *2 
Social capital Crime domain rank  Multiple Deprivation Measure 
2016 *2 
% pensioner households Scottish Census 2011  
% voter participation in last election  Aberdeenshire County 
Council (2017) *6 
Local knowledge % from outside the area  Scottish Census 2011 
 
 
Table 2.3b. Variable data sources, North East Scotland. 
# Variable data set 
1
. 
Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA), Potentially Vulnerable Areas NFRA *1. 




Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation 2016. http://simd.scot/2016/#/simd2016/BTTTFTT/9/-
4.0000/55.9000/(Accessed on 01.01.18) 
3
. 
Aberdeenshire Council  open Space Audit. https://www.aberdeenshire.gov.uk/communities-and-
events/parks-and-open-spaces/open-space-strategy-audit/ 





























2.2  Northern Ireland worked example, village scale.  
 




Variable Fintona Data source 
3. Economic resource 
Livelihood 
stability 
% of working age that is 
employed 
0.6 Census 2011  
 
% unemployed 0.2 Census 2011 /Labour market 
report 2017. (NISRA - Economic 
and Labour Market Statistics)  
 
Income Income Deprivation 
domain *4 
0.1 Multiple Deprivation Measure 
2017 *4 
Employment 
Deprivation domain *4 
0.1 Multiple Deprivation Measure 
2017 *4 

















Variable Assumption Data 
source 
East Belfast 
3. Economic resource 
Livlihood 
stability 
% of working age that 
is employed 
The higher the % of 








Table KS402NI of the NI Census 2011 found that 61% of all residents in Fintona ‘owned’ 
their property, either outright or through a mortgage or loan.  






Min: Minimum value of the given attribute. Min is 0 
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Max: Maximum value of the given attribute. Max is 100 




Once applied the formula yields a result of 0.61, rounded off to 0.6, which remains 






Variable Assumption Data 
source 
East Belfast 
3. Economic resource 
Livlihood 
stability 
% of working age that 
is unemployed 
The higher the % of 
population that is 
unemployed the lower 
the economic 
resource. (This 






According to the Census (2011), the % that never worked/ long term unemployed 
(Economic Activity - KS601NI) was found to be 6.3%. The highest unemployment 
rate in northern Ireland was found to be 7.53% (max) and the minimum was found 
to be 3.2% (min). 
 




Min: Minimum value of the given attribute. Min is 3.26 
Max: Maximum value of the given attribute. Max is 7.53 
V: V is the respective value of attribute. V=6.3% 
newMax: 1 
newMin: 0 
Once applied the formula yields a result of 0.83, rounded off to 0.8. However, when 
reverse percentage is applied (i.e low unemployment equates to high resilience)  






Variable Assumption Data source East Belfast 
3. Economic resource 
Income Income Deprivation 
domain 
The higher the 
income domain rank, 









The Income Deprivation domain forms one of the seven domains of deprivation. 
The indicator assesses the proportion of the population living in households with 
incomes below 60 per cent of the NI median (NIMDM, 2017).  The indicators range 
from 1 (most deprived) to 890 (least deprived) (NIMDM, 2017). The rank for the 
Fintona area (95YY11W1) was found to be 99. 





Min: Minimum value of the given attribute. Min is 0 
Max: Maximum value of the given attribute. Max is 890 
V: V is the respective value of attribute. V=99 
newMax: 1 
newMin: 0 







Variable Assumption Data source East Belfast 
3. Economic resource 
Income Employment 
Deprivation domain 
The higher the 
Employment domain 









The Employment Deprivation domain forms one of the seven domains of 
deprivation. The indicator assesses the proportion of the population living in 
households with incomes below 60 per cent of the NI median (NIMDM, 2017).  The 
indicators range from 1 (most deprived) to 890 (least deprived) (NIMDM, 2017). The 
rank for the Fintona area (95YY11W1) was found to be 126. 






Min: Minimum value of the given attribute. Min is 0 
Max: Maximum value of the given attribute. Max is 890 
V: V is the respective value of attribute. V=99 
newMax: 1 
newMin: 0 






Variable Assumption Data source East Belfast 
3. Economic resource 
Tenure % households owner 
occupier 
The higher the % of 
home ownership the 








The final variable in the Economic resource, assesses the % of households owner occupier. 










Min: Minimum value of the given attribute. Min is 0 
Max: Maximum value of the given attribute. Max is 100 
V: V is the respective value of attribute. V=63.78 
newMax: 1 
newMin: 0 














2.3 Cumbria worked example, town scale. 
 




Variable Kendal Data Source 
4. Human resource 
Community 
capacity 
% of population over the age of 65 0.3 
 
UK Census 2011  
 % of population <15 0.9 
 
UK Census 2011  
 % of population stated general 
health was ‘good’ or ‘very good’ 
0.8 
 
UK Census 2011  
 Health deprivation and 
disability rank *3 
0.8 
 
English Indices of Deprivation 
2015. 
Equity % of college degree or higher 
(Level 4 or above) 
0.9 
 
UK Census 2011 




UK Census 2011  




English Indices of Deprivation 
2015. 
Social capital Crime rank *3 0.6 
 
English Indices of Deprivation 
2015. 








% from outside the area  0.9 
 








Variable Assumption Data source Kendal 
town 
1. Human resource 
Community 
capacity 
% of population over 
the age of 65 
The higher the population 
over 65, the potentially 








The highest % population above the age of 65 in the UK stands at 28.05% (Sussex County 
council, 2011). The UK Census 2011 found that 19.7% of residents in Kendal were above 
the age of 65. 





Min: Minimum value of the given attribute. Min is 0 
Max: Maximum value of the given attribute. Max is 28.05 









Variable Assumption Data source Kendal town 
1. Human resource 
Community 
capacity 
% of population <15 Young, active and healthy 
communities are 
characteristics associated 
with resilient communities. 
Access to a vehicle further 





The UK Census 2011 found that 17.2% of residents in Kendal were under the age of 15. 
The maximum percentage of population under 15 across England was found to be 19%.  





Min: Minimum value of the given attribute. Min is 0 
Max: Maximum value of the given attribute. Max is 19 










Variable Assumption Data 
source 
Kendal town 
1. Human resource 
Community 
capacity 
% of population with 
‘very good’ or ‘good’ 
health. 
Young, active and healthy 
communities are 
characteristics associated 






According to the UK Census (2011), 82.2% of the Kendal population had ‘very 
good’ or ‘good’ health.   
 





Min: Minimum value of the given attribute. Min is 0 
Max: Maximum value of the given attribute. Max is 100 









Variable Assumption Data 
source 
Kendal town 




and disability rank  
Young, active and healthy 
communities are 
characteristics associated 






According to the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD, 2015) Kendal (South Lakeland 













Min: Minimum value of the given attribute. Min is 0 
Max: Maximum value of the given attribute. Max is 32844 









Variable Assumption Data 
source 
Kendal town 
1. Human resource 
Community 
capacity 
% of college degree 
or higher (Level 4 or 
above) 
Knowledge and skills enable 







According to the UK Census (2011) 29.1% of the population have a Level 4 or 
above qualification. The highest percentage of Level 4 and above qualifications 
across England was found to be 43.9% (max) (Census, 2011) 
 





Min: Minimum value of the given attribute. Min is 0 
Max: Maximum value of the given attribute. Max is 43.9% 













Variable Assumption Data 
source 
Kendal town 
1. Human resource 
Community 
capacity 
% of population with 
no qualifications  
Knowledge and skills enable 







According to the UK Census (2011) 21% of the population have no or low Level 1 
qualifications. The highest % of unqualified residents across England was found to 
be 37.23. 
 





Min: Minimum value of the given attribute. Min is 0 
Max: Maximum value of the given attribute. Max is 37.23 









Variable Assumption Data 
source 
Kendal town 




and training rank  
Knowledge and skills enable 







According to the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD, 2015) Kendal (South Lakeland 
003C) ranks 23,411 out of 32844 LSOA’s in terms of health deprivation and 
disability.  
 






Min: Minimum value of the given attribute. Min is 0 
Max: Maximum value of the given attribute. Max is 32844 








Variable Assumption Data 
source 
Kendal town 





Social capital is evidenced to 
produce synergistic 
resilience action. This is 
referred to in the literature as 
the ‘social infrastructure’ 









According to the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD, 2015) Kendal (South Lakeland 
003C) ranks 19,863 out of 32844 LSOA’s in terms of crime and disorder rank.  
 





Min: Minimum value of the given attribute. Min is 0 
Max: Maximum value of the given attribute. Max is 32844 











Variable Assumption Data 
source 
Kendal town 





last election   
High voting rate is indicative 
of a tight-knit community, 
willing to work collaboratively 







According to a Hansard Society report (2015) the lowest % of recorded voters 
nationally was 12% and the highest percentage was 76.9%. Kendal had a voting 
turnout of 39.7%.  
 





Min: Minimum value of the given attribute. Min is 12 
Max: Maximum value of the given attribute. Max is 76.9 









Variable Assumption Data 
source 
Kendal town 
1. Human resource 
Local 
knowledge 
% from outside the 
area 







According the census (2011), only 1.6% of all Kendal residents are from outside the 
area compared to 13% nationally.  
 






Min: Minimum value of the given attribute. Min is 0 
Max: Maximum value of the given attribute. Max is 13 




Once applied the formula yields a result of 0.12, rounded off to 0.1 and inverts to 
0.9. 
 




Variable Assumption Data source Ballater 
1. Physical asset 
Exposure River flooding return period: 
1 in 100 year *1 
The higher the 
number of properties 







 Surface water return period 
1 in 100 year 
The higher the 
number of properties 







 Coastal flood return period 1 
in 100 years *1 
The higher the 
number of properties 







 SEPA Flood Priority The higher the 








Housing Housing domain rank *2 This variable 
represents the sum 
of people in 
households that are 
overcrowded or 
have no central 
heating. Such 
conditions are 
assumed to impede 
relocation and 
subsequent 
recovery after a 
flood. 







% of people working further 
than 30k from home 
The higher the 
number of people 
travelling long 
distances to place of 
work or study, the 












                                                
45 Score (0 least resilient, 1 most resilient)  
 468 










Min: Minimum value of the given attribute.  
Max: Maximum value of the given attribute.  
V: V is the respective value of attribute.  
newMax: 1 
newMin: 0 
By means of explanation, this section will outline the long-hand process of 
normalization and aggregation of data for the ‘Physical’ community asset, as shown 










    
Exposure Number of properties 
exposed to river flooding 
return period: 1 in 100 year 
*1 
The higher the number 
of properties at risk, the 








Flood exposure is represented by the percentage of properties that are potentially 
affected by flooding within each community. This was deemed more representative 
than the proportion of the land surface of the community potentially affected by 
coastal or fluvial flooding. For example, a community may have a large land area, 
potentially affected by flooding, but this land area may not be associated with 
housing. 
All case studies were chosen as they are affected by flooding and, as such they all 
lie within Potentially Vulnerable Areas (PVA) as part of the National Flood Risk 
Assessment carried out by SEPA. The number of properties at risk within each PVA 
 469 
area were obtained from the NFRA as outlined by SEPA46. This figure includes both 
residential and commercial properties. 
The ‘max’ number (960) was derived from the total population within the PVA. Of 
this max figure, 237 of the properties are at risk from flooding.   
Applying the formula:  
 
 
Min: Minimum value of the given attribute. Min is 0 
Max: Maximum value of the given attribute. Max is 960 




After application the results yield a figure of 0.24 rounded down to 0.2. However, the 
lower the figure (%), the higher the resilience. This meant that the figure had to be 










    
Exposure Surface water return period 
1 in 100 year 
The higher the number 
of properties at risk, the 








Of the 960 properties in Ballater, 3 (1% of all flooding) are at risk from flooding as 
outlined by SEPA on their flood maps and stated by SEPA in the PVA areas47. 
Applying the formula:  
 
 
Min: Minimum value of the given attribute. Min is 0 
Max: Maximum value of the given attribute. Max is 960 
V: V is the respective value of attribute. V=3 
newMax: 1 
newMin: 0 





After application the results yield a figure of 0.03 rounded down to 0. However, as 
with the previous example, the figure then needed to be inverted, giving Ballater a 










    
Exposure Coastal flood return period 1 
in 100 years *1 
The higher the number 
of properties at risk, the 








Ballater community lies inland and, as such, applying a score to this variable would 
artificially inflate the resilience of the area. 
Variable 4  
Community 
Asset: 




1. Physical asset 
Exposure Potentially vulnerable area 
(PVA) priority rank.  
The higher the priority 









This variable refers to areas which are acknowledged to be at a significant risk of 
flooding now or is likely to flood in the future. Ballater is ranked 90 out of 168 PVA 
nationally (North East Local Plan District, 2016).  
Applying the formula:  
 
Min: Minimum value of the given attribute. Min is 0 
Max: Maximum value of the given attribute. Max is 168 




Once applied the formula yields a result of 0.53, rounded off to 0.5, which remains 















    
Housing Housing domain rank *2 This variable represents 
the sum of people in 
households that are 
overcrowded or have no 
central heating. Such 
conditions are assumed 
to impede relocation and 
subsequent recovery 








This variable is drawn from the housing indices of deprivation. The indices rank 
each datazone from 1 being most deprived to 6,505 being least deprived. The 
domain score is a simple percentage, drawn from the Scottish Index of Multiple 
Deprivation (SIMD)48 housing rank. Ballater is represented by the two data zones: 
(S01006789) and (S01006790) as shown in Figure 8.1 below. Their housing domain 
ratings of 3731 and  2500.5 had a combined average of 3115 (3731+2500.5 ÷2= 
3115).  
 
Figure 8.1. The two data zones representing Ballater. Source:SIMD, 2016. 
 
Applying the formula:  





Min: Minimum value of the given attribute. Min is 0 
Max: Maximum value of the given attribute. Max is 6,505 




Applying this information to the equation, the results were found to be 0.47 which 
was rounded up to 0.5. 
Variable 6  
Community 
Asset: 






    
Physical 
access 
% of people working further 
than 30k from home 
The higher the number 
of people travelling long 
distances to place of 
work or study, the more 
vulnerable the 






Drawn from the Scottish census (2011 Output area: LC7402SC), the figure for the 
output area are presented below.  
 
Table 8.2. Census data areas for Ballater. 
 
Ballater (2011 output area) All people aged 16 to 74 in 
households in employment 
Number of people who travel 30km 
or more to work 
S00091444 35 14 
S00091543 49 8 
S00091544 38 13 
S00092448 80 20 
S00092634 51 15 
S00092633 30 6 
S00091541 76 13 
S00092925 78 15 










































Appendix 3: Secondary and observational data sources 
3.1 Secondary data sources 
 
List of secondary data material utilised in relation to the selected case study area of 








2. North Eastern Flood Risk Management Plan, 
Available at: https:// www.infrastructure-
ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/dard/north- 
eastern-frmp.PDF (accessed 30.11.17). 
 
DARD 2015 
3. Planning Policy Statement 15 (PPS 15) DOE 2014 
4. Sustainable Water: A Long Term Water Strategy for 
Northern Ireland Part 3: Flood Risk Management 
and Drainage,  
DRD 2014 
5. Review of Response to Flooding on 27th and 28th 
June 2012. 
PEDU 2012 
6. Preliminary flood risk assessment and methodology 
for the identification of significant flood risk areas. 
Rivers Agency 2011 
7. Floods Directive – Local Flood Forums – Terms of 




8. Draft Belfast Metropolitan Area Plan (BMAP) 2015: 
Technical Supplement Volume 1: Population and 
Housing,  
DOE 2004 
Documentary analysis: England 
 
1. Managing flood and coastal erosion risks in England. Environment Agency 2016 
2. Managing flood and coastal erosion risks in England.  Environment Agency 2016 
3. Delivery benefits through evidence: Issues and 
options concerning FRCM volunteering 
Environment Agency 2015 
4. Public dialogues on flood risk communication  Environment Agency 2015 
5. Quantifying the benefits of flood risk  management 
actions and advice  
Environment Agency 2015 
6. Quantifying the benefits of Flood and Coastal 
Erosion Risk Management Stakeholder and 
community engagement and modeling, mapping and 
data 
Environment Agency 2015 
7. Flood Risk Management Plans: what they are and 
who’s responsible for them 
Environment Agency 2014 
8. Understanding the risks, empowering communities, 
building resilience: the national flood and coastal 
erosion risk management strategy for England 
Environment Agency 2011 
9. Flooding in England:  A National Assessment of 
Flood Risk 
Environment Agency 2009 
10. Synthesis of flood social science evidence for policy 
decision and delivery improvement  
DEFRA 2014 
11. The National Flood Emergency  
Framework for England  
DEFRA 2014  
 
12. Community and Public Participation: Risk 
Communication and Improving Decision Making in 
Flood and Coastal Defence  
DEFRA 2007  
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13. Flood Resilience Community Pathfinder Evaluation  
Final Evaluation Report  
DEFRA 2015 
14. Flooding in England: Lead Government Department 
Plan  
DEFRA 2013 
15. Obtaining flood insurance in high risk areas  DEFRA  
16. Flood Resilience Community Pathfinder Evaluation 
Rapid Evidence Assessment  
DEFRA 2014  
 
17. Making space for water. Developing a new 
Government strategy for flood  and coastal erosion 
risk management in England  
DEFRA 2010  
 
18. Community Flood Risk Management: Improving 
effectiveness and efficiency: Early Lessons from the 
Flood Resilience Community Pathfinders  
 
National Flood Forum 
(NFF) 
2015 
Documentary analysis: Scotland 
 
1. Flood Risk Management Plans. Aberdeenshire Council 2016 
2. The river basin management plan for the Scotland 
river basin district: 2015 – 2027 
 
SEPA 2015 




4. Scotland’s National Flood Risk Assessment SEPA 2011 
5. Scottish Planning Policy (SPP). Scottish Executive 2014 
6. Surface Water Management Planning Guidance. Scottish Government 2013 
7. Delivering Sustainable Flood Risk Management – 
Principles of Appraisal: a policy statement. 
Scottish Government 2011 
8. The Flood Risk Management (Scotland) Act 2009: 
Delivering Sustainable Flood Risk Management. 
Scottish Government 2011 
9. The Flood Risk Management (Scotland) Act 2009. Scottish Government 2011 
10. Flood Risk Management Planning in Scotland: 
Arrangements for 2012 – 2016  
 
Scottish Government 2012 
11. Final Report of the National Technical Advisory 
Group on Flooding. 
Scottish Executive 2005 
12. Planning Advice Note 69: Planning and building 
standards advice on flooding.  
 









3.2 Observational data sources 
Observation events attended by the researcher 
 
Date Observation Type Location 
5/7/16-
12/7/16 
Community Flood meetings in Cumbria (x7) held by 
the Lead Local Flood Authority and the Environment 
Agency. 
Kendal (x2), Glenridding, Shap, 
Eamont Bridge, Carlisle. 
7/07/16 North West Regional Flood Conference Kendal, Cumbria 
30/06/16 Floods 2017, Institute of Civil Engineers. London 
02/06/16 RTPI Ireland, Flood Risk in Planning Conference.  Limerick, Ireland 
18/05/16 Resilience 2017, conference.  Cardiff, Wales. 
30-
31/06/16 
Facing the Future, resilience conference. CECHR.  Aberdeen, Scotland. 
18/10/16 Sustainable Urban Drainage, Workshop. Institute of 
Civil Engineers, Northern Ireland. 
Belfast, Northern Ireland. 
09/01/17 Community resilience in Urban Areas, Conference. 
Red Cross, Northern Ireland. 
Belfast, Northern Ireland. 
09/01/17 Flood Review on Northern Ireland. Institute of Civil 
Engineers, Northern Ireland. 































Appendix 4: Analysis of Social Network data 
 
4.1 SNA as applied in the thesis 
 
The following descriptive values and measures were undertaken as part of SNA 
across the three case-studies.Network density or ‘modularity’ is a measure of 
network structure that determines the connectedness of a network. Dense networks 
are indicative of communities that can easily self-organise, collaborate and transfer 
information efficiently (Nakagawa and Shaw, 2004). Gephi assisted this analysis by 
calculating degree distribution for each network. The analysis was achieved by 
analysing the ratio of existing ties against to the total number of potential ties within 
a network (O’Malley and Marsden, 2008).  
Modularity measures adopted Blondel’s algorithm (2008) to calculate network 
density or “strength of division of a network into modules” (Xiaonan Ji et al, 2015).  
Networks with dense connections between actors are indicative of high modularity. 
The choice to use Blondel’s algorithm was attributed to four key reasons. It is easy 
to implement and has the capacity to handle and compute large dense networks 
(Blondel, 2008). Further, it has been applied and tested successfully in numerous 
SNA studies (Lancichinetti et al, 2008) and it is supported by the Gephi platform.  
With network density established, attention turned to assessing network centrality, 
to determine the most influential actors within a network. Centrality is cited as being 
an indicator of the “structural power” of a network (O’Malley and Marsden, 2008). 
Centrality was calculated by ‘betweenness centrality’, 49 ‘degree centrality’50  and 
‘degree distribution’51 measures. The first centrality calculation sough to determine 
the number of direct connections or nodes an actor has within a network. Freeman 
(1979) refers to this as an actors ’degree’. ‘Degree distribution’ charts were used to 
illustrate frequency distribution of actors in numerical degrees. Analysis of degree 
distribution reveals variances of connectedness levels across network actors. For 
example, actors with higher ‘degree’ are often associated with having greater 
influence within a network (Snijders 1981). Further, knowledge of high network 
density may also be indicative of a ‘closed’ network which is reluctant to accept 
outside help or new ideas, essential for transformation (Granovetter, 1983).  
                                                
49 Betweenness centrality measures the number of connections an actors connects with others who normally would 
not be part of his network (McCann et al, 2016). .   
50 Degree centrality calculates the number of links an actor has within the network. 
51 Degree distribution refers to the probability distribution of potential ties ‘degrees’ across a network. 
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Betweenness centrality is based on the number of times a node acts as a 
‘gatekeeper’ on the shortest path between other nodes within the networked 
analysis (if that node was not there then the transfer of information and resources 
would cease at that node). It is the metric used to convert this concept of the 
shortest path influencing centrality (most important node in a network) and 
converting it into a calculated score which represents the percentage of shortest 
paths that include a given node. Once all the shortest paths are calculated for each 
node they are aggregated and the betweenness centrality score produced. 
Betweenness centrality informs which actors are most influential can be useful in 
assessing which nodes are central with respect to spreading information and 
influencing others in their immediate community.  
Degree centrality is a less complex calculation, measuring the number of 
connections or ties an actor has within a network. It serves to identify how many 
direct, ‘one hop’ connections each node has to other nodes within the network. 
Within the case-studies this is used to identify very connected individuals, who are 
critical to the operationalisation of resource distribution (for example the Chair of the 
Flood Resilience Group, community champions). These key individuals or 
organisations are likely to hold most information or influence on individuals who can 
quickly connect with the wider network. By means of explanation Figure 4.1 serves 
as an example to highlight ‘R’ has the highest Degree score with 9 direct 
connections. 
 
Figure 4.1 Illustrated example of Betweenness and Degree Centrality. 
 
Once betweenness centrality and degree centrality had been calculated, key actors 
could be identified based on their scoring in the aforementioned tests. Ego-centric 
analysis followed in order to ascertain how key figures (those with high levels of 
betweenness and degree centrality), influenced relations within the network. These 
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‘key actors’ were chosen to highlight the extent of their influence through (either 
directly or indirectly) connection with the community and how they assist the access 
and mobilisation of resources and assistance. For example, Figure 4.2 illustrates 
the extent of connectedness and influence (or lack thereof) of a key node (actor) 
across the network. The map legend lists the source of the connection and is 
indicative of the nature of the assistance or resource. Further, by way of percentage 
calculations the legend highlights source hierarchy across the network. The network 
visualisation map serves to highlight how a key actor connects and interacts with a 
diversity of flood stakeholders, both formal and informal, to access and mobilise 
resources.  
Figure 4.2 Example of Gephi social network visualisation of “Inverurie Support Group”.  
Visual representation using Force Atlas algorithm.  
In addition to the network structure calculations described above, a K-core filter was 
applied in Gephi. K-core analyses cohesiveness of the overall network structure, by 
calculating the maximum number of actors who are connected to a particular actor 
(k). The K-core filter in Gephi prunes all nodes (and respective edges) which have 
of connectedness K-core of -2 (Seidman, 1983; Bollobas and Thomason, 1985). 
Maps with limited ‘pruning’ are indicative of higher cohesiveness and less structural 
holes. Such networks are more stable and less likely to experience system collapse 
(Tierney et al, 2001).  
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4.2 Cumbrian SNA graphs 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Gephi visualisation of average distribution measure 1.709. North East Kendal 
Flood Action Group. 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Gephi visualisation of modularity distribution measure 0.47. North East Kendal 
Flood Action Group.52 
 
                                                
52 Algorithm; Vincent D Blondel, Jean-Loup Guillaume, Renaud Lambiotte, Etienne Lefebvre, Fast unfolding of 
communities in large networks, in Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment 2008 (10), P1000. 
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4.3 Barriers and drivers to multi-scalar engagement 
 
The analysis above further affirms that communities possessing multi-scalar 
relationship ties (bonding, bridging, linking) (Putman, 2000; emBRACE,2015b) are 
likely to be more adaptable along the continuum of resilience (cope, adapt, 
transform). The section outlined the integral role ‘linking social capital’ plays in 
facilitating the mobilisation of resources and capacities necessary for transformative 
resilience. Despite this, linking ties were found to be the least used of the multi-
scalar ties. In view of the unrealised potential of this relationship tie, it was 
necessary to explore the barriers and drivers toward effective practice of this tie. 
Respondents were asked if they received any formal assistance (e.g. Statutory 
agencies, Government) during the recovery period. Responses illuminated both 
barriers and drivers in engagement with authorities through the medium of FAGs. 
Barriers were found to concern four main issues: (1) lack of ‘risk awareness’ 
(Indicator 1); (2) reluctance to take on ‘flood responsibility’ (Indicator 11); (3) lack of 
‘risk communication’ (Indicator 3) of the complex statutory organisational workings; 
and (4) misunderstanding of perceived capabilities of communities or  ‘self efficacy’ 
(Indicator 10). On the other hand, drivers of horizontal ties were found to include: (1) 
‘risk experience’ (Indicator 3); (2) space to form a ‘analytical thinking’ (Indicator 18) 
and (3) an established ‘cohesive community’ (Indicator 15). Taking each of these 
barriers and drivers in turn the following section explores ‘risk awareness’ as a 
barrier to linking capital.  
Risk awareness (Indicator 1) 
 
All eight communities had a history of flooding, however, changes to the catchment 
area through increased development, farm drainage practices, flood defenses 
(changing path of flood water) and aging infrastructure mean that places that had 
not previously flooded in living memory experienced flooding in winter 2015. Areas 
such as Kendal and Appleby which had flooded numerous times in the past, 
included a large percentage of first time flood victims: 13 and 3 interviewees 
respectively. In addition, the episodic nature of flooding means that those who have 
not been flooded in recent years were less engaged in community/flood resilience 
groups; “I stopped going to the meetings. We had been dry for three years and I 
kind of thought it was a one off and lost interest to go to meetings” (K141). There is 
a strong correlation between the extent of the flood experience and participation 
levels in Flood Action Groups:  
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“We started to become a bit complacent I guess when they put the flood defenses 
in. We thought we were safe, we let the (group) contact information of members go 
a bit stale. Yeah, we were caught off guard but I think we’ve learned from that …. 
now we are bang up to date again with contact numbers. You could say you need to 
get your feet wet before you take action” (K138). 
 
The above evidence highlights that flood awareness of current risk has the 
propensity to fade as a consequence of reduced frequency and a false sense of 
safety brought about by new flood defenses.   
Flood responsibility (Indicator 11) 
 
Resistance to engage with higher-level ties attributed to an apparent lack of 
acceptance of new roles imposed on the community. Many residents accepted that 
they needed to be flood aware and take responsibility for individual precautionary 
measures such as using property level protection, moving their car to higher ground 
and valuable items upstairs. Beyond these measures, there was resistance to 
taking responsibility for roles formerly the sole responsibility of statutory agencies, 
project planning and management.  
 
“If they can’t help us after a flood you do start to question why the hell my pay 
packet loses a third in taxes. I am happy to help where I can but at the end of the 
day we as a community are not going to pay their wages and then go and do their 
job for them”. (K148) 
 
The above quote corroborates with Gidden’s (2013) assumption that some 
community members are opposed to the idea of taking on roles that were formerly 
the sole responsibility of the statutory agencies.  
 
‘Risk communication’ (Indicator 3) 
 
A further barrier to communities enacting ‘linking ties’ with agencies is the complex 
institutional setup seen in public sector agencies, which communities find difficult to 
communicate with. A community member in Appleby commented: 
 
“You ring them up (Council) and you either get through to a switchboard and get cut 
off or an answering machine. I can tell you one thing, they don’t make it easy for us 
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to contact them”. (K139) 
 
In addition to direct communication barriers, communities were often unaware of 
who to contact and what the exact role of agencies was in the overall picture of 
FRM. Community members were asked if they were aware of who to contact should 
they wish to offer or receive assistance during the recovery period.  Across the 8 
case-studies, 78% responded ‘no’, highlighting the extent of fragmentation within 
the existing communication structure.   
 
Unsurprisingly, the literature argues for a more joined up approach to FRM (Pitt 
Review, 2008; Bosher et al, 2009). Progress has been made within Cumbria and 
England as a whole, in particular through the implementation of the Flood Risk 
Management Act 2010. Its introduction has led the local council to act as an 
umbrella for FRM through its role as the LLFA, with the EA, and utility companies 
working alongside them (Section 7.3). Despite this movement towards a more 
unified approach, in practice the roles and responsibilities of each agency remains 
fragmented, acting as a barrier to inclusion from the community level. A member of 
the Carlisle community commented: 
 
“You don’t see them (statutory agencies) from one flood to the next. I rang the 
Environment Agency once and they said it wasn’t their issue as it wasn’t river 
flooding. I was told then to ring the council and that went nowhere. I don’t care what 
type of flood water it is, it destroys my property either way”. (C35) 
 ‘Self efficacy’ (Indicator 10) 
 
The final barrier to vertical interaction stems from a lack of understanding of 
community capacity. Greaves (2012) reiterates the need for practical defined 
community roles that have an empowering effect on the community (Giddens and 
Sutton, 2013). In a similar vein, a flood-affected resident in Kendal commented; 
 
 “But sure what can I do anyway. I’m a lady in my 60’s, I’m not exactly going to build 
a flood wall myself now, am I?”. (K145) 
 
The evidence suggests there’s a need for greater awareness of community capacity 
both by the community themselves and also how the community and agencies can 
work in parallel for mutual benefit. Keswick FAG is an example of a community 
 486 
which bridged this gap: “We as volunteers know when to step in and when to step 
out” (K145). In this instance, the community were recognised as equal members of 
the emergency team, however their role was in warning and informing residents by 
door knocking prior to the flood event. Once there was a risk to life, they were stood 
down and the emergency services took over. Clearly defined roles meant that “Toes 
were not stepped on” (K137), and once danger to life had passed the FAG could 
continue their work by supporting the community through the recovery process: 
 
 “We called ourselves the stanley knife brigade and went door to door cutting up wet 
carpets, bringing food and cups of tea, helping with donations like dry clothes. Later 
our role became more advisory and we helped with form filling and we had a base 
where people could just come for a chat”. (K143) 
 
Further instances of the community working in collaboration with authorities to help 
buttress overall resilience were cited in the interviews. Examples of communities 
and authorities sharing the same common goal included: matched funding by the 
council, drain and gulley maintenance, river gauge monitoring, warning and 
informing (flood wardens).  
Risk experience (Indicator 3) 
 
It was found that the frequency of flooding played a significant role in whether 
communities chose to engage with outside help. This section looks at settlements 
with established FAGs, however, it is important to note that other flood-affected 
communities (frequency not magnitude) chose to utilise existing connection ties 
rather than form new ones through FAGs.  For instance, in Shap, one interviewee 
commented: 
 
“It’s mainly just us on this street that got the worst of it (in Shap). We just sort it out 
between ourselves and help each other out where we can. I’m not sure they know 
we flood here because we’re not near a river ”. (S158) 
 
Case-study evidence from isolated (Shap) and low impact (Kirby Stephen) flood 
incidents revealed that residents opted to deal with the event at the local level 
themselves, rather than establish a distinct Flood Action Group: “We get our local 
councillor to fight our [Kirby Stephen] corner”. (K150) 
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At the opposite end of the scale, areas with a long, almost bi-annual flood history 
(Keswick and Carlisle) were found to have established FAGs in place.  Keswick 
FAG operated as an extra layer of support and did not view itself as a “finger 
pointing”(K151) group. By contrast, pressure groups such as Carlisle FAG emerged 
partially to lobby against a perceived breach of contract by the agencies to keep 
residents safe from flooding. 
 
The above evidence conflicts with Lichtermann’s (2009) belief that flood action is 
linked to the severity of the event. The evidence from Cumbria suggests that flood 
action will occur regardless of the severity of impact, however the form of “coming 
together”(G86), be it a formal (FAG) or informal (county councilor) flood group, is 
dependent on the severity and magnitude of the event.  
 ‘Analytical thinking’ (Indicator 18) 
 
An important finding from the interviews was the role spatial and physical ‘place’ 
plays in facilitating social interaction. Networks at the village and town scale 
commonly met in public spaces including “church”, “parish hall”, “shops” and “post 
office”. By contrast, the density of the city offered less opportunity to maintain social 
capital. “Third spaces”, where community members can meet and interact on an 
impromptu basis, were less pronounced at the city scale. This evidence may be 
attributed to why social media communities (facebook, twitter) were more common 
at the top of the settlement hierarchy. Following the flood events, many third sector 
organisations identified the need for physical places for communities to meet as a 
form of support and act as a medium through which communities can discuss the 
flooding issue: 
 
“I go down to the church for support. They were flooded too but they have a 
temporary building its called the Encouragement Cabin and I get a lot of support 
there….just a cup of tea and a chat with other who were flooded….you can get 
advice there…. many meet and discuss what can be done better in order to be in a 
better situation if God forbid it happens again” (K 120) 
 
 ‘Cohesive community’ (Indicator 15) 
 
The argument within the literature is clear: enhanced social infrastructure facilitates 
greater community capacity and, consequently improved resilience (Aldrich et al, 
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2015). Accepting that flood events are ‘acts of man’ not ‘acts of God’ (White, 1945), 
there is a clear need to understand how communities interact during these ‘social 
events’ through analysis of how they communicate, mobilise resources and plan to 
allow communities to effectively recover and reconstruct after a disaster. This 
viewpoint resonates clearly with the findings from the Cumbria communities, which 
exhibit a strong ‘social infrastructure’ to stimulate their recovery process.  Bonding 
capital was evidenced at the village scale and during low-impact events, whilst other 
communities evidenced multi-scalar ties by coming together through the medium of 
FAGs (Carlisle, Kendal, Keswick).  
 
FAGs have proven to be an efficient means for communities to self-organise and 
manage flood impacts from advance preparation through to the reconstruction 
phase. Indeed, social capital ties were found to have a temporal nature. In the 
immediate aftermath of the flood event, bonding (close friends and family) social 
capital was predominantly accessed. Particularly in rural areas where there was 
acknowledgement that the services would not arrive immediately, communities 
relied on close bonding ties to cope. However, as the immediate danger receded 
and the focus turned to recovery and reconstruction, there was greater evidence of 
bridging (organisations, third sector) and linking (authorities) ties.  
 
Beyond the direct value of FAGs in helping to reduce flood impact, they further 
serve as a valuable means of building and sustaining social capital. For example, 
FAGs were found to facilitate building expertise (skills and training, Indicator 22) 
and local community understanding of flooding and appropriateness of various flood 
alleviation mechanisms within their community. In addition, they acted as a vehicle 
to increase community participation by coming together with the common goal of 
addressing flood risk and maintaining flood memory. Regular meetings of FAGs 
illustrated in ego-centric maps (Figures 7.27-29) show that frequent group meetings 
generate higher levels of trust within the group, but also assist the community as a 
whole in “coming together” (K141). Residents commented that through the process 
of risk planning and management they felt “empowered” and that as a group they 






4.4 SNA in North-East Scotland  
 
4.4.1 SNA applied at the town scale 
 
Increased engagement amongst actors may lead to greater mobilisation of 
resources and capacities, thus potentially enhancing long-term resilient adaptation 
and recovery (Murphy et al, 2016). In addition, engaged communities are more 
likely to maintain ‘flood memory’ after the flood water fades, limiting the risk of 
complacency and reduced awareness often associated with  ‘unprecedented’ 
events (Hansen et al, 2016). 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Gephi social network visualisation of K-core >1 for “Inverurie and Garioch Flood 




Figure 4.8 Gephi visualisation of average distribution measure 1.435. ‘Inverurie and Garioch 
Flood Support’ page.  
 
On the other hand, the low degree distribution measure (1.435) is representative of 
structural holes within the network. These weaknesses are illustrated as gaps 
across the x-axis (15-18; 24-33; 35-43) in Figure 4.8. The modularity results (0.584) 
also reflect these findings by highlighting the ‘factional’ (bridging) nature of the key 
brokers. These ‘factional’ brokers are represented by node peaks across the x-axis 
in Figure 4.9, (14, 13, 19). Structural holes hinder the potential connectedness of 
the network, limiting access to information, resources and capacities. In particular, it 
reduces the potential for those least connected to receive the assistance and 
support they need to be resilient (McCann and Barlow, 2015). 
 
 
Figure 4.9 Gephi visualisation of modularity distribution measure 0.584, ‘Inverurie and 




4.3.2 Village scale SNA 
 
Key ‘brokers’ (14,13,19,3,5) operate as an important bridging channel to connect 
isolated nodes. In addition they act as a means to disseminate  ‘Flood advice’, ‘Help 
and assistance’ and ‘Donations’ which otherwise may be unattainable (Figure 4.12). 
The bridging of connections through a ‘broker’ is an important component in 
adaptive capacity building, for example by helping to engage outside knowledge 
and innovation, and preventing collapse or fragmentation of the network. As such, 
the fostering of bridging ties has the potential to galvanise existing networks by 




A balanced spread of connections was evident across the network (Figure 4.11). 
However, the Degree Distribution Graph highlights the exception of (1) ‘Donations 
and distributions’ presenting itself as a node peak on the x-axis (Figure 4.10). This 
is attributable to the fact that the node (1) acted as a network ‘broker’, encouraging 








Figure 4.11 Gephi visualisation of modularity distribution measure 0.513, ‘Inverurie and 




Figure 4.12 Gephi social network visualisation of K-core >1 for “Hope floats”. Visual 









4.5 Ego Centric Analysis in North-East Scotland 
 
Figure 4.13a Raw ego-centric data outputs from interview discourse, Aberdeen. 
 
Figure 4.13b Raw ego-centric data outputs from interview discourse, Inverurie. 
 
Figure 4.13c Raw ego-centric data outputs from interview discourse, Ballater. 
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4.5.1 City scale Ego-centric analysis 
 
The urban scale reveals a reliance on authorities (Council, SEPA) and emergency 
services (police, ambulance) for assistance. The map shown in Figure 4.14, 
highlights how information sources are drawn mostly from the social media site 
‘Fubar’ and informal communication between local businesses. As a significant 
proportion of the flooding across Aberdeen affected commercial premises, it was 
found that many businesses related to the impact sustained by other businesses. In 
particular, local businesses became a significant source of support (donations) for 
small businesses across North-East Scotland, as shown by ‘local businesses’ in 
Figure 8.30. The apparent lack of engagement at the community level is potentially 
attributable to the commercial nature of the area (non-established residential area) 
and the lack of a resilience group. 
 
Figure 4.14 also illustrates strong ‘bonding’ capital through support from family, 
however the network lacked bridging social capital. Reaffirming the nature of linking 
capital in North-East Scotland, the quote below highlights the perception of flood 
responsibility during a flooding incident:  
 
“I coped with help from family….raising valuables and putting sandbags down. After 
that we left it to the services (Council, SEPA, Emergency services) to do what they 
had to do” (A3). 
 
 




4.4.2 Town scale Ego-centric analysis 
 
The importance of social media is highlighted as a connector of nodes in the 
Inverurie ego-centric map (Figure 4.15). In the absence of a resilience group, ‘The 
Inverurie and Garoich Flood Group’ Facebook page was set up after the floods as a 
means of providing information and support, but also as a way of connecting those 
in need with available resources. This medium was also used a channel to 
disseminate information from authorities (SEPA, local authority) to the affected 
community. The map further highlights the extent of civic spirit through the 
prominent ‘donations’ node, comprising Foundation Scotland and local businesses. 
Support for home renovations was mentioned in terms of financial support from 
insurance companies but also through the relationship with builders and tradesmen.  
 
 
Figure 4.15 Ego-centric map for key actor in Inverurie Flood Support Group. 
 
 
4.4.3 Village scale Ego-centric analysis 
 
The ego-centric map in Ballater is illustrative of a close-knit community (Figure 
4.16). The floods prompted the mobilisation of a flood resilience group in its early 
stages and strong bonding capital was evident through friends and family, however 
bridging and linking capital was also present. It is apparent from Figure 4.16 that the 
resilience group acted as the catalyst for engagement with authorities as indicated 
by the black nodes (CNPA, local authority, SEPA, highways). The Church was 
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represented by a large node, indicative of its very strong influence throughout the 
recovery process. Of note was the amount of fundraising within the community 
(Charitable Chiels) which is demonstrative of the cohesive characteristic of the 
community. The presence of over 36 community groups (Community Council, 2016) 
within a population of 1,500 reaffirms the close-knit nature of the community.  
 
 




































Appendix 5: Interview question set and participation forms 
 




1. How did your household situation change as a consequence of the recent floods 
in 2015? (Relocate, extensive repairs, financial worries etc) 
 
(Note: The severity of case-specific flooding and the subsequent impact on the 
communities will be taken into account during analysis).  
 
2. How long was it before normal life resumed after the flood event? 
 
Risk awareness and responsibility 
 
3. Did you know prior to acquiring or buying your property that you lived in a flood 
risk area? 
        - If no.  At what point did you become aware of this and through what  
          mechanisms ? 
        -If yes. What made you decide to take on this risk? 
        
4. During the most recent flooding in 2015, what medium was used to communicate 
to you that there was a potential threat of flooding? 
(e.g Telephone, mobile, text, email, social media, TV, radio, local flood warden, 
word of mouth)  
            - Who informed you via this method?  
            - Were you informed formally, informally or both? 
 
(Note: Questions relating to flood alert systems will be case dependent taking into 
account the existence and structure of flood alert systems already in place)  
 
Social connections 
5. From who did you receive formal assistance in the weeks and months after the 
flood event to facilitate the restoration and resumption of normal life? 
 
6.From who did you receive informal assistance in the weeks and months after the 
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flood event to facilitate restoration and the resumption of normal life? 
 
7. Think of organisations, networks, associations that you or any of your household 
belong to. These can be both formally or informally organised groups.  
 
-How many of such groups are you or anyone in your household a member of? 
Please describe them? Did any of these groups form in a different capacity in the 
weeks and months after the flooding to assist in the recovery and reconstruction? 
(e.g clean up groups, sandbag distribution etc). Pease describe them. 
 
8. If you wanted to offer assistance during the recovery and reconstruction process 
after a flood event, do you know if there is an identifiable means of facilitating this?  
 
9. Having experienced a flooding event this year, what lessons have you learned 
and actions undertaken from the experience to make you more resilient in the 
future? 
 
10. Have you or would you be willing to pay for flood prevention measures to 
improve the resilience of your home? 
   - In your view who should be responsible for paying for such interventions? 
   - Should insurance be proactive or reactive in this regard? (E.g incentivise  
      policy holders to implement flood prevention measures through lower  




1. How long have you been living in (xxxxx) community (inclusive of moving 
property within the community) ?  
                                                                   ---- years ---- months 
Have you moved property whilst living in this community? 
 
2. How many people live in your household?          ------ adults 
                                                                                ------ school-age children 
                                                                    ------ children under 5 
 
3. Age (Tick box) 18-24  25-29  30-44  45-59  60-64  65-74  75 + 




4. Do you have any additional comments about resilience and your community that 
you wish to mention?  
 
5. Would you be willing to participate in a follow up focus group as part of this 
study? 
 














































Re: request for short interview  
 
Dear community resident,  
 
An Ulster University research project assessing the perception of resilience within 
flood-affected communities is due to take place within your community. Ulster 
University is seeking the participation of residents of your community who were 
affected by the recent flooding, to be interviewed about the perception of resilience 
within flood affected communities.  
 
The interview will take approximately 15- 20 minutes. Participants can participate 
during one of several interview sessions in your area between (insert date) and 
(insert date). Additional dates are pending and a phone interview may also be 
scheduled at your convenience.  
 
Whether or not you are willing to participate, please consider passing this notice to 
someone else living in your community who has been affected by flooding. 
 
Please contact Kate Crinion  
 Crinion-k@email.ulster.ac.uk  to learn more about how to participate.  
 






















                                   Informed Consent Form 
Semi-structured interviews 
 
Project Title: Disaster recovery and reconstruction: Harnessing capacity and  
                       improving resilience within affected communities. 
Investigator: Kate Crinion  
Supervisors: Prof Stanley McGreal, Prof Martin Haran, Dr. David McIlhatton. 
 
Invitation:  
You are being invited to take part in a research study as part of a PhD research 
programme at Ulster University, Northern Ireland. Please take time to read the 
following information carefully.   
 
Purpose:  
The purpose of this study is to evaluate communities and practitioners’ perceptions 
of resilience through an evaluation of the key dimensions of resilience currently 
existing within flood affected communities. 
Procedure: 
Your participation in this study, will entail an interview of approximately 15-20 
minutes. You will be asked a series of questions about your community, including 
what kinds of social groups you encounter, the kinds of resources available to you 
after a flood event and what actions the community took to recover after the flooding 
events.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part and you are free to withdraw at 
any time. If you decide not to finish the study, you have the right to withdraw any 
data collected about you. If you withdraw, all records of your input and participation 
will be destroyed.  
 
Confidentiality:  
All information collected for this study will be kept strictly confidential and full 
anonymity of participants will be ensured during the collection, storage and 
publication of research material in accordance with Ulster University. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results will be used in a postgraduate PhD thesis that will be held in the Library 
at Ulster University. 
 
Questions about the Study:  
If you require further information about this study, or information about the research 







Contact details for information about the research: 
 
Researcher: Kate Crinion 









Questions about the Study:  
 
If you sign below, it means that you have read (or have had read to you) the 





Participant Name (printed)  
 
______________________________________________    ______________  
Participant Signature Date    
 
______________________________________________    ______________  
































                








































Appendix 7: Case-study Context and Profiles 
 
7.1 Fintona Case-study Profile, Northern Ireland 
 
The village of Fintona sits in the townland of County Tyrone and is located within 
the Fermanagh and Omagh District Council area. The West Tyrone Area Plan 
describes Fintona as a “deprived area”, despite it being one of the three biggest 
towns in the Omagh district (Community Technical Aid, 2005). The socio-economic 
profile of Fintona described in this section discusses: population; education and 




The population of Fintona was estimated at 2,063 in 2016, of which 1,048 (50.8%) 
were male and 1,015 (49.2%) were female (NINIS, 2016). Fintona has an 
increasing ageing population where currently 16% of the current population are 
aged 65 years or above (Figure 7.1); this is projected to increase to 20% by 2025. 
71.99% of the Fintona population identify themselves as being Catholic and 26.59% 
are considered part of the 'Protestant and Other Christian religion’. Through the 
interviewing process it became apparent that the community is not homogenous 










Figure 7.1. Population profiles by broad age bands, 2016. Source: NISRA Demography 
Branch, 2016.  
 
Education and Qualifications: 
 
Census data (2011) revealed that, 51.5% of 16-64 year olds in Fintona had no 
formal qualifications (above level 1). This figure is significantly higher than the 
Northern Ireland average rate of 40.5%. Moreover, the proportion of the working 
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age population qualified to degree or higher standard (19%) does not compare 




Analysis of the population considered to be of working age (16 to 74), highlighted 
60.68% were employed and 39.32% unemployed. In total 51.92% were in paid 
employment. The annual claimant count for Fintona stood at 7.1% average in 2014 
(NINIS, 2016). 
Deprivation levels:  
The Northern Ireland Multiple Deprivation Measure (NIMDM) (2017) was used to 
provide an accurate insight into socio-economic make-up of the area. The 
deprivation measure ranks areas (Super Output Areas) from those most deprived 
(rank 1) to those least deprived (rank 890). The composite measure takes account 
of seven deprivation ‘domains’ namely: “Income, Employment, Health, Education, 
Proximity to Services, Living Environment and Crime and Disorder” (NIMDM,2017). 
Fintona was found to have an overall deprivation rank of 200 (Figure 7.2).  
 
 




Rental tenure was used to determine the economic status of the area. Housing 
Census statistics (2011) revealed that 63.78% of the majority (63.78%) of 
households were owner occupied, while 30.98% were rented.  
 
Health 
On the last Census (2011), 25.27% stated they suffered from a limiting long-term 
illness (LLTI). The areas health deprivation issue was further highlighted by the 
number of people providing unpaid care to family, standing at 10.85%.  
 
7.1.2 Fintona flood history 
 
According to a Regional Community Resilience Group (RCRG) in 2015, Fintona 
was described as receiving flooding to “a greater or lesser extent on an annual 
basis” (RCRG,2015:p66). Significant internal flooding to properties in 2011 and 
2014 led to the proposal of a £127,000 flood alleviation scheme for the village in 
2016. The extent of the flooding issue also led to Fintona being chosen as one of 
the 10 RCRG pilot studies across Northern Ireland. In partnership with the Red 
Cross, consumer council and endorsement from the Civil Contingencies NI group, 
the intention of the pilot study was to review of regional resilience. The aim of the 
group was to assist communities to do more for themselves by assisting them to 
“deliver consistent, prioritorised and focused community activities” to reduce flood 
risk (RCRG, 2015:p3). 
 
 
Figure 7.3. Flooded street in Fintona. Source: Ulster Herald, 2014. 
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7.2 East Belfast Case-study Profile 
 
Consistent with the approach taken in Appendix 7.1, this section outlines the socio-
economic profile of East Belfast outlines. It does so in relation to its: population; 




The population of three communities comprising the East Belfast study is estimated 
at 11,000 (Census, 2011). Of this population 48.05% are male and 51.95% are 
female (NISRA, 2011). The population is on an upward trend since 2010 (Census, 
2011). In relation to the three communities, 77%-81% of the East Belfast population 
identify themselves as belonging to a 'Protestant and other Christian religion’ 
community, while 5.8 - 11% identify themselves as Catholic.  
 
Education and Qualifications: 
Data from the 2012 Labour Force Survey shows that 64% of Clarawood, 43% of the 
Sydenham and 34% of Orangefield population had no or low (level 1) qualifications. 
These figures do not compare favorably with the mean rate of 27.9% across 
Northern Ireland. The percentage of the population considered as economically 
active ranged from 61% Clarawood, 69.67% Sydenham and 74.53% in Orangefield 
(Census, 2011).   
Deprivation levels: 
Despite the close proximity of the three communities along the Connswater River, 
the respective deprivation profiles varied considerably. As outlined in Appendix 7.1 
above, deprivation rankings range from the least deprived (rank 1) to most deprived 
(rank 890). Sydenham has an overall deprivation rank of 206 while Clarawood Park 





Figure 7.4 Deprivation Index maps for Sydenham, Orangefield and Clarawood. Source: 
NIMDN, 2017. 
Further, home ownership is often used to assess economic levels. Housing and 
accommodation statistics from the last census revealed that the level of owner-
occupation ranged from 58.88% to 77.83% and that between 20.52-36.98% rented. 




On the last Census in 2011, 20.43% of people in Orangefield suffered from long-
term health issues or a disability. This figure rose to 34.6% in Clarawood 
highlighting the health deprivation in the area.  
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7.2.1 Historical flooding context  
 
The River Agency (2017) estimates the East Belfast has had a recurrent flooding 
issue since the year 2000. In particular, increased development within East Belfast, 
has increased river flows leading to significant flooding in the area. Beyond surface 
water and river flooding (knock river), tidal flooding from Belfast Lough is also a 
concern. A tidal surge in January 2014 led to a near miss in the Sydenham area 
(Northern Ireland Assembly, 2016). Further, Sydenham resident have to contest 
with sewage flooding due to its proximity to the Sydenham Wastewater Pumping 
Station. In recent years failure of the pumping station has led to flooding in the area, 




7.2.2 Belfast flood history 
 
Reports of flooding in Belfast date back to the 1600s (Prior and Betts, 1990). 
Flooding in the city became more frequent in the 1900s with flooding ‘Beyond any 
like occurrence for 50 years’ (Belfast Telagraph) in 1901 and 1902. A major event in 
1916 led to widespread flooding across the city in particular the Connswater and 














Figure 7.5 Belfast Flooding, 1916. Source: Belfast Telegraph,1916. 
 
The frequency of flood incidents has increased in recent years within the city. A 
chronology of recent significant flood events illustrates the multiple flood risks 
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affecting Belfast: “rivers, surface water, sewage (wastewater treatment plant) and 
the sea” (Rivers Agency, 2015a). East Belfast continued to suffer significant flood 
events in 2005, 2007 and 2008. More recently, extreme rainfall in 2012 led to 44mm 
of rainfall in three hours (Rivers Agency, 2015a). Such was the scale of the flooding 
that 1400 households received flood relief payments53. On this occasion, flood relief 
payments were made to in excess of 1400 property owners. It was this major 
flooding that prompted the Northern Ireland Executive to commission a report by 
“Performance and Efficiency Delivery Unit” PEDU, to investigate the response to 
flooding in Northern Ireland (Rivers Agency, 2015a).  A further tidal surge hit Belfast 
in 2014 and narrowly missed severe flooding in the area. Existing flood banks and 
defences held back the surge, however evacuations were organised for the 



































                                                
53 Prior to the Homeowner Flood Protection Scheme introduced in 2015, Flood relief payments were given to 
household who suffered internal flooding to their property.  
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7.3  Cumbrian Socio-demographic Profiles  
 
An above-average aging profile, together with sustained outward migration of 
younger populations, reduces Cumbria’s resilience capacity. Literature indicates 
that the elderly demographic group its most affected by flood events (Sharkey, 
2007), revealing a significant resilience gap in the Cumbria population. A further 
weakness is the high percentage of communities (28%) lying within the 10% of the 
most deprived areas nationally. A GIS based analysis of deprivation levels within 
Environment Agency flood risk map areas (low, medium, high) revealed that 
deprived areas are more susceptible to flooding (SEPA, 2011a).  
 
Propensity to recover from flood risk is closely related to a community’s ability to 
learn new skills and knowledge (UNDP, 2012). Education levels in Cumbria were 
found to be on par with the national average, indicative of potential future learned 
resilience. However, eroding this potential is the high percentage of young people 
leaving the area for employment, typical of rural areas. A lack of timely access to 
services and resources, further depletes resilience levels in rural areas. The aging 
population negatively impacted upon the region’s health and well-being 
assessment. The above average aging demographic had a knock on effect on 
higher than average poor health and disability (20.3% of the population). 
 
Housing is a complex mix of high home ownership (indicative of established 
communities) in rural areas, positively impacting upon resilience level. By contrast, 
increasing rental tenure in urban areas (representative of transient communities) 
revealed a low sense of belonging (Miron, 1990; Leviten-Reid and Matthew, 2017). 
In particular, areas of above average deprivation in urban areas are found to be 
more susceptible to impacts of flooding (Lindley et al, 2011). The following section 





Cumbria is regarded as having an aging population profile relative to the rest of the 
UK. The 2011 Census indicates that the number of Cumbrian residents in the 65+ 
age demographic has risen faster than the national average (11%), increasing by 
15%(Table 7.1). The growing elderly population can be attributed to Cumbria’s 
popularity as a retirement destination. Within Cumbria 21,900 people reported they 
had a second address. This equates to 44 persons per 1,000 residents of the 
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county (Census, 2011), representing a higher average in relation to England & 
Wales generally (28 per 1,000) (Cumbria County Council, 2013). 
 




An investigation into vulnerable groups across Cumbria revealed that of the 
population affected, the 65+ age profile (22.2% of population), represented 63% of 
all flood victims and (CIO, 2016). As discussed in Chapter 3, elderly population 
groupings are reported as having a higher level of flood vulnerability (Sharkey, 
2007). The UN predicts that the aging population of developed countries is on an 
upward trend and those aged 60 years or above is projected to grow by 56% by 
2030 (UN, 2015).  
 
Deprivation Levels 
A report by the Institute of Environment and Sustainability Research (IESR) (2009) 
revealed a relationship between deprived areas and disproportionately higher levels 
of flooding risk. The results indicated that deprived populations (based on Index of 
Multiple Deprivation data) are 62% more likely to be at risk of flooding relative to 
those in moderately or highly affluent areas. Within Cumbria, 29 (out of 166) 
community wards are found to be within the 10% most deprived areas in England 
(Cumbria Intelligence Observatory, 2015). According to a LLFA report (2016), two of 
the five wards are reported as ‘flood hotspots’, namely ‘Belle Vue’ and Upperby 
ward in Carlisle. Cumbria county council report that both areas suffer from recurrent 
low and medium level flooding (Cumbria County Council, 2016). 
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Acknowledging the compounding effect of flooding on deprived areas, the Indices of 
Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 2015 was used as a framework to analyse the Cumbrian 
socio-economic profile. The analysis presented investigates multiple deprivation 





Education and learning is an important component of community resilience (UNDP, 
2012). Dufty (2012) highlights the importance of education in fostering community 
resilience by describing education as “well-placed to help communities build their 
resilience to flooding” through the ability to help people learn and improve as a 
result of learning.  Levels of educational attainment are an import factor to 
investigate in terms of a community’s potential future resilience. The 2011 Census 
showed that Cumbria’s education level is above the national average (27%), with 
30.9% of adults holding a level 4 or above qualification (Census, 2011). Evidence of 
disparity in the levels of educational attainment was noted, with Kendal in South 
Lakelands holding the highest rate of academic achievement with 91.7% of pupils 
gaining five A*-C grades compared to just 25.9% in some areas of Carlisle (Census, 
2011).   
 
Rurality and Accessibility  
 
According to the literature, rural area vulnerability may be increased by patterns of 
migration and rural depopulation, leaving behind those residents who are most 
vulnerable to disasters (for example the old, young, and disadvantaged/disabled) 
(IRNH, 2011).  Cumbria with an above average ageing demographic has 
heightened  vulnerability due to  a lack of access to timely outside services and 
resources. Conversely, as argued by Mercer (2010), it is the actual 
acknowledgement that ‘the cavalry’ may not arrive that can lead to the enhanced 
utilisation of local knowledge and participatory approaches to disaster management.   
According to Cumbria County Council, 54% of its residents live in rural setting 
compared to UK average of 18%. Of the 54%, Allerdale and Eden have the greatest 
proportions of residents living in rural areas (72% and 71% respectively) (CCC, 
2013). Carlisle is the county’s densest settlement however it is still 27% more rural 
than the national average (CCC, 2013). Figure 7.6 emphasises the disparity 
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between this largely rural area and its low percentage of urban settlements. 
Furthermore, the rural nature of the county explains its high “geographical barriers 
to services” score, where 84 (of 320) of the county’s (LSOAs54) rank in the 10% 
most deprived areas nationally. 
 
 
Figure 7.6. Rural Urban Classification in Cumbria. Source: CIO, 2015. 
 
 
Health and disability 
 
 
The 2011 Census reports that the proportion of Cumbrian residents limited in their 
day-to-day activities due to poor health or disability stood at 20.3%, above the 
national average of 17.9%. However, the average score for Cumbria conceals stark 
variations between districts. Health scores in the districts of Eden and South 
Lakeland were above average, whilst the Barrow district was shown to be the third 
most deprived district nationally in terms of health. In total, it was found that 61 of 
Cumbria’s LSOA (total of 320) ranked in the 10% most deprived areas in terms of 
                                                
54 A Lower Super Output Area (LSOA) is a geographic hierarchy used to present small area statistics in the UK 
Census.  
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health nationally. However Ullswater ward in Eden was the exception, ranking in the 
10% least deprived nationally in terms of health. The level of limiting illness and its 
knock-on effect on social connectedness will be qualitatively investigated in more 




In areas of high socio-economic insecurity, Oven (2009) argues that communities 
have little choice but to live in locations that are more exposed to hazards. 
Conversely, literature suggests that others chose to substitute higher exposure to 
hazards for a better quality of life including factors such as accessibility to schools 
and services (Halverson, 2010). 
 
The disparity in housing quality across Cumbria is evident in the high number of 
sub-standard rental properties, particularly in the private sector (Cumbria County 
Council, 2012). Reaffirming the above point, over 25% of private sector properties in 
the districts of Allerdale, Copeland and Eden were found to be ‘dangerous’ and  
considered Category One hazards 55  (Cumbria County Council, 2012; Allerdale 
Borough Council, 2015). According to the 2011 Census, of the 222,042 households 
across Cumbria, 18,107 (7.5%) of the properties had no usual residents compared 
to the national average of 4.4.%. It is argued that this figure is a function of the 
higher than average number of second properties used as holiday homes in the 
region. The census further highlights that 87,019 (39.2%) of properties are owned 
outright, (non-mortgaged), above the average national figure. This figure represents 
an increase of 19.3% in comparison to the previous Census and a 6.4% rise above 
the national average. 
Rental tenure across Cumbria is on par or below the national average (27.1%) with 
the exception of Carlisle city, which had a significant increase in the number of 
privately rented households. Private housing association households (social) rose 
by 4,795, equating to a proportional increase of 364.4% in comparison to the 
previous census (Census, 2011). This dramatic rise is largely attributable to an 81% 
decrease in socially (social housing organisations) rented properties, with private 
housing associations meeting the rental gap brought about by a reduced number of 
available social housing (Census, 2011). It is possible that these increased rental 
                                                
55 Category 1 hazard refers to the severity of risk posed to a potential occupant. When a property scores above 
1000 on the housing Health and Safety Rating, it is deemed a category 1 risk.  
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figures are attributed to the fact that many house owners, who were unable to sell 
their homes without incurring a financial hit (post-flood), opted to rent out their 
property after the 2009 floods. Renting out their own property while renting another 
property for themselves elsewhere partially explains the inflated rental figure in 
Carlisle.  Reiterating this thinking, the Citizen Advice Bureau (CAB) in Carlisle 
(2011) propose that increased rental tenure is directly linked to the 2009 floods. The 
CAB further reports that increased post-flooding demand pushed private rents “up 
overnight” and they continued to rise after the “situation improved”. Displacement 
after the floods significantly increased the number of private rents, however it is 
assumed that this figure remains artificially high and will reduce within a two-year 
period when flooded homeowners return to their renovated properties.   
7.4 Overview of Cumbrian case-study profiles 
 
The case-study settlements are in line with the three river catchments that comprise 
the new Cumbria Flood Action Plan (2016); Eden, Derwent and Kent and Leven 
catchment.  
7.4.1 Overview of Eden catchment case-study profile 
 
The Eden catchment Flood Management Plans state the catchment comprises 
1490 square miles and is predominately rural in nature (EA, 2009a) It has a 
population of 244,000, comprising principal settlements: Carlisle, Appleby, Penrith 
and a nearby village Eamont Bridge, all of which form part of the research case 
study. The market town of Kirkby Stephen and Shap are also included as indicated 




Figure 7.7. Map illustrating the spread of case study settlements across the Eden 
catchment. Annotated from EA, 2016. 
 
Carlisle City profile 
 
Representing the urban case study, Carlisle city is the largest metropolitan area in 
Cumbria with a population of 107,524 (Census, 2011). The industrial city is 
considered an economic hub in Northern England as a result of position at the 
confluence of three major rivers.56 Its proximity to three significant watercourses has 
however led to numerous flood events in the city. Carlisle has experienced a long 
history of widespread flooding across the city, including: 1771, 1822, 1856, 1925, 
1968, 2005 and 2009. The House of Commons Winter Flood report 2015-2016, 
described the floods as ‘unprecedented’ (House of Commons, 2016), with Eden 
river levels reaching a height of 0.6m above the highest recorded flood level in 2005 
(CCC, 2016). The January 2005 flood affected approximately 1600 properties, by 
contrast, 2125 properties were affected in 2015 - despite expenditure of £4.4 million 
on flood defences in the intervening period. The areas most affected were Warrick 
Road (St.Aidans and Botchery LSOA), Viaduct Estate and Willow Holmes (Denton 
Home and Castle LSOA) areas of the city. On the back of the 2015 flood, the 
                                                
56 Carlisle city is situated at the confluence of three rivers namely: the Eden, Caldew and Petteril. 
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Carlisle Flood Action group was established. The city presently has an AEP of 
0.59% (CCC, 2016). 
 
Appleby town profile 
 
Appleby is a market town with a population of 3,048 (Census, 2011). The River 
Eden flows through the town splitting it in two. Given its proximity to the river, the 
town has a long flood history dating back to 1571. This trend has continued in 
recent years with flood events occurring in 2005, 2009 and 2015. The severity and 
impact of the 2015 flood in Appleby was above levels previously witnessed. The EA 
report that river levels were at the highest ever recorded in the town. The number of 
properties damaged also exceeded previous years, with 176 properties affected 
compared to 4 in 2009 and 53 in 2005. The long history of flooding in Appleby 
prompted the development of structural flood defences (AEP +1%) in 1995, 
protecting part of the town (EA, 2009e). Other protection measures included 
property level protection and development of a flood action plan collaboratively with 
the Environment Agency, however the town has no formal FAG.  
 
 
Kirkby Stephen town profile  
 
Kirkby Stephen is a market town with a population of 1,804 (Census, 2011), situated 
at the head of the Eden Valley. Three watercourses flow through the town, 
explaining its long flood history dated back to 1985. More recently the town suffered 
flooding in 2009, 2013 and most significantly in 2105 (CCC,2016). The Winter 2015 
event caused internal flooding to twenty properties as a result of the run off from the 
unnamed watercourse that overwhelmed a culvert (closed drain) on the private land 
of the caravan park site. Further flood incidents across the town included the areas 
of Quarry Close, High Street and north Road (CCC, 2016). The town does not 
benefit from any structural defences or a FAG.  
 
Eamont Bridge village profile 
 
 
Eamont Bridge is a small village of 535 residents (Census, 2011) located near the 
town on Penrith. Flowing east from Ullswater lake, the River Eamont  directly 
passes many properties in the village. Bearing the name of the village, the bridge is 
the main cause of flooding. “Acting like a dam” the bridge restricts river water flow, 




During the 2009 flood event, 43 residential properties and 2 commercial properties 
were flooded in the village. This figure rose to 72 residential properties in 2015. No 
formal flood defences protect the village however, a property level protection 
scheme was implemented after the floods in 2009 (EA, 2009e; EA, 2009a). The EA 
and the local community worked together and of the 45 affected houses, 37 availed 
of funding for property level protection measures, including air brick covers and 
flood gates (Cumbria County Council, 2015).  Whilst the village has an active parish 
council engaged in flood issues, it does not have a formal FAG. 
 
Glenridding village profile 
 
Glenridding with a population of 450 residents (Census, 2011) is located within the 
Lake District National Park. Tourism is one of its main industries as a consequence 
of its unique geography. However, its location at the shores of the second largest 
lake within the Lake District, and surrounded by mountains, render the village highly 
susceptible to flooding with no structural defences. Its recent flood history includes 
1997, 2005, 2009 and 2015. The Winter 2015 event resulted in 15 properties being 
flooded and the town further suffered infrastructure and utilities disruption, rendering 
the village inaccessible for several days and without electricity, phone or mobile 
signal (CCC, 2016). The village has a very active parish council to deal with flooding 
issues however it does not have a formal FAG. 
 
Shap village profile 
 
Shap, a village of 1,264 residents (Census, 2011) is located approximately 10 miles 
south of Penrith. Much of the watercourse is culverted through Shap village. Shap 
has flooded previously in 2005 and 2010 (CCC, 2016). On the 5th of December 
2015, 25 homes and businesses were flooded in Shap (CCC, 2016). The majority of 
the properties affected were located along Main Street with lesser, more isolated 
properties in the other areas of the village affected. There are no structural 
defences in Shap, however works carried out by Network Rail are reported to have 








7.4.2 Overview of the Derwent Catchment Case-study 
The Derwent catchment is situated within North West Cumbria (Figure 7.8). It 
contains four major river systems and several lakes across a total area of 760 miles. 
There are several lakes which play a key role in the Derwent catchment, including 
Thirlmere Reservoir near the town of Keswick. Above average rainfall in the area, 
combined with the impermeable underlying geology, has led to severe run-off and 
flooding. In particular, this research will focus on the catchment market town of 
Keswick (EA,2009b). 
 
Figure 7.8. Keswick case study in Derwent catchment area. Annotated from EA, 2016. 
Keswick town Profile 
 
Keswick is a market town of approximately 5000 residents (Census, 2011), located 
immediately north of Derwent Water, and lies within the Lake District National Park 
(EA, 2009b). Owing to its popularity as a tourist destination, Keswick’s population is 
increased by the number of temporary visiting tourists. The town suffers from fluvial 
flooding from the two main watercourses running close to or through Keswick and a 
major United Utilities reservoir upstream of the town is reported to compound the 
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flooding issue (CCC, 2016). 
 
Keswick has a long flood history dating back to 1822. In the years leading up to the 
significant floods of 2005 and 2009, there was a history of recurrent flooding with a 
total of 20 individual floods detailed in the archives (EA, 2009b). In total, 175 
properties were flooded in 2005, 250 in 2009 and most recently 515 properties (the 
highest figure to date) in December 2015 (CCC,2016). As a consequence of earlier 
floods, substantial investment in flood defences have been constructed and the 
current AEP stands at 1.43% (CCC, 2016). In terms of social resilience, the FAG in 
Keswick is widely recognized in the region as being an exemplar for other 
communities to try and emulate.  
 
7.4.3 The Leven and Kent Catchment 
Similar to other two catchment areas, the Leven and Kent Catchment (Figure 7.9) is 
set within the Lake District National Park and is predominately rural (EA, 2009c). It 
also suffers from extreme rainfall run off from the fells due to its mountainous 
topography.  
 
Figure 7.9. Kendal case study within Derwent catchment. Annotated from EA, 2016. 
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Kendal town profile  
 
The market town of Kendal is the third largest settlement in Cumbria. A large 
percentage of its 30,000 residents are susceptible to flooding due to its location at 
the confluence of three rivers (EA, 2009c). Consequently the river Kent which flows 
through the town has been altered (deepening and widening) and flood defences 
erected in order to reduce risk to the town. Industrial development in designated 
floodplains further adds to the flood risk in the town. Kendal has a prolonged flood 
history dating back to the 17th century, experiencing repeat floods in 1954, 2004, 
2005, 2009 and most recently in 2015 (EA, 2009d; CCC, 2016). The town has 


























7.5 North-East Scotland Case-study context and Profiles 
 
The following section outlines the socio-economic profile of North-East Scotland. It 
does so by detailing the factors affecting a community’s resilience, such as: 
population, deprivation levels, education, rurality and accessibility, health/disability 
and housing.  




North-East Scotland’s rurality is reflected in its low population. The estimated 
population of North-East Scotland’s largest city, Aberdeen, stands at 230,350, with 
a further 261,960 residents in Aberdeenshire (National Records of Scotland, 
2016b). The population has been steadily rising over the last century, with annual 
increases of 0.5 per cent being typical (National Records of Scotland, 2016a). 
During the period 2012-14, the number of people entering North-East Scotland 
(9,652 per year) exceeded the number leaving (7,965 per year) the area (National 
Records of Scotland, 2016a).  
 
However, outside of Aberdeen city, there is a growing elderly demographic 
particularly in the smaller towns and villages (National Records of Scotland, 2016a). 
Specifically, persons aged 60 and over make up 24.1% of Aberdeenshire. Of note is 
the fact that Aberdeen’s suburb, Peterculter, has a higher elderly age profile than 
both Aberdeen city and Scotland generally. At the opposite end of the age 
demographics, 15% of Aberdeenshire’s population were aged 16 to 29 years, 
standing below the national average of 18.2%.  
 
Deprivation levels 
The Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation (SIMD) reports that the Aberdeenshire 
council area comprises 1.8% of the most deprived areas nationally. In addition, 
Aberdeen city (which sits outside Aberdeenshire Council area) comprises 7.8% of 
the most deprived areas nationally (SIMD, 2016). By contrast, a third of 
Aberdeenshire’s data zones (121) stand in the “20% overall least deprived” 
nationally (Lindley et al, 2013). The above statistics highlight the disparity in 
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deprivation levels across the Aberdeenshire council area and highlight ‘pockets’ of 
social deprivation.  On the whole, however, the residents are reported as having 
comparatively “good health” and “affluence” relative to national (Scottish) 
deprivation levels (National Records of Scotland, 2016a). 
Education 
 
Education is integral to the capacity of communities to act upon lessons learned in 
order to enhance their future resilience. The 2011 Census statistics highlighted that 
79.8% of the Aberdeenshire population had some level of qualifications (above the 
national average of 73.2%). Of these, 33.2 % were level 4 or above, which places 
Aberdeenshire above the national average of 26.1%. 
 
Access to services 
The literature demonstrates that a lack of access to services has the potential to 
restrict community resilience (Cutter, 2010). According to the SIMD (2016), access 
to services is calculated through proximity to essential services (doctor, schools, 
petrol station, post office, retail). In this regard, Aberdeenshire comprises 5% of the 
most deprived areas in Scotland for geographical access to services, reflecting the 
rural nature of the county. However, the Rural Facilities Monitor (2015) also 
highlight that the case study settlements of Garioch (Inverurie) and Marr (Ballater) 
have reportedly benefitted from an increase in key services in the period between 
2013-2015.  
Health and Disability 
 
The literature reports high levels of health have the potential to positively influence 
community resilience (Ray-Bennett, 2016). General health in Aberdeenshire was 
described as ‘very good’ by 55.4 % of the population, above the national average of 
52.5% (Census, 2011).  In addition, long-term health was described as ‘not limited’ 




The sharp population growth in Aberdeenshire as a consequence of the oil and gas 
industry has led to issues relating to the provision of housing and transport 
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infrastructure (Aberdeen City Council, 2015; Gazetteer for Scotland, 2017). 
Consequently, Aberdeenshire now holds the second highest average house price in 
Scotland (ASPC, 2016). The above average wealth in Aberdeenshire has led to an 
overall low rental tenure in the area. Of the 112,000 houses across Aberdeenshire, 
68% are owner-occupied compared to the average of 58% in Scotland (Census, 
2011). This is important as the literature notes a correlation between high resilience 




Much of the employment in Aberdeenshire is underpinned by the oil and gas sector, 
directly employing 11% of the population and having a knock-on effect on the 
services industry (PWC, 2015). However, an over-reliance on this sector of the 
economy has ultimately led to increased unemployment, with a loss of 10,000 jobs 
across the Aberdeenshire area as a consequence of the oil crash (Scottish 
Parliament, 2016). The Scottish Parliament Information Centre (Spice) report 
indicates that the number of claimants of ‘out of work benefits’ has risen by 92% in 
Aberdeenshire and 69% in Aberdeen city (Scottish Parliament, 2016). However, 
despite the economic strain of the oil crash, Aberdeenshire still holds a lower 
unemployment (claimant count) of 1.1% (Jan-march 2016) compared to the national 
average of 1.8% (Aberdeenshire Council, 2016b). 
 
7.5.2 Overview of North-East Scotland case-study areas 
As outlined in Chapter 5 (applied in Chapter 6), the case-studies selected are  
representative of the village, town and city settlement hierarchies. The unique and 
varied flood history across Aberdeenshire allowed for a spread of case-studies, 
ranging from first-time flood affected communities to those which have experienced 
recurrent flooding. Largely, the communities did not benefit from hard engineered 
flood defences, however bunds57 were present in Inverurie and Ballater. A hierarchy 
of settlements with and without resilience groups was included in order to assess 
the social connectedness and dynamics between settlements of various densities. 
The section below outlines the cultural history of the individual case-studies, 
together with their respective flood histories and flood protection plans.  
 
                                                
57 A bund is a protective embankment typically made from reinforced earth that serves to prevent flooding. 
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Aberdeen city profile 
 
Aberdeen is the third most populous city in Scotland, with an estimated population 
of 230,350 (National Records of Scotland, 2016b). The city is situated between two 
river mouths, the Dee and the Don, and comprises four main flood risk areas: 
Deeside, Bridge of Don and Denmore58 (Figure 7.10). The fourth flood risk area 
comprises the suburb of Peterculter or ‘Culter’ which is subject to significant flood 
risk as illustrated in Figure 7.11 below. Together, these four areas represent flood 
risk for 10,440 residential properties and 3,240 commercial properties 
(Aberdeenshire Council, 2016c).  
 
The Scottish House Conditions survey (2011-2013) reports above average 
(£24,700) household income levels for the region, standing at £28,800 in Aberdeen 
city and rising to £29,600 in Aberdeenshire generally. Indeed, one Aberdeen 
postcode reportedly had the second highest number of millionaires of any postcode 
in the UK (The Times, 2008). 
 
The complexity of the flooding issue in Aberdeen is exacerbated by the multiple 
potential sources of flooding (fluvial river flooding, surface water, culverted 
watercourses, sewage and coastal tidal surges). Further compounding the issue is 
the fact that much of the city’s critical infrastructure is located in at-risk areas, 
ranging from schools, healthcare and emergency services to transport links such as 
rail, roads and bridges. Specifically, 3240 of Aberdeen’s business properties are 
located in a flood plain, highlighting a significant risk to the economy (Aberdeenshire 
Council, 2016c).   
 
The Deeside area (Figure 8.4), located within the city centre, has had a recurrent 
flood history dating back to the 1970s and continuing through the 1980s. These 
flood incidents caused substantial damage to agricultural land, properties, facilities 
(such as a golf course) and critical infrastructure, including railway lines and roads 
(Aberdeenshire Council, 2016c). 
                                                
58 The village of Peterculter also lies within the boundaries of Aberdeen City Council area however due to its rural 
nature it is dealt with separately at the village scale.  
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Figure 7.10. Aberdeen flood risk area including the potentially vulnerable areas of Deeside, 
Bridge of don and Denmore.  
 
In 2000 and 2001, surface water impacted the Denmore and Bridge of Don flood 
risk areas (Figure 7.10), when floodwater exceeded the capacity of the drainage 
systems. The Bridge of Don area predominantly suffered from surface water 
flooding as a result of blockages in the drainage system and built up debris blocking 
the watercourse (Aberdeenshire Council, 2016c). This surface water flooding 
extended across large parts of the city in July 2015, when manhole covers became 
displaced by the force of the water (Aberdeenshire Council, 2016c). In December 
2015, flooding devastated homes and businesses across Aberdeen city, in 
particular Grandholm and the surrounding areas, which led to the evacuation of 
seven nearby care homes (FSHC, 2016).  
The Aberdeen suburb of Peterculter, with a population of 7,220 (Census, 2011), lies 
within the boundary of Aberdeen city council area.  Its locationon the northern banks 
of the River Dee at the confluences of the Crynoch Burn and Leuchar Burn rivers, 
has contributed to its long flood history. An estimated 380 residential properties and 
20 non-residential properties are reported in SEPA’s flood maps to be in an area at 
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risk of flooding in Peterculter (Figure 7.11). Peterculter’s recorded flood history 
dates back to 1827, when intense rainfall caused the failure of several small dams, 
resulting in the flooding of crops and the paper mill. Flooding as a consequence of 
‘blocked and inadequate drainage’ reportedly caused damage to approximately 50 
properties in 2012 as well as further flooding in winter 2015/2016 (Aberdeenshire 
Council, 2016c). Of the three case-studies considered, Peterculter in Aberdeen was 
the only community to have a Resilience Plan in place prior to winter 2015.  
 
Figure 7.11. Peterculter flood risk area. 
Whilst officially part of Aberdeen city, Perterculter has an atypical profile and is 
referred to as the “the village in a city” (Miles and Ebrey, 2017). To this end, 
Peterculter has a relatively new attachment to the city and was first incorporated 
into Aberdeen city in 2006. As such, its urban façade hides a semi- rural culture.  
The ‘ village in a city’ remains distant from the cultural institutions and amenities of 
Aberdeen city centre, with its social activities evolving around Culter Village Hall, 
Culter Mills Social club and other social/community clubs (as advertised on the 
village website). Residual village forms such as these highlight Culter’s 
geographical position as a place ‘on the edge’, with a foot firmly placed in its rural 
past.  
Inverurie town profile 
 
Inverurie is a market town located in the valley of the river Don. The town, including 
the suburb of Port Elphinstone, has a population of 12,760 (Census, 2011) rising 
17.3% since the 2001 census (Census, 2001). Situated 16 miles (26 km) north west 
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of Aberdeen, it serves as a commuter town for 30% of its inhabitants (Census, 
2011). There are approximately 230 residential and 19 business properties at risk of 
flooding from the confluence of the River Don and Urie at the southern end of the 
town (Figure 7.12). In addition to fluvial flooding, the area suffers from surface water 
flooding due to the overwhelming of culverts at the Strath Burn) and Over Burn 
(Aberdeenshire Council, 2016c). In addition, the critical infrastructure (such as the 
A96 road and the railway/line) are exposed to flooding (Aberdeenshire Council, 
2016c). 
 
Inverurie’s flood history extends back to 1768. More recently the river Don has 
caused flooding in 1995, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2009 (Aberdeenshire Council, 
2016c). On the 2nd January 2016 a total of 80 residential properties were affected in 
Inverurie, of which six were businesses (Aberdeen and Grampian Chamber of 
Commerce, 2016). At present the town has flood protection from a bund wall along 
Keithhall Road and Riverside Park. However, the structural integrity of both bunds 
were compromised as a consequence of rabbit burrows. Local businesses have 
taken it upon themselves to reinstate the bund with a hard-engineered flood wall 
along Keithhall, after negotiations with Aberdeenshire Council were deemed too 
lengthy (The Press and Journal, 2016).  
 
 
Figure 7.12. Flood risk in Inverurie from river Don and river Urie.  
 
 
Ballater village profile 
Ballater is a village located on the River Dee in Aberdeenshire and has a population 
of approximately 1,500 residents (Census, 2011). The village sits within a 4.3 
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square miles ‘potentially vulnerable area’ (Figure 7.13) and has a flood history 
extending back to the Muckle Spate in 1829 (Aberdeenshire Council, 2016c). 
 
Figure 7.13. Flood risk in Ballater from river Don.  
Flooding continued in 1877, when the village suffered basement flooding to cellars 
and road flooding in 1920 and 1929. Lower parts of the town suffered repeat floods 
in the 1980s, largely as a consequence of blocked drains which became 
overwhelmed. In 2008, surface runoff also caused internal flooding to some 
properties in the village. More recently flooding of roads and the caravan park in 
August 2014 led to the evacuation of 150 people from the site. Rainfall in December 
2015 also affected large areas of the village but not to the extent of the December 
2016 floods which affected over 300 properties and 60 businesses (Aberdeenshire 
Council, 2016c). Over 100 residents had to be evacuated from their homes and the 
area suffered significant disruption to critical infrastructure, with a section of a major 
road (A93) connecting Ballater and Balmoral Castle being washed away (Figure 
7.14). The location of critical services (police station, ambulance and fire station) 
within the flood area impacted upon the response and recovery service after the 
event. A flood risk assessment carried out in 2009 identified that approximately 200 
residential and 40 non-residential properties were at risk of flooding. Hard structural 
defences in response to this risk are limited to a bund wall near Ballater golf club.  
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Figure 7.14. Damage to A93 road connecting the villages Ballater and Braemar. Source: 

































Appendix 8: Codebook of Practitioner Level Interviews 
8.1 Codebook of practitioner level interviews, Northern Ireland. 
 
Organisation Responsibility Interview codes 
Policy-Prevention 
NI Water Strategic Flood planning P29 
DOE Tactical Flood Planning P30 
Recovery and Reconstruction 
Rivers Agency Head of operations P31 
Fermangh and Omagh 
Planning Department 
Planning officer P32 
Fermanagh and Omagh 
District Council 
Community Development Planning P33 
Rivers Agency Site Engineer  P34 
Belfast City Council Connswater Greenway Project Manager P35 
Belfast City Council Urban Development P36 
Belfast City Council Community engagement (Belfast) P37 
Fermanagh and Omagh 
District Council 
Councillor (Fintona) P38 
Emergency Management 
Met Office Flood forecasting and communicating. P39 
Rivers Agency Community Resilience P40 
Transport NI Emergency Planning Officer (EPO) P41 
Rivers Agency Flood Engineering P42 
Belfast City Council Emergency Manager P43 
Belfast City Council Resilience Forum Director P44 
Industry and Independent 
Red Cross Researcher  P45 
NI Housing Executive  Property level protection  P46 
Environmental Link  Senior policy officer P47 
Climate NI Adaptation P48 
Ulster Farmers Union Vice president P49 
Design Consultants Water engineer P50 
UpSkill Enterprises Community resilience and capacity P51 
Consumer Council RCRG community  representative P52 





8.2 Codebook of practitioner level interviews, Cumbria.  
 
Organisation Responsibility Interview codes 
(NVivo) 
Policy and prevention 
Environment Agency Asset Engineer P165 
United Utilities Head of water programme P167 
Carlisle City Council Principal planning officer P171 




Met Office Flood forecasting and communicating. P174 
Environment Agency Resilience officer P163 
Allerdale Borough  
Council 
Flood Risk Team P175 
Cumbria County Council Flood Risk Management Team P168 
Recovery and Reconstruction 
Environment Agency Asset manager P176 
Cumbria County Council Development and infrastructure planning P177 
Cumbria County Council Community planning and development P178 
Cumbria County Council Councillor P179 
Carlisle City Council Community and economic development P162 
Carlisle Churches Flood Recovery Team P164 
Cumbria CVS Flood Recovery Manager P166 
Industry and Independent 
Red Cross Community adviser P180 
Farmers Network Managing director P161 
Cumbria action for 
sustainability 
Property resilience manager P170 
National Farmers Union Vice president P169 
Property level Protection Business manager P181 







8.3 Codebook of practitioner level interviews, North-East Scotland 
 
Organisation Responsibility Interview codes (NVivo) 
Policy and Prevention 
Scottish Environment 
Protection Agency 
Flood adviser P34 
Aberdeen City Council Team Leader (Flooding and 
Coastal Protection) 
P41 
Emergency Management  
Ready Scotland Resilience co-ordinator P37 
Ready Scotland 
(Grampian) 
Grampian Resilience Adviser P33 
Met Office Regional Adviser P40 
Recovery and Reconstruction 
Adaptation Scotland Sustainable Development Officer P36 
Cairngorms National Park 
Authority 
Director of Planning and Rural 
Development  
P38 
Cairngorms National Park 
Authority 
Head of Land Management and 
Conservation 
P39 
Cairngorms National Park 
Authority 
Community Support Manager P42 
Aberdeenshire Council Infrastructure Services Director P32 
Aberdeenshire Council Principal Engineer, Flood Risk & 
Coast Protection 
P35 
Independent and Industry 
 
Sniffer Climate Resilience Project 
Coordinator 
P43 
National Farmers Union 
Scotland 
North East Regional manager P44 
Property Flood protection 
Company 
Director P45 


































Appendix 9: Lessons from the pilot study 
 
9.1 Alterations made to community level case-study questions 
 
A brief description of the significant changes to the methodology going forward are 
listed below: 
 
- The question under flooding impact altered to include more specific wording 
on ‘after’ the flood event to include ‘weeks and months after’ to ensure the 
focus is on the recovery and reconstruction phase and not on the direct 
response phase.  
- The question on social connections sequenced later as the question on 
‘formal assistance’ tended to receive a negative emotive response which 
side-tracked the interview focus. 
- The question on informal connections, organisations and associations re-
sequenced as it yielded a poor response. This can be attributed to genuine 
low engagement with the community but also some residents related 
community groups to low class areas.  “There are no community groups 
here, you have to go to low class areas for them”. Further, the proportion of 
elderly and those suffering from poor health and confined to their home, 
could also be attributed to the poor response. 
- In locations where availability of data on tenure and education level are not 
available they are included in the background questions. The reasoning for 
this is to further investigate if education levels have an affect on the capacity 
of a community to utilise lessons learned and the strength of skill and 
competency levels.  
- The strategic level questioning proved largely effective with the exception of 
community planning. Limited ‘community planning’ data may be attributed to 
Northern Ireland’s newly devolved local councils, where the community 
planning department is in an embryonic stage and requires a bedding-in 






9.2 Expert validation of data indicator results  
 
The Framework approach articulated in Chapters 4 and 5 resulted in a list of 21 
higher-level indicators (Tables 6.7 - 6.10). The research acknowledges that 
qualitative research inevitably runs the risk of encapsulating some form of research 
bias through its subjective coding process (Norris, 1997). In order to mitigate 
against this, the results were disseminated through a presentation to a group of 
statutory level participants in Belfast, in September 2016. The group comprised 16 
representatives of organisations involved in flood risk management and climate 
adaptation in Northern Ireland (Table 6.14).  
 
Table 6.14 List of organisations from which validation feedback was received 
Members of climate NI steering group in attendance 
Bryson Group 
BT Group 
Business in the Community Northern Ireland/ARENA Network 
Chartered Institute of Environmental Health 
Construction Employers Federation 
Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs (Climate 
Change) 
Department for Infrastructure (Planning) 
Institution of Civil Engineers Northern Ireland 
Northern Ireland Electricity Networks (NIEN) 
Rivers Agency 
Northern Ireland Environment Link 
Northern Ireland Local Government Association 
Northern Ireland Water 
Royal Society of Ulster Architects (RSUA) 
Ulster Farmers Union 
Ulster University 
 
Feedback from participants confirmed that the synthesised results reflected their 
overall perceptions of resilience indicators within a Belfast and Northern Ireland 
context. In particular, the feedback also noted that Phase 1 (quantitative) scores 
were useful for initiating discussions of resilience, however the contextualised 
indicator level results from Phase 2 (qualitative) were found to be the more useful in 
understanding the overall pattern of resilience performance across the two 
communities. It was agreed that Phase 2 indicator results provided a more useful 
measure of the performance of the systems, assets and functions of a community, 
which contribute to resilience. The feedback further indicated that all participants 
understood the value of the Phase 1 quantitative profiles as baselines for 
monitoring, however groups questioned whether the profiles in some way masked 
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important trends due to aggregation of results. In particular, feedback from a 
Northern Ireland Water representative, noted that the results from Phase 1 in East 
Belfast did not reflect the investment made on flood alleviation measures in the area 
in recent years, however this point was captured in the qualitative Phase 2. As 
such, going forward into the main case-study it is important to note that quantitative 
assessments may have a lagging effect (Keerthiratne et al, 2017).  
 
“I think the difficulty here (Phase 1 results) is that a lot of important, community 











































Appendix 10: Framework component charts for Northern Ireland case-
studies59 
 
10.1 Risk component 
 
                                                











































































Appendix 11: Age distribution of interview sample, Cumbria. 
 
 












































Appendix 12: Component indicators sheets, Cumbria 
 




































































































































Appendix 14: Dissemination of PhD work 
 
14.1 Publications and conference papers 
 
▪ Bouncing forward- The development of a theoretical framework to enhance 
transformational resilience within a post-disaster context. Institute of Hazard Risk 
and Dealing with Disasters Conference, Durham, 22 September, 2017.  
 
▪ Wet Behind the Ears: The Impact of Planning and Development on Flood 
Resilience. A Case-Study from Cumbria. UK-Ireland Planning Research Conference 
(PRC2017), Belfast, 13 September, 2017. 
 
▪ Findings from a theoretical framework to enhance transformational resilience 
within a post-flooding context. SRA-E conference, Lisbon 19-21 June, 2017. 
 
▪ Community Level Resilience. Perspectives from flood affected communities in 
Northern Ireland, Conference and workshop, University of Reykjavik, Iceland, May 
2017. 
 
▪ Unlocking transformational Resilience in the aftermath of a Flood Disaster: A Case 
Study from Cumbria. World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology. 
International Journal of Geological and Environmental Engineering Vol: 4, No:5, 
2017. Amsterdam, May, 2017. (Peer reviewed) 
 
▪ StreetSpaces from a post-earthquake city, Yushu, China. StreetSpace exhibition, 
PLACE, Belfast, April, 2017. 
 
▪ Bouncing forward after the rain- An Investigation into Perceptions of Community 
Resilience after the 2015 Winter Floods in Cumbria. Flood and Coast Conference, 
Telford, March (2017). 
 
▪ Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction: Harnessing Capacity and Improving 
Resilience within Flood Affected Communities. Research Graduate School, Annual 
PhD Conference, Ulster University, Belfast, Poster Presentation, March, 2016. 
 
▪ Facing the future, Octasynthesis as a systems approach to the U.N. Sustainable 
Development Goals. Centre for Human Resilience and Environmental Change 
(CECHR). Delegate contribution (2016). 
 
▪ Role of urban design and masterplanning in responding to Climate Change. 
Institute of Civil Engineers (ICE), Northern Ireland, September, 2016. 
 
 
14.2 Funding and Awards 
 
▪ Awarded British Council funding to participate in “Renaturing cities-Theories, 
strategies and Methodologies” workshop, Goianaia Brazil, 10-13th July 2017. 
 
▪ Scholarship to present at SRA-Europe Conference; New challenges, new threats: 





▪ Best paper presentation award: Findings from a theoretical framework to enhance 
transformational resilience within a post-flooding context. SRA-E conference, Lisbon 
19-21 June, 2017. 
 
▪ Scholarship to attend workshop on ‘Resilience and crisis management in the 
context of welfare states’, University of Reykjavik, Iceland, May 2017. 
 
▪ Scholarship to present at ‘Disaster Management’ Conference, Wessex Institute, 
Amsterdam, May 2017. 
 
▪ Best paper presentation award: “Unlocking transformational Resilience in the 
aftermath of a Flood Disaster: A Case Study from Cumbria”. Disaster Management 
Conference, Wessex Institute, Amsterdam, May 2017. 
 
▪ Awarded funding to present at ‘Flood and Coast Conference’, Telford, March 
2017. 
 
▪ Best Poster award at the Research Graduate School Annual PhD Conference 
Award, Ulster University, March, 2017. 
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